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Summary  
This study focuses on the history of the Muslim Students’ Society of Nigeria (MSSN) and its 
involvement in the religious change among “Yoruba Muslims” in Southwest Nigeria from 1954 
to 2014. It posits that the notion of being a “good Muslim” has changed significantly, especially 
among Western educated Yoruba Muslims since the colonial period and that the MSSN not 
only play a key role in this change but also represent this change. The main questions that guide 
the study are thus, how has the MSSN contributed to religious change and the ways of being 
Muslim in Yorubaland and how is the MSSN itself subject to change? The study argues that 
central to this change is the fact that the MSSN developed from a religiously affiliated students’ 
club into an Islamic reform movement. This includes its own fragmentation caused by different 
discourses that shape its reform as well as to the foundation of other Islamic movements who 
promoted ways of being Muslim that both intersect and differ from the position of MSSN. To 
understand this change, the study, on the one hand, describes how the MSSN became involved 
in wider religious changes among Yoruba Muslims. On the other hand, it illustrates how social 
changes due to Christianization, colonialization, the formation of the nation-state, socio-
economic change, and transnational Islamic movements shaped the self-definitions and 
practices of the MSSN as well as its transformation to a reform movement. 
The study adopts a multidisciplinary approach largely situated in the fields of history, religious 
studies and anthropology. This approach is reflected in the type of sources and methods 
employed which include fieldwork, archival study, and analysis of literature. The conceptual 
framework of the study is based on the notion of Islam as a “discursive tradition” and its 
interlinkages with the concepts of “Islamic reform,” “religious change,” and “Christian-
Muslim encounters.” These additional concepts not only help to understand discursive 
traditions as fragmented but also give voice to the different actors and dynamic positions 
involved. The study draws on a wide range of literature on these analytical frames, and at the 
same time, it contributes to this literature. 
The study has four central results: firstly, it notes that the reasons for the formation of the 
MSSN in 1954 are closely linked to the Yoruba Muslims’ encounter with Christianization and 
the social change that was facilitated by colonialization since the mid-nineteenth century. To 
illustrate this, the study explores the history of Yoruba Muslims and their experiences up to the 
1950s when the MSSN was founded. A major aspect of their history is how they negotiated 
their religious identities over the schools that were established or managed by Christian 
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missions and instructors in order to be part of the new economic and political systems created 
by the British colonialists. Many young Muslims who were affected by the decisions of their 
parents also got involved in this negotiation following their encounters in the schools. While 
the encounter motivated the formation of MSSN by students and the way its objectives were 
promoted in Nigeria, the students also aimed to promote a way of life that fits into their 
changing world. 
By 1954 when the MSSN was founded, the Yoruba Muslim communities had been diversified 
and fragmented by a number of debates on Islam, which were often in relation to the activities 
of Christian missions and the colonial government. These debates involved clerics of the 
Qur’anic schools and religious movements like the Ahmadiyya and Young Ansar-Ud-Deen 
Society (later Ansar-Ud-Deen Society), and the outcomes of the debates shaped what being a 
good Muslim meant for many Yoruba Muslims. A few of these debates emphasised the non-
adoption of prophetic traditions (sunna) that were deemed less suitable in the Yoruba social 
context, the use of Yoruba and English during mosque sermons, the public participation of 
women in religious and secular life, the enrolment of Muslims in Christian mission schools, 
and the employment of Muslims in colonial service. The knowledge of a good Muslim from 
this broader perspective also informed the understanding of Islam of the students who formed 
the MSSN, and for many years, this knowledge, in turn, shaped their social lives and the 
activities of the MSSN as an organisation. Over time, while the MSSN upheld many aspects of 
this notion of Islam, it nevertheless contested some of the fundamental positions in which the 
understanding of the religion is embedded. The emphasis on the adoption of prophetic 
traditions as the definition of what it meant to be a good Muslim was generally at the centre of 
this contest.  
Secondly, the study discovers that reform in the MSSN was inspired by historical and 
epistemological developments that were not only connected to the Yoruba Muslim 
communities but also the globalized Muslim world. The historical developments relate to the 
link between the MSSN and transnational Islamic movements such as the International Islamic 
Federation of Students Organisation (IIFSO), the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) 
and the Muslim Brotherhood as well as the emergence of graduate students who studied abroad 
and in local Qur’anic schools. On the other hand, the epistemological development relates to 
the emphasis on proof based on the Qur’an and the Hadith, and on a different interpretation of 
prophetic traditions. These developments paved way for critical discourses on Islam and the 
MSSN practices as well as the revival of the prophetic traditions. But while the discourses 
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shaped new ways of being Muslim in the MSSN, they also inspired its factionalisation by the 
1990s. 
Thirdly, the study points out that despite the quest for reform, the Islamic discursive tradition 
in MSSN was neither uniform nor reducible to a fixed understanding of Islam among its 
members. Rather different existential and social realities in Yorubaland and Nigeria forced the 
MSSN to construct its ideals of reform on interpretations of Islam that emphasised 
“moderation,” “tolerance,” “flexibility,” and a “gradual” embodiment of Islam. This reflected 
in the MSSN’s non-rigidity to ethics like veiling and its promotion of popular culture in 
Nigeria. Generally, the MSSN’s interpretations of Islam encouraged a great deal of diversity 
in the religious and social lives of members and further added to the diversity of Yoruba 
Muslims. 
Fourthly, the study reveals that the MSSN is involved in the transmission of Islamic knowledge 
and posits that its involvement is one of the ways in which the ‘classical’ Islamic education has 
changed in Yoruba society and the Muslim world. The transformation of Islamic education 
shows evidence of objectification and functionalisation of Islam which reflect in new forms 
and subjects that are taught to Muslim students. It also reveals some epistemological variations 
from the esoteric to the exoteric paradigm of knowledge transmission. The new forms of 
education introduced by the MSSN include the Islamic Vacation Course (IVC), the gendered 
Brothers’ Forum and Sisters’ Circle and the Leadership Training Programme (LTP) which are 
not only used to teach Islamic knowledge but also socio-economic skills. Although the MSSN 
method of learning appears to challenge the pedagogy and epistemology of the ‘classical’ 
Qur’anic schools, the new forms, however, show continuities in various ways with these 
Qur’anic schools. Thus, this study argues that the new forms of Islamic education are a part of 
MSSN’s contribution to religious knowledge production in contemporary Yoruba Muslim 
society, and to their religious change as a whole. 
In general, the study demonstrates the manifold contributions of MSSN to religious change and 
new ways of being Muslim, which include the formation of national and transnational Muslim 
organizations, revival of sunna, introduction of new forms of religious education and the 
production of new Muslim elite. Overall, the case study presented in this study helps to 
understand how the confluence of local contingencies and global entanglements contribute to 
processes of religious change. 
4 
 
 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.1 The study 
On the 5th of February 2013, a fourteen year old female pupil named Aisha Alabi of Kadara 
Junior High School Lagos was flogged many times in the presence of the school’s staff and 
pupils by her principal, Mrs. E. C. Ukpaka, for wearing the ḥijāb (headscarf/veil) outside the 
restricted hours.2 In schools owned by the Lagos State government, the ḥijāb was approved for 
use only during Islamic Religious Knowledge (IRK) class and the Muslim noon prayers. The 
ban, according to government, was issued to “preserve the secular nature of the institutions” 
and to ensure uniformity in schools’ dress.3 Aisha was aware of this restriction. On that day, 
however, she attended the IRK class and according to her teacher forgot to remove it before 
she was apprehended by the principal.4 Like other people present, Aisha’s teacher, Mr. Abdur-
Raheem Adekoya who taught the IRK, watched furiously as she was subjected to this 
humiliation but was helpless to stop the Principal.5 Barely two weeks following this incident, 
on February 20, the principal of another Lagos school, Mrs Elizabeth Omidele of Mafoluku 
Senior Secondary School,  harassed a ḥijāb-wearing pupil, Bareerah Tajudeen, on her way to 
school. Like Aisha, Bareerah was also aware of the restriction on the headscarf. Therefore, she 
only wore it from home and removed it just before entering school (and wore it again on her 
way home after school). However, according to press releases, the principal who protested that 
this violated the school uniform seized Bareerah’s veil, threw it on the ground and trod on it.6 
The two incidents infuriated the Lagos Muslim community and led to an altercation between 
them and the government of the state. With the support of Mr. Adekoya who narrated his 
account to the Muslim community, they decried the problem of “hijabophobia” in all 
 
2 Many reports claimed she was beaten 43 times. See Abdur-Rasheed Abubakar, Hijab and the Nigerian Press 
(Lagos: Rawshield PR Company, 2016), 6; Sahara Reporters, “Group calls on Governor Fashola to end 
discrimination and ill-treatment of Muslim women and girls in Lagos State,”, 
http://saharareporters.com/2013/03/20/group-calls-governor-fashola-end-discrimination-and-ill-treatment-
muslim-women-and-girls (accessed January 12, 2019).  
3 Onozure Dania, “Appeal Court Lifts Ban on Hijab in Lagos Public Schools,” Vanguards, July 21, 2016, 
https://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/07/appeal-court-lifts-ban-hijab-lagos-public-schools/ (accessed 
December 13, 2018). 
4 Adekoya Abdur-Raheem, interview by Adeyemi Balogun, January 30, 2017, Yaba, Lagos; Abubakar, Hijab 
and the Nigerian Press, 6. 
5 Adekoya Abdur-Raheem, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
6 PressTV, “Hijab Controversy in Lagos: INfocus,”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W0Ir44fNEBw 
(accessed January 12, 2019). 
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educational institutions and the fear of “Islamization” which was articulated by many 
Christians on the incidents.7 A major actor in the encounter was the students’ movement, the 
Muslim Students’ Society of Nigeria (MSSN, generally known in Nigeria as ‘MSS’ but also 
referred to as the ‘Society’ by its members), established in 1954. On February 28, 2013, MSSN 
mobilised hundreds of students who protested at the Lagos State governor’s office over the 
harassment of their members. They held banners and placards which expressed their grievances 
with inscriptions such as “My Hijab, My Right” and “What is wrong with the Hijab?” They 
also called for the resignation of both principals on allegations of “child abuse and human rights 
violation.”8 Later in the year, the MSSN contested government’s ban on the headscarf in court. 
In 2014, a High Court judge upheld the ban while an Appeal Court overturned it in 2016.9 
Aisha and Bareerah’s punishments and the reactions they stimulated are products of two 
interdependent historical experiences of the diverse Yoruba groups in Nigeria, who identified 
with Islam, also referred to as “Yoruba Muslims” by many scholars (including by T.G.O. 
Gbadamosi, Stefan Reichmuth, and J.D.Y. Peel).10 The first is the religious change which is 
noticed in how they embraced Islam and practised the religion up to recent times. Primarily 
connected to this change is the second experience, which is their response to the social 
transformation that started with Christianization and colonization in the nineteenth century and 
continued into the postcolonial nation-state today. At a broader level, this study is about these 
historical experiences. However, rather than “Yoruba Muslims” in general, the study focuses 
specifically on the MSSN, a nationwide Muslim movement in Nigeria, and its role in religious 
change in present day Yorubaland. This is not to suggest that the MSSN represents the whole 
“Yoruba Muslims” experience nor restricted to Yorubaland, but the history of the movement 
(and how it became involved in the veil crisis) is largely interwoven into experiences and 
definitions of being a Muslim in contemporary Yoruba society. This study thus aims to 
reconstruct the history of MSSN in the context of the “Yoruba Muslims” experience, and, to 
an extent the experience of other Muslims in Nigeria. 
 
7 Abubakar, Hijab and the Nigerian Press, 8–19. 
8 Ibid; PressTV, “Hijab Controversy in Lagos”. 
9 The Lagos government challenged this judgment at the Supreme Court in 2017. See Dania, “Appeal Court lifts ban 
on Hijab in Lagos public schools.”; Ramon Oladimeji, “Lagos Takes Hijab Case to Supreme Court,” Punch, 
February 7, 2017, https://punchng.com/lagos-takes-hijab-case-supreme-court/ (accessed January 17, 2019). 
10 See T.G.O. Gbadamosi, The Growth of Islam among the Yoruba, 1841-1908, London: Longman, 1978. xiii; Stefan 
Reichmuth, “Education and the Growth of Religious Associations among Yoruba Muslims: the Ansar-Ud-Deen 
Society of Nigeria,” Journal of Religion in Africa 26, no. 4 (1996); O. M. Opeloye, “The Yoruba Muslims’ 
Cultural Identity Question,” Ilorin Journal of Religious Studies, (IJOURELS) 1, no. 2 (2011); J. D. Y. Peel, 
Christianity, Islam and Oriṣa-religion: Three Traditions in Comparison and Interaction, (Oakland, California: 
University of California Press, 2016), 158–60. 
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More specifically, the study is about the change in the notion of a “good Muslim” in Yoruba 
context. Tracing the history of the MSSN from 1954 to 2014, it shows how on the one hand 
the MSSN takes part in the formation and transformations of religious identities and moral 
selves, as well as in wider religious changes among the “Yoruba Muslims.” On the other hand, 
it demonstrates how transformations of social realities due to Christian missions, colonial rule, 
the formation of the nation-state and transnational Islam feed back into the self-definitions, 
objectives and practices of the MSSN as a Muslim organisation and its transition into a reform 
movement with a global perspective. The role of the MSSN in this change of ways about a 
“good Muslim” has been underscored by Peel in his work on the religious change and historical 
encounters between “Yoruba Muslims,” Christians and Òrìṣà (deities) devotees.11 Peel argues 
that the identity of “Yoruba Muslims” has changed since the colonial period which is noticed 
in their rejection of so-called syncretism and the pro-British Ahmadiyya movement, founded 
in 1889 by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad in India and introduced in Lagos in 1916. In turn, the 
“Yoruba Muslims” moved “closer to the orthodox Sunni mainstream”12 and adopted an 
alternative concept of modernity from Muslims in the Middle East, which thereby reduced their 
differences from Muslims in Northern Nigeria. For Peel, “no Muslim organisation registered 
these changes over the course of the 1970s so closely as the Muslim Students Society (MSS).”13 
In this study, I argue that this understanding of “Yoruba Muslim” history and the MSSN by 
Peel is problematic. My contention is based on his implicit assumption that the MSSN 
represents the experience of an idealised “Yoruba Muslim,” and “Yoruba Islam,” which I take 
up in the next section. Also, it is problematic to conceive of the MSSN as an organization that 
represents all “Yoruba Muslims” because of the danger of overlooking those who hold a 
divergent, albeit similar, interpretation of Islam from the movement, for instance, the Sufi14 
brothers. Another problem in Peel’s argument, related to the first, is the essentialised notion of 
“orthodox Sunni” ideals which “Yoruba Muslims” and the MSSN are said to have adopted. 
Again, this is misleading because it does not consider the multiple interpretations of Islam and 
the diversity among Muslims, not only in Yoruba society but in other parts of the world. 
Therefore, while this present study builds on Peel’s work, it nevertheless offers a critique of 
his argument. 
 
11 J. D. Y. Peel, Christianity, Islam and Oriṣa-Religion: Three Traditions in Comparison and Interaction 
(Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2016). 
12 Ibid., 157–59. 
13 Ibid., 159. 
14 Sufi is also called taṣawwuf in Arabic referring to mysticism 
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In addition to Peel, the studies by Gbadamosi and Reichmuth are also connected to this 
religious change among the “Yoruba Muslims.” Gbadamosi’s study focuses on the Islamization 
in Yorubaland, tracing the process from the mid-nineteenth century to the first decade of the 
twentieth century.15 Generally, his work provides a useful background to understanding the 
historical experience that led to the formation of the MSSN in 1954. Reichmuth’s study, on the 
other hand, looks beyond the first decade of the twentieth century and unveils how “Yoruba 
Muslims” dealt with the social changes that were brought about by colonization and 
Christianization. As an illustration, he used the Ansar-Ud-deen Society, established in 1923, to 
show how they employed religious associations to promote education and Islamic reform in 
order to cope with some of the aspects of these changes, such as conversion to Christianity. 
The MSSN, as this study will demonstrate, is another form of association that was established 
to deal with other aspects of these changes that are specifically related to Muslim students. This 
study is, therefore, also aimed at contributing to these existing studies on religious change of 
“Yoruba Muslims.”  
The main argument in this dissertation is that there has been a change in how Islam is portrayed 
and articulated by a significant number of “Yoruba Muslims” since the colonial period and that 
the MSSN plays a key role in this transformation. Central to this argument is that the MSSN 
also transformed into a movement that focuses on reform and revival of Muslim traditions in 
the past and helped to shape what is understood as a “good Muslim” for many students. 
Although founded as an organisation of students/pupils, the history of the MSSN goes beyond 
that of students wanting to reassure themselves as Muslims in a Christian/secular school 
system. It is also about its own change to a movement of reform that turned away from many 
of its initial objectives and interpretation of Islam in the wider “Yoruba Muslim” society where 
it was established. Besides, the MSSN activities and contributions are about negotiations and 
transformations of Muslim identities and practices, including beliefs, religious rituals, manners 
of dressing, the notion of a youth/student, associational life, and inter- and intra-group relations 
within the wider context of the Muslims in Nigeria and beyond. In addition, the history of 
MSSN is about its contribution to the changing methods and episteme of Islamic education in 
Nigeria. 
The MSSN contribution further draws attention to some of the ways in which “Yoruba 
Muslims” engaged Christianity, from the early years of Christian missions, and dealt with the 
 
15 Gbadamosi, The Growth of Islam among the Yoruba, 1841-1908. 
8 
 
legacies of colonial rule. The history of the MSSN also shows why this engagement caused a 
shift in the lived religion of everyday life of many Western educated Muslims in Yoruba society 
and in Nigeria. At the same time, it helps us to understand the different efforts made to define 
and negotiate “Islam” and how these efforts are entangled with wider socio-political 
transformations and power relations. The notion of “being a good Muslim” in the title of this 
study refers to these efforts which I consider to be inspired by the consciousness of Islam 
among Muslim students and aimed at shaping and transmitting ‘Islamic’ ideals in non-Muslim 
settings. It also refers to the identification with Islam and the preservation of this religious 
identity without disregarding the moral values of the social context of the students and the 
modern world. These efforts and the conditions that gave rise to them are important to 
understanding what it means to be a “good Muslim” in the MSSN. 
In making my argument, I depart from Peel’s understanding of religious change among the 
“Yoruba Muslims.” Instead, I build on Talal Asad’s argument on the importance of 
approaching Islam as a “discursive tradition.”16 Taking Islam as a discursive tradition, as Asad 
contends, helps us to think of multiple interpretations of Islam and ways of being Muslims that 
aspire to uniformity on Islamic traditions in various historical times and settings among 
Muslims. This conception of Islam is crucial for this study because it suggests that while there 
has been a change in how Islam is defined and represented by many “Yoruba Muslims” and 
the MSSN, the idea of a “good Muslim” or “Sunni orthodoxy” is neither fixed by one actor nor 
limited to a specific point in their history but is rather an ongoing debate by many agents. 
Accordingly, I argue that the leading members of the MSSN and the Society as a movement 
are part of the agents involved in this debate. 
In addition to my understanding of Islam as a discursive tradition, I will analyse the role of the 
MSSN in the religious transformation of “Yoruba Muslims” with the help of a conceptual 
framework that focuses on the processes of “Islamic reform,” “religious change,” and 
“Christian-Muslim encounter,” and shows their individual contribution to understanding 
religious transformations as well as their linkages. My understanding of conceptual framework 
is based on Joseph Maxwell’s definition as “primarily a conception or model of what is out 
there that you plan to study, and of what is going on with these things and why—a tentative 
theory of the phenomena that you are investigating.”17 Based on this definition, I consider 
 
16 Talal Asad, The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam, Occasional Papers Series (Washington D.C.: Center for 
Contemporary Arab Studies, 1986), 14. 
17 Joseph A. Maxwell, Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach, 2.ed. 41 (Thousand Oaks, 
Calif.: SAGE, 2005), 39. 
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“Islamic reform,” “religious change” and “Christian-Muslim encounter” as theory-driven terms 
for the description and analysis of empirical processes and events that help to clarify the role 
of MSSN in “Yoruba Muslim” religious change. Islamic reform, religious change and 
Christian-Muslim encounter are the central concepts I developed based on my empirical 
research data and the literature review, and I take them to be framing ‘the things that are going 
on’ in the history of the MSSN since 1954. Through a wide range of literature on these terms, 
I will show in this study that understanding Islam as a discursive tradition also implies an 
understanding of Islamic reform, religious change and Christian-Muslim encounter as 
interrelated discursive fields. Taken together they provide an understanding of the role of 
MSSN regarding the transformation of practices and identities of many Western educated 
“Yoruba Muslims.” 
To further understand the MSSN as an important object of religious and historical study in 
Nigeria, I wish to draw attention to how the Society connects with these points: the 
contemporary forms of “religious organisation” and the concept of “religion,” the link between 
youth and religion, and the interaction between religious movements and the nation-state. 
Starting with the first point, the MSSN can be understood as an organisational framework of 
Western educated Muslims that illustrates one of the new forms of religiosity which began in 
the second half of the nineteenth century among the “Yoruba Muslims.” The history of the 
Society is therefore important to understanding the role of religious organisation in the 
conceptualisation of “religion.” Many studies show that “religion” is a contested term, as the 
attempt to define it usually leads to the creation of boundaries on what is “in” and “out” of its 
frame.18 Attempting to define “religion” is beyond the scope of my study. Nonetheless, without 
implying a universal definition, I consider it to be discursively constructed based on the ways 
people talk about and relate to what they understood variously as the supernatural and sacred. 
Meredith McGuire argues that one of the modern characteristics of religion is “institutional 
specialisation” in which there is a standardised doctrine, specialists with religious 
responsibilities, and an organisation that ensures uniformity of rituals, facilitates group 
teachings and coordinates programmes.19 When comparing this argument to the MSSN, it can 
be said that the Society as an organisation has clearly defined objectives and mission statement, 
administrative units, personnel with varying duties, structured educational programmes and 
 
18 Meredith B. McGuire, Religion: The Social Context, 5th ed. (Illinois: Waveland Press, Inc., 2002), 1–14; 
Robin Horton, “A Definition of Religion, and Its Uses,” The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of 
Great Britain and Ireland 90, no. 2 (1960): 201. 
19 McGuire, Religion, 99. 
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social activities, all of which are coded in a constitution. By showing the history of the MSSN, 
this study demonstrates one of the ways in which modern Muslim religious practices developed 
as well as their organisational structures and why the practices and structures are changing.  
Also, the experiences of the members of MSSN is useful in understanding the relationship 
between Islam and the youth. Many studies have shown that the focus on the youth is important 
because they helped to communicate new expressions and orientations of Islam.20 As Marloes 
Janson argues in the case of Tabligh Jama’at, a reform movement founded in India in 1926, the 
new expressions of Islam are represented “in terms of age and generation” and they could be 
in the form of conversion from a cultural interpretation of Islam to more modern 
interpretations.21 Focusing on the youth is also significant because, as Janson points out, the 
concept of “youth” is modern and what it means to be a “youth” remains largely controversial.22 
The history of MSSN further reveals the complexity of making sense of the term. It shows that 
while a ‘youth’ is generally understood to be a ‘student’ and defined in terms of an age category 
in Nigeria, the MSSN departs from this conceptualisation. Instead, it adopts a contentious idea 
of a ‘student,’ which is less restricted to age, as the definition of a Muslim. The history of the 
Society thus shows that members have their ideas of what it means to be Muslim youth in ways 
that challenge the meanings of the two categories among other Nigerian religious groups. 
Also, the history of MSSN sheds light on the interaction between religious movements and the 
nation-state. To an extent, the MSSN is also a ‘movement’ that seeks change of state policies 
that go against its interpretation of Islam. My understanding of the MSSN as a movement 
borrows from the social movement scholars, Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani, who are 
of the view that we can identify three distinctive features of movements: their involvement in 
conflictual relations with clearly identified opponents, linkage by informal networks, and a 
distinct collective identity which unites its members.23 According to Simone Flynn, movements 
are also assumed to be voluntary organisations that employ collective action to make or block 
 
20 See Marloes Janson, Islam, Youth, and Modernity in the Gambia: The Tablighi Jamaʿat Volume 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Adeline Masquelier and Benjamin F. Soares, eds., Muslim 
Youth and the 9/11 Generation (Santa Fe: School for Advanced Research Press; Albuquerque: University of 
New Mexico Press, 2016); Asef Bayat and Linda Herrera, eds., Being Young and Muslim: New Cultural 
Politics in the Global South and North (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Abdoulaye 
Sounaye, “Irwo Sunnance Yan-No! 1: Youth Claiming, Contesting and Transforming Salafism,” Islamic 
Africa 6, 1-2 (2015). 
21 Janson, Islam, Youth, and Modernity in The Gambia, 14. 
22 Ibid., 15. 
23 Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani, Social Movements: An Introduction, 2nd ed. (Malden, Mass., 
Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 20. Emphasis in italics mine 
 
11 
 
changes in society, and whose interest is in group goals rather than individual goals.24 As a 
movement, the MSSN is a voluntary association of students who have commonalities such as 
religion and education, and its members are opposed to certain government policies that affect 
the expression of their religiosity, as illustrated in the veil crisis. Among its stated objectives is 
to fight for student religious rights and protest government policies that are considered to affect 
the public. But beyond fighting for the rights of Muslim students, the history of MSSN also 
illustrates that government policies have also shaped some aspects of its own change such as 
Islamic education.  
In the same vein, the MSSN is an interesting case study for recognising one of the efforts to 
strengthen the ties between the culturally diverse Nigerian groups.25 Since the colonial period, 
the wide diversity of Nigerians, coupled with their competing interests, has led to a situation 
where three major ethnic groups, Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo, are suspicious of one another, from 
fear of domination over power and economic resources. This resulted in a recurrent political 
instability and a series of violent ethnic conflicts, including a civil war in the first decades of 
Nigeria’s independence.26 The suspicion between different ethnic groups often affect their 
relationships on religious practices such as their disagreement over religious public holidays 
and the implementation of Sharia. To deal with the problem of fear of domination in Nigeria, 
the MSSN promotes the importance of brotherhood in Islam of all Muslim students in Nigeria 
and encouraged them to be united regardless of their cultural diversities and political 
affiliations. However, despite promoting national unity, the MSSN relationship with the 
Nigerian state has not always been consistent. For instance, while the Society has opposed the 
government over its constitution, it has nevertheless encouraged active participation of 
Muslims in public life and democratic governance. 
 
24 Simone I. Flynn, “New Social Movement Theory,” in Theories of Social Movements, ed. Editors of Salem 
Press, 88–98 (California: Salem Press, 2011), 88–89. Emphasis in italics mine 
25 Several policies have been made in this regard, among which are state creation, federal character principle, 
and national youth service. For detailed discussions on these policies, see Adiele E. Afigbo and Toyin Falola, 
eds., Nigerian History, Politics and Affairs: The Collected Essays of Adiele Afigbo (Trenton, NJ: Africa 
World, 2005), 423–36; Richard L. Sklar, “Unity or Regionalism: The Nationalities Question,” in Crafting the 
New Nigeria: Confronting the Challenges, ed. Robert I. Rotberg, 39–59 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publisher, 2004), 39–59; R. T. Akinyele, “States Creation in Nigeria: The Willink Report in Retrospect,” 
African Studies Review 39, no. 2 (1996); Yemi Balogun, “Why Youth Service in Nigeria: The Contests and 
Agitations in 1972-1973,” Journal of Pan African Studies 7, no. 8 (2015). 
26 Toyin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, A History of Nigeria (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), 8; Jean Herskovits, “One Nigeria,” Foreign Affairs 51, no. 2 (1973): 392–3. Some of the most detailed 
studies of ethnicity in Nigeria are Okwudiba Nnoli, Ethnic Politics in Nigeria (Enugu: Fourth Dimension 
publisher, 1978) and Onigu Otite, Ethnic Pluralism and Ethnicity in Nigeria (Ibadan, Nigeria: Shaneson, 
1990). 
 
12 
 
By encouraging Muslims to seek appointment in public offices, the Society also sets itself apart 
from many Islamic groups such as the Boko Haram in Northeast Nigeria that has taken up arms 
against the government. The group, whose name, Boko Haram, translated as “Western 
education is forbidden,”27 has been inspired by the traditions of the Salafis (followers of pious 
predecessors regarded as al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ) while emphasising a jihadi (violence) worldview.28 
From 2004, the founder of the group, Muhammad Yusuf (1970-2009), spoke against the need 
for Muslims to acquire Western education and work for the government, a position that was 
opposed by his teacher, Ja’far Mahmud Adam, as counterproductive for the Muslims goal to 
fight their Western enemy. Yusuf also rejected the legal system of Nigeria and other institutions 
of the nation-state such as the police and the judiciary. Since 2003, the argument of the group 
steadily turned into violent clashes with the Nigerian government, from attacking police 
stations and carrying out suicide bombings (of markets, churches and mosques) to kidnapping 
women and taking over towns and villages.29 While the MSSN has positioned itself differently 
from the Boko Haram, its own history specifically reveals that an Islamic movement can work 
with a non-Muslim nation-state system despite having contradictory visions with that state. In 
the next section, I wish to clarify how I use the term, “Yoruba Muslim.” I will also provide a 
short narration of the aspect of religious change among “Yoruba Muslims” in order to show 
the continuities and discontinuities of their history in the MSSN as well as the MSSN history 
in Nigeria. 
1.2 The MSSN in Yoruba Muslims experiences: forms of Islam, education, and 
associational life  
The term “Yoruba Muslim” is controversial among those who identify with Islam in 
Yorubaland, and, this controversy is related to my critique of Peel’s work. For many Western 
educated Muslims in Yorubaland, the term does not describe their “proper” identity because it 
suggests to them that a person is first a ‘Yoruba,’ a  so-called “Traditionalist” in practice, before 
 
27 The group was initially called ahl al-sunna wa-l-jama'a wa-l hijra (the people of the Sunna (of the prophet) 
and the community (of Muslims) as well as (those who accept the obligation) to emigrate. See Roman 
Loimeier, “Boko Haram: The Development of a Militant Religious Movement in Nigeria,” Africa Spectrum 
47, 2-3 (2012): 151. At various times, it was also called Yusufiyya, Taliban, and eventually, Boko Haram. 
The name Boko Haram which derives from its argument against Western education is sometimes translated 
erroneously as "Western education is sin." See Abimbola Adesoji, “The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic 
Revivalism in Nigeria,” Africa Spectrum 45, no. 2 (2010): 99–100. The new name of the group Ahl al-Sunna 
li-l-Daʿwa wa-l-jihād (Salafis for Proselytisation and Jihad) is reflected in a recent study by Alexander 
Thurston, Salafism in Nigeria: Islam, Preaching, and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2016), 193.  
28 Thurston, Salafism in Nigeria, 193–96. 
29 Roman Loimeier, “Boko Haram: The Development of a Militant Religious Movement in Nigeria,” Africa 
Spectrum 47, 2-3 (2012): 149–52; Thurston, Salafism in Nigeria, 202–18. 
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he is a ‘Muslim.’30 Here, I used the term “Traditionalist” to refer to a Yoruba who identifies 
with cultural practices and beliefs which many Yoruba Muslims and Christians call 
“Traditional Religion.”31 Given the debate around the term, I discovered that Gbadamosi, 
Reichmuth, and Peel do not clarify why they use the term, “Yoruba Muslims” - in their studies. 
However, in his comparative analysis of indigenous culture and Islam, Peel seems to employ 
the concept together with another term, “Yoruba Islam,” to imply ‘tolerant’ and ‘peaceful’ 
Muslims and form of Islam in contrast to what is noticed among Muslims in Northern Nigeria. 
In one instance, where he commented on a young Muslim of Yoruba origin, Michael 
Adebolajo, who hacked a soldier to death with a cleaver in London in 2013, Peel argues that, 
The bitter irony of his having adopted a violently jihadist form of Islam is that 
Yoruba Islam is not at all like this. In Yorubaland, Islam and Christianity, although 
rivals, coexist peaceably within a framework of shared community values, in 
marked contrast to the situation in Northern Nigeria, where a jihadist tradition has 
contributed to a pattern of endemic religious violence whose most recent 
manifestation is the militant Islamist organization known as Boko Haram.32 
On the contrary, the arguments in many studies show that this is an oversimplifying way of 
categorising Muslims and forms of Islam. Rüdiger Seesemann argues that such categorisation 
can be linked to the colonial image of ‘African Islam’ which suggests “contaminated,” 
“syncretist,” or “malleable” Islam as a deviation from the “original,” “violent,” and “Arab’ 
Islam.33 This dichotomous view is problematic because it denies change and diversity of Islam 
as a religious tradition as well as Muslim identities. My work will present such cases of change 
and diversity and thus shows the danger of this dichotomy. Contrary to Peel, “Yoruba Muslim” 
is used in the study simply to refer to the diverse ‘Yoruba group’ who identify with Islam and 
whose identifications have changed over time in relation to religious and social changes in 
Yorubaland, Nigeria and the Muslim world.34 Importantly, it is employed to draw attention to 
Muslims whose experiences differ, but intersect, the Hausa and Fulani who have been the 
subject of numerous studies on Islam in Nigeria.35 As is the case with the Hausa and Fulani, 
 
30 Afis Oladosu, interview by Adeyemi Balogun, April 2016 - January 2017, Ibadan.  
31 As I will show in Chapter Four, the cultural practices of the Yoruba were not framed as ‘religion’ before the 
arrival of Christian missions in the 1840s. However, I am using the term “Traditional Religion” to show what 
those cultural practices are now called.  
32 See Peel, Christianity, Islam and Oriṣa-religion, 2. Emphasis mine 
33 Rüdiger Seesemann, The Divine Flood: Ibrāhīm Niasse and the Roots of a Twentieth-Century Sufi Revival 
(New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 11–12. 
34 The word ‘Yoruba’ is sometimes difficult to use to describe the people because the diverse nationalities in 
the region do not agree in their identification with the term. In chapter Three, I will draw attention to this 
difficulty and why the word came to be used to create a sense of unity among them.    
35 Such studies include Lovejoy, Slavery, Commerce and Production in the Sokoto Caliphate of West Africa; 
Roman Loimeier, Islamic Reform and Political Change in Northern Nigeria (Illinois: Northwestern 
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Yoruba Muslims follow Sunni tradition and the Maliki school of jurisprudence. They are also 
a largely diverse Muslim community which reflects not only in their everyday practices but 
also religious organisations and orientations about Islam. 
Patrick Ryan and Gbadamosi’s studies reveal that many Yoruba had become Muslims by the 
nineteenth century.36 As they embraced the religion, their practices were shaped by Islamic 
traditions taught by clerics of different orientations, who they called alfa/alufa, many of who 
operated as itinerant preachers and Imams (called lemọmu), in mosques and teachers in 
Qur’anic schools.37 The different orientations of the alfas ensured that the Yoruba Muslims 
grew as a diverse religious communities in the colonial period. Apart from Islam, studies by J. 
F. Ade Ajayi and Peel showed that the arrival of Christian missionaries from the 1840s onwards 
also led to a religious transformation in Yoruba communities.38 The missionaries established 
schools which offered education alongside the gospel to win souls for Christ and promote 
‘civilisation’ based on European ideals. 
Even though the schools encouraged many people to convert to Christianity, it was the 
influence of colonial rule that facilitated it. Education was required for employment in the 
colonial service, acquisition of modern professional skills, and access to new hierarchies of 
power. As Peel rightly pointed out, education was seen by many Yoruba as a form of Ọlaju 
(‘enlightenment’ or ‘civilisation’) and a means to enable progress in the society owing to its 
link to the new opportunities created by colonization.39 Islam was also understood as Ọlaju, 
but, for many Yoruba Muslims, it offered a way of life which was less ‘western’ than the one 
Christian missions promoted.40 For many Yoruba, the term ‘western’ refers to the ways of life, 
education, language and system of government, among others, that are associated with 
 
University Press, 1997); Murray Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, Ibadan history series (London: Longman, 
1977); Elisha P. Renne, Veils, Turbans, and Islamic Reform in Northern Nigeria (Bloomington Indiana: 
Indiana University Press, 2018); Ostien, Philip, Jamila Nasir and Franz Kogelman, eds., Comparative 
Perspectives on Sharia in Nigeria (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 2005) 
36 Patrick J. Ryan, Imale: Yoruba Participation in the Muslim Tradition: A study of Clerical Piety (Missoula, 
Montana: Scholars Press, 1978), 104–17; Gbadamosi, The Growth of Islam among the Yoruba, 22–39. 
37The Qur’anic school, where Arabic literacy and various subjects on Islam are taught, is understood to mean 
madrasa by many Yoruba. This is why I use Qur’anic school and madrasa interchangeably in this study. See 
ʼLai Olurode, Glimpses of Madrasa from Africa (Lagos: Islamic Network for Development, 2009), 52–53. 
38 J. F. A. Ajayi, Christian Missions in Nigeria, 1841-1891: The Making of the New Elite (London: Longmans, 
1965); J. D. Y. Peel, “Religious Change in Yorubaland,” Africa 37, no. 03 (1967). 
39 J. D. Y. Peel, “Ọlaju: A Yoruba Concept of Development,” The Journal of Development Studies 14, no. 2 
(2007). 
40 Stefan Reichmuth, “Education and the Growth of Religious Associations among Yoruba Muslims: The 
Ansar-Ud-Deen Society of Nigeria,” Journal of Religion in Africa 26, no. 4 (1996): 366. 
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European civilization.41 They also see the schools established by the Christian missionaries as 
part of what constitutes the ‘western.’42 My usage of the term, “Western education,” in this 
study is informed by this assumption. 
Western education and colonization presented challenges as well as opportunities for the 
Muslims, and how they reconciled with the situation impacted on why their self-understanding 
and practices as Muslims changed. Many parents enrolled their children in the mission schools 
(some of whom converted to Christianity), while the majority showed antipathy towards them. 
In the 1890s, the colonial government addressed this antipathy among the Lagos Muslims and 
facilitated the establishment of the first set of institutions designated as “Government Muslim 
schools” between 1896 and 1899.43 Unlike the Qur’anic type, they were schools that offered 
both Western (e.g. the 3Rs, English, Geography and History)44 and Islamic teachings. Although 
they received financial support from the government, the management of these schools was in 
the hands of the Muslims. 
Over time, these schools produced Western educated Muslim elite.45 But, despite the higher 
number of Muslims in the population, Muslim members of the educated elite were few 
compared to Christians. Worried by the huge gap and their disadvantaged position, the Muslim 
elite began to promote Western education in many Muslim communities. In 1916, some of 
them invited the Ahmadiyya Movement-in-Islam to Lagos for this objective.46 In this period, 
the movement was at the forefront of promoting Western education as part of its programmes 
of Islamic reform in Muslim societies of Africa. Some other young Muslims were also inspired 
by the importance of Western education in reform, and, in 1923, they formed the Young Ansar-
Ud-Deen Society (now Ansar-Ud-Deen Society).47 Like the Ahmadiyya, the Ansar-Ud-Deen 
and other movements established during the colonial period, focused primarily on providing 
 
41 Michael Omolewa, “Traditional African Modes of Education: Their Relevance in the Modern World,” 
International Review of Education 53, 5-6 (2007): 594; Muhib O. Opeloye, “The Yoruba Muslims’ Cultural 
Identity Question,” Ilorin Journal of Religious Studies, (IJOURELS) 1, no. 2 (2011): 3. 
42 Opeloye, “The Yoruba Muslims’ Cultural Identity Question”: 3. 
43 G. O. Gbadamosi, “The Establishment of Western Education Among Muslims in Nigeria, 1896-1926,” 
Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria 4, no. 1 (1967): 107. 
44 Ibid., 110. 
45 Reichmuth, “Education and the Growth of Religious Associations among Yoruba Muslims”: 370–1. 
46 Ibid., 371. For a history of how the movement was founded, see John H. Hanson, “Jihad and the Ahmadiyya 
Muslim Community: Nonviolent Efforts to Promote Islam in the Contemporary World,” Nova Religio: The 
Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions 11, no. 2 (November 2007): 77–86 
47 Reichmuth, “Education and the Growth of Religious Associations among Yoruba Muslims”: 372–5. 
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access to Western education among Muslims.48 In addition, they promoted some reforms which 
inspired new practices such as the use of elective officers and written constitutions for socio-
religious activities as well as the adoption of English and Yoruba for the khuṭba (sermon) 
during Friday prayers, thereby adding to the diversity of Yoruba Muslims.49  
The operation of the Qur’anic schools and their alfas was challenged by the popularity of these 
western-style Muslim schools. Many Qur’anic schools adjusted to the new social order by 
borrowing from the pedagogies of the Western schools. Sakariyau Aliyu’s study of these 
madrasas showed that this was started in 1938 by an itinerant Ilorin scholar in Lagos, Shaykh 
Kamalud-deen Al-Adaby (1907-2005).50 Despite the criticism of many alfas against his 
innovation, Al-Adaby’s school witnessed large enrolment and became one of the leading 
institutions of modern Islamic education in Yorubaland. The madrasas that adopted the 
western-style pedagogies like the Al-Adaby’s model later produced students who became 
teachers and leaders in the MSSN from the 1960s. 
Besides religion and education, there were changes in other aspects of Yoruba Muslims social 
lives from the nineteenth century. The changes were in associational life in areas like 
recreation, religion, occupation, education and politics.51 A number of Muslims belonged to 
the non-religious associations that emerged in this period, but they also had religiously 
exclusive ones for themselves. One of the most successful in terms of members was the Killa 
Society (c.1895) which propagated mutual-help and modernisation of Muslim life and 
festivities.52 The establishment of MSSN was part of this growing associational colonial life, 
and, like the Ahmadiyya and Ansar-Ud-Deen, it symbolised a specific effort to promote some 
objectives in light of the prevailing social changes. 
However, unlike other founders of Muslim associations, those of the MSSN were mainly 
secondary school students. What led to the formation of MSSN was their encounter with a 
 
48 Other groups founded in the colonial period were the Jama'at-ul-Islamiyya (est. 1924), Zumratul-Islamiyya 
Society of Lagos (est. 1926) and Isabatudeen Society of Ibadan (est. 1958). See Ishaq O. Oloyede, “Islam in 
Nigeria: A Century of National Islamic Societies,” Journal of Islam in Nigeria 1, no. 1 (2015); Gbadamosi, 
“The Establishment of Western Education among Muslims in Nigeria, 1896-1926”. 
49 Reichmuth, “Education and the Growth of Religious Associations among Yoruba Muslims”: 367. 
50 Sakariyau A. Aliyu, “Transmission of Learning in Modern Ilorin: A History of Islamic Education, 1897-
2012,” (PhD Thesis, Leiden University, 2015), 113–27. 
51 The specific dates when most of these associations were established are not known. For those reported in the 
newspapers, see Nozomi Sawada, “The Educated Elite and Associational Life in Early Lagos Newspapers: In 
Search of Unity for the Progress of Society,” (PhD Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2011), 98–108; Philip 
S. Zachernuk, Colonial Subjects: An African Intelligentsia and Atlantic Ideas (Charlottesville, Va.: 
University Press of Virginia, 2000), 53. 
52 Reichmuth, “Education and the Growth of Religious Associations among Yoruba Muslims”: 370. 
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Christian way of life and an understanding of religion in the schools owned by missionaries 
and the government in Lagos. Students in these schools received lessons from the Bible and 
also participated in socio-religious activities organised by associations like the Students 
Christian Movement (SCM) founded in Nigeria in 1940. While these schools facilitated the 
study of the Christian faith, Muslim students were concerned about not having opportunity to 
learn about their own religion. Dawud Noibi contends that the inability of many of them to 
attend a madrasa in this period further posed a limitation to their knowledge of Islam.53 These 
students were also worried that they had no associational platform for social activities that 
promoted their own religious tradition. 54 
Lateef Adegbite (1933-2012) of King’s College and Tajudeen Aromashodu of Methodist Boys 
High School were among the students who expressed these concerns.55 While Adegbite 
discussed with his friends about the need to have a platform similar to the SCM for Muslims, 
Aromashodu discovered a group named Muslim Students Society (est. 1923) in Burma (now 
Myanmar) in a monthly magazine of the Ahmadiyya, The Islamic Review.56 Following 
correspondence with Burma, the texts on the activities of the group were sent to Aromashodu 
and used to develop the objectives of MSSN when it was established in 1954.57 In addition to 
the Burmese influence, the Ahmadiyya also contributed to the formation of the ideals of MSSN, 
even though the Society later severed ties with the Ahmadis.58 Also, the growth of the MSSN 
was supported by most Muslim organisations and prominent individuals, including politicians 
and market chiefs, in Yorubaland and Northern Nigeria. They encouraged their children to join 
the Society and provided financial and material aids during the Society’s activities. This 
support provides an important insight into the relationship between the MSSN and the Muslim 
community in Nigeria.59  
 
53 D. O. S. Noibi, Yoruba Muslim Youth and Christian-Sponsored Education (Ijebu-Ode: Shebiotimo 
Publications, 1987), 17. 
54 Prof. Saidat and Prof. Fathi Mabadeje, interview by Adeyemi Balogun, May 22, 2016, UNILAG Mosque 
Akoka Lagos. 
55Adegbite, who is a prominent figure in this study, was a great-grandson of a Sierra Leonean recaptive. He 
rose to become an academic, a minister and Secretary of the highest Islamic body in Nigeria, National 
Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (NSCIA). See Musa A. Adedayo, Abdul-Lateef Adegbite: A Life for the 
People (Lagos: WEPCOM Publishers Ltd., 2006), 11–35. 
56 More details is given on the magazine in Chapter One. MSSN UNILAG, “Embryonic Stage of Muslim 
Students' Society of Nigeria,” Ash-Shabaab (The Youth) Pen, 2004, http://www.mssnlagos.net (accessed 
November 14, 2015). 
57 MSSN UNILAG, “Embryonic Stage of Muslim Students' Society of Nigeria”. 
58 Peter B. Clarke and Ian Linden, Islam in Modern Nigeria: A Study of a Muslim Community in a Post-
Independence State, 1960-1983, (Mainz: Grünewald, 1984), 49–50. 
59 Prof. Saidat and Prof. Fathi Mabadeje, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
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Generally, in Nigeria, the postcolonial period witnessed a series of contestations by Muslims 
against the British colonial legacies. Of major interest, as Peter Clarke and Ian Linden pointed 
out, was a rise in national organisations which considered Islamic belief and practice as viable 
alternatives to the nation-state.60 Adegbite, the first national President of the MSSN articulated 
this in the ideals of Muslim brotherhood. He was also of the view that the brotherhood would 
help to tackle the problem of ethnicity that was, from his point of view, created by 
colonialism.61 This idea saw the MSSN spread from its Lagos base to other parts of Nigeria in 
less than a decade, and in the late 1960s connected to students in Africa and other parts of the 
world. In this period, the membership base of the Society also grew from secondary schools to 
tertiary institutions, and over time it included academics, medical doctors, engineers and 
artisans.  
The MSSN also promoted an objective that sought to defend the interests and rights of Muslim 
students. In many cases, it went beyond Muslim students’ interests by protesting perceived 
marginalisation of Muslims in politics, corruption and the non-adoption of Sharia in 
Yorubaland.62 But, despite challenging the postcolonial system, there were also concerns that 
Muslims could take advantage of various opportunities it offered such as education and 
appointment into public services. This was considered in the MSSN as a measure to solve the 
disparity between Muslims and Christians in educational attainments and social status. 
Over time, while protesting the postcolonial order and trying to provide alternatives to 
educational and communal life, the understanding of Islam in the MSSN and the practices of 
students also underwent major changes. In the 1980s, the MSSN promoted a series of reforms 
that challenged the Ahmadis, Sufi orders and some Yoruba cultural practices such as kneeling 
and prostration to greet elderly people. In addition, the Society revived some traditions of Islam 
from the past and stressed the importance of the ways of life of Prophet Muhammad and his 
companions, known as the sunna. These efforts to “reform” and “revive” prophetic traditions 
shaped new identities and practices among students which, for instance, were symbolised in 
keeping beards and wearing ankle-length trousers by the males and veiling by the females. 
Indeed, many Yoruba Muslims were aware of many aspects of these “prophetic models” before 
this period, but they were either considered to be voluntary acts or less suitable in their context 
unlike the MSSN.  
 
60 Clarke and Linden, Islam in Modern Nigeria, 81–90. 
61 Lateef O. Adegbite, “The Role of MSSN: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow,” The Muezzin (1975), 6–8. 
62 Ishaq Kunle Sanni, interview by Adeyemi Balogun, May 9, 2016, Bodija, Ibadan. 
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The MSSN emphasis on the reform and revival of the sunna in the 1980s deepened its own 
transformation as a reform movement. This transformation was inspired by many transnational 
revivalist movements such as the International Islamic Federation of Students Organisation 
(IIFSO) founded in Germany in 1969 and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) 
established in Saudi Arabia in 1972.63 The success of the 1979 revolution in Iran was also an 
inspiration for many students. In addition to these movements, the revival was produced from 
the teachings of scholars who studied in countries such as Kuwait, Egypt and the United 
Kingdom and those who graduated from local madrasas. But while the discourses facilitated 
knowledge production, it also led to the factionalisation of the Society. In the 1990s, most of 
these factions left the MSSN to establish their societies, thereby adding to the diversity of 
Muslim groups in Yorubaland. The most prominent of the newly founded organisations are 
The Muslim Congress (TMC) (estb. 1994), the Dawah Front (estb. 1996), the Tijaniyya Muslim 
Students Association of Nigeria (TIMSAN) (estb. c.1990) and various groups who identified 
as Salafis. 
Although it was anchored on the notion of sunna, the reform in the MSSN showed ‘diversity’ 
rather than a fixed practice nor a single interpretation of this concept. I used diversity in this 
context to mean multiple and often contradictory ways in which what is understood as sunna 
is portrayed. Many factors gave rise to this diversity in the MSSN, among which was the 
concern that the knowledge of Islam cannot be fully comprehended at once. There was also 
opposition by many parents and guardians of Muslim students to practices such as veiling, due 
to “hijabophobia” in public establishments as the veil crisis above shows. These challenges 
inspired the leaders of the MSSN to promote notions of Islam that emphasised moderation, 
tolerance, flexibility, multiple authorities and an acknowledgement of the social realities of 
Yorubaland and Nigeria in general. 
The transformation of MSSN and its contribution to religious change were also observed in the 
method of religious knowledge transmission. The Society introduced several forms of learning 
that combined the pedagogies and epistemes of modern schools, the Qur’anic schools and the 
ideals of Muslim modernist thinkers such as Hassan Al-Banna (1906-1949). These forms of 
learning facilitated what Dale Eickelman refers to as “objectification” of religion, whereby 
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‘Islam’ is made a separate object of study in relation to other subjects.64 They also led to what 
Gregory Starrett called “functionalisation” of religion which refers to the process of making 
Islam work for socio-economic and political ends.65 The Islamic education in MSSN, promoted 
through platforms like the Islamic Vacation Course (IVC) and Usrah (family in Arabic, but 
referred to as the learning circle in the MSSN), emphasised Qur’an memorisation and a wide 
range of knowledge focusing on spirituality, gender, leadership skills, politics, and 
entrepreneurship considered to be necessary for being Muslim in modern society. As will be 
shown in this study, these forms of learning illustrate the changes in Islamic education of many 
Western educated Muslims in Yorubaland. With this brief description of the Islamization of 
Yoruba Muslims and its link to the MSSN, I wish to give a short review of studies about the 
MSSN and draw attention to the importance of research on the Society in Nigeria. 
1.3 The MSSN in studies of Muslims in Nigeria 
The significance of researching on the MSSN cannot be ignored as many studies have 
highlighted the involvement of the Society not only in the religious change of the Muslim elite 
in Nigeria but also in the socio-political history of the country. To avoid repetition, I wish to 
note that the study by Peel which underscores the role of the MSSN in Yoruba Muslims’ 
religious change, referred to earlier, is one of these studies. Apart from this, there is a study by 
Clarke and Linden which describes Islam in modern Nigeria and shows the various ways 
Muslims grapple with the post-independence state.66 As mentioned earlier, these include the 
formation of national organisations of which the MSSN is one. Clarke and Linden also 
emphasise the role of MSSN in the emergence of “Islamic fundamentalism” in Nigeria from 
the late 1970s which is mostly expressed in the contest against the country’s constitution in 
place of the Sharia and the opposition to Western education.67 Several publications have also 
demonstrated that some aspects of Muslim-Christian encounters have contributed to political 
instability and religious crisis in Nigeria.68 Don Ohadike in one of these studies argues that the 
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MSSN is one of the movements responsible for this volatility in the 1980s.69 He buttresses his 
argument with examples of the MSSN clash with a Christian preacher in Kaduna in 1987 and 
its protest against a church cross overlooking the mosque at the University of Ibadan in 1986. 
Some studies have also revealed that the crises that grappled the state in Nigeria are motivated 
by the failure of political leadership, corruption and economic recession which led many people 
to identify more with religion than the state.70 Within the context of tertiary institutions, 
Ebenezer Obadare argues that religiosity has been accentuated because the economic crisis of 
the 1980s led to decay in educational infrastructures and restriction of bursaries to students.71 
This allowed many religious groups an opportunity to fill the void, typically in a very 
competitive manner. The MSSN, according to him, provided this support for Muslim students 
by encouraging piety and actively guiding against the advances of Christian groups seeking to 
convert its members. Besides the effect of economic crisis, Obadare calls attention to the view 
that the students’ religiosity is embedded in the process of modernity which includes the 
university system. What is more, is that students’ religiosity is also an indication of the rapid 
transformation of youth identity.72  
The agency of MSSN has also been identified in researches on new Islamic reform movements 
in Nigeria.73 One of the most prominent and well-researched is the Yan Izala (Society for the 
Removal of Innovation and Reinstatement of Tradition) founded in 1978 in Jos. Ousmane Kane 
demonstrated in his study of this movement that the MSSN provided the platform for many 
students who identified with it outside the schools. Together with Yan Izala, these students 
criticised the Sufi orders and advocated a return to Prophetic traditions. Also, Kane contends 
that many reform movements in Northern Nigeria are splinter groups of the MSSN. A well-
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known one is the pro-Shi’a Muslim Brothers (later Islamic Movement of Nigeria [IMN]) led 
by Ibrahim El-Zakzaky, a former member of MSSN.74  
The reference to the MSSN in these studies confirms its importance in the modern-day religious 
history of Nigeria. However, it is curious to note that there has been no major research on the 
Society and how it links up with contemporary Nigeria’s religious history. As a matter of fact, 
except Ohadike, and Clarke and Linden who used two paragraphs, the history of the Society is 
only in one paragraph in each of the studies mentioned above, which includes the work of Peel. 
This excludes the few references often made to it on other issues discussed by the authors. But 
in the absence of a major research, I found two publications on two different aspects of the 
history of the Society. The first is Saheed Ahmad Rufai’s work in 2011 on the experiences of 
students that gave rise to the MSSN.75 Rufai argues that the MSSN was founded because of the 
“persecution” of Muslims in mission schools. This persecution, according to him, was in 
discriminatory practices which included not allowing Muslim students to practice their religion 
and requesting them to convert to Christianity before enrolment.76 As I will show later, this 
argument is inadequate to explain why the MSSN was founded. The second work is by 
Abdullahi Adamu Sulaiman and Aminu Mu’allimu Kambari in 2014 which only discusses the 
recurring challenges, which include finance, of the MSSN in one of its Area Units located in 
Nasarawa State.77  
Besides these publications, others are mainly undergraduate and graduate projects. The most 
recent from the year 2016 is the doctoral thesis of Mufutau Bello which explores the activities 
of MSSN inspired schools and a credit scheme in Ekiti. Bello argues that the schools helped to 
mould the religious identities of students, while the credit scheme facilitated mutual support 
among Muslims.78 There is also a master’s project by Rasheed Asimiyu (2011) on the causes 
of conflicts in the MSSN from the 1980s.79 The study notes the factors responsible for the 
conflict which include differences in the interpretation of Islamic texts and leadership tussle. 
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Another MA project by Muhammadu-Thani Muhammadu-Mukhtar in 2006 examines the 
impact of Al-Banna’s writing on the reform in MSSN. The study argues that the litany, called 
Al-Ma’thurat, produced by Al-Banna was influential in the “spiritual development” of MSSN 
members because it was used to discourage the use of charms among them.80  
Some BA essays have also focused on the annual activities of MSSN outside the schools. The 
main activities in this regard are the village da’wa (invitation/propagation) and hospital 
visitation which take place in many communities such as Ibadan, Lagos and Kwara.81 Another 
interesting essay is the one by Sherifa Bankole on the role of the MSSN in the ethical formation 
of students. In the essay, she notes that the attitude of many Muslims is affected by 
“modernisation,” “Western fashion,” “media,” and “inferiority complex” and that the MSSN 
aims to inspire good morals by guiding students on how to manage these concerns.82  
I consider these researches very useful, but they are not enough. In fact, some arguments in 
them are also misleading. For instance, Ohadike, who based his argument on the non-tolerant 
posture of students in Northern Nigeria, claimed that the MSSN was “most active” in the North 
in the 1980s and thus, more active than in the South.83 This is a narrow way of analysing the 
MSSN because it suggests that activism only corresponds to protest and displays of anger. It 
will also be mistaken to follow the argument of Rufai that the MSSN was founded because of 
the persecution of Muslims. Although he acknowledged that there were other factors that led 
to its formation, his study however remained silent on these factors.84 This theory of 
persecution, still widely held in the MSSN and among many Yoruba Muslims, is also 
reproduced by Kane in his study.85 As this thesis will show, this theory is inadequate because 
it excludes other important reasons for the founding of the MSSN like the need for Islamic 
education and enjoyable social activities in that period.  
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This study does not only argue for the need to address these misconceptions, it is also aimed at 
situating the history of MSSN in the studies of Muslims in Nigeria. Specifically, it seeks to 
contribute to the existing literature in many fields that are related to these Muslims. First, it 
adds to studies on religious change among Yoruba Muslims. To achieve this, it draws attention 
to how Western educated Yoruba Muslims facilitated the revitalisation of traditions of Muslims 
in the past while they sought to remain attuned with current realities. Second, it adds to studies 
on Christian-Muslim encounters with a focus on Yoruba society. Specifically, it situates the 
role of young Muslims in this encounter and shows the co-constitution of religious identities 
and traditions in and through these encounters. Third, the thesis contributes to studies of Islamic 
reform. Using the case of MSSN, it draws attention to the conception of reform in the MSSN 
and the way it was inspired and produced. Also, it will show how reform was propagated by 
the MSSN and trace the changes it produced both in the MSSN and Yorubaland. Fourth, this 
study also connects to the literature on the impact of the colonialization on Muslim societies. 
As a movement formed in the colonial period, the study illustrates that the establishment of the 
MSSN is one of the ways the Muslims in Yorubaland dealt with the legacies of colonial rule. 
1.4 Arguments and questions  
This research is guided by the assumption that the MSSN has contributed to the change in the 
idea of a “good Muslim,” especially among the Western educated Muslims in Yoruba society. 
The MSSN did not only help to mediate this change, it also became an object of this change by 
transforming into a reform movement. One of the aims of this thesis is to trace the history of 
the MSSN to better understand this religious change among Yoruba Muslims. It analyses the 
main objectives for which the MSSN was founded, the way they were applied in many 
activities from the beginning and why they shifted over time. The study also explores the 
transformation of the MSSN into a reform movement and why the Society actively shaped 
what came to be accepted as “Islam” or as “good” Islamic practice. To specify what this 
changing tradition includes, the impact of MSSN reforms in selected spheres will be analysed:  
the sphere of Islamic education, modes of dressing, religious rituals, Yoruba cultural practices, 
and modes of sociality. Furthermore, the study draws attention to the fragmentation of the 
MSSN which began with the isolation of the Ahmadis and later the breaking away of many 
factions such as The Muslim Congress (TMC) and those who identified as Salafis.  
This study is also anchored on the argument that the MSSN contribution to Yoruba Muslims 
religious change did not occur in isolation but largely connected to encounters with Christian 
missions, the social transformations of the post/colonial Nigerian state, as well as to 
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developments in the world of Islam. Another objective of this thesis is to establish why these 
entanglements feed back into the history of MSSN. Specifically, the thesis draws attention to 
several MSSN efforts to prevent Christianization of Muslim students and close the Muslim 
educational gap with Christians in order to increase their share of opportunities in Nigeria’s 
economic and political sectors, which until recent times is predominantly in favour of 
Christians. Furthermore, the thesis will point to why the MSSN challenges the Christian way 
of life in the school system in Yorubaland and helps its members to negotiate the ideals of 
modernity. Also, it will demonstrate the MSSN endeavour to fashion ways of being Muslim 
that include the adoption of some practices from Christian groups, and at the same time to 
integrate the cultural practices of the Yoruba, global Islam and the modern world. 
One of the key arguments in this study is that the involvement of MSSN in religious change 
does not correspond to every non/Western educated Yoruba Muslim experience. As observed 
in many Muslim societies, the Yoruba Muslims are diverse in their religious expressions, and 
the MSSN is only an aspect of their diversity. Clearly, the MSSN was aware of the varying 
orientations of its members from the start and aimed to create a sense of uniformity while 
respecting their differences. The reform in the Society in the 1980s appears to challenge this 
diversity as certain creeds such as those of the Salafis and Sufi brothers began to be questioned. 
However, the reform only narrows the possibility of diversity in the Society rather than 
eradicating it entirely. To illustrate this, I draw attention to the different expressions and notions 
of Islam in Yoruba society and the form of diversity in MSSN in the periods before and after 
its reform. I also shed light on the central arguments that shape the diversity in MSSN in order 
to understand why it promotes varying interpretations of Islam and ideas of a “good Muslim.” 
Although the MSSN as an organisation is at the centre of my study, I pay little attention to 
analysing it from an organisational perspective. However, I show why it can be understood as 
a reform movement following its emphasis on reviving age-old Muslim traditions. Also, I 
highlight the principal actors, both in local and international spheres, that helped to shape the 
history of the MSSN, and thereby show why changes in the notions of Islam and correct 
practices are the subject and object of an ongoing local and transnational Islamic discourses. 
The central question that guides this research is how has the MSSN contributed to religious 
change and new ways of being Muslim in Yorubaland which includes its own transformation? 
The research explores four questions to answer this. First, what were the objectives for which 
the MSSN was established and how were these objectives put into action? Second, in what 
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ways was Islamic reform inspired and produced in the MSSN and why did the MSSN become 
fragmented after the reform? Third, what were the impacts of Islamic reform on Muslim 
students and the MSSN as a movement? Fourth, what are the forms of Islamic education in the 
MSSN and what kind of knowledge is taught to Muslim students through these forms? In the 
section below, I describe the methodology employed to answer these questions and achieve the 
research objectives. 
1.5 Methodology 
The study adopts a historical perspective to show how the MSSN has developed and changed 
over time. This perspective underscores my use of the historical method of data collection and 
interpretation which involves a systematic collection of sources produced by various events 
about the MSSN and analysing them in line with the research objectives. A major aspect of the 
method employed in the study is also based on an ethnographic approach to data collection and 
analysis that involves participant observation, interviews and reflexivity. There are two major 
reasons behind the use of this ethnographic method. Firstly, it is useful for me to supplement 
the paucity of sources on the MSSN, which I will refer to later. Secondly, it allows me to 
understand the history of the MSSN and its activities from a nuanced perspective. The study 
also takes insights from concepts such as ‘discursive tradition,’ ‘Islamic reform,’ and ‘religious 
change’ in other fields, especially the Anthropology of Islam, Islamic Studies and Religious 
Studies. These concepts contribute to how I frame and analyse the activities of MSSN within 
a time perspective. In the sections below, I describe the scope of this study, the limitations, the 
sources (from the archives, libraries and interviews) as well as my fieldwork experience and 
challenges.  
Scope of the study: This study is from 1954 to 2014. However, it also addresses issues that 
are beyond this time frame. Most importantly, it traces the history of Yoruba Muslims before 
the 1950s and the MSSN up to the time of writing this thesis. The opening period, 1954, is 
when the MSSN was formed, while 2014 happens to be its sixtieth anniversary. This period is 
deemed long enough to research about the changes occurring on the diverse generations of 
Muslims who are associated with the Society. Moreover, this time frame can also be linked to 
a popular narrative in the Society about its genealogy. The narration is based on the writings 
of its former leaders such as Adegbite. In 1974, Adegbite divided the history of MSSN into 
three decades, namely: the Foundation Decade, 1954-1964; the Decade of Consolidation, 1964-
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1974; and the Decade of Crusade, 1974-1984.86 In 2014, Afis Oladosu, a former leader of the 
Society, built on this form of classification and identified six decades, but with a different 
interpretation, of the history of the MSSN referred to as: the “Era of Inauguration, Proclamation 
and Expansion, 1955-1965”; the “Era of Consolidation, 1965-1975”; the “Decade of Progress, 
1975-1985”; the “Emergence of Schism, Dissensions and Extreme Opinions, 1985-1995”; the 
“Era of Total Balkanization, 1995-2005” and the “Era of Rediscovery and Reconstruction, 
2005-2015.”87 
However, while this time frame is useful for thinking about chronology, the course of events 
in the Society does not fit into rigid boundaries, because they are linked and overlapped. This 
is why I only adopt this timeline where it fits into my argument. As Ivan Hrbek points out, 
“historical periodisation is one of the means by which the historian can see historical 
development not only as a chronologically arranged succession of events and facts, but as a 
phenomenon with its own inner laws, with different stages, that can be interpreted in causal 
terms and that offers itself to a synthesis.”88 Hrbek further contends that historians’ approaches 
to their subject matters would determine the periods they employ.  
In 1955, with the election of national officers, the MSSN became a national organisation in 
outlook, although it was only in the following year that students from Northern Nigeria began 
to participate in the activities of the Society.89 However, this change was not reflected in the 
constitution of the Society until about 1966 when some branches of the Society had been 
established in the region. The constitution divided the Society into two zones: the A-Zone 
(representing Northern Nigeria) and the B-Zone (Southern Nigeria). The MSSN members in 
Yorubaland are in the B-Zone together with students in the South-East and South-South 
regions.90 In the B-Zone, Yorubaland presently has six administrative divisions, which 
correspond with the geopolitical state system in Nigeria, referred to as Area Units. They are 
the MSSN Lagos Area Unit, the MSSN Ogun Area Unit, the MSSN Oyo Area Unit, the MSSN 
Ondo Area Unit, the MSSN Osun Area Unit and the MSSN Ekiti Area Unit.91 This study 
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focuses on these six units. But it also refers to Yoruba students in other regions, especially 
Kwara, which according to the political map of Nigeria, is part of the North. 
As noted earlier, the membership base of MSSN has extended from secondary schools to 
tertiary institutions and to Muslims of various professional fields since the 1960s. While it 
remained a voluntary organisation, its national outlook makes the history of the Society key to 
understanding the experience of many Muslim elites who have gone through the formal school 
system in post-independence Nigeria. Despite embracing Muslims from all over the country 
today, its formation is still seen by many Muslims in Nigeria to based on the experience of 
Yoruba Muslims in their reaction to the activities of Christian missions.92 This is one of the 
reasons I situate the study in Yorubaland. But, given its national outlook, the history of the 
MSSN should not be understood as a Yoruba affair. Having said this, however, one cannot but 
query the boundary between Yoruba Muslims (and why this study is worthy of research in 
Yorubaland) and other Nigerian Muslims if the MSSN is a national organisation. A simple way 
to recognise this is to view the MSSN beyond the main factors that unite its members which 
are Islam, Western education and their common goals. Besides these common factors, the 
members have different histories with regards to ethnicity, language, economy, social 
organizations and cultures which shaped their understanding of Islam and the nature of their 
interreligious encounters.93 Indeed, such differences are responsible for the diversity of lived 
Islam in Muslim societies around the world.  
Another crucial factor to think about is the uneven demographic distribution of Muslims and 
Christians in Nigeria that also shaped the pattern of religious encounter in different regions of 
the country. Although there is no reliable figure on the population of Nigerians by religion, 
Muslims appear to be the majority in the North, the Christians are the majority in South-East 
and South-South, while Yorubaland has an almost equal number of Muslims and Christians.94 
This disparity has led to a fluid political power distribution and social hierarchy between 
Muslims and Christians in various regions. For instance, in most parts of Yorubaland like 
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Ondo, Ekiti, and Osun, while Christians dominated political administration, civil service and 
professional fields for many years, the situation varies in a place like Lagos where Muslims 
may occupy political offices with Christians dominating the work force.95 Viewed from this 
angle, it becomes even more problematic and enormous methodologically to study the MSSN 
as a national organisation with the aim of paying serious attention to the key variables that 
shape different understanding of Islam and social encounters in many parts of the country. A 
focus on the MSSN in Yorubaland is however more manageable. To this extent, my study of 
the MSSN in Yorubaland should also be considered as studying an aspect of its history in 
Nigeria in relation to the wider religious encounter of the Yoruba since the colonial era. 
Limitations: This study has some limitations which are due to the problem of data. It was 
difficult for me to find all the sources on the history and activities of the MSSN up to about 
2000s. This is mostly due to the absence of a functional regional secretariat and archive in the 
MSSN over much of this period. To be certain, the MSSN B-Zone had no ‘identifiable’ office 
up to 2003 when it acquired some acres of land at Ogunmakin, Ogun state, along the Lagos-
Ibadan Expressway. The facilities at this site also remained under construction up to the time 
of my fieldwork, and therefore, it did not function except during the annual events of the 
Society. However, the MSSN in tertiary institutions referred to as “Branches” have secretariats 
which are in their mosques. But the problem with these Branches is that most of them do not 
have properly maintained archives. A major consequence of this lack of systematic 
documentation is the production of contradictory accounts on the Society such as the 
differences between the timeline and titles provided by Adegbite and Oladosu mentioned 
above. There is another source produced at the Lagos branch of the Society whose timeline 
differs completely from those written by Adegbite and Oladosu.96 I discovered from the 
testimony of OIadosu that this contradiction arises because each author writes from his/her 
perspective and experience in the Society.97 This suggests that the lack of a functioning 
secretariat is not the only reason for the inconsistencies in these accounts; the standpoint of the 
writer is also a factor. 
While this problem of data constitutes a major challenge in establishing certain facts about the 
history of the MSSN, I was able to mitigate the challenge with a few memoirs and journals 
produced by the Society which were given to me by my respondents. Also, I employed data 
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sourced from archives, libraries, oral testimonies, participant observation, books and the 
internet. Parts of the data also came from the website of the MSSN and its social media 
accounts, especially Facebook. A few of my respondents also shared information with me 
through WhatsApp. Together, these sources provided me with information on the MSSN and 
the Muslims in Yorubaland in general. The major part of these sources draws from nine months 
of fieldwork. Below, I describe these data, where they were obtained, how they were collected, 
and my encounter. 
Archives and libraries: In June 2016, I visited the archive of the Nigerian Institute of 
International Affairs, Lagos (NIIA) where I collected documents on interreligious encounters 
in Nigeria. This is a specialised archive on issues that link religion with politics, economy and 
international relations regarding postcolonial Nigeria. I also visited the National Archives 
Ibadan (NAI) between October and November 2016. The aim was to look for records that show 
the history of Yoruba Muslims up to the end of colonial rule as a background to the formation 
of MSSN. However, I only found a few records on this period. These records are on pilgrimage, 
education, festivals, sports, relations with the Islamic world, inter-religious encounters and 
columns in newspapers. There is also information on Muslim organisations such as Nawair-
Ud-Deen, Ansar-Ud-Deen, and the Ahmadiyya movement. Besides these organisations, I could 
not find any record on the MSSN despite being established in the colonial period. 
Furthermore, in November 2016, I collected data from the archive of the Nigerian Tribune 
(NT) at Ibadan, a prominent newspaper outfit established in 1949. The NT has collections of 
other newspapers such as the Daily Times, the Nigerian Observer, The Guardian, the Concord, 
and the Daily Sketch from the colonial period up to the present date. There is a handful of 
information on the MSSN and Muslims in Yorubaland in this archive that is similar to those at 
the NIIA. Finally, in July 2017, I found some very useful data on the MSSN and Yoruba 
Muslims at the archive of the Institute of African Studies (IAS), University of Bayreuth, 
Germany. In addition to these archives, I visited the libraries of three universities in Nigeria in 
2017. These are the Lagos State University, the University of Ibadan, and the University of 
Ilorin. The libraries of these universities keep many undergraduate essays and graduate theses 
on Muslims in Yorubaland including the MSSN. 
Oral interviews, respondents and location: I collected oral testimonies from at least eighty 
respondents. Generally, the testimonies were acquired through structured and semi-structured 
interviews. In some cases, the interviews were less formal. But a few of these interviews 
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followed the focused group model. My informants included the key actors in the MSSN, 
including the pioneer members. I interacted with these informants either in formal settings in 
their homes or places of work. I also held discussions with many respondents in tertiary 
institutions which include the University of Ibadan, Ibadan (UI); Ladoke Akintola University 
of Technology, Ogbomoso (LAUTECH); University of Lagos, Akoka (UNILAG); Lagos State 
University, Ojo (LASU); Obafemi Awolowo University, Ife (OAU); Federal College of 
Education, Akoka (FCE); Yaba College of Technology, Yaba (YABATECH); and Adeyemi 
College of Technology, Ondo (ACE). The MSSN secretariats in these institutions, which are 
in the mosques, are the main sites of the Society’s activities and the point of contact between 
students and other members of the university Muslim community irrespective of differences in 
their creeds. I used these mosques as part of my research locations.  
Data was also collected in secondary schools namely Fatima Grammar School, Ikire; Alegengo 
Community High School Akobo Road, Ibadan; Isabatudeen Girls College, Akobo Road, 
Ibadan; and Zumratul-Islamiyya Secondary School, Yaba (Lagos). Also, I collected data during 
the MSSN activities some of which were held outside the schools. These activities include the 
Rural Dawah at Igbo-Oloyin, Ibadan; the Convention of Secondary School Muslim Students 
(COSSMUS), Akinyele Ibadan; the Usrah at Ibadan, Lagos and Ife; the Ramadan lectures at 
the University of Ibadan (UI); the MSSN madrasa at UI; Orientation Week programmes at UI 
and OAU; the Islamic Vacation Course (IVC), Lagos-Ibadan Expressway and the MSSN Lagos 
Area Unit IVC, Lagos. In addition, data were collected from organisations that have links with 
the MSSN such as the Ansar-Ud-Deen Society of Nigeria, Jama’atul-Islamiyya of Nigeria, The 
Muslim Congress (TMC), Tijaniyya Muslim Students Association of Nigeria (TIMSAN) and 
some members of the Salafiyya movement. Apart from these groups, I also had interviews with 
Muslim clerics, parents and non-Muslims who have little or no links with the MSSN. 
Participant observation and challenges: As participant observers in the study of religions, 
researchers must contend with two crucial dynamics referred to as insider and outsider 
perspectives. Part of these dynamics relates to whether a researcher who belongs to a religious 
community is in a better position to conduct an academic study in that context than a non-
member.98 Studies by Kim Knott and Russell McCutcheon show that this has become a major 
problem in the study of religions because it not only inspires a debate on the issue of objectivity 
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but also on ethics.99 To deal with the problem, McCutcheon notes that researchers can adopt a 
middle ground through “methodological agnosticism” in which they “avoid validating and 
dismissing” questions of truth and values.100 However, as Rob van Ginkel suggests, none of 
these perspectives, insider or outsider, should be preferred over the other because each of them 
has advantages and problems that vary from one context to another.101 Importantly, van Ginkel 
argues that both the object and the goal of research usually play central roles in the choice of 
positionality.102 In addition, he maintains that it is misleading to think that being an outsider 
necessarily presupposes objectivity.103  
For the most part, I faced these dynamics as a participant observer during fieldwork and in my 
writing. This reflected on the various positions I found myself, which according to Knott can 
place a researcher in four roles namely; “complete participant, participant-as-observer, 
observer-as-participant, and complete observer.”104 My experience in the field also shows that 
these roles are not fixed because there are circumstances that warrant shifting from one to the 
other. In this regard, I wish to state that my positionality in this study traversed the four roles. 
I will illustrate this and point to why my different roles aided and affected me in the collection 
of data in various contexts. 
To begin with, I identify as a Yoruba Muslim and I am a former member of the MSSN. But I 
ceased to be an active member of the Society after my secondary school. Yet, throughout the 
years of my undergraduate and graduate studies, I often interacted with members of the MSSN 
especially during prayers at the mosque. Consequently, despite not considering myself as an 
active member, I find it difficult to place myself in the position of either a “complete 
participant” or “complete observer.” Nonetheless, I went into the field with the impression that 
I would faithfully ‘observe’ while I remained a ‘participant’ only for me to discover that my 
role consistently shifted between the two roles with different implications.  As I interacted with 
my respondents, I also participated in their religious activities such as lectures and prayers. 
This largely requires constantly switching between “participant-as-observer” and “observer-
as-participant.” And, I benefited from each of the positions I found myself in. For the most 
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part, it was easy for many respondents to relate with me having observed that I was a Muslim. 
When I introduced myself and made a request for a discussion, many of them responded with 
enthusiasm. When I later told them that I was surprised by their willingness to answer me, they 
responded that it was their duty as Muslims to support whatever a coreligionist was doing. But 
I suspected that being a researcher away from home also played a role in some cases because 
as Peel suggests, many Yoruba Muslims respect those with higher education.105 
Notwithstanding, I benefited from being an insider in the field because it put me in a position 
that aided my interaction with the respondents. 
But the benefits of being an insider also came with challenges. In some situations, I noticed 
that while I was gaining insights into my research questions, I was equally learning and 
experiencing a change in my attitude to issues of Christian-Muslim encounter in Yoruba 
society. For instance, I learned some rules of prayers for travellers which applied to me in most 
of the places I visited. On the other hand, I also empathised with the females who suffered 
discrimination due to the use of the veil in schools or workplaces and with parents who decried 
the inability of public schools to employ teachers to teach Islamic Studies. These experiences 
encouraged me to ask several questions surrounding my identity and my object of study. I 
asked myself if it was possible for a researcher, at the same time an insider, to learn about his 
religion. I was also concerned about a researcher’s empathy towards to the respondents. 
Besides these challenges, it was often difficult to identify the object of study in many situations 
where I found myself. This mostly happened when I prayed with my respondents and interacted 
with them informally. Also, as a Yoruba Muslim, while I discovered that my understanding of 
some stories which my respondents recounted to me was pedestrian, I was also quite familiar 
with their experiences. This difficulty calls attention to van Ginkel’s argument that while 
outsiders face the problem of “how to get into a culture,” the insiders’ challenge is “how to get 
out in order to enable them to have an ethnographic gaze at familiar surroundings.”106 It is in 
this situation that the importance of adopting “reflexivity” which Knott and McCutcheon refer 
to can be appreciated. Reflexivity encourages scholars to write and think about their objects of 
study from their contexts and standpoints in a diffuse manner and to be mindful of their powers, 
statuses and identities.107 Adopting this reflexive stance helped me to resolve the difficulties 
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which relate to empathy and making sense of my familiarity in the field. In addition, reading 
about insiders’ ethnographic studies in other contexts was useful because it inspired me to do 
a comparative analysis as van Ginkel suggests.108 At the same time, these studies contributed 
to the understanding of my study. 
Another challenging experience I had as an insider was when my role changed into a 
“participant-as-observer” in one of the MSSN programmes called the IVC. This happened by 
accident. At this IVC, an officer was called over the public address system to be assigned his 
duty. Coincidently, the name of that officer happens to be the same as mine, so I answered. 
Although the announcer discovered that I was not the person in question, he requested if I could 
support the programme by becoming an officer, and I obliged. Following this, I was assigned 
duty at the security outfit referred to as the MSSO (Muslim Students’ Security Organisation). 
Even though I was worried about my positionality in this role, it allowed me to gain better 
insight into the activities of the Society. Through my co-officers, I learnt about the objectives 
of the MSSO and it how connected to the activities of MSSN. 
Scholars like Jenny Wustenberg often argue that those who conduct research at home have 
several advantages because they are acquainted with their respondents’ language, cultural 
nuances, ability to blend into social situations and the tendency to avoid misconceptions about 
their object of study.109 On the contrary, Wustenberg also notes the reports of researchers who 
experienced difficulties in their home countries. These contradictory findings support my own 
experience. During my fieldwork, many respondents became reluctant when I requested to 
record our conversation on tape. In most cases, I pleaded with them and they requested that 
their names must not be mentioned. But one of them declined to have the discussion on tape. 
Owing to this, there are many instances in this study where I used pseudonyms of these 
respondents. Later, I discovered that many of those who were reluctant to have the conversion 
on record had different reasons. Some of them, for instance, told me it was because of the 
sensitivity of the activities of the MSSN branches on their campuses. The branches in question 
are the MSSN UNILAG which was embroiled in a leadership crisis in 2016, and the MSSN 
Obafemi Awolowo University, Ife where a Salafi faction of the Society had dissociated itself 
from the wider objectives of the MSSN. Also, the respondent who declined to have an 
anonymous recording feared that I had another motive apart from research. His suspicion was 
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shared by another respondent who had to confirm my identity on the BIGSAS website before 
granting me an interview and allowing me to record. 
In addition, there were MSSN events where my access was denied due to my male identity. 
For these events, which relate to the female members of the MSSN, I occupied the role of a 
“complete observer.” Among these events were the female IVC and the Sisters’ Circle. In these 
situations, I employed female research assistants to report on these programmes. Apart from 
this, it was also a challenge for me to approach veiled women because many of them usually 
guide against interacting with strangers. Moreover, the uncertainty of their identities such as 
age and social status made it more strenuous to do so. In a few cases, I was lucky enough to 
meet them through their friends. But in other cases, my female research assistants came to the 
rescue. Consequently, I rely on second-hand reports of research assistants in these contexts. 
If there is another useful lesson that I learnt from participant observation and the other primary 
sources, it is how they reshaped my research questions and goal of study. I became aware of 
this because I went to the field with structured questions that were based on my initial 
knowledge of changes in the MSSN and many theories in the literature on Islam in Africa and 
research methodology. Although some of the questions were useful, most of them were 
reviewed due to field experiences. This experience confirms the importance of a grounded 
approach in which fieldwork data determine our research questions and theoretical 
frameworks.110 
1.6 Structure 
The study is divided into eight chapters. The first chapter introduces the study which includes 
the main arguments, the state of the art, research questions, significance, methodology and 
structure. Overall, the thesis adopts a multidisciplinary approach largely situated in the fields 
of history, religious studies, Islamic studies and anthropology. This perspective is reflected in 
the type of sources I employed, my fieldwork experience, the conceptualisation of the 
arguments and the interpretation of the data. The conceptual framework is presented in the 
second chapter. The framework is based on four empirical driven concepts which describe the 
processes and events explored in the history of the MSSN: Islam as discursive tradition, Islamic 
reform, religious change, and the Christian-Muslim encounter. This chapter demonstrates why 
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the history of MSSN and its contributions to the religious change of Western educated Yoruba 
Muslims can be understood with the help of these empirical concepts. 
Chapter Three provides the historical context for the establishment of the MSSN. The main 
argument in the chapter is that the history of the MSSN is closely linked to the encounter of 
Yoruba Muslims with Christianization and the social change that was facilitated by 
colonialization. To illustrate this, the chapter discusses the history of Yoruba Muslims and their 
Islamization process. It also points to the forms of changes they experienced and the discourses 
that shaped these changes. This chapter also draws attention to the definition of Islam by 
Western educated Yoruba Muslims and their practices in the colonial period and why their 
conception of Islam and practices linked up with those of Muslim students who founded the 
MSSN. 
In Chapter Four, the study focuses on the history of MSSN as a movement at the intersection 
of political and social changes of the colonial and postcolonial eras in Nigeria. It explores the 
immediate factors that motivated its formation in the school system and how these are linked 
to the broader experience of Yoruba Muslims as well as other Muslims in Nigeria. This chapter 
also discusses the objectives of MSSN and how they were promoted at different times, 
including how the Society became a national organisation and joined transnational Islamic 
movements. The argument in this chapter is that the MSSN was established for Muslim 
students to promote different objectives that addressed their encounter within the school 
system. However, the objectives of the Society were modified over time following the 
widening of its vision beyond the school system and a shift in its orientation to Islam which 
impacted on its relations with non-Muslims and the Nigerian state in a very significant manner. 
This chapter argues that while the impact on students’ lives was minimal, the new orientation 
signals the change of the Society to a reform movement. 
In Chapter Five, the study discusses how reform was inspired and produced in the MSSN and 
the further transformation of the Society into a reform movement. The argument in this chapter 
is that the reform was inspired by historical and epistemological developments which were 
connected to the MSSN and Yoruba Muslim communities and that these developments 
facilitated the transition of MSSN into a reform movement. This chapter also argues that the 
reform was produced by discourses of many agents, who studied in Nigeria and abroad, through 
the various educational programmes of the Society. In addition, the chapter shows the effects 
of the reform on the factionalisation and division of the MSSN.  
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In Chapter Six, the thesis analyses the extent to which Islamic reform has changed the 
objectives of the MSSN and the practices of Muslim students. The impact referred to in this 
chapter is connected to chapter five which shows that the reform appears to challenge the 
MSSN ideal of brotherhood and diversity among Muslims. Chapter six takes the argument 
further by showing that Islamic reform did not produce a uniform nor an unchanging 
understanding of the practices of Islam among Muslim students. The chapter demonstrates that 
a homogenisation did not occur due to the different existential and social realities in 
Yorubaland and Nigeria which again forced the MSSN to build its ideals of reform on 
interpretations of Islam that emphasised moderation, tolerance, flexibility, and multiple 
authorities. The chapter thus shows the way these interpretations are brought into play through 
religious practices and rituals, mode of dressing and socio-cultural activities in the Society. 
Chapter Seven discusses knowledge transmission in the MSSN not only as an aspect of 
religious change but also an illustration of the MSSN as a reform movement that seeks to 
produce the ideals of “good Muslims.” The main argument is that MSSN involvement in 
Islamic education is part of the way in which the ‘traditional’ Islamic education has been 
transformed following the impact of Western schoolling, colonial policies and technology. The 
chapter further shows that the major aspect of the knowledge transmitted in the Society is 
geared towards building moral subjects based on the MSSN understanding of Islam. Some 
aspects of the knowledge are also meant to develop students’ socio-economic skills that are 
needed in the modern world. 
The concluding chapter eight summarises the main argument of the study and findings. It also 
discusses the implications of the MSSN contribution to Yoruba Muslim religious change and 
how they connect to wider transformation in other Muslim societies of Africa. Furthermore, it 
draws attention to the contribution which the thesis made to the literature on religious change 
in Yorubaland, Christian-Muslim encounters, colonial rule and Islamic movements, youth and 
Islam, Islamic reform and Islamic education. In addition, it reflects on what the history of 
MSSN suggests about religion in the public sphere, interreligious encounter and the 
relationship between the state and religion in contemporary Nigeria.  
38 
 
 
Chapter Two 
Locating the MSSN in Religious Change 
2.1 Introduction 
The conceptual framework that underpins the arguments of this thesis is explored in this 
chapter. The framework is formulated around existing studies on the concept of Islam as a 
discursive tradition, Islamic reform and revival, religious change, and Christian-Muslim 
encounters. This chapter aims to outline the central arguments in these studies and to show why 
they helped me to understand the involvement of MSSN and Yoruba Muslims in religious 
change. It also presents how my empirical findings link up with the debates in these studies. 
Given the main argument of the thesis, this chapter aims to demonstrate why the history of the 
MSSN and its contributions to the religious change of Western educated Yoruba Muslims can 
be understood within these debates. 
In doing this, I first explore the concept of Islam as a discursive tradition as the basis of my 
analysis of Yoruba Muslim society and the MSSN history, which includes its definition of 
Islam and what it means to be a good Muslim. Based on the work of Asad, I note that this 
conception of Islam is significant because it helps us to appreciate the different ways Islam is 
lived and interpreted within the MSSN.111 More importantly, it allows us to know that multiple 
interpretations of Islam and ways of being Muslim are interconnected with the process of 
religious change. This is so because religious change is not only practical, it is also discursive. 
In addition to religious change, approaching Islam as a discursive tradition is also linked to 
other frameworks of analysis in this chapter; Islamic reform and Christian-Muslim encounters. 
Islamic reform is an aspect of discursive tradition because it includes an effort to define what 
is correct and incorrect in the traditions of Muslims. Furthermore, the discursive tradition of 
Islam in any Muslim society is relational in nature. In this regard, the debates and knowledge 
of Islam are not only informed, for instance, by the Qur’an and the Hadith, but in relation to 
the prevailing historical and social contexts of Muslims. Using the example of Yorubaland, the 
context in which the MSSN discourse of Islam can be appreciated is the one shaped by 
Christianization and the legacies of colonization. 
 
111 Asad, The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam.  
39 
 
In the next section, I focus on studies of Islamic reform and the different orientations of 
reformist movements in Africa that are connected to the MSSN. In these studies, I show that 
the meaning of ‘reform’ for many reform movements is not fixed because they have different 
orientations. I also demonstrate how Islamic reform has been studied in relation to ‘modernity’ 
and the difficulty of the attempt to link the two processes. While I note that the MSSN is a 
‘modern’ organisation, I will also show that the idea of ‘modernity’ has its limitation for 
describing the experience of its members. In the third section, I discuss religious change, the 
factors responsible for it and its different forms. I also show how the history of the MSSN fits 
into the process and forms of religious change among Yoruba Muslims. The final section 
focuses on the studies of Christian-Muslim encounters in Africa and shows why the history of 
the MSSN is an example of these encounters. The literature on Christian-Muslim encounters, 
based on the work of Benjamin Soares, emphasised the need to study the relationship between 
the two religious groups in its complex forms rather than focusing explicitly on either co-
existence or conflict.112 I show why the history of the MSSN illustrates this complexity in this 
final section. 
2.2 Islam as a discursive tradition: the background to conceptualisation 
To understand the concept of Islam as a discursive tradition, I wish to give a brief background 
to its conception to show why it inspires my analysis in this study as well as the critique of 
Peel’s position on the idea of “Yoruba Muslim/Islam” and the MSSN shift towards so-called 
“Sunni orthodoxy.” The conceptualisation of Islam as a discursive tradition was proposed by 
Asad against the background of a search by anthropologists of Islam in the 1980s for a 
framework to understand ‘Islam’ and the heterogeneity of Muslims and their practices.113 This 
is given the fact that while Muslims frequently refer to the common foundational texts – the 
Qur'an and the Hadith – and agree on many aspects of their creed, they also engage in debates 
and give multiple and conflicting positions on a wide range of social, religious, economic and 
political issues.114 They also have different practices which might include those adopted from 
 
112 Benjamin F. Soares, ed., Muslim-Christian Encounters in Africa v. 6 (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2006), 1–16. 
113 Jens Kreinath, ed., The Anthropology of Islam Reader (London: Routledge, 2012), 43–44; Ovamir Anjum, 
“Islam as a Discursive Tradition: Talal Asad and His Interlocutors,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, 
Africa and the Middle East 27, no. 3 (2007): 656–61. 
114 See Zulfikar A. Hirji, ed., Diversity and Pluralism in Islam: Historical and Contemporary Discourses 
Amongst Muslims (London, New York, London: I.B. Tauris and the Institute of Ismaili Studies, 2010); “The 
World’s Muslims: Unity and Diversity,”, Forum on Religion & Public Life (PEW Research Center, August 9, 
2012); Oliver Leaman, Controversies in Contemporary Islam (London: Routledge, 2014); David Robinson, 
Muslim Societies in African History 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), XVIII. 
 
40 
 
non-Muslims. What inspired the search for a new framework to understand this diversity, as 
Ovamir Anjum noted, was that the initial scholarship was dominated by Orientalists who 
essentialised ‘Islam’ and showed less sensitivity to the transformations, dialogues, and 
heterogeneity of lived Islam. Anjum added that many anthropologists also gave up the search 
for thinking about ‘Islam’ as ‘one’ and focused their investigation on the idea of the ‘local 
Islams’ rather than conceptualising the religion from a holistic perspective.115 According to 
Soares, the focus on these ‘local Islams’ had certain problems, a major part of which was the 
tendency for scholars to “attach ethnic and geographical qualifiers to Islam” such as “Moroccan 
Islam” and “African Islam.”116 This created an assumption in such studies that “Islams” in the 
local contexts were on the periphery and different from the ‘purer’ form presumed to be in the 
Middle East. 
In reference to the search for an alternative approach, Robert Launay noted that the task of the 
anthropologists of Islam was therefore “to find a framework in which to analyse the 
relationship between this single, global entity, Islam, and the multiple entities that are the 
religious beliefs and practices of Muslims in specific communities at specific moments in 
history.”117 Some of the major questions that confronted them include; what is ‘Islam’ or the 
‘real Islam’ among the ‘local Islams’? what is responsible for the diversity of Muslim 
practices? and, how can scholars conceptualise these diversities using a single framework?118 
Clifford Geertz’s Islam Observed was one of the studies that attempted these questions with 
the example of differences in Islamic religious change between Indonesia and Morocco.119 He 
showed that there was a unified religious tradition called Islam which was shared by the two 
societies even though they had two different cultures. Morocco, in the study, was a highly 
structured “tribal” society while Indonesia was a peasant society. Informed by their cultural 
differences, Islam in the two countries developed along two dimensions, experiences and 
traditions: in Morocco, it developed as one of “uncompromising rigorism,” “moral 
perfectionism” and a “purified” creed, while it developed with “partial compromises, halfway 
covenants, and outright evasions” in Indonesia. Even though he reveals the diversity of Islam 
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in the two countries, Geertz’s study, according to Daniel Varisco, portrays two variants of this, 
one that is “scriptural” and another one that is “mystical.”120 Many studies have continued to 
situate Muslims within these two perspectives. However, the wide range of Islamic reform 
orientations that we have today, as will be shown in the next section, demonstrate that this 
division is indeed inadequate.121 
Taking a contrary view from Geertz, Abdul Hamid el-Zein in “Beyond Ideology and Theology” 
challenges the assumption of a unified religious tradition called “real Islam.”122 His argument 
built on Geertz’s symbolic approach and recognises the diversity in which Islam is expressed. 
From this perspective, he argues that the diverse expressions of Islam have their own meanings 
and that Muslims are meaning-making subjects. However, unlike these expressions, the 
subjects can make meanings that are dynamic and flexible. The disparity between the two, 
according to him, points to the difficulty of locating the “real Islam” because each expression 
of Islam has “a web of frozen points of meaning” that is different from the “fluid meaning” 
which a subject who engages the expression inhabits.123 Thus, he concludes that “Islam” as an 
analytical object is not fixed and has no necessary existence. This argument does not only 
suggest that ‘Islam’ is unreal, it also implies that what Muslims define as orthodox practice or 
belief is problematic. 
Another scholar who contributed to the debate is Ernest Gellner who draws attention to the 
importance of the “divine rules” that inform Muslim practices and traditions. He argues that 
“Islam is the blueprint of social order. It holds that a set of rules exist, eternal, divinely 
ordained, and independent of the will of men, which defines the proper ordering of society.”124 
The problem with this argument is that it does not provide enough answer as to why Islam is 
understood differently by Muslim groups and individuals. Furthermore, as Asads points out, 
Gellner’s argument implies that Muslims are “actors” who do not think but only ‘act’ based on 
the rules set by the divine.125 Michael Gilsenan’s study, however, moved away from that 
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position.126 Instead, he suggests that the different things which Muslims referred to as ‘Islamic’ 
should be understood within the context of their lives and historical conditions. Based on this 
assumption, he encourages scholars to pay attention to what a Muslim or Muslim community 
regards as ‘Islam’ in their context and accept it as valid. This argument ultimately foregrounds 
the possibility of ‘many islams.’ However, according to Asad, Gilsenan’s argument created a 
paradox because it does not answer the question, what is Islam?127 That is, what is ‘Islam’ if 
many Muslims say that what some Muslims take to be Islam is not the “real Islam”? To answer 
this, Asad proposed the conceptualisation of Islam as a “discursive tradition.”128 Rather than 
thinking of Islam as a blueprint of society or unreal, Asad argues for the need to consider it as 
a “discursive tradition.” Below, I highlighted the main arguments of this notion of discursive 
tradition. 
2.2.1 Discursive tradition: a framework for studying Islam and Muslim societies  
Asad argues that Islam “is neither a distinctive social structure nor a heterogeneous collection 
of beliefs, artifacts, customs, and morals. It is a tradition.”129 Asad’s notion of tradition builds 
on Alasdair MacIntyre’s definition. While earlier scholars conceived tradition as a practice or 
culture that is fixed over time, MacIntyre posits that tradition is also a “historically extended, 
socially embodied argument” that is subject to change either by innovation, addition, extinction 
or depreciation.130 Relating it to Islam, Asad argues that Islam is a tradition made up of 
discourses that aim to teach Muslims the proper mode and function of a practice that is 
historically established.131Based on this notion of tradition, he contends that scholars seeking 
to analyse the questions, ‘What is Islam?’ and ‘What are the reasons for diversity among 
Muslims?’ should proceed as Muslims do, which is through the discourse of tradition. “An 
Islamic discursive tradition” as he defines it, “is simply a tradition of Muslim discourse that 
addresses itself to conceptions of the Islamic past and future, with reference to a particular 
Islamic practice in the present.”132 Anjum explained this further noting that the Islamic 
discursive tradition is defined by its own line of reasoning based on texts, history, and 
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institutions, but this is not to imply that the reasoning is typically ‘Islamic’ or inaccessible to 
non-Muslims.133 
Also, Asad draws attention to the mistaken notion that all the things Muslims say and practise 
is part of an Islamic tradition or duplicate of the past because what they do and say is also 
informed by their interpretation to connect with the past. In addition, he notes that the teaching 
of “orthodox doctrine,” by which he meant “the correct process of teaching” and “the correct 
statement of what is to be learned,” is key to the tradition of Islam. This teaching could be 
taught by a Sufi Shaykh, an Imam or an untutored parent. However, he contests the assumption 
that underlies Gellner’s thesis of orthodoxy as a fixed body of thought that is found everywhere 
in Muslim societies. For Asad, orthodoxy is also a specific relationship of power and it can be 
found in any context in which “Muslims have the power to regulate, uphold, require, or adjust 
correct practices, and to condemn, exclude, undermine, or replace incorrect ones.”134 This 
suggests that what is considered as correct practices is an attempt to establish a form of power, 
which therefore frequently provokes resistance from those who contest the definition of that 
orthodoxy. Again, Asad contends that the argument and resistance enabled by this attempt are 
integral to the discursive tradition of Islam and it is important for scholars to pay attention to 
the social contexts that give rise to them.135  
Running through Asad’s argument is the assumption that historical and social conditions are 
important factors in the concept of Islamic discursive tradition. These factors are responsible 
for the heterogeneity of Muslim practices in different societies. The heterogeneity, according 
to him, is an indication of “the different Islamic reasonings that different social and historical 
conditions can or cannot sustain.”136 In his elaboration of this point, Roman Loimeier notes 
that Muslim discourses in different historical eras seek to translate specific traditions in a 
corpus of “Islamic general knowledge” into local contexts.137 This corpus, according to him, is 
what is generally known to Muslims. It includes the Qur’an and the Hadith; “core” places like 
Mecca, Medina, al-Qudus, and sites of memorable battles; the Sunna of the Prophet; iconic 
symbols like the ḥijāb; and “core” religious debates such as the rules of fasting. To translate 
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any tradition, religious scholars or actors refer to the corpus through a reinterpretation of the 
corpus in relation to the historical conditions of their societies. However, Asad contends that 
the diversity produced by this process should not be mistaken for lack of homogeneity in 
Islamic traditions. At the same time, it should not be assumed that Islamic traditions are 
essentially homogenous, but that despite their diversities, Muslims seek to achieve coherence 
even if this is impeded by the unstable and disparate economic and political conditions of their 
societies.138  
Largely, the conception of Islam as a discursive tradition reveals that various subjectivities and 
practices produced among Muslims cannot be reduced to only two categories, “scriptural” and 
“mystical” traditions, as portrayed by Geertz. It also allows a re-evaluation of one authentic 
Islam that is represented by a single authority or practised by one Muslim society which is 
different from others.139 This is why I consider Peel’s idea of “Yoruba Islam/Muslim” and his 
argument on the Yoruba Muslim adoption of the “orthodox Sunni,” represented by the MSSN, 
as problematic. Taking Islam as a discursive tradition suggests to me that the idea of a good 
Muslim is difficult to fix to a specific point in the history of Yoruba Muslims or any Muslim 
society. Furthermore, as Scott Reese explains, discursive tradition also helps us to move 
beyond the thinking that Islam is a rigid and unchanging body of knowledge because this notion 
of Islam demonstrates that Muslims everywhere are continuously involved in a process of 
reinterpretation of their body of knowledge in a way that allows them to react and cope with 
transformations at different times.140  
Taking Islam as a discursive tradition is also useful for conceptualising the process of “reform” 
and “revival,” to a large extent. As Ebrahim Moosa and SherAli Tarren posit, we can “think of 
reform as a discourse of improvement, recovery, and healing” of tradition.141 Explaining this 
further, they contend that discourse of “revival” is “the process of restoring that tradition, of 
sustaining the promise of its continued repetition and also inventing it simultaneously.”142 They 
also note that despite the assumption of some modernist reformers that the process is a straight 
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path, reform does not have one connotation or follow a specific trajectory. And, even though 
the attempt is to repair an existing practice, Moosa and Tarren insist that reform is capable of 
producing something new through discourse.143 Loimeier provides another useful argument on 
the relationship between discursive tradition and reform movement. He argues that discourse 
is used by reform movements to develop distinctive positions in relation to their context and to 
other reform movements of their time and/or in the past.144 Discourse also allows reformers to 
contest and denounce some traditions as unlawful innovations (referred to as bid’a) using their 
interpretation of the corpus of Islamic knowledge. In turn, those who are accused of innovation 
also use discourse to reject the reformers claim and brand them as innovators. But the ultimate 
success or failure of this argumentation, as Loimeier contends, is not so much about which is 
right but the capacity of a movement to respond to socio-economic and political crises and to 
win people for its project of reform.145   
Approaching Islam as a discursive tradition applies to the history of Yoruba Muslims as well 
as the MSSN and its reform process in many ways. As I will demonstrate in the study, the 
concept helps to analyse what inspired reform in the Society, the actors involved and the 
reasoning that shaped their arguments. It also guides my understanding of why discourses on 
correct practice led to real contests for power and division in the Society. Besides, the study 
shows that discourses in the MSSN are not limited to Islam. Many of the discourses also 
focused on comparing Islam with Christianity and the cultural practices in Yorubaland. This 
comparative discourse thus shows that Islam is not only understood from the traditions of 
Muslims but also in relation to the traditions of non-Muslims. 
Despite its usefulness, the discursive tradition of Islam is not without its critics. Among them 
is Ronald Lukens-Bull who argues that Asad’s depiction of Islamic discourse placed more 
emphasis on the Qur’an and the Hadith.146 It is true that these texts are significant to Islamic 
discourse, however, according to Lukens-Bull, it is also important to consider other forms of 
knowledge that play into the Muslim discourses. Among these are the various texts produced 
by Muslim thinkers (in the past and in contemporary times), local concerns, and non-Muslim 
discourses and practices. As I will demonstrate in Chapters Five and Six, the history of the 
MSSN confirms this point. 
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Samuli Schielke also contests Asad’s notion of discursive tradition because, according to him, 
it placed more emphasis on religious tradition while little attention is given to everyday 
practices of Muslims. He is of the view that the practices and behaviours of Muslims, which 
are informed by “existential and pragmatic sensibilities of living a life in a complex and often 
troubling world,” show a wide range of ambivalences and inconsistencies that challenge the 
framework of a single tradition.147 This implies that despite their attempt to follow the correct 
traditions of Islam, Muslims are nevertheless unable to do so in many cases. This reality 
inspired the argument by Schielke that emphasizes the importance of incorporating failures and 
ambiguities in the conception of Islam to show that it is an incoherent entity. I am of the view 
that Schielke’s argument does not challenge the usefulness of Islamic discursive tradition. As 
a matter of fact, my sources on the MSSN confirm his observation about the struggles and 
inconsistencies of being Muslim which I showed in Chapters Six and Seven. 
There is also Gabriele Marranci who contests Asad’s argument on the “object of study,” Islam, 
as a tradition. Marranci’s point is that “the main thing that Muslims share among themselves 
and others is certainly not Islam, but rather the fact that they are human beings.”148 As humans, 
Muslims engaged in relationships and behaviours with others and the environment in ways that 
generate “feelings.” Thus, for him, this “feeling” is integral to what it means to be Muslim for 
many people insofar as “they feel to be Muslims” without adequate knowledge of the Qur’an 
and the Hadith. Furthermore, he argues that Muslims articulate “feelings” that are different 
from one another through discourse. Therefore, he suggests that Islam can be conceptualised 
“as a map of discourses on how to ‘feel Muslim.’”149 This informs his argument that the starting 
point of our research should be on Muslims rather than Islam which appears theological in 
orientation.  
Marranci’s argument is also useful because it shows another important perspective to studying 
Islam and Muslims. Yet, I disagree with his theory of “feeling” which suggests that people 
must be emotionally attached to Islam or other Muslims before they can be considered as 
Muslims. This is problematic because it fails to consider the broad range of ways of being 
Muslim. There are studies showing how many Muslims converted to Islam in Africa following 
dreams and divination. These include Gbadamosi’s work on the Yoruba and Humphrey 
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Fisher’s study on dreams.150 Moreover, Lori Peek’s study of Muslim students in the United 
States discovered that being a Muslim can be a developmental process, especially from 
childhood to adulthood.151 The process, as he points out, starts with Islam being an “ascribed” 
identity (when it was chosen for them by parents) to a “chosen” identity (when they embrace 
it for themselves) and later to a “declared” identity (when they strengthened and affirmed their 
belief). While Peek notes that his example may not be replicated in other places, he maintains 
that “religious identity is a dynamic and ongoing process” for many Muslims.152 What I found 
useful in this argument is the idea of religious ascription which can be related to the experience 
of most members of the MSSN. For the students I worked with, the fact that Islam was chosen 
for them by their parents does not preclude them from identifying with Islam except we want 
to say they are not Muslim enough as Marranci implies here: “it is that feel to be which makes 
an enormous difference when we try to understand Muslim societies.”153 I can understand 
Marranci’s argument from the point of view of removing theological bias from the concept of 
Islam. But doing so not only runs the risk of not understanding the wide range of being Muslim, 
it could also create the impression that there are ‘proper,’ ‘improper,’ ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
Muslims. The concept of Islam as a discursive tradition is, however, useful to help us avoid 
this impression. In the next section, I will discuss Islamic reform and show how it is related to 
the concept of Islam as a discursive tradition. 
2.3 Islamic reform (movements) 
Over the last two decades, there has been an increase in researches on Islamic reform and 
movements of reform in Muslim societies around the world.154 In Africa, the studies include 
Ousmane Kane’s Muslim Modernity in Postcolonial Nigeria, Ousman Kobo’s Unveiling 
Modernity in Twentieth Century West Africa Islamic Reforms, Roman Loimeier’s Islamic 
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Reform in Twentieth Century Africa, Terje Østebø’s Localising Salafism, Adeline Masquelier’s 
Women and Islamic Revival in a West African Town, Saba Mahmood’s Politics of Piety, and 
Yunus Dumbe’s Islamic Revivalism in Contemporary Ghana.155 However, despite the 
academic attention it has generated, Islamic reform is not an entirely new phenomenon among 
Muslims. Historians like Ira Lapidus has traced many reform movements to periods between 
the ninth and nineteenth century. A major example he cited was the ninth century Hanbali 
movement in Baghdad and Syria.156 Nehemia Levtzion also noted that there were many Sufi-
oriented reforms in eighteenth-century West Africa which include those of Usman dan Fodio 
in Hausaland (now in Nigeria) and Sidi Mahmud in Aïr (now in Niger Republic).157 
But there are significant factors that differentiate past movements from these contemporary 
movements. Among these are the context in which they are formed, the actors involved and 
how they deal with contemporary issues. Lapidus argues that the contemporary movements are 
inspired by what constitutes “modernity” which include “the formation of national states, the 
organization of capitalist economies, technological and scientific developments, and the 
cultural and social changes that accompany these phenomenon (sic).”158 Beyond the role of 
“modernity” in their emergence, some scholars have emphasised the importance of looking 
inwardly into situations in different contexts and specific countries. In many countries, John 
Esposito suggests that the movements emerge as a response to an identity crisis caused by low 
self-confidence and disappointment after colonialism. Added to this is the failure of 
governments to address the socio-economic needs of their countries.159 In many African 
countries, Benjamin Soares and René Otayek consider that the turn to religiosity, which is 
exemplified by these movements, must be understood “through the dynamics internal to 
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African societies” which include the challenges of governance, economic crisis, worsening 
educational and health care systems, and population growth.160 
With regards to the actors, Lapidus notes that these movements draw members from students, 
civil servants, engineers, medical personnel, lawyers and those with modern education.161  
However, I wish to point out that not all of them are in support of or a product of modern 
education as Lapidus suggests. On the issues they deal with, Lapidus also contends that these 
movements seek “to find a legitimate basis for the construction of a modern state and a modern 
economy.”162 But, I wish to note that this is only part of their concerns. As Robinson’s study 
of South Asia suggests, some of them also placed emphasis on eliminating the age-old person-
to-person transmission of knowledge, promoting ethical formation and rationalising Islamic 
knowledge.163 Another point to consider is that these reform movements are very diverse in the 
aims and traditions they promote, and this can be understood by focusing on many concepts 
associated with “reform” and “revival” and how each movement conceive its projects.  
The concept, ‘reform,’ is one of the most common terms used to describe the transformation 
which these movements seek in society. Loimeier defines ‘reform’ “as any transformation that 
is linked with an implicit or explicit programme of change.”164 For him, a movement of reform 
should not only advocate for change, it must also have a “programme” to actualise it. However, 
while this notion of reform is useful, it also tends to generalise the idea of reform which is 
constructed and realised in multiple ways in different contexts, as I will show later. Another 
term is ‘reformism,’ often used interchangeably with ‘reform.’ Filippo Osella and Caroline 
Osella refer to this as “projects whose specific focus is the bringing into line of religious beliefs 
and practices with what are held to be the core foundations of Islam, by avoiding and purging 
out innovation, accretion and the intrusion of ‘local custom’.”165 In spite of its relevance, this 
notion of reform is also problematic because it suggests a particular interpretation of reform 
that is advocated by Salafi-minded movements, which I discussed below. Although Loimeier 
and the Osellas point to the complexity of finding a specific meaning for the term, I think it is 
rather useful to think of this complexity in order to see the range of diversity in which it is 
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anchored. To be sure, Loimeier draws attention to this diversity. According to him, reform 
movements have different orientations which may be noticed in the terms they use to describe 
their cause or propagation (da’wa) in different social and historical contexts. The terms ranged 
from the more general one referred to as tajdīd (renewal) to such others as iṣlāḥ (purification 
or return to the pure values of early Islam), nahḍa (renaissance), iḥyāʾ (revival or 
revivification), sahwa (awakening), and taraqqī or taqaddum (progress).166 
Up to the early twentieth century, Loimeier notes that tajdīd was the most frequently used term 
in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa.167 John Voll has argued that the basis for using it is a 
reported saying of the Prophet Muhammad in which he declared, “God will send to this umma 
(the Muslim community) at the end of each century those who will renew its faith for it.”168 
The one who is expected to bring about the renewal is called the mujaddid. Although the 
process and situation that would lead to this renewal have inspired debates among Muslims, 
Voll notes that the idea of a renewer expressed in it is consistent. Because of this saying, the 
Muslim community is deemed to need a mujaddid when it is deviating from the way of the 
Qur’an and the sunna.169 In the twentieth century, Loimeier contends that the term iṣlāḥ became 
widely used by many reformers in sub-Saharan Africa. The shift, according to him, suggests 
their reorientation to return to the pure ways of the Prophet.170 But Voll’s argument suggests 
that this may not be the only idea meant by the term. For him, it is also translated as “reform” 
and it is close to the notion of “moral righteousness” and “reshaping for the sake of improving 
effectiveness.”171 Apart from tajdīd and iṣlāḥ, Loimeier argues that other terms (that is, nahḍa, 
iḥyāʾ, sahwa, and taraqqī) are rarely used in sub-Saharan Africa except in Arab countries. 
Thus, given these multiple concepts around the term ‘reform,’ Loimeier notes that ‘reform’ in 
Muslim societies signifies a motley of ideas which has activist, liberalising, modernising, 
conservatist and revolutionary undertones.172  
While reform movements refer to these concepts, according to Loimeier, it is also important to 
look at the distinct names which they call themselves. Notable examples are jamāʿa (union, 
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group), ḥizb (party), ahl (people), anṣār (supporters) and ḥaraka (movement). These names are 
indications of who belong to their group (often identified as ‘proper Muslims,’ and not all other 
Muslims) and the religious orientation they offer. Also, the names can be used to articulate a 
shift in their religious or political goal. Despite the differences in names, the majority of them 
point out the centrality of the Qur’an and the Hadith. They also criticise some practices in their 
societies and advocate the form of change they want to achieve.173 In addition, their viewpoints 
are not distinctively exclusive but intersect and incorporate one another. In the section below, 
I draw attention to a few of these reformist orientations in Africa. This is to show their different, 
but similar, orientations and why they are related to the Muslim students in Yorubaland. 
2.3.1 Reform movements and orientations 
Many reform movements in Africa are Salafi-oriented.174 Those who identify with such 
movements consider themselves to be followers of the al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ, ‘pious predecessors.’ 
They describe the predecessors as the Prophet Muhammad and his companions and the three 
generations that followed him, and they are of the view that Muslims must return to the 
practices and beliefs of these predecessors as the only way to achieve piety and the renewal of 
faith.175 Despite their claims, many studies show that the term (al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ) also applies 
to all Muslims regardless of their different doctrinal positions. Henri Lauzière argues that the 
term had been used among Muslims before its adoption as a doctrine (by the Salafis) in the 
1920s.176 Besides focusing on the term, Thurston also contends that the Salafis can be 
recognised through the canon they embodied and transmitted. The canon, according to him, 
has three streams that include Hanbali thinkers, especially Shaykh Ahmad ibn Taymiyya 
(1263-1328) and Shaykh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792); the scholars from 
Yemen and India who partly recognise ibn Taymiyya; and modernist thinkers like Shaykh 
Muhammad Rashıd Rida (1865-1935). 177 But, while the Salafi community is known to be 
fragmented, Thurston maintains that the canon offers a platform for seeing the uniformity of 
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this community.178 In general, he added that the Salafis are Sunni Muslims who promote direct 
access to the Qur’an and the Hadith, rather than through the established schools of 
jurisprudence. Because of this orientation, they are regarded as ‘scripturalists’ or ‘literalists.’ 
It is also common among them to oppose Sufism which they consider as unlawful innovation 
(bid’a) and to insist on having textual ‘evidence’ of Islamic knowledge in place of the teachings 
of scholars.179 As I will demonstrate, Thurston’s study is relevant to this study because the 
Salafi phenomenon he highlighted in Northern Nigeria plays a role in the understanding of 
Islam of some Yoruba Muslim students who studied in the region. 
Although it has become the subject of criticism of the Salafis, the Sufi-oriented reform is also 
widespread in Africa. Reese’s study of Sufi discourses in early twentieth century Somalia 
draws attention to this. The work shows that the Qadiriyya provided a model of reform that 
emphasised the closer connection of people with God in contrast to the Salihiyya, a pro-
Wahhabi order that emphasised rigorous adherence to the Qur’an and the Hadith as a way to 
address social and moral decay.180 Another notable example of Sufi reform was that of Shaykh 
Ibrahim Niasse (1900-1975) in the Tijaniyya order in West Africa. The order, founded by 
Shaykh Ahmad b. Muhammad al-Tijani (1737-1815) in present-day Algeria, had few adherents 
for more than a century before Niasse’s reform. As Seesemann narrates, Ahmad al-Tijani 
predicted before his death that “a flood shall come upon my companion, so that the people will 
enter our path in throngs.”181 The ‘flood’ is from the Arabic word fayḍa (and fayḍa is not only 
translated as ‘flood,’ but also ‘abundance of grace,’ ‘overflowing’).182 From 1929, Niasse 
declared himself to be the “bringer of the flood.” He also propagated the tradition of tarbiya 
(‘spiritual training’) through which he taught his followers to attain the “interior knowledge” 
of God regarded as maʿrifa.183 Niasse’s teachings led to a massive increase in the members of 
the Tijaniyya order beyond West Africa. While some followers of Ahmad al-Tijani contested 
Niasse’s claim and his traditions of fayḍa and tarbiya, Seesemann points out that he was 
considered by many of his followers as the renewer of the order.184 From the 1930s, the impact 
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of Niasse’s reform began to be felt in Northern Nigeria, and later in the South, as many Muslims 
including the emir of Kano, Abdullah Bayero (1881–1953) embraced his teachings.185 Until 
that period, as narrated by Peel, Sufism in Yorubaland was limited to some revered alfas and 
elders and was considered too powerful for the young and the laity. However, through Niasse’s 
reform and some of his followers in Yorubaland, the Tijaniyya order was gradually embraced 
by the young and the laity. One of the key figures that led the movement was Shehu Usman 
Lanase (d. 1954), who came to Ibadan as a young man from Zaria in the North.186 
The Tabligh Jama’at shows another reformist orientation. The movement was founded by 
Maulana Muhammed Ilyas (1885-1944) in 1927 in India to reawaken the faith of Muslims in 
many ways. The most important of these is to take a full-time duty to preach Islam among 
Muslims, especially those considered to have strayed from the straight path. While many 
Muslims consider such a duty to be the responsibility of learned men, Ilyas departed from this 
and encouraged every Muslim regardless of their knowledge to engage in da’wa (invitation or 
proselytizing).187 This became the primary activity of its members who moved from one 
community and country to another in order to mobilise Muslims.188 Also, IIyas taught the 
Jama’at some moral lessons to be adopted in their interaction with Muslims and non-Muslims. 
He encouraged them to stay away from frivolous discussions and unrewarding activities, which 
include socio-political issues, and follow the Prophetic sunna. Most of his teachings are 
contained in a text called Fazail-i-Amal (the Virtues of Pious Deeds) which, as Yoginder 
Sikand suggests, includes stories of heavenly rewards that await those who follow the 
commandments of God.189 While most of these stories have been contested by many Muslims, 
Tablighis consider them as important teachings to achieve piety.190 Today, the Tabligh Jama’at 
is a transnational movement with a considerable number of members around the world. The 
spread of the movement has been studied in many African countries such as The Gambia, 
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Nigeria, and South Africa.191 In Nigeria, members of the movement appeared to have settled 
in Lagos in the 1950s. However, they were not welcomed by many Yoruba Muslims due to 
their reform orientation.192 Nonetheless, the population of members of the movement has 
steadily grew over time with an increase of over 300 Tablighi learning centres across Nigeria 
by the 2000s.193 
The Society of the Muslim Brothers (Arabic, Jamāʻat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn), also known as 
the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is another influential revival movement. Founded in 1928 by a 
teacher, Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949), in Egypt, it became a transnational movement with 
members in many parts of the world. While its reform orientations have fragmented over time 
depending on its leaders, many of the legacies of al-Banna’s are still observed in the 
movement.194 Richard Mitchell’s study reveals that at the early stage of his life, al-Banna 
belonged to the Sufi order named Hasafiyya and later in life, he was influenced by Salafi 
scholars.195 But, in his teachings, he complained of elements like logic and philosophy which 
he believed to have crept into Sufism. He was also worried that Sufism concentrated more on 
“isolated spirituality” rather than helping people solve social problems.196 Thus, he called for 
“a serious reform effort designed to save 'pure' Sufism from its later accretions.”197 As part of 
this reform, the MB dissociated itself from those Sufi practices. It also established an 
organisational structure based on “families” which were used as bases for moral training and 
fostering loyalty and ‘brotherhood’ among members.198 Al-Banna’s other goal of reform, 
referring to Egypt at the time, emphasised the Qur’an as the constitution of the country and an 
economic system based on this text. Thus, in the mid-1940s, the MB became linked to the 
politics of Egypt. Al-Banna also advocated for social reforms in the field of education, which 
for him should have a secular and religious character. In addition, he encouraged welfare 
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services that promote knowledge dissemination in villages and taught Muslims to stay away 
from practices like gambling and alcohol.199 From the 1960s, some Yoruba Muslim students 
who had links with the MB while studying abroad introduced the movement’s orientation into 
the MSSN. As I will illustrate in Chapters Four and Five, this orientation became part of what 
shaped the new ways of being Muslim in the Society. 
While the four reform movements above have women as members, it is also possible to find 
movements that are exclusively for females. The women’s mosque movement in Egypt in 
Mahmood’s study is a case in point.200 These women, according to Mahmood, are concerned 
about achieving piety. They do this by teaching Islamic texts and encouraging themselves to 
cultivate pious dispositions such as prayers, shyness, fear of God and veiling. For Mahmood, 
while this form of da’wa allowed the female teachers to enter the male-centred field of Islamic 
education, it also demonstrated women’s agency in Muslims societies.201 Besides women, 
many reform movements are formed by young people. But studies that focus on them appear 
to be limited. To an extent, the inadequate scholarly attention is not the only problem; the 
problem also appears to be the historical trajectories of such movements. An example is the 
Muslim Youth Movement formed in 1970 in Durban, South Africa. At inception, Abdulkader 
Tayob narrates that the movement challenged the learning of the Qur’an through a teacher, 
encouraged women’s attendance in the mosque and promoted the use of English in Friday 
sermons. Over time, it introduced study circles and leadership training. But up to the late 1980s, 
it continued to be fragmented by different discourses on Islam such that it could not attract a 
larger number of Muslims.202 Apart from this type of movement, some movements in Africa 
identified as “young” or “youth” at inception but dropped the attribute over time. A major 
example is the Ansar-Ud-Deen Society of Nigeria which was founded as “Young Ansar-Ud-
Deen” in 1923. Reichmuth reveals that this movement dropped the term “Young” in the 1960s 
to reflect its “claim of a national character.”203 One of my respondents narrated to me that this 
was also done to reflect the generational shift of its members from “youth” to “adults.”204 In 
all, I consider this change of terms to be part of what defines the fluidity of Islamic reform. 
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It is worth noting that few studies have emphasised the important role of students in Islamic 
reform in Western educational institutions. Muriel Gomez-Perez, Marie-Nathalie LeBlanc and 
Mathias Savadogo point to these students in countries like Senegal, Burkina Faso and the Ivory 
Coast.205 Their work discusses movements like the Association des Eleves et des Etudiants 
Musulmans de Cote d Ivoire (Ivory Coast’s Association of Muslim Students [AEEMCI]), 
founded in 1978 and the Association des Jeunes Musulmans de Treichville (Treichville's Young 
Muslims Association [AJMT]), established in 1988, which organised public preaching, built 
mosques and promoted the use of the veil among women, all of which contributed to the public 
expression of Islam.206 It is also important to emphasise that there are reform-minded Muslims 
who do not belong to any association or organisation. Masquelier’s study of Islamic revival 
among women in Niger illustrates this point.207 Her study reveals that reform movements and 
scholars of diverse orientations are present in Niger. In this context, many women debate 
Islamic traditions and identify with reformist tenets that fit into their worldviews.  
The history of the MSSN can be conceptualised from these diverse reformist orientations 
above. For instance, in terms of name, the MSSN is also called “Jama’at Taliban Muslimin 
Nijiriya”208 in Arabic by its members. The name, following Loimeier’s argument, is an 
indication of its reform orientation and the social group it regards as its members. The Society 
considers itself as a body for all Muslim students in Nigeria, who, often, belong to other Islamic 
groups outside the schools. One of the arguments used to promote this orientation is that Islam 
is one and that its members must be viewed as a single community in the school context. But 
the Society also recognises the diverse orientations of its members and promoted the diversity 
from inception. Therefore, in addition to its name, the MSSN provides a platform that allows 
the propagation of many reform orientations among students. Among these orientations are 
those of the Salafis, the MB, and those that emphasised piety among women. Although the 
Society has tried in recent times to distance itself from some reformist orientations in the 
Tabligh Jama’at, Sufi and Salafi movements, many of its members continued to be linked to 
these orientations. Furthermore, after many years, like the Ansar-Ud-Deen, the MSSN also 
reframed its identity from a ‘youth’ to a ‘student’ movement. In reality, the MSSN was 
established by ‘students,’ and it continued to be conceived by many Nigerians as a ‘student/or 
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youth’ association linked to a specific age category. Yet, the Society has embraced the notion 
of ‘student’ which is not based on age category. While the term continued to be contested, the 
Society’s theory of ‘student’ ensures that its members and its reform orientation are not 
confined to educational institutions. 
2.3.2 Islamic reform and modernity 
In many studies, Islamic reform is frequently linked with “modernity” which is considered to 
emanate from Europe or the West.209 In fact, it is either conceived as a form of modernity or a 
reaction to it in some studies. Among these studies is the work of the Osellas, which uses the 
term “Islamic modernism” to refer to “projects of change aiming to re-order Muslims’ 
lifeworlds and institutional structures in dialogue with those produced under colonial and post-
colonial modernity.”210 Lara Deeb’s study of Shi’i Muslims in Lebanon suggests another form 
of relationship between modernity and Islamic reform by focusing on how piety is promoted 
in the public by some Muslims. Rather than being a form of modernity or a reaction to it, she 
contends that modernity interacts and co-exists with Islam such that “religiosity is incorporated 
into modern-ness.”211 These differing viewpoints suggest that the analysis of “Islamic reform” 
from the perspective of “modernity” is problematic, as many studies have shown.212 This 
prolem arises from our inability to conceptualise “modernity” and its relationship with the 
process of Islamic reform. Moosa has referred to this problem in the contrasting ways in which 
modernity has been conceived by reformers since the nineteenth century. He noted that while 
the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century reformists were of the view that modernity was 
good, many scholars in the twenty-first-century gave a strong critique against it.213  
This problem calls attention to Frederick Cooper’s argument that the use of “modernity” in 
different discourses might be creating more confusion than clarity.214 This is why he suggests 
that rather than finding a better definition, “scholars should not try for a slightly better 
definition so that they can talk about modernity more clearly. They should instead listen to 
 
209 For instance, Kobo, Unveiling Modernity in Twentieth-Century West African Islamic Reforms, 1–32; Kane, 
Muslim Modernity in Postcolonial Nigeria, 1–7; Osella and Osella, Islamic Reform in South Asia, 11–13. 
210 Osella and Osella, Islamic Reform in South Asia, xi. 
211 Deeb, An Enchanted Modern, 5. 
212 The problem of conceptualising modernity and Islam is noted in many studies including Benjamin Soares 
and Filippo Osella, “Islam, Politics, Anthropology,” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 15, no. 8 
(2009): s4-s5; and Martin van Bruinessen, Armando Salvatore and  Muhammad K. Masud, eds., Islam and 
Modernity: Key Issues and Debates (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 1–6. 
213 Ebrahim Moosa, “The Debts and Burden of Critical Islam,” in Progressive Muslims: On justice, gender and 
pluralism, ed. Omid Safi, 111–27 (Oxford: Oneworld, 2003), 118. 
214 Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History, 4th ed. (Berkeley (Calif.): 
University of California Press, 2009), 113. 
 
58 
 
what is being said in the world. If modernity is what they hear, they should ask how it is being 
used and why.”215 But, many studies on Islamic reform and modernity are not consistent with 
this argument. For instance, Kobo’s study of Islamic reform in Ghana and Burkina Faso agrees 
with Cooper’s argument because he narrated that his informants employed words like 
“modern,” “modernity,” “progress, and “irrationality,” to describe their activities and 
aspirations, as well as their link with the Western and Arab worlds.216 Therefore, by focusing 
on how they imagined their experiences, Kobo analysed Islamic reform from the point of view 
of modernity that was inspired by colonial rule. In doing this, he juxtaposed the conception of 
European modernity and its symbols with the reformist orientations in Ghana and Burkina 
Faso.217 Nevertheless, Armando Salvatore has contested this approach because the comparison 
suggests “de-essentialising Islam” and “re-essentialising modernity” based on an over-
simplified definition of modernity.218 To avoid this trap, some scholars have argued for an 
alternative conception of “modernity” because it privileges the West as the maker of universal 
history.219  
Ousseina Alidou in her study of women in Niger shows that this alternative definition can take 
non-Europeans into account, thereby proving that modernity is “plural and multidirectional.”220 
This approach appears in Kane’s study of the Yan Izala movement that challenges the basis of 
modernity linked to colonial rule in Africa. Kane builds on the theories of postcolonialism that 
emphasised the agency of the colonised and argues that the composition of the modern world 
is largely the product of the interaction between the imperialists and their subjects. For him, 
imperialism is “a process of intense interactions of give-and-take” between the coloniser and 
the colonised.221 Thus, rather than being transported from Europe to Africa, according to him, 
modernity is a joint project of the two. From this perspective, Kane departs from Cooper’s 
argument by insisting that the Yan Izala also promote modernity. While I consider Kane’s 
analysis to be very useful, Cooper’s emphasis on how modernity is conceptualised by our 
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respondents also deserves serious attention. Cooper’s argument is important for me not only 
because I could link the term, ‘modernity,’ to my respondents, but also because the Yoruba 
have a concept known as Ọlaju that is connected to how modernity is understood by them. 
Thus, by focusing on how my respondents used ‘modernity’ and the idea that is connected to 
it among the Yoruba, I will demonstrate the multidimensionality of ‘modernity’ and how I 
approach it with regards to Islamic reform in the MSSN. 
Peel has shown that Ọlaju is a nuanced concept that is related to many ideas such as 
“enlightenment,” “civilisation,” “knowledge,” “power” and “progress.”222 From the late 
nineteenth century, as Peel demonstrates, Ọlaju became associated with Western education and 
other factors of social change stimulated by colonization such as the railways and hospitals.223 
As education was considered a form of Ọlaju that confers power on those who acquired it and 
a capital that facilitates development, it inspired many Yoruba Muslim to embrace it. But 
despite being educated and, given that they consider being Muslim as part of Ọlaju, they have 
remained critical of the Ọlaju of Christianity which they associate with Europe and its ideals 
of modernity. Kobo draws attention to a phenomenon similar to this as the impact of 
imperialism and the creativity of the colonised to use “the colonial cultural and material 
discourse to reinforce local struggles against the remnants of colonial rule.”224 For him, this is 
one of the ways in which “the colonised used colonial discourse against itself.”225 However, 
the example of Yoruba Muslims reveals that they are not using the “remnants” of the coloniser 
in their understanding of modernity. To understand this, it is important to consider the Yoruba 
Muslims discourse not only as a product of colonization but also part of their broader 
worldview. As noted above, Ọlaju could mean ‘enlightnement’ or ‘progress.’ It could also be 
used in both positive and negative senses. On one hand, it could be conceived of as a factor of 
‘development’ or ‘progress’ and on the other hand, as a stimulus to immorality or disaster.226 
To this extent, it is not just employed as a critique of European modernity but a discourse of 
their notion of ‘modernity’ in its own right. The Yoruba Muslims’ critique of European 
modernity must therefore be situated in this broader sense of the term. 
The impact of this notion of ‘modernity’ came out in the testimonies of many respondents. 
Generally, when these respondents talk about Islamic reform, they usually avoid terms like 
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“Islamic modernism” or “modern” Islam to describe their orientation. This is not to suggest 
that other Yoruba Muslims, including students, do not consider reform in the sense of 
modernity. Moreover, the public perception of many Christians about new ways of being 
Muslims have not helped the resentment which most MSSN members have for this “modern” 
term. For instance, many Christians refer to Muslims who do not embrace the Salafi-minded 
practices as either “enlightened,” “modern,” or “good” Muslims. Owing to this, the MSSN 
members prefer to talk about their orientation with terms like “real Islam,” “authentic Islam,” 
“pristine Islam,” “conscious Muslims,” and “Sunnatic” (from sunna) practice. It is against this 
background that I avoid the concept of modernity in my conception of Islamic reform in this 
study.  
Nonetheless, I am aware that modernisation is linked to the history of the MSSN. In this regard, 
I follow Janson’s argument about the ‘modernity’ of the Tabligh Jama’at. Like the MSSN, 
Janson argues that the Jama’at can be regarded as a typical ‘modern’ movement in the sense 
that it emerges under the conditions of processes of modernisation that is characterised by 
industrialisation, urbanisation and individualism, and that the movement represents an attempt 
to deal with the transformations caused by these processes. Analysing the history of the MSSN 
this way also agrees with the views of many MSSN members when they contest the 
interpretation of the Islam of the Salafis in Yoruba society. For instance, one of the positions 
of these Salafis is that Islam does not support the formation of ‘groups,’ ‘parties’ or ‘societies’ 
by Muslims. Although this argument is considered valid by the supporters of the MSSN, 
however, they see the formation of the MSSN as inevitable in a modern Yoruba society. The 
supporters of the MSSN also consider the Society to be useful in dealing with contemporary 
Muslim challenges. This confirms the arguments in many studies that reformists do not seek to 
do away with every symbol of modernity, rather, they often appropriate and ‘Islamise’ them.227 
To this extent, while I do not equate Islamic reform with modernity, I still consider that the 
history of the MSSN can be understood within the context of modern society. 
2.4 Religious change  
The Islamization and Christianization of many parts of Africa by the twentieth century have 
been theorised by many scholars. Among them is Robin Horton who contends that the 
conversion to the two religions is due to the religious thought process of Africans and how it 
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responds to modern situations. 228 He argues that many Africans moved away from the 
recognition of lesser gods, which they associated with smaller communities and smaller issues, 
to a Supreme Being, which they associated with larger communities and bigger concerns. For 
him, the conversion was caused by the inability of lesser gods to cope with or explain bigger 
concerns such as colonialism, modernisation, and transportation technology. However, Islam 
and Christianity played the role of catalysts to support the conversion of many Africans because 
they connected them with the Supreme Being who helped to deal with the bigger concerns.229 
In his response to Horton, Humphrey Fisher proposes a historical approach to Islamization 
based on three stages. He notes that there was a “quarantine” stage when Islam gradually made 
an inroad into the “animist” communities; a “mixing” phase, where the people assimilated 
Islamic traditions but retained elements of old beliefs and practices; and the “reform” period, 
where they abandoned these elements.230 Largely, Horton and Fisher give some insights into 
the understanding of religious change today. However, Janson’s study challenges their 
approaches because they offered an understanding of religious change as a straight path, that 
is, a shift from Traditional Religion to Christianity or Islam.231 Using the example of a member 
of Tabligh Jama’at in The Gambia, Janson argues that conversion can also be “in terms of a 
transformation of the self” which could happen within the same religion, either Islam or 
Christianity. She also calls attention to the conception of this transformation as a fluctuating 
process rather than a unilinear pathway.232 Thus, one of my understandings of religious change 
builds on Janson’s argument. Her argument supports the experience of the Yoruba Muslim 
students in the MSSN because one of the forms of their religious change involves a shift from 
one notion of Islam to another. 
In addition, I build on the conception of religious change by Jack Eller as an aspect of wider 
cultural change.233 Eller considers religious change to fit into Bronisław Malinowski’s 
definition of cultural change as “the process by which the existing order of a society, that is, its 
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social, spiritual, and material civilisation, is transformed from one type into another.”234 
Though it appears as a unidirectional process, this conception of religious change suggests that 
transformation in religion will generally affect other aspects of culture. When this happens, the 
key change processes will function in both religion and culture.235 The key change processes, 
as he notes, are “innovation” and “diffusion.” Innovation can occur in culture when an 
individual or group bring a new idea, object or practice into being. In religion, the innovation 
can be “a new entity to believe in, a new myth to tell, a new symbol to use, a new ritual to 
perform, etc.”236 For the process of diffusion, it can occur if “an idea, object, or practice from 
another society is introduced into the first society which entails further cultural processes such 
as contact, migration, intermarriage, invasion, or conquest.”237 
From a sociological approach, Meredith McGuire contends that the dynamics of religious 
change relate to a broader process of social change.238 This suggests that rather than happening 
in isolation, religious change is also stimulated by social factors. This perspective informs the 
object of research of many sociologists from the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
seeking to understand religion within the society. Among them is Karl Marx who is well-known 
for arguing that changes in the economy are central to religious and social change.239 This 
comes from his conceptualisation of religion as a creation of the material and economic realities 
of the society and a tool used by the rich to oppress the poor. This view is less popular today 
because it tends to subject the historical process only to the forces of the market. There is also 
Émile Durkheim whose perspective to the debate differed from Marx. As Bryan Turner argues, 
Durkheim considers religion to be the seeds of social life and collective activity. This informs 
his concept of religion as a “social fact” – “a phenomenon outside the individual, existing 
independently and exercising moral force over society.”240 Although Durkheim was criticised 
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by many secularists for this position, Turner argues that the revival of religion today has made 
his argument relevant again.241  
Apart from being stimulated by social factors, religion can also have a significant implication 
on social change. As Wallis contends, religion can play this role through direct impact on social 
structures.242 The impact can also be indirect by functioning through the adjustment of people’s 
lives and thoughts. In turn, social change can affect religion which may be due to generational 
changes, technological innovation, a transition from war to peace, and economic prosperity. 
While these changes can reduce previously held beliefs and practices, they can also foster new 
religious ideas and movements among them.243 
The various perspectives above show that there are complex factors at play in the process of 
religious change. This view confirms Peel’s argument that “the factors involved in religious 
change in Africa are very elaborate” such that historians and social scientists can offer different 
explanations.244 This heterogeneity of processes of religious change informs my understanding 
of the concept in this study. This perspective is important because it allows me to approach the 
history of MSSN in a complex way. As part of the complexity, I consider the establishment of 
the MSSN as an innovation that was enabled by the social process of Christianization and 
colonialization. The transformation of MSSN into a reformist movement is also shaped by 
varying postcolonial realities both in the Muslim world and in Nigeria.  
However, despite offering a fluid conception, Eller suggests that the multiplicity of processes 
involved in religious and cultural change also mean that one is not always certain about the 
“ultimate source of novelty.”245 This is made more challenging by the problem of reducing 
phenomena like “religion” to specific meanings. For instance, the notion of “religion,” as 
Wilfred Smith argues, is a reified term confused together with “religious” practices such as 
rituals and praying, while the idea of “religion as a category that abstracted human activities 
and experiences” does not exist.246 The problem of constructing “religion” has therefore raised 
certain questions in many studies such as those on new religious movements (NRM). As Eller 
notes, there are questions on “what does ‘new’ mean?” and “what is ‘religious’ about NRMs?” 
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insofar as many of them integrate other goals like economics and politics.247 Despite the 
problem of abstraction, Eller contends that it is possible to view religious change through 
specific “forms and outcomes,” which I will discuss below.248  
2.4.1 Forms of change  
Eller posits that the result of religious change may include various processes that include 
“addition,” “deletion” “reinterpretation” “elaboration,” “simplification,” “purification,” 
“syncretism,” and “schism/fission.”249 I wish to point out that even though each of these 
processes implies different things, they are all connected, in different ways, to how discourse 
results in a religious change. For instance, “addition,” as Eller points out, may occur if a new 
item is introduced to a pre-existing repertoire. The new item becomes a practice once an 
argument is made to authorise it. This happens many times in the MSSN and among Yoruba 
Muslims in general.250 The major examples are the introduction of the MSSN as a new 
organisation for Yoruba Muslim students, and the various forms of Islamic education which I 
discussed in Chapter Seven. Another major example is the introduction of music which is used 
for entertainment in the MSSN but also regarded as a type of da’wa (propagation of Islam). 
However, employing music for da’wa raised several debates on whether it was a correct 
practice in Islam and was dropped by the Society in the late 1980s. The dropping of the music 
is part of what Eller refers to as “deletion” in which a society or religious organisation 
discontinues a ritual. 
Eller also identifies the case of “reinterpretation,” a process in which initial beliefs and 
practices may be given new meanings. This can occur due to generational difference or by the 
introduction of new viewpoints.251 This process calls attention to the idea of reform and how it 
was inspired in the MSSN, discussed in Chapter Five. In this case, the Society gave a different 
perspective to the notion of sunna which departed from how it was conceived by many Yoruba 
Muslims. A major example is the use of certain veils that cover the woman’s face which many 
Yoruba Muslims considered being less obligatory but was emphasised by the MSSN as central 
to what it means to be a good Muslim. 
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An aspect of this process of “reinterpretation” is what Eller refers to as “elaboration” which 
occurs when an old idea or action is widened and improved.252 In the MSSN, it happens that 
after promoting a different notion of sunna, the understanding and practices considered as 
sunna such as veiling were also expanded. To illustrate this, before the reform, female Muslims 
in Yorubaland used the loose scarves during prayers and in the public domain. This is not to 
suggest that these scarves are no longer in use. However, these scarves are not considered to 
fit into the prophetic examples with which many female MSSN members wish to be associated. 
This has made different types of knitted veils, some of which are in the form of a garment, 
popular among these female MSSN members.  
Another aspect of reinterpretation can be “simplification” which involves reducing the detail 
of an existing idea or practice.253 This is noticed in the method of transmission of knowledge 
in the MSSN which I discussed in Chapter Seven. For instance, while education in the classical 
madrasas starts with the mastery of Arabic, the MSSN promotes the use of English translated 
texts in the acquisition of knowledge. This is not to suggest that the Society de-emphasises the 
importance of Arabic. However, the English texts have been simplified following the process 
of objectification and they fit into the Western educational pedagogies which the students are 
familiar with.  
Besides, Eller explains that “purification” can also be a variant of reinterpretation.254 In this 
case, the effort is to get rid of an element which an individual or group considers to be wrong 
or alien and to return to the ‘real’ or ‘pure’ form. This happened when the MSSN dissociated 
itself from the Ahmadiyya movement and the Sufi orders because they were regarded as 
innovation (bid’a) into the ‘real Islam.’ Islamic reform, discussed above, is therefore an 
example of this process of “purification.” 
The other form of religious change is “syncretism.”255 This is assumed to be a new religion or 
culture showing elements that are derived from the blending of two or more cultural/religious 
sources. Such blending may either occur consciously or unconsciously. Rosalind Shaw and 
Charles Stewart point out that in many studies syncretism is regarded as a form of ‘infiltration’ 
and ‘contamination’ of the ‘original’ and ‘pure’ religious tradition by other symbols or 
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meaning.256 However, they contest this way of thinking because it suggests that every religion 
is impermeable to other cultures and practices. My study also departs from such an erroneous 
conception of syncretism. As I will demonstrate in Chapter Three, some aspects of this 
erroneous notion of syncretism which developed among Yoruba Muslims include participation 
in cultural festivals and divination, although these syncretist practices are contested by reform 
movements such as the Ahmadiyya, Ansar-Ud-Deen and the MSSN. 
Lastly, there is “schism,” which Eller refers to as a condition of reproduction of religion as a 
chapter or denomination of initial beliefs and tradition. He notes that over time, a denomination 
may become a full religion following its break away from the main group.257 This form of 
religious change sheds light on the factionalisation and defection of many groups from the 
MSSN. As I will show in Chapter Five, these groups established their own movements with 
varying ideals of Islam which, nevertheless, intersect those of the MSSN. 
I consider that the forms highlighted by Eller above are very important for understanding the 
dynamics of religious change. Yet, as noted in Wallis’ argument above, religious change can 
also be stimulated by social factors. The role of social factors is relevant to my perspective of 
religious change and my understanding of the role of discursive tradition in this change because 
they create the conditions on which various topics on Islam, such as piety and education, are 
constructed and understood in the MSSN and among Yoruba Muslims. In the next section, I 
explore these social factors within the contexts of ‘deprivation’ and ‘colonial rule’ which 
appear in many debates on religious change. 
2.4.2 Context of change  
In her explanation of the social factors that lead to the formation of religious groups, McGuire 
notes that many studies focused on ‘strained economic conditions.’258 For instance, the 
economic factors resonate in Salihu Hamisu’s account of why the Boko Haram movement 
emerged in Nigeria in 2002.259 However, McGuire contends that the economic deprivation 
thesis is inadequate because it fails to capture a wide range of empirical conditions which are 
beyond this factor. Rather than focusing on economic deprivation, she calls attention to an 
alternative model called “relative deprivation” that captures the various conditions which can 
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lead to the formation of a religious movement. Relative deprivation, as Charles Glock contends, 
refers to “any and all of the ways that an individual or group may be or feel disadvantaged in 
comparison either to other individuals or groups or to an internalized set of standards.”260 This 
suggests that an individual or groups may not only feel deprived in economic terms, but also 
social, political, and ethical ways. When people feel this way, and if they can “mobilise,” 
McGuire argues that they will form a religious or social movement.261 This proposition 
supports the experience of students who established the MSSN. As I will demonstrate, the 
students who founded the MSSN were not only concerned about conversion to Christianity, 
they were also in need of many things which included Islamic knowledge and a platform for 
social activities to cater for only Muslims. Based on Glock’s proposal, I will show in chapter 
four that the theory of “persecution” of Muslim students, which Rufai262 emphasised as the 
main stimulus for founding the MSSN, is both weak and unhelpful in the understanding of 
these students encounter with Christianity. 
Furthermore, many studies suggest that colonialization provides a major context that facilitates 
religious change.263 Although there are debates on the impact of colonization on this change, 
these studies suggest that it played an ambivalent role in different settings. This ambivalence, 
as I understand it, can be placed within the broader process of the making of the colony which, 
as Achim von Oppen argues, has many contradictions. An example is the colonial 
“universalising ambitions” which goes hand in hand with the fragmentation of territories and 
subjects.264 There is another example in the sphere of religion in Jean and John Comaroff’s 
study where they show that Christianity and colonialization shaped the consciousness of the 
Tswana of South Africa towards European capitalism and Western modernity.265 While 
Christianity prepared the ground for the colonialization of the Tswana, the state after 
colonization embarked on a policy to control them through the establishment of schools and 
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the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC). But, many of those who converted to Christianity later 
became opponents of the apartheid policy of the state, thereby revealing the contradiction in 
the colonial agenda. 
Besides such policies of control, the structure of colonial rule also played an important role in 
sharpening religious identities. As Francis Robinson argues, “the growth of the modern state, 
the introduction of new systems of knowledge, the expansion of capitalist production, and the 
spread of communications of all forms - telegraph, post, press - made possible the fashioning 
of all identities at local, regional and supra-regional levels.”266 Focusing on India during the 
British rule, he contends that the colonial system encouraged a marked distinction between 
Muslims and non-Muslims, the development of Muslim political identity and the gendering of 
Muslims identity based on Western thoughts. Apart from sharpening Muslims identities, 
Soares’ study in Nioro, Mali illustrates that the colonial system also contributed to the 
conversion of non-Muslims into Islam.267 It is understood in this region that the French 
conquest and end of slavery in Mali from the late nineteenth century were followed by a large 
migration of non-Muslims of diverse origins, including slaves, who looked for opportunities in 
commerce, colonial armies, education and jobs in new cities opened-up by the state. According 
to Soares, because the cities provided spaces for more interaction and independent religious 
practice than the pre-colonial context, a significant number of the migrants, especially the 
former slaves who previously had marginal status in the society, converted to Islam. 
It is worth noting that even though the colonialization of Africa ended many years ago, its 
structures did not collapse. Thomas Bierschenk and Eva Spies argue that “1960,” which 
represents the period of independence of many states, “does not necessarily mark the most 
significant turning point in recent African history.”268 Furthermore, they contend that African 
states have undergone wide-ranging changes since independence which have made them more 
complex. These changes resonate on religion, often in ways that challenged pre-existing 
traditions. Part of these changes, as Bierschenk and Spies observe, is the hitherto form of 
religiosity at local levels flourishing at the global level. It also includes the development of 
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secular-minded religious actors in the public sphere contesting the normative role of religion 
in modern societies.269 
My understanding of the relationship between colonial rule and religious change is in line with 
these ambivalences. This study contends that the legacies of colonialization resonate on 
changes in the MSSN in multiple and contradictory ways. Importantly, as I will demonstrate, 
colonization facilitated contact between students in Nigeria and the Muslim world from the 
1950s, thus enabling the exchange of knowledge and cultures among them. Colonialization 
also encouraged the introduction of Western education that caused a significant transformation 
of the classical model of Islamic knowledge transmission. In the same vein, it created socio-
economic and political conditions that inspired the encounter between Muslims and Christians 
in Yorubaland. In addition, the social changes caused by colonization impacted on the ways in 
which varying ideas of being Muslim are constructed, debated and lived. 
2.5 Muslim-Christian encounters 
While I locate the history of the MSSN in the context of religious and social changes above, I 
also wish to point out that many aspects of the change are historically linked to how Yoruba 
Muslims encountered the various Christian missionaries and their followers. To understand 
this point, I build on Soares’ discourse on the way Muslims and Christians have encountered 
each other in Africa. Soares adopts the term “encounter” as an analytical perspective to situate 
the range of interactions between Muslims and Christians over time. He is of the view that the 
interactions “cannot be understood as simply existing at a point on a one-dimensional 
continuum that runs from coexistence to conflict.”270 This argument is a critique of approaches 
and assumptions in studies that exclusively focus on either ‘relation,’ ‘dialogue’ or ‘conflict’ 
between the two religious’ groups. In many of these studies, according to Soares, Muslims and 
Christians are treated as single communities that relate as blocs without crisscrossing each 
other’s boundaries. Some of them build on a functionalist approach that conceives of religion 
as instrumental to stability in society. Apart from this, many of these studies tend to presume 
that ‘peace’ and ‘tolerance’ is the “normal” societal condition. Among these studies which 
focus on Nigeria is Akintunde Akinade’s Fractured Spectrum, in which he highlighted the 
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strained relations between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria and calls for a “dialogue” to 
address it.271 
Soares is aware of studies like Akinade’s work which seek to respond to the tensions that have 
characterised the interactions between members of both faiths. Nonetheless, he insists that 
“interactions between Muslims and Christians in Africa must be understood in their full 
complexity.”272 To analyse this complexity, as he proposes, is not “to focus exclusively on 
either conflict or peaceful coexistence.”273 At the same time, the spotlight should not be on 
religion alone because it is only one of the elements that define social identities. On the 
contrary, the focal point should be on the wide range of phenomena on which they interacted. 
To do this, there is a need to be aware that while Muslims and Christians have confronted one 
another and live side by side in peace, they have also converted to each other’s religion. 
Moreover, they have borrowed and appropriated from each other, and married among 
themselves.274 It is this complex form of interaction that informs his conceptualisation of 
encounter as an alternative analytical category for understanding Muslin-Christian relations. 
His argument has been taken further by Insa Nolte and Olukoya Ogen in their study of religious 
encounter in the Yoruba town of Ede.275 They show that the complexity of Muslim-Christian 
interactions may not only be understood from how the two have interacted historically, but also 
the way they relate with the Traditionalists. By paying attention to the three religious’ 
traditions, they demonstrate that there is a varying degree of conflict and coexistence among 
them in different settings which challenges the liberal idea of tolerance. Some of the major 
works by Peel on the Yoruba also show a similar form of interaction between the three religious 
groups.276 In one of these works, Religious Encounter and the Making of the Yoruba, Peel 
reveals that even though many Muslims are opposed to Christianity, the Christian missionaries 
appropriated many Arabic terms, and the cultural ones, which have been localised to produce 
the Yoruba Bible in the colonial period.277 The missionaries also facilitated the development 
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of Yoruba alphabets and the consciousness of “Yoruba” as a single name for the diverse people. 
His study thus suggests that the way Christians interact with Muslims contributes significantly 
to moulding the social identities of the Yoruba. Beyond the Yoruba, Olufemi Vaughan shows 
a similar process in the construction of the identities of the state in Nigeria. Vaughan is of the 
view that while the Muslim and Christian projects have historically run at cross-purposes in 
Nigeria, “their institutions and doctrines are consistently embedded in the structures of society, 
shaping social relations and the configuration of power.”278 Generally, Peel and Vaughan’s 
studies demonstrate the importance of not only looking at religion in Muslim-Christian 
encounters but also the project which members of both faiths set to accomplish. 
The history of the MSSN provides another useful context for looking into the dynamics of 
Muslim-Christian encounters in Yoruba society. The educational institutions, for instance, 
show how one of these dynamics can be appreciated. As I will demonstrate, the Muslim 
students interact in the same settings with Christian students whose church missions pioneered 
the school system and set many of its pedagogies. The school is also a place where the Muslim 
and Christian students acquire the capital and skills which they both need to achieve economic 
and political resources from the opportunities provided by the state. Beyond their quests for 
knowledge, the school also facilitates a varying degree of co-existence and borrowings between 
the Muslim students and their Christian colleagues. The establishment of the MSSN, for 
instance, was inspired by those of the Christian mission schools called the SCM and SU. At 
the same time, the interaction between Christian and Muslim students in the schools showed 
many incidences of conflict and critique of each other’s religion and way of life. To illustrate 
this, I give examples of MSSN’s protest of a church cross in Chapter Four and a lecture that 
specifically focused on comparing Islam with Christianity in Chapter Seven. 
In conclusion, it is possible to link the conceptual frameworks in this study by arguing that 
religious change is a process which takes different forms in many areas, some of which, in the 
context of a Muslim society, are made possible through the process of reform or revival of 
certain traditions. The prevailing social and historical conditions in a society can also shape the 
outcome of religious change. Certain forms of religious change can equally be motivated by 
encounters between people of different religions, particularly in a multireligious society. In all, 
discourses and counter-discourses are central to these three processes because they are used to 
frame the introduction, interpretation and discontinuity of a practice and what to belief. This 
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understanding of the process of religious change is what runs through the whole empirical 
chapters of this dissertation. I will begin by showing this process in the next chapter from the 
Islamization of Yorubaland and why the social experiences of Yoruba Muslims led to the 
formation of the MSSN in 1954. 
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Chapter Three 
Yoruba Muslims: Religious Encounter and Social Change up to 1960 
3.1 Introduction 
By the 1950s, almost all Yorubaland had encountered Islam, Christianity, colonial rule and 
Western culture. The encounter led to a significant change in social relations, religious identity, 
economic and political development in several communities. How the Yoruba interacted with 
the two foreign religions and colonialization, and the conditions under which their interaction 
took place, created new crises and opportunities, as well as diversity among them. On the one 
hand, this chapter explores this encounter between the Yoruba and Islam, and on the other hand 
between Yoruba Muslims, Christianity and colonial rule. The first aim of the chapter is to show 
the social context and experience of Yoruba Muslims up to the period when the MSSN was 
established, and how this experience shaped the visions set out for the Society. This is in line 
with the main argument of the chapter that the history of MSSN is linked to the encounter of 
Yoruba Muslims with Christianity and the social change that was facilitated by colonization. 
Secondly, this chapter aims to illustrate the process of religious change of the Yoruba Muslims 
and its connection to the history of MSSN. 
The first section focuses on the history of the Yoruba, showing the various aspects of their 
culture, religion, economic and political organisations. Although I refer to the past in this 
section, I discussed many aspects of Yoruba history in the present tense to show their continuity 
in contemporary times. The second section is on the history of Islam among the Yoruba. This 
section points attention to the origin of the religion, the factors that facilitated its development 
and how it was practised and organised. In the third section, I focused on the process of 
Christianization of the Yoruba and why the educational activity of Christian missions 
challenged the Yoruba Muslims. This section also demonstrates the process of the imposition 
of colonial rule, which facilitated modern economic and political developments in Yorubaland, 
and why the broader colonial system benefited the cause of the Christian missions. The fourth 
section describes the response of Yoruba Muslims to the social transformation caused by 
Christianization and colonization and how this response impacted their new ways of life and 
identities as Muslims. In the fifth section, I show the experiences of Yoruba Muslim students 
and what their experiences tell us about the Yoruba Muslim society up to the end of colonial 
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rule. I conclude the chapter by reflecting on the process of religious change among Yoruba 
Muslims up to the end of colonial rule. 
3.2 Yoruba: people, culture and society 
The geographical location of the Yorubas has changed since the end of the twentieth century. 
However, the majority of the Yoruba have remained in their former location which is in the 
present-day southwest region of Nigeria made up of six states: Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun 
and Oyo. Other Yoruba groups in Kwara and Kogi States are part of the North-Central region 
of Nigeria. It is difficult to give an accurate population of the Yoruba due to errors and politics 
that have been associated with the figure since the colonial period.279 But in 2017, the 
population of Nigeria was estimated to be 182 million. The Yoruba are estimated to be twenty-
one per cent of this figure which is second to the Hausa and Fulani’s twenty-nine per cent.280 
In the diaspora, Yoruba communities are in several countries across the world, notably the 
Republic of Benin, Togo, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Cuba and Brazil. 
This study is based on those in southwest Nigeria.  
The ethnogenesis of the Yoruba has been a subject of academic and theological debates. A 
popular Yoruba oral tradition claimed that the universe was created at Ile-Ife (now a city in 
Osun State) after Oduduwa descended from heaven.281 Oduduwa is thus held as the mythical 
hero of the Yoruba while Ile-Ife is regarded as their sacred home. Another tradition propounded 
by Samuel Johnson suggested that the Yoruba were from the Middle East in Upper-Egypt. He 
was of the view that the Yoruba were subjects of the Egyptian conqueror named Nimrod, who 
followed him to a battle in Arabia before migrating to Ile-Ife.282 Academic historians rejected 
this argument partly because it confirms the ‘Hamitic theory’ which colonialist historians such 
as C.G. Seligman used to reject African civilisation. The Hamitic theory suggests that African 
civilisation was not indigenous but benefited from the Middle East.283 
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An alternative theory was propounded by P. C. Lloyd who suggested that the Yoruba migrated 
from the savanna belt to the forest in different groups.284 Academic historians such as I. A. 
Akinjogbin are also of the view that the Yoruba had settled in their location for a very long 
time before Oduduwa arrived.285 Several archaeological findings at Ile-Ife and other Yoruba 
towns from 1910 including those of Leo Frobenius, Frank Willet,286 Gérard Chouin and Adisa 
Ogunfolakan,287 gave some credit to this theory. While the Yoruba ethnogenesis remained 
controversial, what I consider noteworthy is that some of these theories indicate that there is a 
link, which remains unclear, between the Yoruba and the Muslim world before the large-scale 
adoption of Islam in Yorubaland. Later, I will demonstrate this with reference to the Ifá 
divination and the conversion stories of some Yorubas to Islam. 
As a cultural group, the Yoruba are widely diverse. Before the twentieth century, there was 
little or no common consciousness which suggests that they were one ‘Yoruba’ people. The 
word ‘Yoruba’ was mostly used to refer to people of the old Oyo empire by their neighbours 
and traders which included the Hausa.288 By the second half of the eighteenth century, the old 
Oyo empire was the largest and most powerful in Yorubaland with an army based on cavalry. 
Its capital was in the savannah of the Niger valley and it stretched over Nupe, Dahomey and 
southeast towards Benin Republic. Following its destruction in 1830, the capital shifted to the 
south where a new empire was founded at its present location.289 Besides the reference made 
to Oyo, the people refer to themselves in terms of the name of their towns and cities such as 
Ife, Oyo, Ijebu, Abeokuta, Ilorin, Osogbo, Ilesa, Eko, Ibadan and Ogbomoso.290 However, they 
speak different dialects which are mutually intelligible and categorised based on their towns. 
It is in the writings of those who documented them such as Sultan Bello of Sokoto, European 
travellers and Christian missionaries that the word ‘Yoruba’ was found and began to be used 
as an identity marker for these linguistic groups.291 Today, it is plausible to refer to them as a 
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linguistic group rather than a ‘Yoruba nation’ as economic and political reasons within the 
larger Nigerian context have been used to create a sense of unity among them. 
The traditional socio-political organisations of the Yoruba are varied. In his study of their 
political systems, N. A. Fadipe identified four monarchical models based on how governments 
and royal lineages are organised. This includes the Oyo, Ife, Ijebu-Ode and Egba models.292 
The Ibadan and Lagos models are different from these four.293 In these monarchical structures, 
there are kingdoms such as Ife, Oyo and Owo which are headed by sacred kings regarded as 
ekeji Òrìṣà (second to the gods). They also performed secular functions,294 usually with the 
assistance of titled chiefs and, to an extent, by honorary chiefs. The family (ẹbi) is the smallest 
unit of social organisation in Yorubaland. Polygamy is socially acceptable in this family unit, 
but monogamy is also widespread. It is common for members of the families to live together 
in the same compound called agbo-ile (a flock of houses which adjoin each other with a wall 
between adjacent apartments).295 The compound is both a residential and political organisation 
named after the head male called baale, who is respected by the juniors. In most cases, 
members of the agbo-ile, except women who are married into it as wives, are usually related 
to the father.296 The agbo-ile is central to the development of urbanization of the Yoruba in that 
several of it make up the ìlú (city-state or town). But there are also farm villages called aba or 
abule which are temporary settlements for farmers.297  
The traditional Yoruba economy is also diverse.298 Up to the 1960s, farming was the major 
occupation of the people. In this period, several farmers changed from subsistence to 
commercial production by the mid-nineteenth century and later benefited from the crash crop 
export of goods like cocoa, rubber and palm oil in the colonial period.299 Many other people 
engaged in trade, wood carving, fishing, metalworking, hunting, dressmaking, dyeing and 
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basket weaving. Even though there are modern economic activities today, these occupations 
continue to be the mainstay of many Yorubas. The economy in the precolonial period also 
developed a financial institution that made money available for commercial transactions. A. G. 
Adebayo has argued that the impact of the monetization of the economy in precolonial Yoruba 
facilitated the development of social classes and aided the formation and accumulation of 
capital.300 A major example was the city of Ibadan where powerful war-chiefs like Basorun 
Oluyole (d. 1847), Balogun Ibikunle (d. 1864) and Aarẹ Momodu Latoosa (d. 1885) emerged 
following the collapse of the former Oyo empire in the nineteenth century. Apart from leading 
wars, these warriors also accumulated wealth through agriculture and trade, which they needed 
in order to support their families and maintain soldiers and slaves.301 
In their social lives, the Yoruba usually form organisations or associations called ẹgbẹ. Ẹgbẹ 
may also be used to mean union, party, club or society. Their emergence is often considered to 
be from Yoruba compounds, ethnic and kinship group.302  While this is true in some cases, the 
trajectory of several other ẹgbẹ did not follow this trend. In a number of cases, associations are 
also formed to promote and protect common interests in various fields such as trade, politics, 
religion and recreation. A major example is the age-grades, Regberegbe, in Ijebu-Ode. Since 
the nineteenth century, the Regberegbe have developed into highly organised social groups 
within the political structure of Ijebu-Ode and have played a major role in community 
development.303 Although MSSN was inspired by the prevailing condition of Muslim students 
in the 1950s, its formation is a continuity of this Yoruba associational life. 
Another common feature in the social relation of the Yoruba are the attributes which they used 
to describe their rival groups. Olufunke Adeboye in her study on intra-ethnic segregation 
between the Ijebu and Ibadan showed that such attributes may be considered stereotypes and 
taunts that developed in the nineteenth century crises in Yorubaland.304 Beyond stereotypes, 
these attributes are important because they illustrate the nature of diversity among them and 
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how they understood themselves. They also point to the various aspects of their social 
encounter. Johnson gives a general feature of these attributes, 
 “dogged perseverance and determination characterise the Ijebus, love of ease 
and a quickness to adapt new ideas the Egbas, the Ijesas and Ekitis are 
possessed of a marvellous amount of physical strength, remarkable docility 
and simplicity of manners, and love of home… the Ibarapas are laborious 
farmers, the Ibolos are rather docile and weak in comparison with others, but 
the Epos are hardy, brave, and rather turbulent whilst the Oyos of the 
Metropolitan province are remarkably shrewd, intelligent, very diplomatic, 
cautious almost to timidity, provokingly conservative, and withal very 
masterful.”305  
Despite these stereotypes, values such as chastity for women, hospitality, paying homage and 
respecting senior persons and those in authority are generally upheld. The young greet the 
elderly person by prostration (for male), kneeling (for female) or sitting and reclining on the 
left elbow (for female).306 There is also a rich oral literature among the Yoruba which includes 
proverb (òwe), folktales (alo̩), poems (ewi), panegyric (oriki) and oral prose (itan aroso̩) used 
to teach morals, praise, honour, entertain and ensure social control in the society.307 This may 
be accompanied by dance and musical instruments during ritual festivals and life-cycle 
ceremonies.308 
As in many African societies, religion permeates the social, economic and political institutions 
of the Yoruba. Peel’s study shows that the concept of “religion” is unknown to the practitioners 
in the past.309 Rather, they talked about aṣa (custom/fashion) or aṣa ibile (country fashion). 
The term “country fashion”, according to Peel, is employed to mean a “shifting and unbounded 
body of customary practices rather than a definite and integrated ‘religion’.”310 The customary 
practices encompass “religion” and other phenomena like manner of greeting, dress, food, 
burial ceremonies, marriage and system of governance. 
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A fundamental belief in the “religion” of the people is the existence of a supernatural Supreme 
Being called Olódùmarè whom they believe can be reached through spirits and deities referred 
to as Òrìṣà (divinities). Among these deities are Ògún (god of iron), Ṣàngó (god of lightning 
and thunder), Ọṣun (goddess of the river), Èṣù (trickster and messenger) and Egúngún (lit. 
“masquerade,” representing the spirit of the dead).311 Bolaji Idowu is of the view that these 
divinities are regarded as the ministers of Olódùmarè in a theocratic government of the 
universe.312 Because the Yoruba considered these divinities to be relevant in their relationship 
with Olódùmarè, these divinities are believed to play important roles in what happens to 
individuals and the community including security, prosperity and outbreak of epidemics. 
Rituals and festivals are also associated with these divinities.313 The rituals and festivals could 
be performed on the advice of Ifá when the need arises, for example in times of misfortune or 
insecurity. Broadly speaking, Ifá is at the centre of religious practice of the Yoruba. It is 
regarded as a corpus of coded messages in poems (ẹsẹ) about the past which are organised 
under some figures called odu.314 Omotade Adegbindin argues that Ifá is also a collection of 
myths, history, proverbs and one of the expressions of the Yoruba thought system.315 It may be 
consulted by individuals or the community before undertaking any major action and could 
explain the procedure that is needed to accomplish it.316 This is necessary to seek the favour of 
deities and spirits which are believed to reside in different spaces such as the markets, or 
environmental and natural resources like the earth, trees, rivers and thunderstorms. Deities and 
spirits are also believed to reside in some individuals such as kings, twins, albinos, and people 
with hunchbacks.317 In the nineteenth century, Peel argues that Christian missionaries associate 
this “religious” custom with terms like “heathenism” and “idolatry” which suggest a cult of 
local idols. These terms were employed to imply that the custom was lower in rank to 
Christianity which was seen as an ‘ideal religion.’318 Even though it is debateable, many studies 
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on the Yoruba today use this controversial concept of ‘religion’ to describe the custom of the 
people as the “Yoruba (traditional) religion” or part of what is understood as “African 
Traditional Religion” (ATR) in African societies.319 
The extent to which religion functioned in determining the social, economic and political 
administration in pre-colonial Yorubaland is not known in detail, and it is not likely that 
people’s beliefs and practices remained static before the arrival of Christianity and Islam. 
Trade, migration and marriage brought new Òrìṣà into different towns, and these Òrìṣàs were 
adopted into existing pantheon often in ways that were different from their origin.320 
Traditional practices and beliefs were further modified following the introduction of Islam and 
Christianity and the imposition of colonial rule. New practices and religions influenced Òrìṣà 
worship also because they resonated with pre-existing ones. Thus, we see the former Ọọ̀ni of 
Ile-Ifẹ, Ọbá Adesoji Aderemi (1889–1980) emphasizing the similarity in traditional and 
Christian values by pointing to the shared emphasis on a mother’s sacrifice for the greater good 
in the celebration of Moremi (in Ile-Ife) and the story of the Biblical Mary, mother of Jesus.321 
Generally, the pre-colonial situation of Yorubaland was not static. Many kingdoms such as the 
former Oyo collapsed and new cities including Ibadan, Ijaiye and Modakeke were founded in 
the nineteenth century.322 Trade with the Hausa in the north facilitated the appropriation of 
Hausa, Nupe and Arabic words, staples and clothes by the Yoruba.323 Some towns became 
urban areas as trade encouraged constant movement and settlement of people of diverse origin 
among them.324 There were non-Yoruba who became assimilated into the Yoruba society such 
that the notion of ‘Yoruba’ either as culture or people becomes flexible to construct. In Lagos, 
for instance, the Aworis were considered to be the first Yoruba settlers from Ile-Ife, but they 
were followed by other groups such as Benin, Nupe, Ijebu and Hausa. The Benin group, led by 
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a noble class, had a significant impact on Lagos history by establishing dynastic houses in 
places like Lagos Island and Ikorodu.325 Apart from this internal development, contacts and 
exchanges also developed with European traders and travellers in coastal areas of Lagos, 
Badagry, Ikorodu and Epe from about the fifteenth century. Largely, the introduction of Islam, 
Christianity and colonial rule may be considered as part of this social change in Yorubaland. 
The trajectory of Islam in Yorubaland will thus be considered in the next section. 
3.3 Imale: the trajectory of Islam in Yorubaland 
The exact period the Yoruba first had contact with Islam has remained controversial in 
academic debates.326 Based on the evidence of a prominent Yoruba Muslim cleric called 
Shaykh Adam Al-Ilory (1917-1992) in his studies of Yoruba religion, Muhib Opeloye argued 
that Islam was first known in Yorubaland in the fourteenth century through the influence of 
Wangarawa traders from Mali.327 Patrick Ryan has suggested that the fourteenth century date 
was only a possibility. He opined that the seventeenth century was the most likely date because 
the period witnessed the visit of some Muslim traders and clerics into Oyo from its northern 
neighbours.328 Gbadamosi however took a different view arguing that Islam came to 
Yorubaland unannounced because the first Muslims might have practised the religion privately. 
But he noted that by the seventeenth century, a few Muslims were in many parts of 
Yorubaland.329 
While the debate continues, what I found useful, though still unclear in these studies, is the 
relationship between Islam and the formation of the identity of ‘Yoruba Muslims’ by the end 
of the eighteenth century. These studies showed that Islam was introduced to Yorubaland by 
missionaries and traders called Imale330 from ‘Mali,’ which was the former capital city of the 
Mandingo (or Malinke) empire of Western Sudan (c.1200-1600AD).331 According to Henri 
Labouret, the city was formerly built at Djeriba (or Djariba) but later moved to Niani. Labouret 
noted that the inhabitants might have referred to it as Melle, Mane or Melli depending on their 
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dialects.332 Due to this link, many Yoruba Muslims began to identify themselves as ẹ̀lẹ̀sin 
Imale, Imale or Male (lit. worshipper/believer of Malian religion) up to the late nineteenth 
century, a term which non-Muslim Yoruba also called them. ‘Islam’ also continued to be called 
Imale (Malian religion) by many Yorubas.333 It is important to note that this translation, 
“Malian religion,” is misleading if we assume that Imale or Male was already known in Mali. 
In the 1970s, Yoruba Muslims protested the use of this term, and according to Peel, their 
“motive” was to identify with other Muslims around the world rather than be seen “to bear a 
name that seems to tie them into a local and particular history.”334 But, this was not the only 
reason for rejecting the name, one other key factor was the corruption of the term by non-
Muslim Yorubas to mean ‘aggressive people’ and ‘hard knowledge’ in Yoruba. In Chapter 
Four, I draw attention to how the MSSN was encouraged to use songs to counter this stereotype. 
In addition to Mali, Islam also penetrated Yorubaland from Hausaland in the North. Given the 
routes of the religion, the social history of Muslims in this period thus showed that most of 
them were non-Yoruba speakers. The leading Muslims were itinerant mallams (scholars) of 
Malian, Nupe, Kanuri and Arab descent. There were also Muslim traders and slaves of Hausa, 
Nupe and Kanuri origin.335 Despite the presence of these other groups, Lisa Castillo336 
suggested that ‘Yoruba Muslims’ were more often identified as Male in the nineteenth 
century.337 But in another study, João Reis argued that the usage of the term was not limited to 
a specific group because it was generally used for West African Muslim slaves including the 
Yoruba and Hausa living in Bahia (Brazil) in the nineteenth century.338 This suggests that Imale 
is not a fixed category. Yet, how it is linked to the ‘Yoruba Muslim’ is important to 
understanding the formation of their identity and Islamization process. 
For the most part, their Islamization process in the early stages was not without some 
challenges, which varied from one community to another. Up to the early nineteenth century, 
many of them prayed in their houses and could not make the adhān (call to prayer) in public. 
In places like Ede, Oyeweso noted that the adhān was called into a keg in order not to attract 
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the attention of the Traditionalists.339 However, trading ensured that there was contact between 
Muslims and the Traditionalists. Many of these Traditionalists, including the kings, also sought 
the services of Muslim clerics for prayers and charms.340 Alaafin Ajagbo (1650-1658) of Oyo, 
and the duo of Ọba Kosoko (1845 to 1851) and Ọba Adele Ajosun ([1811 – 1821], [1835 – 
1837])341 of Lagos were among the prominent kings who tolerated Muslims in their courts to 
the consternation of the Òrìṣà priests.342 Despite their relationship, the conditions of the 
Muslims became uncertain after the collapse of old Oyo. This was after many Hausa slaves 
declared support for the revolt led by a chief of the Oyo army, Afonja (d. 1823), the Aarẹ-ọna-
kankanfo, which led to the breaking away of Ilorin in 1817. Before then, Ilorin had attracted 
many Muslims such as the Fulani preacher, Alimi al-Salih (d. 1823) who fought on the side of 
Afonja. Ilorin later became an emirate under the Sokoto caliphate in 1823.343 This provoked 
suspicion and intolerance of the remaining Muslims in other parts of Yorubaland, some of 
whom were restrained and attacked by the Traditionalists.344 The varying experiences of these 
Muslims are cases that challenge the notion of religious tolerance which the Yorubas are said 
to epitomise by many scholars such as J. F. Ade Ajayi.345 
Later in the nineteenth century, the relationship between the Muslims and the Yoruba improved 
in many towns. This was partly due to the efforts of Muslim slaves such as Oshodi Landuji 
Tapa (c.1800 to 1868) of Nupe origin, who supported the war efforts of Ọba Kosoko in Lagos. 
Muslim clerics also made charms which were believed to ensure the victory of many towns in 
wars.346 In addition to the ease in tension, there was an increase in the Muslim population in 
many towns. One of the main factors responsible for this was the influx of Muslim refugees 
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displaced from old Oyo who settled in places like Ile-Ife, Abeokuta, Iwo, Ede and Ibadan.347 
The image of these Muslims was boosted when some former Muslim slaves arrived from the 
Americas especially Cuba and Brazil, and Sierra Leone from the 1840s. Those who came from 
Sierra Leone were referred to as the Saros (or Creoles) by the Yoruba while those from Brazil 
and Cuba became known as the Agudas.348 Living in places like Lagos, Abeokuta, Badagry 
and Ibadan, the social status of these Muslims caused a change in the perception of Islam in 
Yorubaland because, as Gbadamosi narrated, many of them were ship owners and merchants 
who were educated in Western literacy and who celebrated Muslim festivals with pomp.349 
Also from the 1850s, Yoruba Muslim kings and chiefs emerged in several towns like Epe, Iwo, 
Ibadan, Ede, Ikirun, Lagos and Ijebu. The conversion of these traditional chiefs encouraged 
many Yoruba to embrace Islam and practise the religion without fear of persecution.350 A 
leading example was the Muslim king in Ede, Timi Abibu Lagunju (d.1900) who encouraged 
Muslim clerics to live in the town. He also fought against their persecution and gave his 
princesses to chiefs who embraced Islam.351 There were also Ọba Aliyu Oyewole (d. 1912) in 
Ikirun and Oluwo Momodu Lamuye (1858-1906) in Iwo who not only encouraged their chiefs 
to embrace Islam but also applied the Sharia in their courts.352 Prominent war chiefs and 
entrepreneurs like Balogun Odueyungbo Kuku (1899-1907) of Ijebu and Aarẹ Latoosa of 
Ibadan also declared their conversion to Islam and were followed by several members of their 
compounds and retainers.353 Even though the clashes between the Muslims and the 
Traditionalists did not disappear, there was a significant increase in the Muslim population by 
the late nineteenth century. Based on the account of R.F. Burton during his visit to Lagos, it 
was estimated that the Muslims numbered 800 out of about 30,000 residents in September 
1862. By 1871, the figure increased to about 10,600 of the total estimates of 60,200 residents.354 
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Apart from the support of the chiefs and kings, Gbadamosi argues that several factors facilitated 
the conversion of many Yoruba to Islam. These include the little to no elaborateness in the 
ceremony required to become a Muslim, which was usually after saying the shahāda (a 
statement testifying the oneness of God and the prophethood of Muhammad). Also, the early 
Muslim clerics did not forcibly require people to abandon many of their cultural practices and 
beliefs, which made their process of conversion gradual. For many, such cultural practices as 
polygamy and belief in a Supreme Being which were found in Islam were considered parts of 
the continuity with their cultural practices, thus making it easy to relate to the new religion. 
Being married to a Muslim and the need to have good economic relations with Muslims also 
influenced many people. Added to this was the conversion of people linked to the oracular cult, 
Ifá. This conversion story gave rise to the notion of pre-destined Muslims which includes those 
of the kings mentioned earlier; Lamuye, Lagunju and Oyewole.355 At birth, Ifá was said to have 
revealed their Muslim faith, although it would later be discovered that Ifá also advised many 
Yoruba to become Christian. But the saliency of Ifá in the stories of these Muslims is important 
in the understanding of both the history of the Yoruba and their Islamization. 
In a study of four divination tablets in Africa, Wim van Binsbergen suggests that Ifá may have 
a link to the Arabians in the past.356 Many Yoruba Muslims and Traditionalists also believe in 
this historical connection to date. This is expressed in a popular narrative by them, ayé la ba 
ifá, ayé la ba imọle, ọsan gangan ni ‘gbagbọ wọ le (we met Ifá in the world, we met Islam in 
the world, only later [in the mid-day] did Christianity came into the world). They used this 
narrative to differentiate the link between the Yoruba ‘religion’ and Islam on one hand, and 
Christianity on the other hand.357 In fact, they sometimes employed it to trace the origin of the 
Yoruba to Saudi Arabia and their relationship with Islam. Louis Brenner has suggested that the 
Ifá in this narrative may have developed in response to Islam from the sixteenth century and 
that it existed parallel to the divination of Muslims by the nineteenth century.358 I also consider 
it significant to underline Peel’s argument that the link between Ifá and Islam (and Christianity) 
is due to its pragmatic and client-centred system which “embrace a multitude of individual 
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perspectives (albeit within a common framework of cosmology and ritual practice) rather than 
impose any kind of collective ideology - hence, indeed, its openness to Islam and 
Christianity.”359 
Following their conversion, the development of Yoruba Muslim practices was largely in the 
hands of the alfas (Arabic, ‘khalīfa,’ referring to a successor). The alfas, who many Yoruba 
Muslims referred to as “cleric” were of Ilorin, Nupe, Fulani and Hausa origin. Those who led 
congregational prayers among them were called lemọmu (Arabic, Imām referring to a 
leader).360 In many big cities, there were Chief Imams called Lemọmu agba who was the head 
of Imams in the Muslim communities referred to as ratibi. As the Chief Imam, he presided 
during Friday prayers and the two annual Muslim festivals (ʿĪd al-fiṭr, feast after Ramadan and 
ʿīd al-aḍḥā, the feast of sacrifice). A notable example was the Chief Imam of Ibadan, Ibrahim 
Gambari (d. 1892).361 Apart from prayers, some alfas, called alfa oni jalabi,362 rendered 
spiritual services for the Muslims. In many communities, it was also the responsibility of the 
alfas and lemọmu to preside during the Muslims life cycle ceremonies such as marriages and 
funerals. Their responsibilities also extended to knowledge transmission through madrasas 
located in their houses or mosques. In the fasting period of Ramadan, many of them held open-
air preaching which was often the major avenue to transmit knowledge to many Muslims who 
could not attend the madrasas.363 
As the Yoruba Muslim community grew, its diversity also began to develop. The diversity 
often reflected in the incorporation of cultural practices into Islam, which showed continuity 
with their past tradition.364 This includes chieftaincies titles which were modelled after the 
traditional political system in various towns for prominent Muslim chiefs and alfa. Among 
these chiefs was Sule of Erunwon who returned from Bida and became the Ọba Imale (king of 
the Muslims) in Abeokuta. The post, which was created during the reign of Ọba Gbadebo 
(1898-1920), was part of the traditional political system which included the Chief Imam, and 
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other sectional ọbas in the city.365 In Badagry, there was the influential merchant and returnee 
slave, Seriki Williams Abass (d. 1919), who became the head of the Muslim community 
referred to as Seriki Musulumi.366 In other towns, there were Baba Adinni (patron of the 
religion), Giwa Adinni (District head of Muslims), Iya Sunna (head of the Asalatu or praying 
group) and Iya Adinni (matron of the religion).367 Apart from these titles, cultural practices like 
the use of kola nuts during rites of passage such as naming ceremonies continued to be used. 
The practice of casting Ifá at the beginning of every year at the palace of the king was also 
replaced with gbigbọhun- tira (listening to the voice of the Qur’an). Like the Ifá, this was done 
to ascertain what the new year promises and how misfortunes in that year could be averted in 
the town. Added to this, many Muslims did not abandon their Traditional religious rites. At 
festivals, they showed their commitment with the song: awa o ṣ'oro ilé wa o (2ce), Imale ko 
pe\e\o, Imale ko pe kawa ma ṣ'oro, awa o ṣ'oro ilé wa o (we are going to fulfil our traditional 
rites, Islam does not prevent us, Islam does not prevent us from fulfilling our traditional rites, 
we are going to fulfil our traditional rites).368 While the later generation of reformist Yoruba 
Muslims argue that those practices are bid’as (unlawful innovations) or belonging to the period 
of jāhiliyya (the period of ignorance) of Yoruba Muslims, H. O. Danmole suggests that the 
participation of Yoruba Muslims in these festivals cannot be regarded as violating the tenet of 
Islam because they are symbols of unity rather than religious.369 Yet, accommodation of such 
traditional practices also created the impression among many Muslims in Northern Nigeria that 
Yoruba Muslims are not good Muslims.370 This perception is one of the ways which many 
northerners seek to exercise power and define what is orthodoxy in Islam among the other 
Muslims in Nigeria. Despite such criticisms, many of those practices have not been 
abandoned371 and I consider them as constituting how Islam is localised in Yorubaland. 
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The Islamization of Yoruba Muslims also involved conflicts with the Traditionalists which 
showed that the process was far from being straightforward. At Ikorodu, for instance, the 
Muslims had to engage the Traditionalists who prevented them from building their mosques, 
and, over time, they were emboldened to challenge the Traditionalists. A prominent figure in 
their struggle was Alhaji Alifat Mustapha who was notorious for publicly denouncing those 
who ‘mixed’ Islam with Traditional practices. He clashed with members of the Agẹmọ cult who 
forbade the construction of a “storey building” in Itunmọja near the Agẹmọ shrine and earned 
for himself the title, Ajágbe mọ kèfèrí (the one who shouts at non-Muslims).372 
In the same vein, the Islamization also involved critical debates on many issues which shaped 
different understandings of Islam and diversity of their practices. The debates often led to 
divisions in several mosques and communities. One of the debates, inspired by an itinerant 
Hausa cleric in Lagos named Mallam Sulaiman, centred around the interpretation of Islamic 
texts. During one of the Ramadan lectures organised in 1875, Sulaiman claimed that the Qur’an 
alone was enough to expound itself, a position which was against many clerics who insisted on 
the centrality of Hadith in the explanation of the Qur’an. Sulaiman’s argument caused a wide 
split among the Muslims in Lagos and it led to the formation of Ẹgbẹ Alalukurani (Qur’anic 
group) who left the central mosque to build their own.373 From the first decade of the 1900s, 
members of the Lagos central mosque were further divided into two groups referred to as the 
Lemọmu and Jamat parties. In the split, the Chief Imam, Ibrahim Ankuri (1891-1923), who led 
the first party was opposed by the Jamat (mobilised around Mustapha Adamu Animashaun 
[1885-1968]), for his high-handedness, mismanagement of mosque donations and abuse of 
power.374 As I will demonstrate below, other debates in different Yoruba Muslim communities 
continued as they encountered the Christian missions and colonial rule. 
3.4 Christianity and colonial encounter 
From the 1840s, the position of Islam and the Òrìṣà began to be challenged by Christian 
missionaries who sought to win souls for Christ. The leading missionaries were the Anglican 
Church Missionary Society (CMS), the Foreign Mission Board of the Southern Baptist 
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Convention, the Catholic Society of African Missions, and the Wesleyan Methodist 
Missionary.375 Even though these missions have their interest in the Yoruba society, their 
coming was often facilitated by the Saros who had converted to Christianity in Sierra Leone 
and wanted their new-found religion and the ‘civilisation’ of the white man to replace existing 
cultural practices.376 In 1842, the Methodist pastor Thomas Birch Freeman (1809-1890) and 
the CMS’s Henry Townsend (1815–1886) established the first stations of their churches at 
Badagry. Later in 1846, the CMS set up its first mission in Abeokuta where a significant 
number of Saro were resident. Henry Townsend and the renowned Yoruba clergyman, Ajayi 
Crowther (1809–1891) led the Abeokuta mission.377 Born in Osogun in present-day Oyo, Ajayi 
was a freed slave at Sierra Leone where he converted to Christianity. He was one of the most 
influential figures in the Christianization of Yorubaland and other parts of Nigeria and was 
ordained the first African Bishop of the CMS.378 
Up to the close of the nineteenth century, as demonstrated by Peel, these missionaries failed to 
appeal to most Yoruba, and it is doubtful if the word “conversion” could be applied to the few 
who identified with the religion.379 Most of the converts at inception were slaves or former 
slaves and their offspring.380 On the other hand, many chiefs who patronised the missionaries 
did so for political and economic reasons. A good example was the Egba. According to 
Emmanuel Ayandele, the Egba requested the presence of the missionaries because they 
expected military help from the British government, having been surrounded by enemies which 
included the Ibadan in the north, the Ijẹbu in the south and east and the Dahomey in the west.381 
Also, in Ijaiye, which was ravaged by the Ibadan warriors in 1862, the fiery ruler, Aarẹ 
Kurunmi (d. 1861), invited the missionaries to boost his reputation and draw traders to his 
capital. The Anglican missionary, Mr Mann, who was at the capital, reported that Kurumi 
forbade his people and children from attending their church.382 
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There are many reasons why the missionaries failed. Among these was the insistence of the 
missionaries that people abandon their beliefs and deities before they could be welcomed into 
the Christian faith, of which the Traditionalists did not see the need to do so.383 A Baptist 
missionary, Thomas Jefferson Bowen (1814 - 1875), learned from the Egba who had invited 
him that “To preach against their executive gods is more than you dare to do. It would be the 
height of sacrilege, rebellion, and of anarchy and the whole fury of the heathen soul would 
explode like gunpowder.”384 This was unlike Islam which only required saying the Shahāda 
and accommodated local cultural practices. Apart from challenging the deities of the Yoruba, 
the Christian missionaries also criticized such practices as polygamy and slavery which was an 
established socio-economic institution in the nineteenth century.385 For instance, the CMS, an 
avowed critique of slavery, insisted that the practice was responsible for such “evils” as wars, 
polygamy and lack of industrial growth. As Toyin Falola argues, the opposition of the CMS to 
slavery was part of the early efforts of the missionaries to facilitate the conversion of the 
Yoruba which, however, only achieved a minimum of success.386 
Over time, the missionaries had many programmes and strategies which enabled them to 
improve on their competence to engage Islam and devotees of ancestral deities. This was 
instrumental in the gradual conversion of many Yoruba including Muslims to Christianity. In 
their engagement with Islam, some Christian proselytizers learnt Arabic and translated the 
Qur’an387 and Ifá verses into Yoruba.388 Emmanuel Moses Lijadu (1862-1926), an evangelist 
and author born at Ake, Abeokuta was a major figure among them. He published some works 
on Yoruba oral literature and on the history of Abeokuta titled “Fragments of Egba National 
History,” in the Egba Government Gazette (an organ of the local administration of Abeokuta) 
in 1904-1905.389 Another notable effort of Lijadu was his ethnographic work on the Ifá. Writing 
his foreword to the study, Bishop C. Phillips of the CMS emphasised the importance of this 
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missionary effort that illustrates the aim of the missionaries in their encounter with the Muslims 
and devotees of the Òrìṣà: 
Bí a kò bá rí ìdí ibi tí agbára ọ̀̀ tá gbé wà, a kò lè ṣẹgun wọn. Bí àwa Kristian 
kò bá mo ̣̀ ìdí ìsìn àwọn Kèfèrí àti àwọn Ìmàle, a kì yóò lè gbé ìhìnrere Kristi 
síwájú wọn lí ọ̀̀nà tí yóò fi ká wọn lára.
390 
If we do not locate the source of our enemies’ strength, we cannot defeat 
them. If we Christians do not fathom the foundation of pagan and Islamic 
devotion, we will not be able to present Christ’s gospel to them in its most 
appealing form.391 
The CMS agent, Ajayi Crowther, supported this effort by encouraging other missionaries to 
use the Bible to expose the ‘vanity’ and ‘folly’ of ‘idolaters.’392 His support found expression 
in the attempts of few clergymen who published some texts about Islam which included the 
Yoruba translated version of the Qur’an. Reverend (later Canon) Michael Samuel Cole was the 
first to make the attempt in 1906. A former Principal of Abeokuta Grammar School and 
graduate of Fourah Bay College in Freetown, he was appointed the first African Vicar of the 
Christ Church Cathedral of Lagos in 1920.393 Despite discrepancies in the translation of the 
Qur’an by men like Cole, according to A. K. H. Solihu and A. K. Abdulhameed, Crowther 
employed the translation to present a comparative analysis of the Bible and Qur’an when he 
was invited by the emir of Ilorin, Aliyu dan Shita (d. 1891), in 1872.394 He also recommended 
to other missionaries that the Qur’an’s testimony to certain Christian doctrines and historical 
figures were grounds to “wage our good warfare in support of the great Christian doctrine of 
the Trinity, which the Koran flatly denies.”395 The missionaries produced other texts in Arabic 
and Yoruba such as Awọn Imale (The Muslims) and Itan Mọmọdu (The Story of Muhammad). 
In all, Crowther based the importance of these efforts on his own experience when he was 
defeated in an argument by a Muslim in Sierra Leone in 1832.396 This comparative religious 
discourse has continued to be a feature of Christian-Muslim encounter in Yorubaland as 
Yoruba Muslims began to react in a similar fashion.  
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The strategies devised by the Christian missionaries only give a perspective to the reason why 
many Yoruba converted to Christianity. The colonization of Yorubaland by the British forces 
also played a key role in their conversion. The superiority of the British was proved many times 
with the use of gunboat to deal with kingdoms involved in the slave trade in the nineteenth 
century. The British also took control of coastal trade and contributed to ending the Yoruba 
civil war towards the end of the nineteenth century.397 Sulayman Nyang has suggested that the 
impact of Europeans’ material culture through colonization was overwhelming because the 
way Africans saw them confounded and challenged local beliefs and technologies.398 This 
argument is part of the discourse by scholars like Victor Mudimbe who argue that the 
missionary project is closely connected to the colonization of Africa. Mudimbe posits that “the 
more carefully one studies the history of missions in Africa, the more difficult it becomes not 
to identify it with cultural propaganda, patriotic motivations, and commercial interests.”399 
While this argument is important, Peel’s thesis on the role of local conditions in the process of 
religious conversion among the Yoruba is also useful. A major part of this process saw many 
Yorubas gradually approaching the Christian missionaries to help them deal with perennial 
problems which had taken them to both babalawo and alfa such as the need for protection from 
enemies, healing and fertility, all of which were summed up in worldly well-being called 
alafia.400 The CMS missionaries, for instance, responded to the problems of ill-health and 
disease with medicines (oogun) in their dispensaries and local herbs, regarded as charms by 
many Yorubas. Apart from their medical support, the colonial system further created 
opportunities in which the Christian missionaries helped the Yoruba to benefit through the 
establishment of schools. In the next section, I will discuss this colonial system and the 
opportunities it created for the Yoruba, and how the missionaries supported them with schools. 
3.4.1 The effects of colonization 
The colonization of Yorubaland, and Nigeria, began with the bombardment of Lagos by the 
British naval forces in 1851. This followed the directive of John Beecroft (1790-1854), the 
Consul for the Bights of Biafra, aimed at ending the slave trade by Kosoko, the Ọba of Lagos.401 
The decade after the attack was a period of turmoil that involved dynastic disputes which 
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affected the stability of Lagos and its commercial activities. In 1861, amidst the French interest 
in the territory, the British annexed Lagos as a colony following a series of bargaining and 
persuasions that made Ọba Dosunmu402 (c.1823-1885) cede his territories.403 From Lagos, the 
British gradually brought other Yoruba territories under its colonial empire. As part of this 
conquest, the British forces intervened in the civil war between Ibadan and the alliance of the 
Ekiti, Ijesa, Ife, Egba and Ijebu as a peacemaker by obtaining a peace deal which involved free 
movement of trade in 1886. The peace treaty allowed them to occupy Ijebu which had remained 
hostile to neighbouring traders in 1892. In the following year, many Yoruba states such as 
Ibadan avoided the Ijebu encounter and signed a treaty of protection which brought them into 
the expanded Colony and Protectorate of Lagos. However, the newly reconstituted Oyo resisted 
the British offer, and, like the Ijebu, the resistance broke down and Oyo was brought under 
colonial control on November 12, 1894.404 
The subjugation of Yorubaland by the British forces was part of the international economic 
interest of Britain in the nineteenth century.405 In Africa, the way and manner the colonial 
interest was promoted created varying degrees of opportunities and difficult situations for many 
people. For the Yoruba, the subjugation reduced the influence of their traditional political 
institutions as new centres of power like the Governor, Resident, and District Commissioners 
were established. The District Commissioners could depose an erring Ọba with little or no 
consultation, as it happened to Akarigbo Oyebajo (1891-1915) of Ijebu-Remo who was 
removed over accusations of judicial misconduct by H. F. Duncombe in 1915.406 However, 
while the colonial administrative system affected the positions of existing institutions of power, 
it also enhanced the chances of people of varying social status such as migrants and slaves. A 
major example was the Hausa constabulary force which was employed to maintain public order 
in Lagos following its annexation.407 There was also the Legislative Council (1886-1913), an 
advisory body that was initially set up to serve the Colony of Lagos and later the Lagos 
Protectorate. Although the opinions of the British officials were predominant in the council, it 
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nevertheless encouraged the representation of Africans which included chiefs, traders and 
missionaries in governance, and it allowed them to communicate their grievances on socio-
economic and political matters to the government.408 
As the colonial government consolidated its hold on power, the administrative system together 
with the socio-economic infrastructures needed to exploit the resources of the colony were 
expanded. New transport infrastructures like the railways, roads and seaports were developed 
to aid the faster movement of people and trade within and outside the Yoruba territory.409 Public 
institutions such as the West African Court of Appeal (WACA) (est. 1867),410 the Public Works 
Department (PWD) (est. 1897), the Post Office (from 1852),411 the Railway Department, the 
Maritime Department412 and the Lagos Colonial Hospital (est. 1893)413 were also established 
to facilitate the colonial project. Beyond serving the British officials, the newly created 
infrastructures and institutions enabled the employment of people who worked as clerks, 
secretaries, tax officers, labourers and interpreters in various settings. More importantly, it 
encouraged the emergence of different professionals such as civil engineers, journalists, 
medical doctors and lawyers. However, the emergence of these professions was not only 
facilitated by government establishments, the arrival of European firms and business agents 
also played a key role in their emergence. Among these firms were the United African 
Company (UAC), G. B. Oliphant, John Holt & Co., and A. G. Leventis which traded in 
commodities like cocoa and palm produce and employed many indigenous people as staff and 
buying agents in many parts of Yorubaland by the 1920s.414  
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The Saros and the Agudas were largely conspicuous in this colonial political economy. While 
some Yoruba viewed them with contempt (being former slaves), their professions allowed their 
social statuses to be enhanced in many communities. Among them were the three Saros, 
Nathaniel King (1847-1884) and Orisadipe Ọbasa (1863-1940)415 who were both medical 
doctors and James Johnson (1836–1917), a CMS agent who was linked to the Department of 
Education in Sierra Leone and Nigeria.416 Some of them like João da Rocha (d. 1891) were 
also big business owners with transnational ties across the Atlantic.417 Many of these returnees 
were trained in the elementary schools and colleges established by the Christian missionaries 
in Sierra Leone and Nigeria and, a few of them acquired higher education in England. 
Besides these Saros and Agudas, some individuals had little or no literacy skills but were 
prominent figures in the colonial political economy. This category was comprised of the chiefs 
and Ọbas in the native authorities and courts spread across different colonial administrative 
divisions of Yorubaland by the mid-1930s.418 However, the literacy of the Saros and the 
Agudas ensured their advantage over others in many areas. For instancne, those who lacked 
literacy skills had to rely on interpreters, clerks, translators and letter-writers (most of whom 
were the Saros and the Agudas) in their dealings with Europeans. Their reliance on these go-
betweens draws attention to an aspect of the dynamics of power and socio-economic relations 
in the colonial system. Benjamin Lawrance et al. note that these go-betweens helped to blur 
the colonial dichotomies (such as ‘civilised’ and ‘uncivilised,’ white and black), and they 
symbolised the key link to power, authority and knowledge between the coloniser and the 
colonised which made them the linchpins of colonial rule despite having little official 
authority.419 Also, through their services, these employees used their privileged positions to 
enhance their own political power, social status and wealth.420 
For many Yoruba in the second half of the nineteenth century, the increasing status and 
influence of the Saros and Agudas in the emerging colonial political economy were evident. 
Thus, when the Christian missionaries among these returnees began to advocate the importance 
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of Western education, many Yoruba were keen to enrol their children. James Johnson, an agent 
of the CMS and a member of the Legislative Council, was one of the key voices in this period. 
Johnson was a champion of “literacy” which he considered to be “indispensable to Africans if 
they were to achieve and claim equality with the other races of mankind.”421 As a member of 
the Legislative Council, Johnson also persuaded other members to take the education of their 
children seriously and he encouraged the Colonial Office to pay more attention to the 
development of education when he visited Britain between 1873 and 1909.422 However, while 
Johnson’s argument can be considered as part of the rationales that inspired many Yoruba to 
attend the missions’ schools, I argue that the political and socio-economic opportunities that 
were created due to colonization were the key factors that informed their decisions. In the next 
section, I will demonstrate how the missionaries promoted these schools to facilitate the 
Christianization of Yorubaland. 
3.4.2 The role of Western education in Christianization 
The introduction of Western education was a key factor in the process of conversion of many 
Yoruba to Christianity. As the ability to speak the English language and do some arithmetic 
were necessary skills needed to work in the colonial system, the Christian missionaries’ 
educational enterprise became useful for many Yorubas. The missionaries provided schools 
not only to train people how to read and write, and study the Bible, but also in order to 
encourage them to adopt Western values. This training was central to Christianization because 
it involved learning to read and write from the Bible to ensure that the pupils receive Biblical 
instruction and establish the instructions in their hearts.423 Therefore, becoming a Christian, 
symbolised by baptism and changing of names, was the criterion for admission into these 
schools.424 In many communities, the missionaries made the role of the schools in religious 
change clear to the people as pointed out by Father Wauters, a Catholic missionary in Ondo 
and Ekiti divisions: “We knew the best way to make conversions in pagan countries was to 
open schools. Practically all pagan boys ask to be baptized. So, when the district of Ekiti-Ondo 
was opened (in 1916) we started schools even before there was any church or mission 
house.”425 There was also Johnson of the CMS who envisioned a Christianised philosophy of 
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education which, according to Ayandele, emphasised “Christian ethics, the Christian absolutes 
of justice, goodness, humanity of man to man, love and other virtues.”426 He also conceived a 
philosophy of education, which in Ayandele’s words, is “higher than the ethics and virtues that 
could be fostered by Islam and African indigenous religion.”427 
On a broader perspective, Western education was part of the programmes which the 
missionaries aimed to use to achieve social change and the ‘civilisation’ of Africa. This 
objective was linked to the idea of Christianity and economic development advocated by some 
members of parliament and anti-slavery movements in Britain from the eighteenth century. 
One of the British parliamentarians who epitomised this was Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton (1786–
1845), a key figure in the slavery abolitionist movements. Buxton argued in his idea of 
civilization in Africa that: 
Let missionaries and school masters, plough and spade, go together and 
agriculture will flourish, the avenues to legitimate commerce will be opened, 
confidence between man and man will be inspired, whilst civilization will 
advance as the natural effect, and Christianity operate as the proximate cause, 
of this happy change.428  
To achieve this objective, vocational training in skills such as carpentry, bricklaying and 
agriculture were also introduced by the missionaries in the schools that were established at 
Abeokuta and Badagry.429 In line with this religious-motivated civilising mission, Thomas 
Jefferson Bowen (1814-1875), the pioneer Baptist missionary in Yorubaland, was of the view 
that ‘civilisation’ cannot be achieved unless people have the Bible and could read it (and other 
literature) and follow its instructions in everyday life as he noted here: 
Our designs and hopes in regard to Africa, are not simply to bring as many 
individuals as possible to the knowledge of Christ. We desire to establish the 
Gospel in the hearts and minds and social life of the people, so that truth and 
righteousness may remain and flourish among them, without the 
instrumentality of foreign missionaries. This cannot be done without 
civilisation. To establish the Gospel among any people, they must have 
Bibles, and therefore must have the art to make them or the money to buy 
them. They must read the Bible, and this implies instruction.430 
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One of the words used to convey this notion of ‘civilisation’ to the Yoruba was Ọlaju. As Peel 
argues, Ọlaju is “regularly used by the Yoruba to characterise modern social change in general 
terms.”431 Ọlaju is also implied in other Yoruba expressions such as idagbasoke (growing up), 
igbega (upliftment) and ilọsiwaju (going forward), all of which suggest ‘progress’ and 
‘development.’ Regarding my argument in Chapter Two, these various concepts help us to 
understand how the Yoruba make sense of the social change around them and what they 
regarded as modernity during the nineteenth century. 
Literarily, Ọlaju is from the word Ilaju which means ‘open eye.’ To 'open eye' to something is 
to know and have knowledge of it. This could be knowledge of the people or the phenomena 
outside one's town, external trade and of the spiritual world. Peel contends that having 
knowledge, understood as Ọlaju, is known to exist at two levels in Yorubaland. The first is at 
a “vulgar” level which implies common knowledge about the everyday world, and the second 
is the esoteric “deep” level regarded as imọ ijinlẹ. Unlike the former, those who possess deep 
knowledge are in a position of power over others. The majority of the people in this category 
are Ifá priests and Ọbas. The example of the priests and Ọbas illustrates that Ọlaju was also 
perceived relationally in terms of power and knowledge.432 However, from the nineteenth 
century, it became closely linked with Western education and the idea of ‘civilisation’ and, 
‘community development.’ Western education was considered to confer a form of power, 
understood as ‘knowledge of the white man’ (Ọlaju imọ Oyinbo) and ‘knowledge of books’ 
(Ọlaju imọ iwe) on those who possessed it. To be educated was as equally seen as igbega for 
an individual as it was a facilitator for community development.433 Based on this notion of 
Ọlaju, Peel’s argument about the object of “conversion” of the Christian missionaries in 
Yorubaland is very germane. He notes that the missionaries did not only to seek a religious 
change but also the adoption of a whole complex of values with education playing “a key role 
to personal and communal advancement, progress and prosperity.”434 
For many Yoruba Muslims, this concept of Ọlaju was a big challenge. Before the Christian 
missionaries arrived, they had considered being Muslims to confer Ọlaju on them because the 
bearers of Islam among them were associated with esoteric power. The symbolic pilgrimage to 
Mecca and the fanfare exhibited during Muslim festivals by the alfas and the Muslim chiefs 
were also understood as forms of enlightenment. However, the agents of the Christian missions 
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promoted their ideals of Ọlaju, often with damning stereotypes, that challenged those of the 
Muslims and inspired the conversion of many Muslims to Christianity. M. O. Abdul-Rahman, 
Chief Imam of the University of Ibadan Central Mosque painted a picture of this campaign and 
its effects on Yoruba Muslims in his Friday prayer sermon which I attended on November 
2016. His message was a response to a Christian who attended a programme at the university 
and claimed that many Yoruba Muslims were lucky to be Muslims because they were born into 
Muslim families. Abdul-Rahman, however, rejected this argument and noted that being 
Muslim was due to the sacrifice of their parents who objected to the Christian missions’ 
definition of Ọlaju. As he noted: 
…Our own fathers made the sacrifice. But their own [Christian] fathers did 
not make such sacrifice. When the white man brought his religion, our own 
forefathers decided that they would uphold their religion. This made them 
poor among their peers. But their [Christian] fathers were attracted by what 
the white man brought. They wanted to wear tie. They wanted to collect 
salary…In those days, those who followed the white man were the people of 
Ọlaju. Our fathers later challenged them and told people that ‘there was 
wealth in the Qur’an too (Ola n be ninu kewu). But they [the Christians] also 
said something, or have you forgotten? That they said, ‘a lazy person was the 
one who followed the Muslim clerics’ (Ole ni tele alfa) … ‘laziness caught 
up with him, he ran to the madrasa’ (Ole ba ti, obo le kewu). These are the 
things they said to confront our fathers. Those are the things our fathers paid 
for to remain in Islam today.435 
This statement showed that there were many Muslims who converted to Christianity through 
the missions’ schools, although a few of them remained Muslims. But the majority refused to 
attend these schools. This was confirmed in Johnson’s report to the Secretary of CMS in 1875 
that “The Muhammadans (sic) show no desire for the education that may be had at our 
schools.”436 Certainly, those who attended the schools became professionals, gained 
employment in colonial services and acquired a European way of life. In this process, they 
joined the new class of ‘educated elite’ as opposed to the ‘traditional elite’ (the chiefs and 
ọbas). Taking insights from Kristin Mann’s categorisation in colonial Lagos, the educated elite 
are men and women at the top of the growing population of educated Africans who were 
“professionals (doctors, lawyers, ministers, headmasters, surveyors and engineers), first-class 
clerks or above in the colonial service, and educated import-export merchants.”437 Among them 
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were a few Afro-Brazilian Muslims who went through the mission schools such as Mohammad 
Shitta Bey (merchant), Muhammad Lawal Basil Agusto (lawyer) and Jibril Martin (lawyer). 
People in such occupations as newspaper publishing were not in the category of the three above, 
but they belong to the elite class. Outside of this social class, there was a significant number of 
Muslims who did not attend the Western schools and were not socially or economically well-
off compared to the elite. These were the drivers, tailors, bricklayers, goldsmiths, petty traders 
and farmers.438 
As Abdul-Rahman noted, the emergence of these educated elite created some provocative 
stereotypes against Muslims. While the educated elite were associated with Ọlaju, many 
Muslims were stereotyped as lazy people for refusing to attend schools.439 Beyond the implied 
laziness, this stereotype was also used to differentiate the value of education offered by the 
missions’ schools from the madrasas. The former was seen to equip with skills for employment 
in the colonial system, while the latter did not. The other major issue raised by Abdul-Rahman 
was that many Muslims became poor for refusing to be trained for wage labour. While I do not 
agree with his theory, it cannot be denied that some people might be poor due to their lack of 
education which could have given them access to profitable jobs. In many cases, lack of 
Western education also limited the chances of Muslims to occupy positions in the formal 
economic and political sectors of Western Nigeria by the 1950s. This was a major concern for 
the Yoruba Muslim in the period leading to the 1953 constitutional conference held in London 
as part of Nigeria’s decolonization process. It happened that the government delegates expected 
to represent the Western Region under the political party, Action Group (AG), at the conference 
were predominantly Christian. Having noted the religious affiliation of these delegates, the 
Muslims under the umbrella of the Muslim Welfare Association of Nigeria protested to the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies over their lack of representation despite being the largest 
religious group. Although they acknowledged that the backwardness of Muslims' Western 
educational attainment was responsible for this, they nevertheless called on the Secretary to 
help in addressing their underrepresentation in the government of the Western Region.440  
Below I will discuss how the response of the Yoruba Muslims to these challenges changed 
their own practices and understanding of Islam. However, up to the 1950s, their response was 
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not enough to check the number of people converting to Christianity, and this was reflected in 
the population by religion. By the 1850s, Muslims claimed an outright majority, but the 1952 
population census showed that Muslims had only a slightly higher figure (43.3 per cent) to the 
Christian (38 per cent) population.441 
3.5 Engaging Christianity and colonialism 
In their engagement with the Christian missions and the colonial system, Yoruba Muslims 
debated and fought on several issues which centred on Islam and the colonial policies. One of 
the issues that featured in their arguments was the levy on pipe-borne water introduced in Lagos 
by the colonial government in 1916. The arguments on this levy once more pitted the Lemomu 
party and the Jamat party mentioned earlier. While the Chief lmam had encouraged the 
Muslims to pay the levy because the water would benefit every Lagosian, the Jamat, who on 
this occasion were backed by the Ọba of Lagos, Esugbayi Eleko (1901-1925, 193l-1932), were 
of the view that the levy was equivalent to paying tax and that the water would only benefit the 
Europeans.442 For supporting the water levy, the Imam was denounced as an agent of colonial 
rule. The other key subjects in the debates of the Muslims revolved around Western education 
and the European way of life which I will discuss in the next two sub-sections. 
3.5.1 ‘Islam enjoins one to pursue knowledge’443 
The opposition to Western education reflected in the arguments of many alfas who belong to 
the movement called Zumratul-Mu’meena (also called makondoro). The movement was led by 
Alfa Bamidele from Ilorin and, today, it has spread to different parts of Yorubaland through 
his students and madrasas. As Sakariyau Aliyu noted, members of this movement were of the 
view that Western education was not useful for Muslims because it was less concerned about 
life after death. They also saw it as a ‘useless’ propagation of yehudi (Jew) and nasara 
(Christian) doctrine which placed more emphasis on material values and gains: “how to turn 
ten to a hundred, a hundred to a thousand.”444 There were also some alfas from Ile Gbagba in 
Ilorin who, according to Aliyu, argued that Western education was a project meant to further 
the rule of “Christian colonial government” over Muslims. Aliyu referred to a popular wákà 
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(poem) which they used to criticise some alfa who worked for the Native Authority as judges 
of Sharia courts and allowed their children to attend mission schools: “Baba nre kọtu, ọmọ 
nkọwe, ọmọ ina di meji (the father goes to court, the son is learning in school, now, the two are 
hell-bound.”445 
It was clear that the reactions of these alfas went beyond mere opposition to Western education 
and colonial rule. For the most part, they were also reacting to the loss of privilege and 
patronage of their clients, especially the traditional elite, whom the British subdued. The British 
colonial system affected the status and wealth of many chiefs and ọbas which trickled down to 
them since the government took control of collecting and allocating revenues. The alfas were 
also sympathetic to the cause of many ọbas who were dethroned by the colonial government 
such as Kosoko in Lagos, and some of them were jailed for protesting this action.446 Thus, the 
reasons for their argument on correct Islamic practice were also shaped by their concerns for 
power and resources. 
Despite the criticism of the alfas, many Muslims saw the value of education but feared 
conversion to Christianity. The interest in Western education was particularly felt by Muslims 
in the Lagos Colony where political and economic activities were most active particularly from 
1861. It is important to note that Lagos was the administrative centre of the colony government 
between 1861 and 1906. When the British established the Southern Protectorate in 1906, Lagos 
also remained its capital up to 1914. It became the capital of the newly founded Nigeria in 1914 
and remained so until 1991. The headquarters of many colonial enterprises including banks 
and factories were also in Lagos. By the time of the colonial conquest, its seaport (and later an 
airport) connected Nigerians to other parts of the world and helped the country to maintain its 
global exchange of commerce and information. As the centre of colonial life, the economic and 
political opportunities in Lagos were therefore obvious to its Yoruba Muslim residents by the 
mid-nineteenth century.  
The governor of Lagos, Sir Alfred Moloney (1848-1913), whose interest in education had 
grown towards the end of the nineteenth century, was worried about the small numbers of 
enrolments of Muslims in schools. In 1892, he met with leaders of the Lagos Muslim 
community to discuss their apathy towards Western education and discovered that Muslims 
considered it a form of apostasy to abandon their madrasas for the missions’ schools.447 The 
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Muslims also complained that the missions were being used to convert their children to 
Christianity. Despite his intervention, Moloney’s effort was not enough to make the Muslims 
change their minds, as some elders were reported to continue their criticism of the missions’ 
schools.448 Moloney’s successor, Sir Gilbert Thomas Carter (1884-1927), however, continued 
to engage the Muslims. Following their meetings, Carter engaged the service of Edward 
Blyden449 in 1895 who met the Muslims and convinced them of the importance of Western 
education. This effort led to a decision by the government to establish a separate Muslim school 
that would combine Islamic studies with Western education.  
While they engaged the colonial government, the Lagos Muslims wrote the Sultan of Turkey 
in 1894 for clarification on the position of Western education in Islam.450 Through his 
representative, Abdullah Quillam,451 who visited Lagos in 1895, the Sultan pleaded with the 
Lagos Muslims to accept Western education. Quillam was a British Muslim convert and 
solicitor who performed the opening ceremony of the grand Shitta-Bey Mosque in Lagos in 
1895. During the ceremony, he also advised the Lagos Muslims not to emulate the Muslims in 
India who stayed away from public school because their religion was not taught but to embrace 
it to access government employment.452 His advice was taken by several Muslims following 
Blyden’s efforts that led to the establishment of schools designated as “Government Muslim 
School.” The first of these schools opened in Lagos in 1896, followed by Epe in 1898, and 
Badagry in 1899.453 By seeking the opinion of the Turkish Sultan, the Lagos Muslims did not 
necessarily show they were subservient to Turkey on the interpretation of correct Islamic 
practice. Rather, I consider their action to be part of many Muslims’ efforts to ascertain that 
their practice was consistent within the global Muslim context. Therefore, it seems plausible to 
me to accept Gbadamosi’s view that many Yoruba Muslims attended the government schools 
because it was clear to them that Muslims elsewhere were acquiring Western education without 
affecting their religious conviction.454  
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The establishment of the Muslim schools was welcomed by several Yoruba Muslims. Those 
who resided outside Lagos, Badagry and Epe also began to advocate for such schools in their 
towns. This inspired the initiatives of the educated Muslim elite to continue with the 
establishment of Muslim schools in Yorubaland. Among these elite were Basil Augusto and 
Jibril Martin, who in 1916 introduced the Indian Ahmadiyya Movement to Lagos. In this 
period, the movement had been promoting Western education in other colonial Muslim 
societies as part of its goals to modernise Islam.455 
There are three accounts on how the Ahmadiyya was introduced to Lagos and all of them are 
linked to the magazine of the movement, the Islamic Review.456 The most widely known 
account was that of Odunbaku Oguntola Sapara (1861-1935), a Saro Christian medical 
practitioner who visited London in 1914 and returned with copies of the magazine. The 
magazine was said to be given to him by Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din (1870-1932), an Ahmadi who 
started its publication in 1913 under the Working Muslim Mission which he had established 
the same year in London. Kamal-ud-Din was a member of the Ahmadiyya Anjuman Isha'at-e-
Islam (Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam), a separatist faction based in Lahore, Pakistan. Based 
on its website, the magazine had a chequered history with different titles and, at least, three 
series. The first series was between 1913 and 1948, the second from 1949 to 1971, and the third 
(produced by the Lahore faction) from 1980 to 1989.457 During this period, it published articles 
that taught different aspects of Islam (such as fasting and pilgrimage) and reported the history 
and current experiences of Muslims around the world.458 Upon his return to Lagos, Sapara gave 
this magazine to the Muslim Literary Society which had been formed by Augusto and other 
Muslim elite to promote Islamic knowledge. Augusto and members of this society, therefore, 
established contact with the Ahmadiyya through the magazine and joined the movement with 
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the signing of its “oath of allegiance” (bayʿah) in 1916.459 No doubt, Ahmadiyya’s support for 
Western education appealed to many Yoruba Muslims who joined the movement. Thus, in 
1922, with the support of these Muslims, the movement established its first school named 
Talimul Islam Ahmadiyya Primary School at Elegbata in Lagos.460 I wish to point out that 
while the Lahore branch of the Ahmadiyya was the one contacted by Agusto, it was the Qadiani 
branch that the Muslims in Lagos registered with. One of the major differences between the 
two branches centred on the status of Ghulam Ahmad. The Lahore faction saw him as a mujāhid 
(One who strives in the cause of Allah), while the other group, Ahmadiyya Sadr Anjuman 
(Ahmadiyya Muslim Mission) in Qadian, regarded him as a prophet,461 a claim that made other 
Muslims declared them a heretical sect, which I will show in the next chapter. 
In addition to the Ahmadiyya initiative, a few numbers of the elite who had close ties with 
Muslim scholars in Ilorin and Ibadan also discussed ways to promote Western education. 
Largely a product of the Government Muslim school and with links to the Saros, Reichmuth 
narrates that the concept of Islam among these elite tended towards the Arab countries more 
than the Ahmadiyya.462 Yet, like the Ahmadis, they also connected the acquisition of Western 
education to the understanding and promotion of good Muslim practices. A very influential 
figure among them was Boonyamin Gbajabiamila. In November 1923, he was at a meeting 
with his friends where they discussed how to “ensure the advancement of the Muslim 
community”463 through the promotion of religious consciousness in everyday life. One of their 
objectives at the meeting was to raise money for their regular open-air lectures (held at Alawiye 
house, Balogun Lagos). While the spokesperson of the meeting had focused on raising money 
for the lectures in order to enhance their religious consciousness, Gbajabiamila, on the contrary, 
held a different view. Gbajabiamila spoke about the lack of knowledge and “true spirit” of 
Islam particularly among Muslim children and recommended that a school along western lines 
was needed to teach them, and, in the long run, ensure the development of their communities. 
For him, it was “by this means alone can Islam be better studied and understood. As lack of 
proper knowledge of the essence of Islam and failure to grasp its true spirit and correct 
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teachings have been the greatest cause of the backwardness of Muslims in all the walks of 
life.”464 With this assumption, he proposed the establishment of an organisation whose primary 
goal would be the education of Muslim children. His recommendation was accepted by his 
friends and they formed the Young Ansar-Ud-deen Society (later Ansar-Ud-Deen Society) in 
1923.465 From inception, the society pursued a vigorous educational campaign. Part of this 
campaign was the opening of its first primary school at Alakoro in Lagos in 1931 which by 
1955 had increased to 80 primary schools outside Lagos.466 
The argument by Gbajabiamila that Islam can be understood through a Western form of 
education should be taken seriously in the understanding of religious change among Yoruba 
Muslims, because, in a broad sense, his argument suggests that Western education, which is an 
aspect of social change, is directly related to religious change which I noted in Chapter Two. 
To illustrate, one of my respondents, Alhaji Ladejo, explained how this form of education was 
linked to the knowledge of Islam and religious change by Gbajabiamila and other educated 
Muslims in this period.  
…these educated Muslims would be enlightened and would have read things 
in book. So, they can compare the kind of Islam practised by Muslims here 
with the ones practised in the Arab world better…Minor things that the 
Muslims were conservative about, the western educated ones will explain it 
better for the people and this will allow the youths to remain steadfast in the 
religion.467 
Alhaji Ladejo referred to “book” in this statement and not the Qur’an (further discussion on 
this is in Chapter Seven). I understand this book to mean the English/Yoruba text which could 
be in the form of journals, pamphlets, and magazines. It could also be English, or Yoruba 
translated texts of Arabic. The example of The Islamic Review shows that such texts were in 
circulation in colonial Lagos. Since the language in these “books” was not taught in the 
madrasas, the Western school system became the logical solution in this period. Apart from 
this, Alhaji Ladejo also pointed out that the “educated Muslims” can learn about the practices 
of Muslims in other parts of the world, allowing them to evaluate their own practices within 
the global Muslim context, through such texts.468  
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In addition to the Ahmadiyya and Ansar-Ud-Deen iniatives, more Muslim schools that 
combined Islamic and Western subjects were established by other Muslim organisations such 
as the Nawair-Ud-Deen Society (est. 1934) and Zumratul-Islamiyya (est. 1926). Like the 
Ahmadiyya and Ansar-Ud-deen, these organizations also contextualised Western education 
within Islamic discourses that recommended the search for knowledge for Muslims. As 
narrated by my respondent below, these organisations believed that such knowledge was not 
limited to Islam, and they argued that the contribution of Muslim scholars to such fields as 
mathematics, astronomy, philosophy and geography was an indication that Islam was not 
opposed to scientific or Western knowledge. 
The importance of education is that Islam states that education begins from 
one’s birth and terminates when one dies…Back then, China was the farthest 
of the known world and Islam enjoins one to pursue knowledge even if it is 
that far. That is why it is automatic for every Muslim to pursue education, not 
only Islamic education but also all fields of education.469  
This argument by my respondent suggests to me that the acquisition of Islamic education 
together with Western education was considered a correct Muslim practice by many Yoruba 
Muslim elite by the late-nineteenth century. The argument also shows that Yoruba Muslims’ 
discourse was neither limited to the subject of Islam nor confined to their social context (as 
shown in their contact with Ottoman caliph). Furthermore, it sheds light on how they 
interpreted the acquisition of knowledge in the light of their present condition. And, as I 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, the correct practice in Islam is always interpreted by 
Muslims in relation to their prevailing historical conditions. 
I wish to emphasise again that both Islamic and Western education caused a remarkable change 
to the identities of Yoruba Muslims and their understanding of Islam in a colonial society 
defined by the social changes regarded as Ọlaju. However, being educated in Western schools 
was not the only way they expressed their Ọlaju; they also engaged in other practices and 
activities that were regarded as aspects of enlightenment, even though they were contested by 
many alfas. The many aspects of this enlightenment and the critiques they inspired are the 
focus of the following section. 
3.5.2 ‘To look more modern’470  
From the nineteenth century, the colonization and Christianization of Yorubaland facilitated 
the emergence of different ways of life. The social changes that were caused by both processes 
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came with the introduction of aspects of culture like dance parties, cinemas, newspapers, tea 
parties, picnics, western dress, sports, and new forms of association. These cultural aspects, 
many of which were associated with Victorian England, were largely promoted by the educated 
elite of the Saros and Aguda extraction.471 With their growing popularity and consumption in 
the society, they became subjects of discourses of several alfas as many Yoruba Muslims began 
to follow the trend. To illustrate this, clothes like knickers, shirts and trousers that were a 
fascination for many young Muslims were considered by the alfas to be un-islamic. One of the 
arguments of the alfas was that these clothes were unsuitable for prayers in the mosques. They 
also claimed that wearing them implies borrowing from the culture of the Jews and Christians 
which, according to them, the Qur’an forbids.472 But this notion of Islam was equally contested 
by the Muslim elite. The elite could contest it, as Alhaji Ladejo narrated below, because of 
their knowledge of the ways of life of Muslims in other parts of the world, which the alfas 
might not have, that showed such dress was not prohibited for Muslims. 
…back then when they mentioned Egypt, Dubai, the alfas had not been there 
because they only read and heard about them. These are Muslim countries 
and the educated Muslims had been there and they saw that all the western 
clothes condemned at home were being worn by them. Even the Imams there 
were wearing it, and, so, western dress did not violate the creeds of Islam. 
That is how the educated Muslims got their own idea.473 
By comparing their social experiences with those of other Muslims and connecting with their 
practices, these Western educated Muslims helped to shape an understanding of Islam that 
differs from those of the established alfas. The Ahmadiyya movement was one of the leading 
groups that challenged these alfas in the colonial period.474 Its formal English dress, a double-
breasted suit with a red fez, was an attraction for many Yoruba Muslims.475 However, these 
‘English dressed’ Muslims were also later criticised by the more nationalist Muslims who 
considered them capable of eroding indigenous cultures. Largely educated in Western schools, 
these nationalist-minded Muslims were of the view that Islam was not against the local dress.476 
 
471 J. M. Echeruo, Victorian Lagos: Aspects of Nineteenth Century Lagos Life (New York: Holmes & Meier 
Publishers Inc., 1978); COMCOL, Lagos Musical Society, 3290, NAI. 
472 Alhaji Ladejo, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
473 Ibid. 
474 Alhaji Muritadha Awal, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
475 Peel, Christianity, Islam and Oriṣa-religion, 158. 
476 Ryan, Imale, 206–7. 
 
109 
 
One of my respondents, Dawud Noibi (b. 1934),477 whose dress illustrates this view, argues 
that wearing it is an affirmation of being a Muslim as a Yoruba rather than a Westerner. 
It is an assertion of the fact that: I don’t have to be, I don’t have to appear like 
a non-Muslim or a Westerner. I really want to be what I am. Partially, it is an 
assertion of your belief in your culture. But it also has to do with an assertion 
of being a Muslim.478 
In addition to the dress, public tea parties also emerged among the Yoruba Muslims. This began 
with the Muslims in Lagos gathering in various centres to celebrate the end of Ramadan in 
March 1895. Gbadamosi argues that this was part of the growing concern among them that 
Islam could be made ‘to look more modern,’ by adopting western habits which they understood 
to be compatible with Islam.479 
There were also new forms of association that illustrate this Yoruba Muslim modernity. The 
associations, many of which depart from the concerns of the indigenous ones, were in such 
areas as recreation, sports, religion, occupation, education, community developments and 
politics that the colonial society enabled.480 They include the Order of Forester which some 
Europeans, Saros and Aguda joined in 1891 in Lagos,481 the nationalist-oriented Egbe Omo-
Oduduwa (Association of Oduduwa Descendants) established in 1947,482 and the Lagos Market 
Women Association (LMWA) founded around the mid-1920s to promote the interests of 
women traders. There was also the Church Young Men’s Christian Association (est. c.1888), 
based at Breadfruit Church in Lagos. This association appeared to aim at promoting Christian 
belief, but it also engaged in debates on subjects like “History” and “European Marriage 
Custom.”483 While many Muslims joined the non-religious associations in this period, the 
Muslims also had exclusive ones for themselves. Of major interest was the fashionable male 
club called Ẹgbẹ Killa (Killa Society), named after Abdullah Quillam following his visit in 
1895. The society promoted mutual-help and modern ways of celebrating Muslim festivals 
which spread from Lagos to other communities in Badagry, Abeokuta, Epe, Ijebu-Ode, Oyo 
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and Ogbomoso.484 Another example was the sporting Muslim Cricket Club founded in 1907 
and led by Karimu Kotun (b. 1881), a cotton merchant.485 I wish to note that the few movements 
mentioned earlier, Ahmadiyya movement, the Young Ansar-Ud-Deen and the Muslim Literary 
Society, are included in these colonial Muslim associations.486 Likewise, the MSSN, which is 
the focus of this study, is also part of these broader forms of colonial associational life. 
The emergence of Muslims associational life facilitated several changes in the Yoruba Muslims 
religious expression which were noticed in such areas as the style of interpretation of Islamic 
texts, the mode of transmission of Islamic knowledge and gender relations. The Ahmadiyya 
movement was one of the agents that contributed to these changes. The movement contested 
social practices such as the traditional form of showing respect and the non-use of coffins in 
funeral services, common among the Christian elite.487 Another popular figure who promoted 
these new ways of being Muslim was Agusto. Although the ideals of the Ahmadiyya 
contributed to shaping his own thoughts, he led other members away from the Qadian faction 
to form another movement, the Jama’at-ul-Islamiyya Society on March 1, 1924.488 Through 
his new society, he challenged the use of only Arabic in the weekly Jumat (Friday) sermon 
which was the practice of the alfas and encouraged the use of the Yoruba and English languages 
to make it possible for Muslims to understand the religion better. For this, a large section of 
the Lagos Muslim community brought him to court to restrain the practice, but the case was 
decided in his favour.489 There was also Mustafa Kasunmu Ekemode (1899-1972), Chief Imam 
and Missioner of the Young Ansar-Ud-Deen Society, who studied in the Western school as 
well as the madrasa and had a professional career in firms which included the United Africa 
Company (UAC) and Patterson, Zochonis & Co.490 He was a prominent voice in the debate on 
the prohibition of women praying in the mosques, and he also supported their visibility in 
public religious discourse. In the media, he gave weekly sermons on the radio as part of the 
growing mediatisation of religion which started with the use of the newspaper (introduced by 
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the Christian mission in 1859),491 and radio service established by the colonial government in 
Lagos in 1935.492  
From all the sections above, I have demonstrated the process of Islamization and the new forms 
of religious change among the Yoruba Muslims up to the period of colonization. I consider the 
formation of the MSSN in 1954 as a continuation of this religious change, which illustrate new 
expressions of Islam among the Western educated Yoruba Muslims. However, unlike the 
founders of other associations, those who established the MSSN were students in educational 
institutions. Be that as it may, little is still known about the experiences of these students in 
Yorubaland up to 1960, and this has not been helped by the inadequate studies on the social 
history of childhood and teenage life in Nigeria. A recurring theme in the few studies which 
focused on “children”493 is that they are part of the social problems which developed in colonial 
Nigeria. Among these studies is Abosede George’s work showing that a significant number of 
girls became peddlers to support their parents in the economy of Lagos.494 There are also 
studies by Laurent Fourchard495 and Simon Heap496 that show that many children became 
involved in crimes in Lagos and Ibadan following the socio-economic changes in these cities. 
But the history of children in the colonial period goes beyond these problems. As Saheed 
Aderinto argues, children were also at the centre of the idea of progress, civilisation, modernity 
and social stability of the colonial state.497 This idea was promoted through legislation that 
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defined their social status, British-styled child-rearing practices, and Western education.498 
That said, I argue that the experiences of Muslim children (who I will mostly refer to as 
‘students’) can provide another perspective to the broader history of children’s life in 
precolonial and colonial Yorubaland. The experiences of these Muslims are important to help 
us know their religious lives within the processes of Islamization, Christianization and 
colonization. In the section below, I refer to these experiences, though sketchy, based on the 
context of Muslim-Christian encounter (discussed in the above sections) and from the life of a 
few Muslims who I interacted with. 
3.6 The Muslim students' experience 
The social background of Muslim students up to the end of colonial rule was not uniform 
throughout Yorubaland, and they appeared to be related to the varying socio-economic statuses 
of their parents.499 Generally, these students tended to identify with Islam, but what led to their 
identification with the religion varied. As I have illustrated earlier, they include predestination 
and conversion. By the 1950s, when a significant number of Yoruba had become Muslims, the 
predominant factor was the identity of their Muslim parents.500 To illustrate this point, most of 
the Muslims I interacted with during fieldwork told me that they are Muslims by birth because 
their parents are Muslims. 
The learning experiences of these students also differ from one another. Many of them learnt 
about Islam from the daily practices of their parents while those from the families of alfas had 
more advantage of being trained in madrasas and through instructions at home.501 This led to 
a disparity in the knowledge of Islam among these students. But there were other avenues for 
learning about their religion. During the fasting month of Ramadan, for instance, the alfas 
usually held public lectures, a practice which has continued in the postcolonial era. Since most 
of the earlier alfas were non-Yoruba (and Yoruba was not reduced to writing for a broader 
audience), it cannot be ascertained how much of an impact those sermons made on the practices 
of young Muslims. 
The problem of language was apparent in the madrasas that served as knowledge transmission 
centres. By the late nineteenth century, some alfas addressed this problem by reducing the 
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Yoruba language to Arabic texts called Ajami. An example of these texts, which also developed 
in many African Muslim societies, is attributed to an Ilorin preacher and poet, Badamasi bin 
Musa Agbaji (d. c. 1891).502 The problem of language was also addressed by the Muslim elite 
like Agusto who formed two study groups, the Muslim Literary Society and the Juvenile 
Muslim Society, to facilitate the transmission of Islamic knowledge before the Ahmadiyya 
movement arrived in Lagos.503 
The number of madrasas in this period is not known. Probably due to the language barrier, 
many of those who attended them did not proceed beyond learning a few chapters of the Qur’an 
needed to perform regular ṣalāt. Many did not proceed because they could not raise the money 
for wolimọ (Arabic, walīmah referring to banquet), which was usually requested by the alfa 
before their students proceeded to the next stage of study.504 This was one of the practices 
contested by the Ahmadiyya and Ansar-Ud-Deen from the 1920s.505 It is also worth noting that 
many students could not proceed to the next stage of study because it involved travelling over 
a long distance to madrasas called Ilm (knowledge) school, which expose students to the 
translation of Qur’anic texts. As a matter of fact, they considered such education only to be 
useful for those who wanted to become alfa.506  
However, some students made efforts to study Arabic on their own using transliterated texts. 
This was the experience of Noibi, referred to earlier, who as a teenager could not complete his 
education at the madrasa. Worried by his inability to read the Qur’an, as he narrated below, he 
started by learning short sūras (chapters) of the Qur’an through transliterated texts. Later, he 
interacted with Ahmadis who recommended the texts which he used to improve his knowledge 
of Arabic. 
 I had to pick up a book published in India which tries to help people who 
could read English to be able to learn the Qur’an. And, then I read these books 
and later bought this book: Qoidat Al-Bagdadiyyat – which teaches you Alif, 
 
502 Amidu Sanni, “New Knowledge, Old Medium: The Yoruba Ajami of Southwestern Nigeria in the Factory 
of Learning,” (Paper at Boston University, USA, November 20, 2017), 8; Amidu Sanni, “The West African 
Manuscript Heritage: Challenges of the Digital Revolution in a Research Economy,” in African Studies in the 
Digital Age: Disconnect?, eds. Terry Barringer and Marion Wallace, 128–47 (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 131. 
503 Katz, “Islamic Prestige, Piety and Debate in Early Lagosian Newspapers, 1920s–40s”: 48–9; Muhsin A. 
Balogun, “Islam in Lagos: Its Growth and Development,” in Actors and Institutions in the Development of 
Islam in Lagos State: Essays in Honour of Alhaji Femi Okunnu, eds. Siyan Oyeweso and M. O. Raheemson, 
24–40 (Ibadan: Matrixcy Books Ltd, 2013), 32–33. 
504 Alhaji Muritadha Awal, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
505 Alhaji Ladejo, interview by Adeyemi Balogun; Katz, “Islamic Prestige, Piety and Debate in Early Lagosian 
Newspapers, 1920s–40s”: 66. 
506 Aliyu, Transmission of learning in modern Ilorin, 79. 
 
114 
 
Ba, Ta, Tha ... Because of my background, having studied English grammar, 
it was easy to learn Arabic through such books written in English.507 
To improve his skills, Noibi often practised with migrant traders from Niger Republic and Chad 
who spoke Arabic. He later published a text, Learn to read the Qur’an in Arabic Text, in 1959 
for young Muslims who wish to follow his own method of education.508 
With their enrolment into the Western schools, the educational experience of many Muslim 
students also became adjusted. Many attended the schools in the morning and madrasa in the 
afternoon, a situation which many of them found strenuous.509 But, many students did not 
attend the schools. Those in this category stayed away from schools for many reasons, which 
include the fear of conversion to Christianity, the request by their parents to help them on the 
farms or in markets and the non-availability of schools in their communities.510 Also, many 
students showed no interest in the Western school at all, and some were held back by different 
stereotypes they had about the schools.511 The problem of stereotypes was mentioned by Henry 
Carr (1863 – 1945), Resident of the Colony of Lagos, when he participated at the inauguration 
of the Ahmadiyya primary school on Dec. 11, 1922. He noted that he had suggested to Shitta 
Bey about forty years before to establish a Muslim school, but he declined believing that “it 
would make their children thieves and liars as Christian boys.”512  
Largely from the diverse experiences of these students, we also have another useful perspective 
to the understanding of Yoruba Muslim society up to the colonial period. These experiences 
point attention to several issues that led to the formation of MSSN in 1954, and therefore, will 
be the point of departure into the history of the Society in the next chapter. The history of 
MSSN in the next chapter will come after discussing the colonial and postcolonial Nigeria in 
order to appreciate some of the objectives and activities of MSSN and why they changed over 
time. 
3.7 Conclusion  
In this chapter, I showed that the Yoruba society in which the MSSN emerged is largely diverse 
in terms of people, culture, economy and political institutions. The society has experienced a 
wide range of changes which are shaped by the processes of Islamization, Christianization and 
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colonization. For the Yoruba Muslims, the change included Islamization which accelerated in 
the nineteenth century and was shaped by the effects of Christianization and imposition of 
colonial rule. This ensured that their religious change involved the adoption of Muslim 
traditions, on the one hand, and non-Muslim traditions, on the other hand. The identities of 
Yoruba Muslims which exemplifies this form of change are a function of multiple historical 
experiences and how these experiences are interpreted within the traditions of Islam. In the 
early period, there was an accommodation of indigenous cultural practices by many Yoruba 
Muslims while the era of colonial rule witnessed the adoption of western ideals. As I noted in 
the argument of Asad in Chapter Two, the concept of Islam and how Muslims defined 
orthodoxy are linked to different social contexts. Consequently, the notion of Islam and what 
it meant to be Muslim among the Yoruba Muslims in the past must also be understood from 
their historical context. 
I also demonstrated in this chapter that the encounter which shaped the religious change of 
Yoruba Muslims did not proceed along a unilinear path, whereby they were only in a conflictual 
relationship with the Christian missions. On the contrary, the encounter involves both Muslims 
and Christians embracing Western education, converting to each other’s religion, borrowing 
from one another, seeking the same socio-economic and political opportunities, and fashioning 
their identities in line with the changing world. This confirms Soares’ argument that the 
Muslim-Christian encounter in Africa is complex and multidimensional. The impact of the 
British colonization is also revealed in the religious change of Yoruba Muslims. The colonial 
government built a political-economic structure to foster its own interests. However, the 
structure also served the interests of its subjects in different ways. For instance, while the 
colonial economy made the training of many Muslims in Western schools inevitable, which 
affected attendance in the madrasas, it also encouraged the thinking among the Muslim elite 
that better knowledge of Islam would be transmitted in the western-oriented schools than the 
madrasas. This made the colonial regime an important factor in the understanding of religious 
change in Yoruba society from the mid-nineteenth century to the end of colonial rule and the 
postcolonial era.  
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Chapter Four 
A Muslim Student Movement in Nigeria: MSSN and the Promotion of Islam, 1954- 1990 
MSSN is both a spiritual and a social revolution which quietly crept into the 
Nigerian society at the very right time that a revolution was direly in need for 
Muslim youths. If Islam enjoys a hitherto denied official recognition in 
Nigeria today, it is mostly due to that miraculous revolution. (Femi Abass, 
2014).513 
4.1 Introduction  
The brief remark above was made by a Yoruba Muslim columnist on the occasion marking the 
sixty-second anniversary of the MSSN. His view reflects the understanding of many Muslims 
in Nigeria that the history of MSSN was like a revolution which caused some changes in 
Nigerian society. This revolution began with a few students, actually teenagers, who wanted to 
promote their religion in the largely Christian managed school system in Lagos and helped 
themselves to deal with the social changes caused by colonization. My argument in this chapter 
is that the MSSN was established for Muslim students to promote a set of objectives that 
address their encounter in the Western schools as well as the colonial system. As I will show 
later, the objectives were promoted in many ways that pit them against Christianity on the one 
hand and ensured the preservation of the identity of Muslim students, on the other hand. Many 
aspects of the objectives aimed to promote Muslim students’ sociality, intellectual 
development, mutual support, religious education and linkage with other students in Nigeria 
and abroad. However, the propagation of these objectives did not follow a linear trajectory as 
the Society dealt with controversies ranging from the opposition of the creed of its Ahmadi 
members to the critique of the established authorities about Muslim students’ pedagogy of 
religious education in Western school and the debates about practices like singing. Besides, the 
objectives and activities of the Society gradually shifted between 1954 and 1990, which reflects 
its transformation into a reform movement. But the shift only had an impact on a few members, 
unlike the period after the 1990s. In this chapter, I will discuss the encounter of these students 
in schools and how they established the MSSN. I will also discuss the objectives and practices 
of the Society, the factors that shaped them and how they were propagated up to 1990. Another 
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aim of this chapter is to give empirical evidence of the notions of Islam as a discursive tradition, 
Christian-Muslim encounter and religious change which I refer to in Chapter Two.  
In this chapter (and in the following chapters), I establish that the history of MSSN is at the 
intersection of political and social transformations in colonial and postcolonial Nigeria. 
Looking at the trajectory of the MSSN between these two eras is underscored by the fact that 
these periods are shaped by a varying degree of contradictions and continuities in economic 
and socio-political structures which had considerable effects on the processes of religious 
change and Muslim-Christian encounters in Nigeria. Moreover, the experience of Yoruba 
Muslims from 1914 when Nigeria came into being cannot be isolated from those of other 
Muslims in the country. By implication, the history of MSSN since the colonial era is also 
connected to other Muslims in Nigeria. Therefore, to understand the MSSN from 1954, I will 
first discuss the structure and historical factors that shaped colonial and postcolonial Nigeria 
and how they affect religious change, Muslim-Christian encounter and socio-economic 
changes in the country. In view of the fact that a detailed analysis is too broad to be undertaken 
here, I will only provide a summary of my main points on issues such as the system of rule 
between in the colonial and postcolonial Nigeria, ethno-religious conflicts, social change, and 
economic crises which I consider having an impact on some objectives of the MSSN, how the 
objectives were promoted and why they changed from 1954. 
The encounters of Yoruba Muslim students in their schools and how they formed the MSSN 
are discussed in the second section. This section also discusses the kind of visions and 
orientations which the students had for the Society in the mid-1950s. In addition, it describes 
the Society’s objectives and the orientation behind them. The section also refers to some of the 
Society’s orientations to Islam that were shaped by the attitude of the colonial government and 
politics of decolonization in the 1950s. In the third section, the chapter points to the activities 
of the Society and practices of its members in its first decade in order to show how the Society’s 
objectives are promoted and their impact. The fourth section focuses on the Society’s objective 
of ‘Islamic brotherhood’ that was promoted through transnational Islamic movements from the 
mid-1960s and the effects of this transnationalisation on the Ahmadis (both in Nigeria and the 
MSSN) and on the MSSN’s constitutional review. Importantly, this section also highlights the 
transformation of MSSN to a movement with new orientations concerning postcolonial 
Nigeria, Islamic reform and the conditions of Muslims in other parts of the world. In the fifth 
section, the chapter focuses on other developments in the MSSN that illustrate the promotion 
of its objectives. Specifically, it sheds light on the Society’s reform, the effort to promote 
118 
 
Western education among Muslims in Nigeria, the confrontation with the government, and the 
introduction of new ideas like music and publication of journals. Also, the section refers to 
some of the controversies that arise in response to the Society’s promotion of these objectives, 
for instance, the critique of MSSN preachers by the alfas and the MSSN’s clash with the Oyo 
state government. The sixth section discusses the understanding of Islam as a way of life that 
developed among Muslim students, while the concluding section reflects on the chapter. In 
different parts of the sections, I draw on many studies, which include the works of Peel, Nile 
Green, and Saba Mahmood, that relate to the empirical process I discussed. 
4.2 Muslims in Nigeria between the colonial and postcolonial eras 
Following their conquest of the territories that now make up Nigeria by the early twentieth 
century, the British administrators were concerned about how to maintain stability in these 
territories, especially where they encountered stiff resistance.514 The need for stability became 
even more urgent as the administrators had to cope with inadequate personnel and financing 
from Britain. In dealing with these challenges, they amalgamated people of diverse ethnic and 
religious groups and created Nigeria in 1914.515 As I have noted in Chapter Two about the 
ambivalent colonial state-making process, the British officers also introduced varying 
administrative structures, under the policy of Indirect Rule, that were in many cases patterned 
along ill-informed knowledge of existing socio-political institutions and beset with 
contradictions all over Nigeria. Though a controversial concept, Indirect Rule refers to a form 
of government in which the coloniser rules through what he claims to be the indigenous 
political system of the colonised.516 There are many studies on the process of amalgamation of 
Nigeria, the Indirect Rule policy and their problems, 517 but they are not my concern in this 
chapter. My concern is rather on this system of rule and how it shaped Muslims experiences in 
this region of the British empire. 
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In Northern Nigeria, the British colonial officers met a state-centred form of Islam with a 
caliphate at Sokoto and regional emirates established after the jihad of Usman dan Fodio (1754-
1817) in the 1800s and were convinced that the system had worked well. Frederick Lugard 
(1858-1945), who led the conquest of Sokoto, had promised not to interfere with this system 
of governance but he decentralised it to keep the regional emirs and the newly designated 
‘Sultan’ at Sokoto under different Native Authorities that were components of its Indirect 
Rule.518 The colonial government also established courts where British laws were applied. This 
began with the 1863 Ordinance 3 that led to the establishment of the Supreme Court in Lagos. 
The country also had three courts after the 1914 amalgamation, namely, the Supreme Court, 
the Provincial Courts and the Native Courts.519 In addition to these courts, the administration 
of Islamic laws was reviewed and subjected to the colonial legal system. Thus, while the British 
officers retained the existing Alkali courts, they ensured that certain laws regarded as 
‘obnoxious’ were discontinued, for instance, the cutting off of a hand for stealing.520 However, 
there was no uniformity in the practices of these courts. In most parts of Northern Nigeria, for 
instance, these courts only dealt with cases from Muslims. But in the Ilorin emirate where a 
significant number of Yoruba of diverse religious groups resided, it also heard cases from 
Christians and Traditionalists.521 
To fight off resistant movements, the British administrators gave support to one Islamic group 
over others. They recognised the Qadiriyya brothers which the emirs belonged to as “good 
Muslims” while groups like the Mahdists and the Tijaniyya brotherhood were regarded as “bad 
Muslims.” This discriminatory categorization is part of the attitude of the British officers to 
identify groups who supported colonial rule and those who are opposed to it.522 Unlike the 
Mahdists who took up arms against the British, the emirs accepted the colonial rule and were 
considered as allies, especially after the emirs helped to stop the Mahdists revolt in the early 
1900s.523 Meanwhile, the Tijaniyya brothers were perceived as a threat due to various reasons 
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such as their ‘devout’ religious practices and the concern that they spread ‘superstitious beliefs’ 
and encouraged anti-colonial revolt, an assessment based on the reports of French colonial 
officers in other parts of West Africa.524 
Another policy of the British administrators in Northern Nigeria focused on regulating the 
activities of Christian missions to protect Islam and other cultural practices. Several conditions 
were laid down for the opening of schools which caused a delay in the introduction of Western 
education in the region compared to the South. The missionaries were also barred from 
compelling anyone to attend church.525 But while this policy was meant to protect the religious 
traditions of the Muslims, the crisis it created became obvious by the 1950s. The most 
debilitating effect was the wide gap it created among people with Western education between 
the North and the South. This resulted in a rise of employment of the Western educated 
Christian Southerners in the bureaucracies of the North.526 
British colonial rule showed a different pattern in Southern Nigeria. Having successfully 
implemented Indirect Rule in the North, the British administrators tried to adapt it in the South, 
including the Eastern and Western Regions. However, it failed in the Eastern Region and it 
only achieved relative success in the Western Region.527 The British officers also created a 
judicial system in the South whose source of law was different from the North. For instance, 
while the Native Courts administered the Sharia in the North, ‘native’ laws and customs were 
used in the Southern courts.528 In Yorubaland, where a significant number of Muslims lived, 
the Sharia, which had been applied individually, was placed under the customary laws, thereby 
denying the Yoruba Muslims a separate legal system. Many Yoruba Muslims reacted to this 
on many occasions by petitioning the government to have Sharia. Earlier in 1894, the Lagos 
Muslims had asked the governor to allow the use of Islamic law in practices such as inheritance, 
marriage and naming ceremonies.529 Another demand was made in 1948 by the Muslim 
Congress of Nigeria, a group founded in 1948 by Muhammad al-Amin Kudaisi at Ijebu Ode.530 
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Apart from the legal system, the colonial administrators in the South, unlike in the North, 
encouraged Western education among the Muslims in Yorubaland, which I demonstrated in 
the previous chapter. 
With these contrasting attitudes and political structures, the British administrators built a 
colony that was embedded in contradictions and ethno-religious problems from the North to 
the South. The effects of these contradictions were the cultural nationalism and political 
tensions which began to emerge from the decolonization process of Nigeria in the mid-1940s. 
This found expression in the “northernization” policy of the Premier of Northern Region, Sir 
Ahmadu Bello (1910-1966), from 1954 which aimed to reduce the fear of ‘domination’ by 
Southern Nigerian groups.531 Through his Northern People's Congress (NPC) party, formed in 
1949, all Southerners in the public service sector of the region were replaced with Northerners 
or non-Nigerian expatriates between 1955 and 1961.532 The aim of this policy was not limited 
to the North. B. J. Dudley has suggested that it was also projected by Bello to ensure that 
Northerners take control of the country.533 Apart from Bello, the other major political parties 
in the Eastern and Western Regions also pushed cultural agendas with strong campaigns to rule 
the country and prevent the domination of the North, even though the huge demographic and 
geographical size of the North became a major challenge for them. In the Eastern Region, the 
rallying point was Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe’s (1904-1996) National Council of Nigeria and the 
Cameroons (NCNC), formed in 1944, while the Western Region had the Action Group (AG), 
founded in 1951 and led by Chief Obafemi Awolowo (1909-1987).534 
The regional politics of these three main parties continued up to the first decade of the post-
independence era and it resulted in a series of violent conflicts across Nigeria which included 
military coup d'états that led to the assassination of high-ranking soldiers and political leaders 
such as Ahmadu Bello. These crises also culminated in a civil war from 1967 to 1970, following 
the attempt of the military government to prevent the secession of the Eastern Region from 
Nigeria.535 To illustrate that the war was understood beyond politics, many analysts, which 
included Christian propagandists, were of the view that the fight was between the “Muslim 
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north” and the “Christian south.”536 On the contrary, many studies suggest that the war was the 
result of many problems which included corruption, nepotism, ethnic politics, failure of 
leadership and the inability of the post-colonial state to provide basic human needs and ensure 
an equitable share of resources among the diverse Nigerian groups.537 The ruling elites have 
tried to address these problems through a wide range of policies such as state creation, quota 
system and establishment of unity schools,538 but they remained salient in the politics of the 
country more than forty years after the civil war. As will be illustrated in this chapter, one of 
the central objectives of the MSSN aims to address this Nigeria’s identity crisis, albeit in a way 
that also challenges the constitution of the nation-state itself. 
Post-independence Nigeria also witnessed the emergence of new religious movements and 
actors who not only antagonised themselves but also the new nation-state. A prominent figure 
in these movements was the Grand Qadi of the Northern Region of Nigeria, Shaykh Abubakar 
Gumi (1922-1992) who inspired the formation of the Yan Izala, mentioned in Chapter One. 
Gumi was an ally of Ahmadu Bello and a supporter of his pan-Islamic community 
(Usmaniya)539 in Northern Nigeria. Following Bello’s death, Gumi promoted the scriptural 
tradition of Islam and was very critical of all Sufi brotherhoods.540 In addition to actors like 
Gumi, there were also regional and national religious organisations which united people of the 
same faith to advocate their interests in religious and political matters. The Kaduna based 
Jama’at Nasril Islam [(JNI) (Society for the Victory of Islam)], created by Bello in 1962 as 
part of his pan-Islamic community, is a major example of such organisations. The JNI attracted 
Western educated elite, and, according to Kane, it was part of Bello’s ambition to shift the 
region’s spiritual centre of power from Sokoto to his Kaduna base.541 Although it also aimed 
to unite Muslims in Southern Nigeria, especially the Yoruba Muslims, JNI had little appeal 
beyond Northern Nigeria. Instead, two parallel organizations to the JNI were formed in 
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Yorubaland: the League of Imams and Alfas (LIA) in 1962 and the Western State Joint Muslim 
Organisation (WESJOMO) in 1972.542 But the Muslims who largely occupied the two regions, 
soon discovered that they needed to move beyond their political divide and speak with one 
voice on inter/national issues. For this purpose, they formed the Nigeria Supreme Council of 
Islamic Affairs (NSCIA) in 1973.543 The pioneering president of the MSSN, Lateef Adegbite, 
was largely involved in the formation and management of this organisation.544 Three years after 
this Muslim initiative, the Nigerian Christian communities responded with the establishment 
of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) in 1976. Over the years, the two organisations 
have faced each other over issues such as the ‘secularity’ of Nigeria and the introduction of 
Sharia in many Northern states in 1999. While the CAN has defended the so-called ‘secularity’ 
of Nigeria, the NSCIA has faulted the claim with the assumption that the public institutions of 
the country were created by a British government with Christian doctrinal ethos.545 The rise of 
these religious movements is an expression of new forms of religious mobilisation which 
Clarke and Linden refer to in post-independence Nigeria.546 Unlike the colonial government 
which restricted religious movements that were perceived as a threat, the emergence of these 
organisations further unveils the attempt to contest the legitimacy of that government which is 
represented by the postcolonial state. As will be shown later, the MSSN also became a critic 
of this postcolonial state. 
Beyond politics and religion, there has been a steady transformation of Nigeria’s economy and 
social life since 1960.  The major sectors of the nation’s economy such as education, banking, 
manufacturing, international trade, transportation, entertainment and telecommunications have 
expanded over this period.547 This expansion has also led to the creation of more job 
opportunities and capital in the economy, and it has impacted on changes in the lifestyle of 
many people. In many ways, religion has been affected by some of the factors responsible for 
this change. An example is the use of electronic media by a variety of Christian and Muslim 
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actors to broadcast religious sermons and songs to a wider audience.548 The use of the internet 
and social media has also given rise to new forms of Islamic education among Yoruba Muslims 
and in the MSSN, confirming Rosalind Hackett and Benjamin Soares observation on how 
Muslims religious practices have been transformed by the media in modern Africa.549  
The social transformation of Nigeria is, however, not devoid of economic crises at various 
times especially in the 1980s. Today, the country is faced with critical socio-economic 
problems that include inadequate power supply, unemployment, poverty, cyber-crimes, 
kidnapping and maternal mortality.550 With the failure of the government to address these crises 
effectively, some non-governmental organisations and religious movements have intervened 
in many communities. There are Pentecostal churches like the Living Faith Church (est. 1983) 
and the Deeper Life Bible Church (est. 1973) that provide spiritual services and operate 
business enterprises such as schools, conference centres and hospitals.551 Islamic movements 
such as Nasrul-lahi-li Fathi Society of Nigeria (NASFAT) also play a key role in the welfare 
of members through ventures like the Thrift and Cooperative Society, Tafsan Beverages, and 
Tafsan Tours and Travels Ltd.552 As will be shown in Chapter Seven, the MSSN is also helping 
its members to deal with Nigeria’s socio-economic crises, for instance through vocational 
training that is tailored to reducing unemployment. A number of scholars including Gerrie Haar 
and Stephen Ellis, Abdoulaye Sounaye, and Olujide Gbadegesin have suggested that while 
religious organisations have attracted members due to these activities, their involvement is also  
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a key contribution to nation-building and the development of post-colonial African societies.553 
In the following sections, I will show the history of Yoruba Muslim students who established 
the MSSN and how they link up with other Muslim students in Nigeria and other parts of the 
world. Through this, I will illustrate the entanglement of MSSN history in the political 
development and social transformation of colonial and postcolonial Nigeria and the world of 
Islam.  
4.3 Encounter in schools 
In the 1950s, the leading Muslim organisations in Yorubaland such as the Ahmadiyya and 
Ansar-Ud-Deen had established primary and secondary schools in several communities. But 
the schools were not enough to accommodate the population of Muslim children.554 As a result, 
Muslims continued to send their children either to government schools, predominantly 
managed by Christians or to the Christian mission schools. In many of these schools, the 
students encountered a system of education that raised concerns about their own religious 
identities. One of the practices in these schools was to participate in the Assembly session 
where they sang Christian hymns and read lessons from the Bible.555 The Assembly is a 
gathering of students in primary and secondary schools usually in the morning before classes 
begin. It is used to pray, sing and give information about the school. By the 1950s, every student 
was required to learn a few hymns for this session, a practice which has continued in many 
public and private schools to date. The schools’ curriculum also had Christian studies in which 
Muslims were required to take. In addition, students were required to attend Church service in 
most of the mission and public schools.  
As part of their social activities in school, Muslim students also participated in programmes 
organised by the popular religious associations, the Students Christian Movement (SCM) and 
the Scripture Union (SU). The SCM had been introduced in the 1930s by a few Nigerian 
students who embraced the movement during their studies in Britain. The first was Francis 
Akanu Ibiam (1906-1995) who studied medicine in Scotland and later served as the governor 
of the former Eastern Region of Nigeria from 1960 to 1966. In 1937, he started SCM classes 
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in secondary schools and among a few evangelists and teachers located around Abiriba, Eastern 
Nigeria.556 There was also Theophilus Ejiwumi who studied at the University College, London. 
Upon his return in 1940, he taught at Yaba Higher College where he introduced the SCM to 
students at the college, and later, in junior secondary schools.557 The other association, the SU, 
was founded in England in 1867 to organise special services for children who could not 
participate in adult church services. It was introduced in Nigeria by Rev. Charles Henry Vidal 
Gollmer (b. 1854), a member of the Christian Missionary Society (CMS) in the Yoruba Mission 
field in 1884. The activities of the SU almost collapsed in the 1940s before it was resuscitated 
in secondary schools by British teachers in the 1950s.558 Both the SCM and the SU, which later 
moved to the universities, engaged students in activities like Bible study, sports, vacation 
camps and conferences.559  
In addition to the activities of these associations, mission and government schools offered 
students the opportunity to represent them in sports like cricket and football. By the 1920s, 
these sports had become part of ways the British administrators and Christian missions 
promoted new identities, leisure, and modernization of Nigeria.560 Olusegun Obasa has argued 
that they were key aspects of the colonial education and leisure of the administrators which 
disciplined the minds of Nigerians toward the social life envisioned by the colonial officials 
and missionaries.561 Like education, they also appear to many Yoruba as an aspect of Ọlaju 
which they wanted to be identified with. Since there were few Muslim schools at the time, 
many Muslim children were attracted to the Christian mission schools by these sports, and in 
the process, they became Christians because changing their religion was often required in order 
to enrol in such schools and to participate in the sports. Saidat Mabadeje (née Anibaba), a 
student of Queen’s College Lagos at the time, narrated the story of one of these young Muslims 
to me:  
…we had somebody who converted to Christianity because he was a good 
footballer…And he told me, he wanted to be on the football team, and the 
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only condition was if he would change his religion. It was a Christian school 
and they asked if he would change his religion and he said he would. 562 
While they learned more about Christianity, Muslim students in these schools were less 
informed about their own religion. This was partly due to the challenges and style of learning 
of the madrasa system discussed in the previous chapter. This is not to suggest that they knew 
nothing about Islam, but there was a general perception among them that what they knew was 
not enough,563 and therefore, they considered Muslims who became Christians to be “weak-in-
faith students.”564 On the other hand, most of these schools did not have an Islamic curriculum, 
and there were no teachers for it in the government schools that were willing to allow it. 
Clearly, this is part of the consequences of not embracing Western education earlier by many 
Yoruba Muslims who could have developed the competence to teach the subject. With no 
opportunity to learn their own religion, Muslim students were thus required to receive lessons 
on Christianity and attend Church as part of the school activities. In many schools, this was 
also believed to keep them busy. Such was the case of students at a government school located 
around Ibadan who complained that they were forced to attend church in 1963. Alhaji 
Muritadha Awal, who later became a cleric in Lagos, intervened on behalf of these students. 
He explained to me that:  
The school authority then said the reason behind this action was because the 
Muslim students cannot even recite Arabic. They do not pray, and the school 
cannot allow them to be idle and playing while others are worshipping at 
school…that was why the Muslims were being compelled to go to church.565    
He confirmed that this case was reported to the governor of Western Region who granted the 
Muslim group established by him and his friends, Junudu Lahi L’Islamiyyah, permission to 
teach Muslim students in such schools. This story is interesting because it shows that many 
Muslim students in various parts of Yorubaland made efforts to address their encounter in the 
schools. However, the efforts of some students in Lagos appear to have been the most profound. 
Among them were leading members of their school clubs such as Saidat Mabadeje, the 
Secretary of the Queen’s College Literary and Debating Society. There was also Lateef 
Adegbite,566 a member of various King’s College games who was also making a significant 
impression in the Literary and Debating Society circle in Lagos,567 and Rahman Sahid (b. 
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c.1936),568 the Chairman of the Literary and Debating Society in Lagos. Others were prefects, 
officers and members of the Red Cross and the SCM in their schools. The leadership positions 
of Muslim students in these clubs suggests that the schools recognised their intellectual ability 
rather than their religious affiliation. More importantly, it gives the impression that the schools 
were also involved in the peaceful management of Christian-Muslim encounter in Yoruba 
society.  
Rather than participating in the SCM and the SU, these students considered having a similar 
platform to learn about their religion and preserve their identity. They thought that the number 
of Muslims who were attracted to Christianity could be reduced if they knew about Islam and 
if they were engaged in activities with fellow Muslims through a similar platform.569 By the 
1950s, Muslim organisations like the Ansar-Ud-Deen and the Ahmadiyya had social activities 
that promote religious education and interaction among Muslims. In particular, the Ansar-Ud-
deen organised Adult Education classes which included tafsīr (exegesis) and Arabic lessons in 
various branches such as Alakoro, the site of its first school.570 However, students like Adegbite 
believed that they were more concerned with issues relating to adults. In cases where these 
organisations had programmes for students in their schools, he also thought that Muslims in 
non-Muslim schools might be excluded.571 An exclusive and single platform for all Muslim 
students was therefore expected to bridge this gap. 
The Lagos students also thought that the platform could be used to challenge their school 
authorities to grant freedom to practice their religion such as performing the ṣalāt and fasting 
in Ramadan (for students in boarding schools). But they were concerned that this might not be 
possible if they acted alone as individuals. The platform they envisaged was therefore also to 
“enable them to agitate for their rights and defend those rights for their common interest.”572 
Also, they considered the platform would give Muslim students a sense of pride in their 
religion. The perception that many of these students did not have pride in their religion seemed 
to emerge from the concern that they did not openly identify as Muslims in school.573 Although 
some students who belong to this category were required to bear Christian names, still many 
were understood to think that Christians had attractive programmes and more ‘civilised’ in 
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manners, and thus, would not want to be seen as Muslims.574 This is part of what Peel referred 
to as the “double sense of inferiority” among the Yoruba Muslims,575 although I disagree with 
his generalisation of this phenomenon (see Chapter Seven). A platform for Muslim students 
was therefore expected to offer them similar programmes as the SCM and the SU and instil 
pride in them as Muslims.  
For students like Saidat, this platform was also important for them in order to encourage 
interaction among Muslim males and females, thereby stopping those who were friends with 
Christians and got married to them through such interaction. As it was the social expectation 
among many Yoruba for a woman to practise the religion of her husband, such that Muslims 
normally convert to Christianity, they reckoned that the platform would facilitate marriages 
between Muslim men and women. While I consider this ideal to challenge the normative notion 
of Yoruba religious tolerance, Saidat was of the view that: 
 …it wasn’t an epidemic, but it was something we felt, and we wanted to 
prevent that kind of thing happening. We wanted the Muslim young men and 
Muslim young women to meet and interact, and ultimately, they would get 
married.576 
Based on these concerns, I consider the desire to have this platform not only as a response to 
the encounter the Muslim students had in the Christian managed schools but also the need to 
address other challenges that faced Yoruba Muslims such as ‘poor’ knowledge of Islam among 
young Muslims and a shortage of teachers to teach Islamic studies in schools. On the one hand, 
this response involved conflict and opposition to Christian practices in schools, and on the other 
hand, it involved borrowing from these practices. However, the borrowing was from fellow 
Muslims and not directly from the structure and programmes of the SCM nor the SU, as will 
be shown below.  
Formation of the MSS: By mid-1953, the students who thought about a platform for Muslim 
students had contact and exchanges in various places especially in mosques and during the 
schools’ club events in Lagos.577 In some of the meetings, Adegbite discussed the idea of a 
platform for Muslim students with his friends but did not come up with a framework. This was 
until Tajudeen Aromashodu, from the Methodist Boys High School, informed them about a 
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group called the Muslim Students Society in Burma (now Myanmar).578 By 1954, Aromashodu 
discovered the group in an edition of the Ahmadi magazine, The Islamic Review, which he 
usually read with his friends.579 He later exchanged correspondence with the MSS in Burma to 
become an affiliate member in Lagos and was followed by five of his friends which included 
Sahid. The documents containing the constitution and activities of the society were sent to these 
members. By March 1954 when they wanted to inaugurate the Lagos branch, Sahid convinced 
them about having the Society as an independent body in Nigeria rather than being affiliated 
to the MSS in Burma. He suggested that the problems of the Burmese students were different 
from their own, thus implying that the implementation of the Society’s objectives could face 
some challenges in Nigeria. Aromashodu explained this to the MSS in Burma and their wish 
was granted. With the assistance of some Muslim teachers, they revised the constitution of the 
society to fit into their own experience and it was used as a framework to form the Nigerian 
MSS at Ansar-Ud-Deen School Hall Alakoro Lagos in 1954. The inaugural meeting had about 
forty students from seven secondary schools in Lagos, including King’s College; Queen’s 
College; Methodist Boys High School; CMS Grammar School, Bariga; Ahmadiyya College 
(now Anwarul Islam Model College), Agege; Methodist Girls High School, Yaba; and Baptist 
Academy, Obanikoro.580  
Notwithstanding the revision made in Lagos, their activities were not very different from those 
of the MSS in Burma. Evidence about this link is in Moshe Yegar’s study, The Muslims of 
Burma.581 Yegar shows that the MSS in Burma organised national conferences, sporting 
activities, debating circles and picnics in order to promote social interaction like the SCM and 
the SU. It also published journals and encouraged mutual support among Muslim students. 
Thus, rather than the SCM and the SU, it was the example of the Burmese MSS that shaped 
the structure and programmes that provided Muslim sociability for Yoruba Muslim students 
from 1954.  
One could argue that the correspondence between students in Lagos and Burma is an indication 
of the extent of transnational exchanges that occurred within the global Muslim world during 
the colonial period and how young Yoruba Muslims became involved in these exchanges. With 
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reference to the discussion on the link between colonial rule and religious change in Chapter 
Two, the British empire played a central role in mediating these exchanges by aiding the 
transnationalisation of a formally restricted organisation in Burma. Nile Green’s Terrains of 
Exchange illustrates this phenomenon better.582 His study shows that formally local forms of 
organisation and relationship can developed over time and expanded into the world’s religious 
market. This expansion, according to Green, requires multiple participants who are involved in 
various forms of exchanges across different spaces and facilitating religious production.583 This 
appears in the case of MSS where the British Empire whose colonial activities and 
infrastructures helped to facilitate the expansion of the MSS in Burma and the links between 
various actors which include Muslims and Christians located across Burma, England and 
Nigeria. As will be shown later, this transnational dimension of religious production continued 
to be part of the history of MSS in the post-independence era.  
4.4 The objectives of the MSS 
In the MSS constitution, the students had visions and objectives which reflected imaginations 
of how to be Muslims in a non-Muslim environment and how to engage non-Muslims within 
their social context. They adopted the motto “Peace, Love and Comradeship”584 to express 
these visions and the kind of orientation they wanted to promote about their movement. Saidat 
was of the view that the motto suggested that the aim of the Society at inception was “not 
overly religious” compared to its  “radical” character in later years.585 Even though it supports 
the desire for social interaction which the students wanted, Saidat’s view should also be 
understood within the socio-historical context of Yoruba Muslim students, discussed in 
Chapter Three, and in generational differences on what is understood as “overly religious.” The 
point of view of many students I interacted with suggests that generational differences have 
shaped the understanding of the objectives of the MSSN. The students actually considered the 
MSSN activities as avenues to meet new friends, chat and play while they were growing up 
until they became adults and understood them as ways to learn about Islam and shape their 
lives as better Muslims.586  
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The idea of ‘Peace’ in the motto is understood by many members of the Society to reflect the 
meaning of Islam as a “peaceful religion.”587 But, according to Adegbite, the pioneer members 
were also concerned about the political tension of the late colonial period leading towards 
Nigeria’s independence. Therefore, they made it known that the MSS was a ‘peaceful’ 
association of Muslim youths and it was non-partisan,588 although the history of the Society 
does not confirm that it was politically neutral. Since its formation was connected to the 
Ahmadiyya Movement, this vision of peace could also have been influenced by Ahmadiyya’s 
idea of loyalty and the harmonious relationship between Muslims and the British colonial 
government, as Humphrey Fisher noted.589 Based on their relationship, it is possible that MSS’ 
emphasis on ‘Love’ was also influenced by the Ahmadiyya’s motto of “Love for all, hatred for 
none.”590 Aleah Connley suggests that this is one of the teachings of the Ahmadiyya to 
encourage Muslims “to accept the oppressive attitudes and actions of others, to forgive 
intolerance and to move beyond these experiences.”591 
The notion of ‘Comradeship,’ according to Adegbite, was chosen because the Society wanted 
to promote among its members “that feeling of solidarity which is the mark of the religion of 
Islam.”592 This became symbolised in the epithets “brother” and “sister” used by members as 
a prefix to their names to further create what he considered “the genuine feeling of 
brotherhood.”593 However, what is implied in these epithets among many Yoruba slightly differ 
from this, as they are mostly used to show deference between junior and senior persons usually 
the adolescents and the unmarried men and women. What is more is that the idea of 
brotherhood was also expected to help deal with the problem created by the ethnic identity 
crisis and discrimination which not only haunted many parts of Yorubaland but also Nigeria as 
noted above. In this regard, Muslim brotherhood was considered by the Society to ensure 
“equal treatment which presupposes respect for the other man.”594 
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Comradeship was further seen as a vision to bridge the gap caused by the division among 
different Muslim groups in Yorubaland to which their parents belonged and between those 
attending Muslim and non-Muslim schools. This idea was reflected in the first objective of the 
Society, “To bring into close union the Muslim students of different educational 
institutions.”595 Apart from promoting interaction, the MSS also considered unity among 
Muslim students as an instrument to combat the challenges facing Muslims in Yoruba society. 
Adegbite not only promoted this idea within the MSS, he also expressed disappointment in the 
lack of unity among Muslims towards the propagation of Islam and their challenges in Nigeria.  
I would want to see Muslim more united…all must join hands towards the 
propagation of Allah’s chosen religion. I was not particularly happy about 
lack of unity among Muslims. The solution to the problem lies not on the 
MSS alone but all Islamic organisations and individuals.596  
The emphasis on unity was also defined in religious terms. For the Society, Islam is one religion 
and Muslim students, irrespective of the groups they belong to outside the schools, should see 
themselves as one community.597 This idea became the basis of the idea of ‘One Muslim 
community’ in the school system in Yorubaland and other parts of Nigeria. Until the 1980s, 
this idea ensured that Muslim students did not identify as distinct members of their 
organisations outside the schools, such as Ansar-Ud-deen and Ahmadiyya, but as one group. 
After promoting this idea in the MSS, as mentioned earlier, Adegbite facilitated the formation 
of an all Muslim organzations in Yorubaland named Western State Joint Muslim Organisation 
(WESJOMO) in 1972, and in Nigeria with the establishment of the NSCIA in 1973. 
The second objective of the MSS was “To encourage the studies of the Holy Qur’an and Arabic 
Language”598 in its envisioned Muslim students’ community. Given the unavailability of their 
own religious education in most of their schools at the time, this objective was expected to 
increase their knowledge of Islam and to make up for the lack of Islamic curricula. Indeed, by 
encouraging the study of Islamic texts in the Western school system, the MSS attempted to 
further move away from the method of learning under the alfa in a madrasa, a vision close to 
the organisations that preceded the Society such as Ansar-Ud-Deen and Ahmadiyya. Yet, this 
objective is quite phenomenal in the understanding of the encounter between Yoruba Muslims 
and Christians because it represents an attempt to transmit Islamic education even in Christian 
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schools. While this ensured that the transmission of knowledge of both religions takes place in 
shared spaces, it also gives rise to competing religious orientations within these spaces. 
The third objective of the Society was “To promote the social, moral, religions (sic) and 
intellectual standards of Muslim Students.”599 With this, the Society aimed to ensure that social 
interaction among Muslim students conforms to Islamic values such as separation between 
boys and girls. According to Fathi Mabadeje, who became President of the MSS in 1962, the 
Society’s concern was also to ensure that Muslim students understood Islamic morals early on 
“what Islam teach us about how to live well, how to be good citizens, how to dress 
appropriately.” For him, the MSS was worried about the fashion in the society particularly the 
Christians who wear “bounfo (mini gown)”600 and wanted the Muslim students to despise such 
lifestyle. 
In addition, Muslim students were expected to understand how to perform the daily ṣalāt 
(prayer), ablutions and fast during Ramadan. With regards to intellectual standards, the aim 
was to ensure that Muslim students perform better in school. The Society also aimed to 
encourage more Muslim children to enrol for Western education and learn the basic skills for 
modern professional life. I regard this third objective as a reflection of the MSS aim to 
encourage ethical formation among Muslim students. Drawing insights from Saba Mahmood 
work,601 I used ethical formation to refer to the process by which certain virtues and practices 
are learned and embodied by an agent. Mahmood focuses on this kind of ethical formation 
among Muslim women in Egypt and how it is linked to the politics of public life. But her study 
only sheds light on the religious virtues that are embodied. The case of the MSS, in contrast, 
illustrates that Muslims’ ethical formation is also aimed at personifying the non-religious 
aspect of life, and, it confirms the argument in many studies on the multiple and complex 
representations of being Muslims.602 
The fourth objective of the Society was “To watch, discuss and safeguard the interests and 
rights of the Muslims (sic) Students.”603 This objective shows that bringing Muslim students 
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together as one was not only considered an end, it was also seen as means to confront their 
challenges. The MSS was to be a Muslim community with one voice and the capability to fight 
for their religious rights in schools. To inspire them, Mr. A. T. Lawal, a journalist and 
schoolteacher who was Chairman at its inaugural meeting urged “all members of the young 
Society to see themselves as pioneer Muslim revolutionaries who must never waver in the face 
of any obstacle and who must love each other more than their blood relation.”604 The formation 
of the MSS thus appears as a collective action in which Muslim students mobilised to engage 
the school system on issues regarding their religion. Their action was geared towards 
preserving their Islamic identity and, at the same time, making this identity public and 
challenging the dominant religious practices in their schools. In the remaining part of this 
chapter, I will show how the Society progressed over time and how its various objectives and 
understanding of Islam were advanced. 
4.5 ‘Foundation Decade’: the MSS from 1954 to 1964 
The ten years after the inauguration of the MSS is considered by Adegbite as the “Foundation 
Decade,” while Afis Oladosu, an ex-national leader of the MSSN, referred to it as the “Era of 
Inauguration, Proclamation and Expansion.”605 This decade clearly shows the early activities 
of the Society and practices of members in relation to students encounter in schools as well as 
the experiences of Yoruba Muslims and their coreligionists in other parts of Nigeria. It is also 
a period that depict how the Society initially put its vision and objectives into action and 
portrayed itself. The period began with laying the foundation of the Society which was done 
amid doubts and caution. Many non-Muslim students doubted the capability of the leaders of 
the Society for organisation and thought that the MSS would soon flounder.606 As students in 
secondary school, the pioneer members were also cautious about dealing with their school 
authorities.607 But they had to make the Society work. This began with the appointment of 
executive members for the Society; Lateef Adegbite was appointed as President, Rahman Sahid 
as Secretary, and Saidat Mabadeje as Assistant Secretary.608 These executives represented 
Lagos and its environs as activities of the Society were only restricted to this region at 
inception. 
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A major task for them was to encourage Muslim students to join the Society. This was done by 
identifying them based on their names and networks of friendships. Certainly, this was a 
challenge for the leaders of the Society because many Muslim students did not identify with 
their Muslim names in schools. Many were also afraid to identify with the new Society because 
their school authorities kept a close watch on those displaying the “new Islamic urge.”609 But 
they gradually overcame this difficulty. One of the factors that helped them was the leading 
position and academic achievement of many of these pioneer members in their school clubs, 
which provided inspiration and connections to many students. The cultural and social capital610 
of Adegbite and his team were thus instrumental in this period. While some Christians doubted 
their success, they also had friends among them who helped to identify Muslim students and 
encouraged them to join the MSS.611 The support of these Christian friends is another example 
of Christian-Muslim encounter which shows how members of both faiths supported one 
another despite their differences. 
Towards the end of the 1950s, members of the MSS increased to other major cities in 
Yorubaland which included Ikorodu, Abeokuta, Ibadan, Ilesha, Ijebu-Ode, and Ede.612 The 
growth was largely supported by the parents of the students, the Muslim elite and leadership 
of the Yoruba Muslim community, as well as other prominent Muslims from Northern Nigeria. 
Among them was Saidat’s father who helped to design the logo of the Society.613 In 1955, when 
the Society had a national conference in Lagos to mark its first anniversary, its members were 
hosted by the Ọba of Lagos who identified with the Ahmadiyya, Musendiku Adeniji Adele II 
(1893 - 1964). The Ọba’s endorsement helped to boost the image and acceptance of the Society 
in Lagos. This reflected in his support for the campaign named “Operation join the MSS” 
employed to encourage parents to allow their children join the Society on this occasion. It may 
be worth mentioning that the backing of the Ọba and the campaign at this anniversary were 
significant in the early history of the MSS because they were linked to the political experience 
of Lagos Muslims. The event coincided with the period of intense solidarity of Muslim 
indigenes of Lagos following the huge population of Christians, including Igbos, who had 
migrated into the city by the 1950s. To challenge this Christian population, members of the 
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Ansar-Ud-deen, Ahmadiyya, and Jama'at-ul-Islamiyya aligned with the Awolowo led AG 
which had adopted Ọba Adele’s Area Council (est. 1949) in 1951, and, from 1953, they began 
to dominate Lagos politics.614 Thus, apart from boosting the image of the MSS, the support of 
the Ọba and other Muslim leaders also helped to reinforce the solidarity of the Muslims in the 
city. 
The second anniversary of MSS held at Ijebu-Ode in 1956 showed a remarkable increase in its 
members. The support of influential Muslims outside Lagos also expanded at the time of this 
anniversary. The event witnessed the attendance of students from technical colleges and the 
former University College, Ibadan (later University of Ibadan-UI). Despite the large turn-out, 
Alhaji Mahdi Otubu a prominent chief in Ijebu-Ode was responsible for their feeding and 
accommodation. Another Muslim leader and businessman in Ilesha, Alhaji R. A. Smith, gave 
financial and technical support to the Society at its third national conference held in the city in 
1957.615 The support of these Muslim leaders was symbolised in their appointment as patrons 
of the Society. Another influential supporter was Saburi Biobaku (1918-2001), a professor of 
History and uncle to Adegbite who later became the Vice-Chancellor of the University of 
Lagos. There was also Alhaji Inuwa Wada (1917-2015) a parliamentarian and Federal Minister 
of Works, and Alhaja Humuani Alaga616 (1897- 1993) a businesswoman and Otun Iyalode617 
of Ibadan.618 In addition to the patrons’ support, members of the MSS also supported the 
development of the Society with their own money. An amount of one shilling was contributed 
by each member monthly which was used to cover the cost of running the Society. The Society 
also relied on donations collected during festivals and proceeds from the exhibition of articles 
mounted during its social activities. 
In 1956, the MSS’ national conferences attracted students from Northern Nigeria, with two in 
attendance at the Ijebu-Ode event. The 1957 conference at Ilesha, however, had many students 
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from government schools and colleges in the North such as the Nigerian College of Arts, 
Science and Technology, Zaria.619 The attendance of these students gave the Society a national 
outlook and it led to a change in its leadership structure. In the new structure, Adegbite vacated 
his position in Lagos and became its first national president. Other national officers were 
Shuaib Oloritun, Vice-President; Saidat Mabadeje, Second Vice-President; and Rahman Sahid, 
Secretary.620 As more post-secondary school students joined the Society and its pioneer 
members got admitted into the university, the activity of the Society began to be coordinated 
from tertiary institutions. The University of Ibadan (UI) became the leading institution in this 
regard because of its status as the first university in Nigeria. This began in 1957 when members 
of the Society were admitted to the university. Over the years, Ibadan also overtook Lagos as 
the administrative headquarters of the Society. This was boosted by the huge support which 
the Society got from several individuals such as Alhaja Alaga and Alhaji Isa Yagboyaju (1933-
2012) in Ibadan. The latter was a a businessman and chairman, NSCIA Oyo-Osun states.621 In 
the next section, I discuss how the activities of the Society were established in the schools. 
4.5.1 Establishing Muslim practices in ‘Christian-run’ schools 
The activities of the Society were few in this period, and they often depended on the activism 
of its members and the willingness of the authorities in different schools to accommodate them. 
With more members, the Society could challenge Christian activities to establish its own. This 
began at King’s College where the Society complained to the school authority about 
compelling Muslim students to participate in “Congregational Practice,” a weekly song 
rehearsal held on Thursdays. The school authority considered the complaints and removed the 
attendance requirement for Muslims. Following this victory, the students moved towards 
challenging the daily conduct of morning Assembly with songs and readings from the Bible. 
As prefects were usually tasked with this responsibility, the initiative came from a Muslim 
prefect who was to read the text on a Friday. He informed other members of the Society in 
advance that he was going to read a text from the Qur’an rather than the Bible, which he did 
after he requested permission to do so that morning. Jibril Oyekan, who was a student in the 
College at the time, regarded his action as “something of a revolution” in the school.622 While 
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the government later issued directives to encourage religious tolerance regarding assembly 
practice, Muslim students in many schools were encouraged by King’s College to challenge 
their schools to conduct assemblies on Fridays with Islamic texts and prayers. This became the 
practice in many public schools to date.623 
In schools where negotiation with the authorities was successful, the MSS also organised 
Muslim students to perform the daily ṣalāt, fast in the month of Ramadan and participate in the 
laylat al-qadr (night of destiny/power) session of that month. The Society also arranged picnics 
to celebrate Muslim festivals such as ʿĪd al-fiṭr at the end of Ramadan and mawlid al-nabī 
(birthday of the Prophet Muhammad).624 At the end of school sessions, the Society conducted 
prayer sessions, especially for school leavers.625 Generally, the Society organised lectures and 
symposia to teach members on Islam up to the late 1950s and beyond this period. The lectures 
began to be held at Ansar-Ud-Deen school hall twice in a month for three years before the 
Society spread to other parts of Yorubaland where more lecture centres were created.626 The 
major topics were on how to perform the ṣalāt, ablution, fasting and ritual purity. The lectures 
usually began with memorisation and translation of Qur’anic verses. Providing support through 
extramural classes for those preparing for exams was another activity of the Society. In many 
of its programmes, the Society also had “Brain Trust.”627 This is an intellectually stimulating 
game in which participants representing different schools pick an issue and discuss it within a 
given time. The topics chosen for the game included both religious and non-religious subjects. 
4.5.2 Diversity in lectures and opinions 
Controversial issues in the Yoruba Muslim community such as the relationship between 
Western education and Islam were among the subjects of MSS lectures and symposia in this 
early period.628 At a forum organised in September of 1954, for instance, Alhaji Babatunde 
Ismail Jose (1925-2008), a well-known journalist in Nigeria with the Daily Times, gave a 
lecture on “Muslim Education in Nigeria.” The attention of the Society also focused on the 
challenges of many Yoruba Muslims such as their inability to afford the Western schools. 
Members of the Society debated on this issue during a general meeting held on October 3, 
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1954.629 In some of the symposia, the leaders of various Muslim organizations in Yorubaland 
were also invited as guest lecturers. Among them were Mustapha Ekemode of Ansar-Ud-Deen, 
Basil Agusto of Jama’atul-Islamiyya and Yusau Popoola Oyesile Shodeinde (d. 1991) of 
Ahmadiyya.630 These clerics also focused on different debates on Islamic practice and ʿaqīda 
(creed) in the Yoruba Muslim communities such as the position of the hands during ṣalāt and 
gender relations among young Muslims. What is known about the arguments made during these 
lectures is sketchy. But, given that the clerics invited to these lectures were promoters of the 
new understanding of Islam common among the Western educated Muslims in the colonial 
period, one can argue that such knowledge also flowed into the MSS and helped to shape the 
religious practices and identities of the students. 
Occasionally, the discussants at the MSS symposia were non-Muslims. Among them was M. 
A. Dike (1917-1983), who later became a professor of History and Vice-Chancellor of the 
University of Ibadan. At a symposium held on August 6, 1954, Dike engaged members of the 
Society on the topic: “Role of Muslim Youths.”631 Allowing all kinds of scholars with different 
backgrounds and ʿaqīda laid the foundation of a tradition within the MSS that welcomes 
diversity of opinions on Islam. Ibrahim Uthman, who became the president of the MSSN (B-
Zone) in 1994, narrated to me that this diversity represented “the glorious days of MSS.”632 
…anytime we want to discuss on the position of Islam on singing and 
dancing… this is what we do; we invited the missioner of YOUMBAS 
(Young Muslim Brothers and Sisters) to come with their position. Because 
then, YOUMBAS started the idea of Islamic Musical group in Nigeria. We 
invite those from the other side, and we allow members to decide where they 
would be. So anytime we were discussing issues like Jesus Christ coming 
back; is he dead? Is Ghulam Ahmad a prophet? We invite Ahmadi 
scholars…We invite those of the view that what the Ahmadi hold on to is 
wrong to come and give their position. And throughout, I can say two decades 
in MSS, there was no crisis and things were working.633 
The diversity of opinions ensured that the MSS was not tilted to one Islamic authority or ʿ aqīda. 
Although members participated in general activities of the Society, they had the freedom to 
choose their position on Islam. Building on its idea of one Islamic community, members also 
tolerated the ʿaqīda which contradicted their own. From 1954, the MSSN continued to foster 
this open discussion, and it was sustained with a flexible membership criterion that allows any 
Muslim student to join and leave at their discretion. As will be demonstrated later, it is this 
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openness that allowed the inflow of varying notions of what it means to be Muslims into the 
Society. 
4.5.3 The MSS in political circles 
The first decade of the MSS also laid the foundation of its visibility in political circles. 
Although little is known about the nature of its involvement, its relationship with political 
actors and the state was obvious. This relationship emphasised the need for the MSS to be 
neutral in political circles rather than identifying with a specific political party or actor. This 
was achieved with the appointment of patrons who represented all major political parties in 
Nigeria.634 They included Ahmadu Bello of the Northern People’s Congress (NPC), Alhaji 
Dauda Soroye Adegbenro (1909-1975) of the Action Group (AG), Alhaji Adegoke Adelabu 
(1915-1958) of the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) and Alhaji Aminu Kano 
(1920-1983) of the Northern Element Progressive Union (NEPU). These political figures 
supported the MSS in many of its programmes. An example was Adelabu in Ibadan whose 
vehicle was used on many occasions for its activities. The executives of the Society were also 
scheduled to break their Ramadan fast at his residence when he died in 1958.635 
Association with these political figures was further symbolised by MSS’ participation in 
official government functions relating to the Muslim world. Through Alhaji Adegbenro who 
was an associate of Chief Awolowo, Adegbite and Adeniran were both invited to a luncheon 
in honour of the Pakistani and Sudanese Presidents in 1958. This was considered within the 
MSS as one of the ways it communicated with the government on national issues.636 The 
participation of MSS representatives at this luncheon can be linked to the political history of 
Yoruba Muslims, showing another dimension of their growing solidarity with the political elite 
in the region. Apart from this, the Society’s association with the political elite also appeared to 
shape the process through which many Muslim students negotiated for power and resources in 
Nigeria. The relationship between them enhanced the emergence of members including 
Adegbite into political administrative positions such as commissioners and ministers later in 
life. In turn, these political elite used the MSSN platform to campaign for votes during 
elections.637 
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4.5.4 The Muslim students’ life  
The participation of Muslim students in lectures and other MSS’ programmes represented a 
major practice in their social and religious lives. While little is known about the effects of these 
programmes in the first decade of the Society, the stories of some pioneer members suggest 
that everyday life as Muslims and knowledge of Islam of the majority were not ‘radically’ 
transformed in this period. Oyekan, for instance, believed that his understanding of Islam was 
developed later when he had the opportunity to study in the United Kingdom (UK) with other 
Muslims from across the world in the 1960s: 
My Islamic activities as a student, I believe, got a push at Imperial College 
because there we had Muslims from all over the world… And, it was right 
there in London, really, that I can say I fully discovered Islam and became 
involved in the opportunities to increase one’s knowledge.638 
To an extent, the experience of students like Dawud Noibi, referred to in Chapter Three, 
suggests that many students may have struggled to transform what they had learnt about Islamic 
tradition into daily practice if they had access to such knowledge. Narrating his own experience 
in 1964 when he discovered that it was wrong for Muslims to prostrate for people, a sign of 
greeting in Yorubaland for males, Noibi explained that he could only make up his mind to put 
this knowledge into practise after a prolonged struggle in his mind. This was because “the older 
generation saw that it was rude to even say such a thing, let alone you refusing to prostrate 
before elders.” 639 Based on this experience, I consider what it means to be a better Muslim 
among students in this period was not only dependent on the Islamic tradition but also on what 
was socially approved of based on local practices. 
Many Muslim students in the MSS were also engaged in a socially approved popular culture 
considered to be aspects of Ọlaju linked to the Christians. Among these were picnics and dance 
parties used to celebrate birthdays, Christmas and other events. However, Noibi explained that 
Muslims who attended such parties might be conscious of not taking alcohol:  
…if you do not attend any social parties or let me say… there is a 
consciousness you want to show that you are civilized… and the only way by 
which you can do that is to attend parties and do what they do there. And what 
I’m not sure of is whether they would drink. I don’t think they would drink. 
But attending dance parties…Organizing, like the Christians do, to mark the 
ʿĪd for example. Or at the end of the year, MSS of this institution wants to 
mark the end of the year, they would attend a party… Attending picnics was 
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also part of it. Attending picnic was a way of expressing that consciousness, 
that we are not uncivilized.640 
Many Muslim students also wore modest dress in this period. As the Mabadejes’ suggested 
above regarding females, ‘bounfo’ dress was discouraged. But what was considered modest 
dress for females, according to them, was “not necessarily covering their heads or covering 
their faces.”641 Like the females, the dress of the male students also varied. The pictorial record 
of the Society below shows they wore agbada (loose-fitting garment), shirts, suits, and trousers 
reaching their ankles.642  
 
Fig. 1: Yoruba Muslim students in the 1950s. Source: MSSN UNILAG, Ash-Shabaab (The Youth) Pen, 2004. 
4.6 National Brotherhood and global Islamic movements, 1964-1974  
In the period between 1964 and 1974, the MSS strengthened the promotion of its various 
objectives and connected with Muslim students in Northern Nigeria and other parts of the 
world. In this regard, it held two national conferences, in Zaria in 1965, and Kano in 1966, and 
established branches in many post-secondary schools to achieve its vision of Muslim 
brotherhood. Some branches were also established in Mid-Western states including Benin, 
Auchi and Asaba. With its national outlook, the administrative structure of the Society was 
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reviewed at the 1966 Kano conference. In the reviewed constitution, Lagos remained an 
independent unit, while the former Western Region was divided into three: West Area Unit A, 
West Area Unit B and West Area Unit C. The Northern region was also divided into three: 
Near-North Area Unit, Far-North Area Unit and Bauchi-Yola-Adamawa Area Unit. The last 
was the Mid-West Area Unit. These units were further divided into A-Zone representing the 
North and B-Zone representing the South (Southeast and Southwest).643 With this division, the 
National President of the Society began to be rotated between the two zones.  
A major figure in the history of the MSSN in this period was a former member of the 
Ahmadiyya named Abdul-Razak Afolabi Solaja (1933-2012). He was a student activist who 
served as President of the Students’ Union of UI in 1962 and the National Union of Nigerian 
Students (NUNS) in 1963.644 After his appointment as the National President of the MSSN in 
1966, he became involved in promoting the various objectives of the MSSN beyond 
Yorubaland. Among these objectives was the importance of Western education to Muslims 
which he emphasised at the Kano conference of the Society. In his address at this conference 
titled ‘Jihad against Ignorance,’ he considered Muslims in Nigeria as lagging in the “scheme 
of things” despite being the largest population. Therefore, he urged them to use all their 
resources to fight ignorance and to produce qualified Muslims in Nigeria’s public service.645 
By making such a statement in Kano, Solaja made a strong point against the colonial policy 
that prevented the expansion of Western education in Northern Nigeria. His address was also 
a challenge to many Muslims in the region who were unwilling to embrace the Western schools. 
Building on the argument of Adegbite, Solaja also advocated for the unity of Muslim students 
in the South and the North which he considered was needed in order to confront the challenge 
posed by Christianity. He saw the unity between them to be proven in the Qur’anic injunctions 
that all Muslims are brethren.646 This national campaign shows the desire by Yoruba Muslim 
students to identify with fellow Muslims in the country. It also demonstrates an attempt to make 
the objectives of the Society a national cause among Muslims and mobilise students in various 
parts of Nigeria to support this cause. 
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Another contribution made by Solaja was the introduction of the Islamic Vacation Course 
(IVC) which was first organised for some students in 1965. He probably got the idea of this 
IVC from the SCM and the SU who engaged Christian students in this activity because he was 
also said to have encouraged young Muslims to borrow the proselytization method of songs 
from Christians.647 The idea might also be from the transnational Muslim movements, 
discussed below, that the MSSN joined in this period. The MSSN played a key role in the 
emergence of these movements and study camp was one of the activities which began to be 
used for daʿwa by them. The IVC, which I will discuss in Chapter Seven, was included in the 
MSSN reviewed constitution of 1966 and it became an annual national programme for all 
members. 
Under Solaja, the MSSN took the idea of the Muslim students’ brotherhood outside Nigeria 
and connected with the visions of some Islamic revivalist movements in the Muslim world. 
This began in 1966 with ‘The International Seminar of Islam and Society in Modern Time’ 
held at UI.648 The seminar was co-organised by the MSSN and the Extra-Mural Studies 
department of the university and it had delegates from such countries as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
Iraq, Egypt, Sudan, Ghana and the Gambia. There were also goodwill messages sent from 
Indonesia, India, the US and the UK. The seminar was supported with donations from the 
MSSN patrons in Nigeria and participating countries.649 A major outcome of the seminar was 
the adoption of a motion to form the International Islamic Youth Organisation (IIYO). 
The Ibadan conference gave some insights into the objectives which the MSSN aimed to 
articulate with this international brotherhood. Of major interest was to challenge the 
international colonial system in Muslim societies through a common organisation. The 
organisation also aimed to provide support for Muslims who might be a minority group in their 
societies. In his address at the conference, Solaja pointed out that;  
In a world where Islam is faced with attacks from various bodies and 
phenomena, we quickly realised what a great advantage it would be for 
Muslims and particularly Muslim students to keep close together in order to 
achieve self-realisation, a thing which Muslims lack today. We also realised 
that self-realisation will lead to self-reassertion and once we can reassert 
ourselves, we shall practically recall the golden era of bygone tears (sic) when 
Muslims dictated the pace of world civilisation. The time has come when such 
efforts at self-realisation and self-reassertion should be coordinated 
throughout the world so that, among other things, those Muslims living in 
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non-Muslims areas where Islam has been denigrated and Muslims are being 
hired into other religions may gain inspiration from their Muslim brothers 
who are placed in more privileged position.650 
He added at the seminar held at Omdurman Islamic University, Sudan in 1967,651 where the 
idea of this movement was further developed, that “The time has indeed come when Muslims 
all over the world should adopt a more missionary outlook for the propagation of Islam among 
non-Muslims and the strengthening of Islamic faith among Muslims.”652 The students from 
Europe and North America who could not attend the Ibadan seminar were present in Sudan. 
This seminar produced a committee that facilitated the transformation of the IIYO into the 
International Islamic Federation of Students Organisation (IIFSO). The new organisation was 
inaugurated at its headquarters in Kuwait in 1968653 while its inaugural conference was held in 
Aachen, Germany, in 1969.654 How the MSSN linked up with this movement and other 
Muslims involved its formation abroad remains sketchy, but it is possible that this was through 
the Nigerian students abroad which included the Yoruba Muslims. The connection between 
Oyekan and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), described below, points to this 
assumption. 
Existing literature suggests that the emergence of IIFSO can be traced to student members of 
the Muslim Brotherhood who facilitated the expansion of the movement in the years after 
World War II.655 These students, among other members of the Brotherhood, had fled their 
countries from various parts of the Middle East to Europe and North America due to the 
hostility of their governments, and they planned to reorganise themselves in the West before 
returning to their countries to promote their ideals of Islamic states. However, a few of them 
began to reconsider their return home by the 1970s. Lorenzo Vidino noted that one of the key 
factors responsible for this was the rising population of Muslims in the West who wished to 
fulfil their spiritual obligations and required guidance on how to be Muslim in non-Muslim 
societies.656 In Germany, some Syrian students of the Brotherhood at the Technical University, 
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Aachen, began the construction of the Bilal mosque for this purpose in the 1960s.657 A 
document from the website of IIFSO written by Azhar Niaz confirms that the inaugural 
conference of IIFSO was held at this mosque in June 1969.658  
Some US-based Iraqi students also played a key role in the formation of IIFSO. The most 
prominent were Ahmed Tontonji (b. 1941), Hisham Altalib (b. 1940) and Jamal Barzinji (1939-
2015).659 Before founding IIFSO, Tontonji and Barzinji had created the Muslim Students 
Association (MSA) at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Campaign in 1963. Several years 
later, this association had about 600 branches in universities that spread across the US and 
Canada.660 Niaz further claims that these students sought to create an Islamic movement that 
integrates the best of the Islamic world and the West.661 They also aimed to have “an umbrella 
organization that could help in the organised promotion of concepts such as the unity of Islamic 
thought, the universality of the Islamic movement, and the consolidation of a mature Muslim 
leadership.”662 For this purpose, IIFSO produced many Islamic texts in about eighty different 
languages that were made available to students across the world. Among these texts were the 
works of Abul A’la Mawdudi, Hassan al-Banna and Sayid Qutb.663 In 1981, Barzinji and 
Totonji, as well as the MSSN, were involved in the establishment of another organisation called 
the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) located in the state of Virginia in the US 
which has been concerned with the project titled ‘Islamization of Knowledge.’664 
It is interesting to observe that the thoughts of these students’ movement were noticed in the 
international seminars organised by the MSSN from the late 1960s. In 1968, for instance, the 
MSSN collaborated with the JNI in Northern Nigeria to host the ‘Muslim Education in Modern 
Age’ seminar in Kaduna where it reviewed the curriculum of Western-oriented school systems. 
The MSSN at the seminar bemoaned the neglect of Islamic sciences and their contribution to 
world civilisation in this school system. It also pointed out that Islam had been misunderstood 
and misinterpreted because emphasis had been placed on the ritual aspect of the religion.  
Delegates at the seminar, therefore, advocated the need for policies and methods to guide 
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Islamic education that would allow Muslim students to develop a spiritual life and contribute 
to societal growth.665 
It should also be mentioned that in 1972, Totonji and Barzinji as well as the MSSN666 were 
involved in the establishment of another transnational organisation, the World Assembly of 
Muslim Youth (WAMY), founded in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Between 1972 and 1975, Ibrahim 
Sulaiman served as a representative of the organisation with an office in Kano, while Oyekan 
became its second representative from 1975 to 1982 with an office in Lagos.667 The aim of 
these students, according to Zeyno Baran, was to facilitate the link between the Wahhabis in 
Saudi Arabia and the Muslim Brotherhood to promote their notions of Islam around the 
world.668 A study by Cemil Aydin suggests that WAMY was also part of King Faisal bin 
Abdulaziz’s (1906-1975) domestic and international reforms that sought to position Saudi 
Arabia at the centre of the Muslim world during the Cold War.669 In contrast to the pan-Arab 
and Third World solidarity promoted in this era by Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918-1970) of Egypt, 
Faisal pursued a Muslim world solidarity that invested in economic development, women’s 
education and the abolition of slavery at home. At the same time, he provided support or 
inspiration for the establishment of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and humanitarian 
assistance abroad. Of major interests were the Muslim World League (MWL) (est. 1962) and 
the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) (est.1969).670 While these organisations 
targeted the leaders of their member countries, the formation of the WAMY was aimed at 
strengthening fraternal relationships among the Muslim youths. In the same vein, it was used 
by the Saudi Arabian government to promote international humanitarian assistance in Muslim 
societies through several means, such as education,671 donation of Islamic literature and the 
organisation of study camps and conferences.672 
Beyond the desire for Islamic brotherhood, the MSSN geographical expansion beyond Lagos 
and its relationship with these transnational Muslim movements had significant effects on the 
understanding of Islam among its members. Most importantly, it led to the transformation of 
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the MSSN into a reform movement. It also caused a change in the relationship among members 
of the Society. The changes, which are discussed below, reflected in the objectives to be 
promoted by the Society from the late 1960s, relationship with the state and the religious 
identity of the Ahmadiyya movement. 
4.6.1 Constitutional review and change 
There was a minor review in the constitution of the MSSN in 1960.673 However, while little is 
known about the details of this review, later constitutional reviews showed that the motto of 
the Society was changed twice by the 1970s. From the initial “Peace, Love and Comradeship” 
to “Peace, Faith and Brotherhood” and eventually to the Kalima (utterance) regarded as the 
word of purity: ilāha illā Allāh wa-Muḥammad rasūl Allāh (There is no god but God, and 
Muhammad is His messenger).674 This sequence of change to the Kalima is what Peel considers 
telling the story of “development of a more defined and consciously orthodox Muslim 
identity.”675 I understand his use of “orthodoxy” here to refer to beliefs and practices that relate 
exclusively to prophetic traditions based on the Qur’an and the Hadith. However, I would like 
to point out that the change towards prophetic traditions should not be understood to mean that 
these students and Yoruba Muslims, in general, were not aware of them before this period. Yet, 
it is the consciousness for these traditions that the MSSN emphasises in its definition of a good 
Muslim, which I will discuss in the next chapter. I also argue that the change to the Kalima is 
a key indicator of the transformation of the MSSN into a movement with another orientation 
of Islam. As Loimeier argued, the terminology which an Islamic movement uses is a signal to 
a change in either its religious orientation, political agenda, or difference from other 
movements.676 The confrontation between the MSSN and the Oyo state, to be discussed later, 
is an example of the effects of this shift. 
Despite the change, what is known about the impact of its new orientation on everyday 
practices of Muslim students remains sketchy. Aisha Lemu (1940-2019), who noticed changes 
among Muslim students in Nigeria between 1966 and 1976 made a few generalisations which 
suggest that the development of an orthodox Muslim identity made little impact on everyday 
practice. Aisha was a British-born author and religious educator who converted to Islam in 
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1961. She was married to a Nigerian who was the former Grand Qadi of the Niger State Sharia 
Court of Appeal, Shaykh Ahmad Lemu, whom she met in the UK. Together with Oyekan, 
Aisha was involved in the project of the Islamization of knowledge and training of Muslim 
youths through the Islamic Education Trust (IET) established in 1969 in Niger State. Although 
she did not refer to Yorubaland, her observation is worth considering because the MSSN had 
become a national movement in this period and she was also involved in the MSSN as a teacher. 
If I look back to the first decade that I spent in Nigeria, from 1966 to 1976, I 
was struck by the high level of tolerance on the part of the Muslims…Students 
in school were still generally being taught their religion by traditional 
mallams [teachers]. Islam meant how to perform prayers, the rules of fasting, 
memorization of the Qur’an and so on.677  
A member of the Board of Trustees of the MSSN and one of its early members, Nurudeen 
Oladapo Alao,678 made some remarks at the thirtieth anniversary of the Society in 1984 which 
further suggested that the development of a conscious orthodox Muslim identity in the MSSN 
did not translate into everyday practice for the majority. According to him, the Society had the 
challenge of producing “good Muslims” in the 1980s despite the large number of students who 
identified with the Society and participated in the range of activities employed to facilitate this. 
A lot of progress has been made at the national level of MSS now. A variety 
of enlightenment programmes are now available for the benefit of the 
members. People are becoming aware of the excellence and beauty of Islam. 
But the problem now is how to cope with what had also increased. You have 
to be extra-courageous to be a good Muslim today. The task of making people 
good Muslim has become difficult. And so, there are more nominal Muslims 
in our Society.679 
Even though it was difficult to observe in everyday practice, orthodox Muslim ideas were 
reflected in the revised objectives of the Society in the mid-1980s. The key ideas in the first 
constitution were assumed in the reviewed constitution, but the constitution showed more 
commitment to the fundamentals of Islam and the global Muslim community which included 
the use of Sharia and faith in Allah. The objectives were:  
i. To bring Muslims throughout Nigeria into closer union and inculcate in them the 
true Islamic spirit of brotherhood and absolute faith in ALLAH as the only basis 
for the achievement of peace among mankind. 
ii. To establish an Islamic Ummah governed by the principles and rules of the 
SHARIAH. 
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iii. To encourage the study of the Glorious Qur’an as a Holy Book and the Arabic 
language as the Lingua franca of the Islamic World.  
iv. To promote the general welfare of Muslims and safeguard their interests and rights 
in any community. 
v. To constitute a strong force for the propagation and strengthening of Islam in 
Nigeria and throughout the world.680 
 
At least three objectives in this constitution deserve serious attention. The first is the 
commitment to establish a Muslim community that is ruled by Sharia, which suggests to me 
that the Society is opposed to the postcolonial nation-state and its legal system. It should be 
mentioned that the MSSN’s call for Sharia cannot be said to be mainly influenced by its 
association with transnational Islamic movements since many Yoruba Muslims had requested 
its implementation from the nineteenth century. Moreover, students in Northern Nigeria were 
familiar with the Sharia since it was being administered in some courts in the region. However, 
the MSSN’s emphasis on its introduction for all Muslims in Nigeria can be considered as part 
of its new orientation by the mid-1970s. The inclusion of Sharia in the objectives of the Society 
is thus another sign of the shift in its ideas of Islam between the colonial and post-colonial eras. 
It shows that while the policies and attitude of the colonial government to resistant movements 
played a role in the definition of its first constitution that emphasised “peace” and “love,” this 
new objective appears that the Society is opposed to that system of rule. 
The second objective that is worthy of attention is the promotion of Arabic as the lingua franca 
of Muslims. In this regard, I do not intend to imply that the Society is opposed to English, but 
the emphasis on the language is an effort to acquire an Arabic identity as part of what it means 
to be Muslim. The third objective centres on propagating Islam in Nigeria and throughout the 
world, and it suggests that the Society ceases to consider itself as a Yoruba or Nigerian Muslim 
affair but a global movement, which is evidenced in its membership of the IIFSO and the 
WAMY. It also indicates that the activities of the Society are not limited to educational 
institutions in Nigeria. In general, even though these new objectives point to a shift in the 
orientation of the MSSN, a broad change in practices for the majority was a gradual process, 
and it was constrained by what was socially and culturally accepted in Yoruba society. 
However, the separation between the MSSN and its Ahmadi members was an obvious change 
that showed another orientation of many Yoruba Muslim students on what it means to be 
Muslim in the 1970s. 
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4.6.2 The Ahmadiyya question in the 1970s 
Before the identities of Ahmadis became an issue in the MSSN, many Yoruba Muslims such 
as Agusto had left the movement in 1924. By 1939, the Ahmadis in Nigeria further split into 
two, reflecting the division between the Qadian and Lahore factions over the status of Ghulam 
Ahmad.681 As mentioned in Chapter Three, the Lahore faction saw him as a mujāhid while the 
Qadianis regarded him as a prophet and Mahdī (the guided one). However, many Muslims 
considered the claim to contradict Prophet Muhammad’s position as khātam al-nabīyīn (seal 
of the prophets).682 In the MSSN, students like Solaja belonged to the Ahmadiyya Movement 
in Islam who saw Ghulam Ahmad as a mujāhid. At the 1968 Sudan conference, he learnt about 
the extent of the debate on Ghulam Ahmad’s claim from other delegates and was later involved 
in the cause that challenged the Muslim identity of the Ahmadis in 1971. 683 In one of his 
critiques, he made a distinction between ‘Muslims’ and the ‘Ahmadis’684 The Ahmadis, 
according to him, were those who owe allegiance to their headquarters in Qadiani, believe in 
the prophethood of Ghulam Ahmad, a reincarnate of Jesus Christ and one who attained the 
same spiritual peak as Prophet Ibrahim and would not pray behind other Muslims because they 
are considered inferior to them. However, he differentiated the position of his own faction by 
pointing out that “I was brought up in the Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam where these cardinal 
‘Ahmadi’ dogmas have not been preached for over forty years.”685  
Concerned that his own faction had retained the name ‘Ahmadiyya’ despite their opposing 
claims, he convinced members of the Ahmadiyya Movement to cut their link with anything 
under that label. Severing this link, for him, was necessary to avoid any problem which the 
Ahmadiyya might face in the Muslim world. 
It owes no allegiance at all to the ‘Mission.’ But if unlike the Late Alhaji L. 
B. Agusto the ‘Movement’ chooses to retain the link with Ghulam Ahmad, 
then any current that swept away Ghulam Ahmad must necessarily sweep 
away the ‘Movement.’686  
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In 1974, the Ahmadiyya Movement in Nigeria separated from the Ahmadiyya and changed its 
name to Anwarul-Islam Movement Nigeria. This was followed by many Yoruba Muslims who 
also renounced their membership in the Ahmadiyya. This development came after the adoption 
of a resolution by members of the Muslim World League (MWL) in 1970 which declared the 
Ahmadis as non-Muslims but belonging to a subversive sect in Islam.687 In 1973, as Solaja 
envisaged, Saudi Arabia banned the Ahmadis from performing the hajj and took steps to stop 
the issuance of visas to them. The resolution of the League was adopted in Nigeria by the 
NSCIA and the JNI on March 9, 1974. The NSCIA later developed regulations that ensured 
that Muslims in Nigeria intending to perform the pilgrimage had to obtain a certificate from 
local Imams stipulating that they were not Ahmadis, despite the protests of the Ahmadis at the 
Saudi Arabian embassy in Lagos that year.688  
The Ahmadis in the MSSN were generally affected by this takfīr, a declaration that another 
Muslim is a non-believer. Whereas in 1969, over half of the Society’s sixteen area chairmen 
were Ahmadis,689none of them could hold a leadership position after the takfīr. Unlike before, 
Ahmadi scholars began to be prevented from giving lectures in MSSN programmes. They were 
also criticised by many Muslim scholars who renounced their membership of the movement. 
Among them was Ismail Balogun, a professor of Arabic and Islamic Studies at UI, who wrote 
polemical essays in newspapers and argued emphatically that “for all intent and purpose, 
Ahmadiyya is not Islam.”690 Balogun’s critique was influential in shaping the position of many 
students toward the Ahmadiyya because he was one of the scholars who engaged them in 
MSSN programmes and the university. The critique of the Ahmadis continued in the MSSN 
until 1983 when one of its members, M.O. Tola Kareem, led an initiative among his colleagues 
to break away from the MSSN and establish the Ahmadi Muslim Students’ Association 
(AMSA) as an alternative group for their members in 1984.691 
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One of the points that struck me in the Ahmadiyya crisis relates to the issues raised by Solaja 
which illustrate what attracted many Yoruba Muslims to the movement and what they defined 
as a Muslim. As he pointed out,  
If you ask any member of the Ahmadiyya movement why he is an Ahmadi, 
his answer will invariably be first, that he considers it to be the best organised 
Muslim group. His emphasis will be on the neatness of their ceremonies 
especially along the pattern of Western civilisation. In the Movement, you 
are thought (sic) that Islam is a very simple religion that focuses your attention 
on one God. To us in the Ahmadiyya Movement, he is the myadid692 (sic) of 
the present Muslim countries, no more no less.693  
This suggests that apart from sharing a similar notion of Islam and practices with other Muslim 
groups, many Yoruba Muslims considered the Ahmadiyya as an enlightened Muslim group 
than others, and to be an Ahmadis for them was to be a better Muslim. In the context where 
Christianity was linked with western culture as markers of Ọlaju, the Ahmadiyya became an 
alternative expression of that idea for them. However, as Peel suggested, the takfīr against the 
Ahmadiyya gave way to another conception of a better Muslim that was more in tune with 
wider currents in the global Muslim community in this period.694 Therefore, what it means to 
be a good Muslim in the MSSN in this period involves doing away with the Ahmadis. 
Curiously enough, almost all my respondents did not regard the Ahmadiyya incidence as part 
of what challenged the MSSN notion of one Muslim community. While the silence could mean 
that they consider the Ahmadiyya incident as a problem between ‘Muslims’ and ‘non-
Muslims,’ the interaction between the MSSN and the Ahmadi students since that time further 
reveal an ambivalent conception of a ‘Muslim’ between them. Since there was a takfīr against 
the Ahmadis, the expectation was that they would have the freedom to pull out of the MSSN 
and have separate programmes for their members. To the contrary, the MSSN and the Muslim 
community in many tertiary institutions have resisted this attempt. On many occasions, AMSA 
programmes were disrupted at UI while their request to build a mosque of their own was 
rejected at the Obafemi Awolowo University, Osun (OAU) and in other schools. But some 
institutions allowed the Ahmadis to operate as AMSA and I found them in some MSSN 
programmes at UI during my fieldwork. To understand this ambivalent relationship better, one 
of the arguments of the MSSN against the AMSA assumes that all Muslims in the school are 
one community who should not hold a separate programme different from it. However, this 
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argument implicitly meant that the Ahmadis are regarded as Muslims by the MSSN.695 Another 
MSSN argument assumes that they are a subversive group which suggests that Muslims can 
discourage them from operating, as recommended in the takfīr of the Muslim World League. 
But, in all, it seems to me that the silence and ambivalent relationship between the Ahmadis 
and the MSSN is an illustration one of the difficulties in constructing who is a ‘Muslim’ in 
Nigeria and the Muslim world more generally. 
4.7 Progressive era or Jāhiliyya?:696  the MSSN from 1974 to 1990  
This period in the MSSN coincided with what most of my respondents framed in terms like 
‘golden era,’697 ‘glorious years’698 and ‘era of progress or success.’699 They mostly used these 
terms to differentiate the experiences of the Society in the period after 1990. But some aspects 
of the experiences were criticised by others, as discussed in the next chapter, suggesting that 
they were not correct Islamic practices. Thus, I use ‘Progressive or jāhiliyya’ to emphasise that 
the history of the MSSN in this period is contested by members. In addition to the IVC, which 
I will discuss in Chapter Seven, this period was dominated by experiences which related to 
daʿwa in the Yoruba Muslim community, agitation for Sharia, active engagement with the 
school system and government, use of music for daʿwa, journal and magazine publications, 
and the understanding of Islam as a way of life. These aspects of the history of MSSN are taken 
up below. 
4.7.1 The “Crusade” 
During the annual conference of the Society in 1974, Adegbite argued that after two decades, 
the MSSN had justified its existence for creating a sense of belonging and letting Muslim 
students know more about their religion. Therefore, he encouraged the Society to move into 
the next decade, 1974-1984, with a “Crusade.”700 By this time, he had a doctorate in Law from 
the University of London, taught at the University of Lagos and held a political appointment 
as the Attorney-General and Commissioner for Justice of the former Western State. Like many 
of his colleagues, whom the Society began to refer to as babas (fathers),701 he continued to 
inspire members of the MSSN and participate in major programmes of the Society which he 
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considered part of his “organisational work for Islam.”702 His idea of a crusade in 1974 was not 
to embark on a war with the Christians or the Traditionalists, but a strong campaign for socio-
cultural change and educational development among Muslims. As part of this campaign, he 
urged every member of the Society to “see himself as a crusader; ready to infiltrate every 
Muslim community so as to rid that community of ignorance and other social ills.” 703 Given 
the level of their own educational experience, Adegbite encouraged members of the Society to 
see themselves as “privileged citizens” with “superior modern knowledge” that could be used 
to help elder members “organise themselves on modern lines extolling the benefits of unity and 
discouraging wasteful tendencies.”704  
The crusade on education was made against the backdrop of Nigeria’s Second National 
Development Plan (1970/74) which provided for a Universal Primary Education (UPE) policy. 
He was therefore concerned that many Muslims might not take advantage of this opportunity 
because, for him, they were too nonchalant. When he made this statement, he was aware of the 
preponderant number of Christians in Nigeria’s socio-economic and political sectors, but he 
did not think that Muslims should “operate a religious apartheid.” 705 For him, Muslims should 
be ready to face the reality and secure their “due share from the general pool” 706 based on merit 
rather than “quota” distribution. The quota system had been introduced at the end of Nigeria’s 
civil war to ensure equal distribution of Nigerians into public institutions due to inequalities in 
population and educational attainments in various parts of the country.707 It was also used in 
admission to government schools. This policy developed into the Federal Character principle 
which has been included in the Nigerian constitution since 1979. The principle stipulates that 
public service appointments should reflect the ethnic, geographic and religious diversity of 
Nigeria.708 But while these policies are aimed at ethnic balancing and sharing of resources 
equitably, they have largely been criticised by academics for promoting “discrimination” and 
giving room for “representation” at the expense of “merit.”709 Adegbite’s argument could also 
be understood from this perspective. To encourage Muslims to compete on merit, he urged the 
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MSSN to “join both official and private groups in explaining the aims and objectives of the 
UPE, bringing out its long-term benefits to Muslim children.”710 He also implored the Society 
to assist Muslim children preparing for entrance exams to various schools through coaching. 
Probably because of his own experience and involvement in government, he also advised 
members of the Society to proceed on further studies after their first degrees because he 
considered that the Nigeria of the future would belong to the highly qualified. 
The MSSN campaign for socio-cultural change was carried out in many ways and was 
supported by a number of its influential patrons. Among them was Alhaji Yagboyaju who 
donated buses to many Area Units of the Society in the 1980s in order to facilitate the campaign 
and other activities.711 One of the ways in which the campaign was carried out in the early 
1980s was through the weekly Open-Air Service, which featured mostly sermons, for its Area 
Units in the rural areas in Oyo, Ogun and Lagos. The local Imams and alfas were often invited 
to listen to these sermons. The topics of sermons in these localities ranged from ‘Presenting 
Islam and its Beauties,’ and ‘Calling for Moral Improvements among Muslims,’ to ‘Comparing 
Islam with other religions.’712 During mawlid celebrations, the Society also addressed Muslims 
on issues like marriage, funerals, and naming ceremonies.713 However, some of the arguments 
in these lectures appeared to have signalled the start of a confrontation between the student 
preachers and the established alfas. In these lectures, for instance, the student preachers 
criticised many practices among the Yoruba Muslims which include the collection of money 
during naming ceremonies by the alfas. Although the MSSN also collected donations during 
its own programmes referred to as ‘Appeal Fund,’ the money was used for the Society’s 
activities in contrast to the alfas who might use them for their own upkeep. The other practice 
which the MSSN criticised related to what a respondent regarded as a ‘wrong’ ʿaqīda that was 
promoted by many alfas. According to this respondent, the alfas’ “belief” at the time was that 
mixing traditional practices with Islam did not impugn on being Muslim. Even though he 
considered this claim to be wrong, he did not see why the MSSN preachers should have made 
the practices of the alfas their concern. Using his Ikire hometown as an example, he narrated 
that: 
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One of their priorities back then was to correct the corrupted ʿaqīda [creed] 
that was prevalent among the people of the Area Council back then. What 
was not clear to the people, they would be made to understand… But back 
then, if they had focused on the youth, you know the philosophy of “Catch 
them young.” But back then the focus was on the alfas instead of 
concentrating on the youth.714 
Many alfas engaged the student preachers on such issues. Through their engagements, the alfas 
discovered that these students had little or no learning experience in the madrasa to understand 
Arabic texts and exegesis of the Qur’an, which they considered to be a prerequisite to speak 
with authority. Even though, as will be shown in the next chapter, some of these students 
actually studied in madrasas, the alfas still derisively referred to them as confusionists with 
the terms; afiwekewu (literally, one who learns Arabic/Qur’an in English texts/western 
school)715 and awon alakatakiti a f’iwekewu (radicals who learn Arabic/Qur’an in English 
texts/western school).716 This stereotype feeds into the criticism of a renowned cleric in 
Yorubaland, Shaykh Adam Al-Ilory (1917-1992), who claimed that Islam cannot be fully 
understood without the Arabic language. Shaykh Al-Ilory was the founder of one of the famous 
madrasas in Yorubaland which appropriated western school pedagogies called the Institute of 
Arabic and Islamic Training Centre, Markaz (est. 1952), located in Lagos. Although he 
encouraged his students to pursue Western education, he considered the use of English to teach 
Islam in Western schools as part of the colonialist agenda to detach Islam from its official 
Arabic language.717  
To encourage the educational development of Muslims in the 1970s, the MSSN organised 
extramural classes for students in secondary schools and those in tertiary institutions. After 
exams, it assisted the qualified candidates to lobby for admission into tertiary institutions. The 
Society also established a school in Ibadan called the Halal Nursery and Primary School in 
1987.718 Over the years, more schools were established in various parts of Yorubaland such as 
At-Tawheed Nursery and Primary School and the At-Tawheed Model College, Ekiti 
established in 2000.719 In many cases, the establishment of these schools was the initiative of 
the members rather than the MSSN as an organisation. 
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To illustrate the achievement of the Society in this educational campaign, many of my 
respondents told me that the stimulus to their education up to the university level was due to 
their membership of the MSSN which they identified with through relatives and friends. One 
of them was Abideen Olaiya. At the time his compeers were enrolled in schools, his father 
preferred the madrasa, and therefore, did not allow him to go to school due to fear of 
conversion to Christianity. He later enrolled in school because his parents were convinced by 
the UPE scheme and by many Muslims who had gone through the school system without 
becoming Christians. After his secondary education, a minimum required to get employed in 
many organisations at the time, Olaiya declined an offer of appointment in Lagos against his 
parents wish because he was encouraged by members of the MSSN to further his studies at The 
Polytechnic Ibadan.720 He later had a doctorate degree, became a lecturer in the university and 
contested in elections for a federal parliamentary seat for Oyo State in 2007.721 Many 
respondents like him told me that they are grateful to the MSSN for encouraging them to be 
educated in Western schools without affecting their Muslim identities,722 and I consider their 
stories as testimonies of how Nigeria’s post-independence policy on education, which is part 
of the National Development Plan, has changed the social status of many Western educated 
Yoruba Muslims. More importantly, they show the impact of social factors on the process of 
religious change of many Yoruba students. 
4.7.2 “To belong to MSSN is to be feared by those in power” 
But beyond promoting the development plan of government, the MSSN relationship with the 
state was also tense between the mid-1970s and the early 1980s, which informed the statement 
by Oladosu723 used as a title of this sub-section. The tension between the MSSN and the 
government was first reflected in the national debates over the proposal to establish a Federal 
Sharia Court of Appeal and Sharia Courts in regions like Yorubaland in 1976.724 The proposed 
courts were in line with the military government’s plan to fashion a new constitution for Nigeria 
as part of the post-war reconstruction and transition to a new system of government following 
the collapse of the colonial parliamentary government in 1967. While the government’s plan 
was aimed at promoting the religious diversity of Nigerians in the proposed constitution, the 
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debates over the Sharia courts, as Clarke and Linden argue, became part of the long-standing 
questions between Muslims and Christians over religious freedom in schools, the ethos of 
Nigeria’s constitution, judiciary and legislature, and the symbolic matters like religious 
holidays and the structure of the working week.725 The MSSN also contributed to this debate. 
In the North, the branch of the Society at Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria called for the 
decolonization of Nigeria’s constitution which it argued was based on the English Common 
Law. In Yorubaland, the MSSN worked with its leaders such as Chief Moshood Kashimawo 
Abiola (1937-1998),726 Dawud Noibi and Lateef Adegbite through the organisation called 
NAJOMO (from WESJOMO, mentioned earlier) to request the establishment of Sharia Courts 
for Muslims in Lagos, Oyo, and Ondo states.727 For Adegbite, the introduction of these Courts 
was not only a matter of religious freedom and pluralism of Nigeria, but also about the right of 
Muslims to be administered under divine laws.728 Although the government’s proposal for the 
Sharia Courts was rejected following stiff opposition from Christians as well as a few Muslims, 
the MSSN continued to agitate for it in 1984 and 1999.729 The failure to allow the establishment 
of the Sharia courts in the late 1970s gave rise to more concerns especially among Yoruba 
Muslims that the government has always been unfair to them in relation to Christians and 
Muslims in the North. These concerns, therefore, contributed to the public reaction of the 
MSSN to other issues of Christian-Muslim encounters in educational institutions from the late 
1970s. 
Unlike the colonial experience, the incidence of requesting Muslims to change their names to 
Christian names had reduced in this period, but other challenges like the shortage of Muslim 
teachers, reading Bible and singing songs of praise at the Assembly continued. The MSSN’s 
grievance in this period was strong because it considered some actions of government and 
school authorities as “oppressive” to Muslim students. They included allegations of deliberate 
refusal to recruit Islamic Studies teachers, distribution of free Bibles to secondary schools with 
public funds and the upgrade of Christian mission schools to colleges of education; whereas, 
Islamic studies were not allowed to be taught in these colleges. These allegations were made 
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worse by Christian leaders who were believed to support such actions.730 It should be pointed 
out that the MSSN’s desire for Islamic studies was not limited to primary and secondary 
schools, it was also expressed by Muslim students undergoing studies like Law in various 
universities by the 1980s.731 
At different international seminars supported by IIFSO and WAMY in the 1970s, MSSN 
expressed concerns on the need to promote Islamic Studies in the Western schools that 
discouraged it.732 These concerns were very strong in Oyo state which had a significant number 
of Muslims.733 In 1979, the MSSN in the state had an opportunity to engage the government 
on these concerns. This came after Abdur-Raheem Adebayo Shittu,734 its former president at 
the University of Ife (now OAU), was said to have been ridiculed and called “a religious 
fanatic”735 at the Oyo State House of Assembly over his suggestion that the state provides for 
the training of Islamic Studies teachers through a crash programme.736 The MSSN considered 
Shittu’s failure to convince the government as part of the official bias against Muslims in the 
state. This got the sympathy of its National President, Kamil Oloso, and Muslim lecturers at 
the Department of Arabic and Islamic Studies, UI. Before then, these lecturers had informal 
discussions with colleagues outside the university on how to unite Muslim youth organisations 
in the state for their common interests. The failure of Shittu to convince members of the State’s 
Assembly, therefore, provided them with an opportunity to put this into action. Together with 
the MSSN, they formed the Council of Muslim Youth Organisations of Oyo State (COMYO) 
at the university on March 30, 1980. Although COMYO’s activism was mostly restricted to 
Oyo state at inception, it had the sympathy of Muslims in other states. It later became a national 
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organisation called the National Council of Muslim Youth Organizations (NACOMYO) with 
the support of WAMY at a youth camp held in Ilorin in 1987.737 
Among the objectives of COMYO was “Resisting, in collaboration with the Muslim Students' 
Society of Nigeria, any religious oppression in educational institution in the State.”738 This 
objective was pushed in many ways which included writing protest letters and addressing press 
conferences. In addition, COMYO lobbied the government through Muslim leaders and 
organisations like the League of Imams and Alfas (LIA). The LIA gave unflinching support to 
COMYO, articulated in a letter to the governor of the state, Bola Ige (1930-2001). In the letter, 
the LIA expressed disappointment that the government had stifled religious freedom enshrined 
in Nigeria’s constitution by allowing Muslim pupils to be taught Christian religious doctrines 
while it failed to provide for teachers of Islamic studies.739 There was also a direct confrontation 
at a stormy meeting in 1981 where Oloso and Bola Ige insulted each other. The insult was over 
their mode of dressing, but it became a fall-out of that crisis.740 The MSSN and SU activities 
were later suspended in the schools by the government in Oyo state as a result of the 
controversy. However, rather than stopping its activities, the ban goaded the MSSN to embark 
on another campaign with COMYO which focused on alleged government’s pro-Christian bias 
in political appointments in the state. Using handbills and ‘abusive songs,’ they mobilised the 
support of Muslims in the state against the re-election of Ige in the 1983 governorship election. 
As it turned out, Ige lost that election, and members of the Society who participated in the 
campaign considered their efforts to have paid off by his loss.741  
In 1985, the MSSN was involved in another confrontation at UI over a cathedral cross which 
stood some yards away in front of its newly built central mosque. The confrontation, which 
took several months, was used to open issues of alleged marginalisation of Muslims in the 
university staffing and student admission. Following series of protests and press releases, the 
matter was resolved after a compromise was reached to erect a concrete screen nearer the 
mosque. Owing to the activism of the Society in this period, Oladosu suggests that “to belong 
to the MSS was to be feared by those in power.”742 I consider this statement to draw attention 
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to understanding the MSSN’s shift from its initial emphasis on relating ‘peacefully’ with the 
state by the 1980s. The confrontation between the Society and the government on different 
issues such as the use of the ḥijāb from this period thus illustrates another way in which the 
relationship between many Islamic movements and the states in Africa has shifted from the 
colonial to post-colonial state. 
4.7.3 New ideas and trends 
But beyond their clash with the government, the MSSN continued to adopt new ideas, that were 
growing since the colonial era, which defined the modern social and cultural life of many 
Yoruba in post-independence Nigeria. The use of music as a da’wa method, discussed below, 
is one of the activities that defined this new trend in the MSSN.743 There were occasions when 
short dramas were also staged during the Society’s programmes.744 As part of the new trend, 
the Society also began the publication of magazines and journals such as the Muezzin, Al-Ilm 
and Mifta Ul-Ilm used by members to discuss Islamic ethics, Fiqh (jurisprudence), Hadith and 
social issues relating to marriage, education and local culture. The contributors to these 
publications were not only students but also senior academicians such as T.G.O. Gbadamosi, 
I.A.B. Balogun, Musa Abdul, as well as professionals like Alhaja Lateefat Okunnu (b. 1939)745 
and Justice Abdul-Kadir Orire (b. 1934, first grand Kadi of Kwara).746 These publications were 
also supported by the MSSN patrons such as Alhaji Isa Yagboyaju and Azeez Alao Arisekola 
(1945-2014) who often advertised their businesses in them. 
Besides these publications, many students engaged in comparative religious discourse and had 
access to texts produced by the South African Muslim public speaker of Indian descent, Ahmed 
Deedat (1918- 2005). Deedat’s polemical debates (in texts, videos and audiocassettes) have 
inspired several Muslims in their engagement with Christians in Africa.747 However, while 
many Yoruba Muslim clerics were averse to participating in those debates, the MSSN 
encouraged the debates among its members. According to Taofeeq Yekin (an academic at UI, 
appointed National President of the MSSN in 2018) who got some texts from Deedat, the 
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discourse is necessary to teach Muslim students how to talk in the language of other religious 
faiths in the Yoruba social context.748 In the mid-1970s, the use of music for da’wa was also 
considered part of this necessity.  
4.7.3.1 Music as daʿwa: sing-song 
The use of music for da’wa in the MSSN is connected to the upsurge of Christian gospel music 
in Yorubaland in the 1970s. By the end of colonial rule, the Christian missions, including the 
African churches, in Yorubaland had choirs who not only performed in their churches and 
schools but also during occasions like the Christmas. The choirs’ genres of music were a mix 
of biblical verses and indigenous words accompanied by western and local musical 
instruments. From the 1960s, this music began to be professionalised as many choristers left 
the church, though they often remained members, to perform in the public domain for 
commercial purposes.749 Among them were Prince S. A. Adeosun of Christ Apostolic Church 
Yaba, Rev. T. M. Ilesanmi’s choir of St. Peter’s and Paul’s Catholic Church Ibadan, the Ibadan 
based Bola Are and Deborah Fasoyin led Good Women Choir of the Christ Apostolic 
Church.750  
Some young Muslims who noticed that these songs had become an attraction for many Muslims 
argued that listening to these songs was un-Islamic.751 They also believed that these songs were 
inspiring many young ladies to attend churches.752 In 1974, these Muslims formed a musical 
group in Ibadan called the Young Muslim Brothers and Sisters (YOUMBAS) to produce 
alternative songs for Muslims.753 This was followed by the emergence of other groups such as 
the Jihad Muslim Brothers and Sister of Nigeria (JMBROSIS).754 As these musical groups were 
associated with the MSSN, because some of their members attended MSSN programmes, a 
thinking developed in the MSSN that songs could also be adopted in the Society to promote 
da’wa. This thinking ushered in the era famously referred to as ‘Sing-Song’ in the MSSN. It is 
worth noting that apart from the MSSN, there were other organizations such as the Ansar-Ud-
Deen who also supported and promoted the use of songs for da’wa in this period.755 
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Wahab Falowo, who was then an Imam and President of the MSSN Ilorin Area Council at the 
University of Ilorin, was probably the first to lead the sing-song era. In 1979, he produced an 
album funded by the Society titled, Ẹ ye pe Musulumi L’onimọle (Don’t call Muslims Imale).756 
Given that imale had been linked to the Yoruba Muslims, the title of this album would seem to 
be an expression of their desire to be associated with “orthodox sunni” Islam as Peel claims.757 
However, the lyrics of the album largely describe the Yoruba Muslims response to the 
stereotype of their fellow Christians and Traditionalists about them and Islam in general. By 
the late 1970s, many non-Muslim Yoruba had derisively deconstructed ‘imale,’ literally in 
Yoruba, to mean ‘difficult/hard knowledge’ and ‘people with aggressive religion.’758 Owing to 
this misinterpretation, Alhaji Yagboyaju, an influential patron of MSSN in Oyo, was said to 
have persuaded the branches in Oyo and Kwara to begin a campaign against this stereotype. 
He also advised them to use a song, to which he also contributed, for this campaign to make it 
effective.759 Thus, Falowo’s song not only aimed to entertain Muslims, it also aimed to correct 
the wrong impression about imale and their religious identities. Falowo also produced other 
albums for the Society and later formed his own band, Sawtul-Hikma al-Islamiyya (The Voice 
of Islamic Wisdom).760 Other members of the Society joined this trend, among who were 
Abdullah Akinbode’s Voice of Islamic Ummah and Wasiu Sidiq’s Voice of Islamic Charity.761 
While the songs were considered a necessity for da’wa, its economic advantage was perhaps a 
major factor that further sustained it. The singers were said to have produced the albums for 
the MSSN with no financial rewards. Instead, money accrued from the sale of the albums went 
into the purse of MSSN.762 As many of my respondents told me, this was part of the 
understanding in Islam that the work of da’wa should not be done for personal gains.763 Funds 
also came through music and dance competitions organised by the Society in such programmes 
as Jihad Week and IVC. Musical groups were formed in different schools who participated in 
this competition. Abdullah Akinbode, whom many Yoruba Muslims considered to have 
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attracted a large followership from the mid-1990s to NASFAT through his songs,764 was one 
of the lead vocalists of MSSN Lagos Area Unit song group. In fact, the sing-song became the 
major attraction for most students and their guests who danced and appreciated them with 
money. But while money was given to the performers, according to my respondent who was a 
business chairman in this period, most of it still went to the MSSN purse.765 
By the mid-1980s, there was a strong debate in the MSSN regarding singing and dancing in 
Islam.766 Indeed, such debate was not new to the Yoruba Muslims. Since the 1920s, Muslim 
groups like the Ahmadiyya and Ansar-Ud-Deen had contested both singing and dancing,767 but 
many Yoruba Muslims continued to engage in them. The mid-1980s debate, however, appeared 
to challenge the initial assumptions that sustained the practice for many Muslims. In the MSSN, 
some members argued that singing was a correct practice in Islam and there were those who 
claimed that it was not a correct practice. The argument of this second group was upheld and 
the sing-song was formally ruled out in the MSSN by 1990. This debate is part of the reform 
in the MSSN which is facilitated by many factors that are discussed in the next chapter. 
However, while the concern was on correct practice, stopping the song had many effects on 
the Society from the 1990s. One major effect was the reduction of people who were attracted 
to the MSSN because of music and those who appreciated singing groups with money, which 
also meant less funding for the Society.768 It also led to breaking away of singing groups and 
members who were not convinced by the argument that singing was not permissible in Islam. 
Among them were Abdullah Akinbode and Wasiu Sidiq. While Sidiq continued to sing, 
Akinbode could not continue after he became a “Chief Missioner” in NASFAT by 2000.769 He 
established another prayer group Jamaa’tu Ahli Llahi (Household of Allah) when he resigned 
from NASFAT in 2017.770 
4.7.4 “Islam as a way of life” 
Compared to her first decade in Nigeria, Lemu argued that there was a dramatic change in the 
practices of Muslim students in Nigeria from 1976. She noticed that many of them began to 
get their knowledge of Islam from a variety of sources which included books in English, 
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magazines, newspaper articles, as well as teachers who gave both informed and less informed 
sermons on radio and television. Gradually, they also became less tolerant and less trusting of 
non-Muslims. Most importantly, they had a change in their understanding “that Islam is not 
just prayers, fasting and memorization of the Qur’an. They have a much broader idea of the 
implication of Islam as a way of life, together with its social, economic and political 
teachings.”771 
While I agree that there was a new understanding of Islam as a way of life in the MSSN, I 
consider this knowledge to be reflected in the everyday practices of only a few members. The 
wholescale adoption of the sunna of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions (discussed 
in the next chapter), which was central to this meaning of Islam was seldomly practised by 
most members. A pointer to this argument is from the personal experience of Habibah Oladosu, 
a lecturer at UI who became a member of the MSSN in 1985. She described the outlook of 
members of the Society during the IVC of that year thus,  
When I joined the MSS, I joined the MSSN in 1985, my first IVC was in 
1985. When I got to the IVC, I saw Islam then, I saw the sincerity in people. 
Then clothing was not emphasized. Keeping of beard was not emphasized. 
Jumping trousers was not emphasized. The most important thing then was 
how do you project yourself as a Muslim. When you are doing that, it must be 
based on sincerity that everything you do must be directed to Allah, and Allah 
alone. There shouldn’t be hero worship, no lip service.772 
One may assume that not having access to Islamic literature (which played a key role in the 
reform in the Society, as will be shown in the next chapter) might have informed the decision 
of many students not to adopt the sunna. However, I would link their decision to the 
understanding of the Islamic practices among the majority of Yoruba Muslims. I remember 
even in the late 1980s that the majority of alfas usually differentiated between what was 
considered voluntary and involuntary practices in Islam. The majority of sunna practices were 
defined as voluntary and not doing them, according to these alfas, did not make a Muslim less 
good or less complete in faith. Based on this orientation to Islam, those who emphasised some 
aspects of sunna in their social life such as the Alfa Bamidele led Zumratul-Mumeen were 
derisively called names like alaṣeju (who do more than is required) by many Yoruba Muslims. 
In addition to condemning Western education, which I referred to in Chapter Three, women in 
this group wear the elaborate veil that covered them from head to toe called burqa’ (also 
referred to as purdah in Yorubaland), while men keep their beards and wore turbans. A similar 
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group was the Tabligh Jama’at who faced criticism on its practice of travelling for several days 
away from home on da’wa. 
It is worth mentioning that while most alfas were not strictly against embracing this notion of 
sunna, they considered them unsuited to Yorubaland. Thus, up to the early 1980s, the general 
view in the MSSN, according to Oladosu, was also “that there was no chance for the 
propagation of foreign dawah methodologies and opinions which were considered not suitable 
for a terrain such as ours.”773 Based on this experience, I argue that what is understood as Islam 
as a way of life by many students does not necessarily mean adopting every practice that is 
considered Islamic as a compass for everyday life without subjecting them to a debate based 
on their compatibility within the local context. 
Because of this understanding in the MSSN, most female students could only put on the scarf 
that was common among Yoruba Muslim women; a piece of fabric of different colours loosely 
wrapped over the head and chest. The majority could not wear the ḥijāb up to 1990 except for 
a few like Sururah Bello (nee Waheed) at OAU, Ife.774 Noibi, who left UI as Imam in this 
period also noted that: 
I recall that before I left Nigeria for Britain in 1990, I can hardly remember 
that there was a single student who was a female wearing ḥijāb. They were 
very few in the University of Ibadan and we had to actually struggled to get 
some professors and lecturers to allow the few who would wear simple ḥijāb 
to attend the classes.775 
Furthermore, local socio-cultural practices could not be divorced from the practices of many 
Muslim students in this period. According to some of my respondents, many students relied on 
charms from the alfa or Ifá priest for personal protection and success in exams rather than 
prayers from Qur’anic texts.776 Courtship before marriage, a practice which was later 
discouraged, was also common among members of the Society, and, it was common for many 
female students to be impregnated before marriage, as this was the social expectation from 
many in-laws to test their fertility.777 Before such marriage, many parents also consulted either 
the alfa or Ifá priests for guidance.778 Even if this consultation was contested later, engaging in 
it was not considered to make a person less Muslim by many Yoruba Muslims, and I consider 
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it to be part of their pragmatic consideration which continued from their engagement with the 
Òrìṣà. As Peel has pointed out, this pragmatism was based on “the thought that because there 
were many powerful Òrìṣà, it was imprudent to neglect any of them”779 for human and societal 
good. 
A telling example of the huge influence of local culture on Muslim students’ practices between 
the 1970s and 1980s was that of Adegbite, who was a charismatic figure in the MSSN. He was 
appointed and installed as the Seriki of Egbaland in 1979, one of the highest-ranked traditional 
titles of the Egba Kingdom.780 Probably because such titles require Traditional rites and 
practices, he was criticised by several Muslims including NACOMYO who considered his 
acceptance of the title as being at variance with being Muslim. Although he was later appointed 
as the Baba Adini of Egbaland in 1997, Oba Oyebade Lipede (1971-2005) the Egba monarch 
who bestowed him with the Seriki title defended him that year suggesting how he combined 
being Muslim and remaining a Traditionalist: “Dr. Adebite has remained a devout Muslim, a 
loyalist, traditionalist and a man of pleasant manner.”781 Even though what is known about 
Adegbite’s role as Seriki is insufficient, his acceptance of the title suggests to me that he did 
not see the position to affect his identity as a Muslim. 
4.8 Conclusion 
This chapter shows the history of the MSSN by focusing on its idea of Islam and the objectives 
on which it was established in 1954. Furthermore, it reveals how the ideas and objectives of 
the Society were propagated up to 1990. It demonstrated that between 1954 and 1990, the 
Society’s idea of Islam emphasised love, peace, unity of Muslims, brother/sisterhood and 
Islamic moral values, and they were tied to different objectives which included promoting 
Islamic education, encouraging the development of Western education among Muslims, 
fighting for the rights of Muslim students, providing a platform for social interaction and 
protecting the religious identity of Muslim students. The understanding of Islam in the Society 
as well as its objectives were propagated through the organisation of public lectures, vacation 
camps, the publication of journals, linking with Muslims across Nigeria and other parts of the 
world, and challenging authorities in the schools and government. Such practices like drama 
and songs were also incorporated into the Society for da’wa. But there were changes in this 
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understanding of Islam, although the impact of the change on everyday practices was limited 
to a few students. The most obvious was the constitutional reviews and the knowledge that 
Ahmadis among them were not to be considered ‘Muslim.’ There was also an understanding 
that Islam was a comprehensive way of life and that singing was not a good Muslim practice.  
The historical conditions in which the MSSN evolved played a role in its conception of Islam 
and the objectives it sought to achieve. They also shaped how the Society’s objectives were 
publicised and why they change. An example was the MSSN’s campaign to support the 
education of young Muslims as part of Nigeria’s development plan in the 1970s. Besides, new 
notions of Islam (e.g. from ‘peace’ and ‘love’ to emphasis on the kalima and Sharia) were also 
adopted by the Society as Nigeria transitioned from colonial rule to an independent state. Even 
though the shift to these notions of Islam did not cause a fundamental transformation in the 
lives of the students, it nevertheless signalled the metamorphosis of the MSSN to a reform 
movement. Both the formulation of the Society’s initial objectives and their shift between the 
colonial and postcolonial eras confirm Asad’s argument on the role of different historical 
conditions in the varying conception of Islam and ways of being Muslim.  
This chapter also draw attention to the MSSN’s connection with new transnational Muslim 
movements: IIFSO, WAMY, and the Muslim Brotherhood. The history of MSSN between the 
1960s and 1970s gives an insight into why these movements have developed and how they are 
challenging the legacies of colonialism which include the state in Africa. A number of actors 
in Nigeria are helping to promote the visions and ideals of these movements. While there have 
been suspicions and stereotypes about the aims of these movements in many parts of the 
world,782 they have nevertheless inspired new definitions and alternative ways of being Muslim 
in countries like Nigeria. In the next chapter, I will discuss the impact of MSSN’s association 
with these transnational movements on its own reform and the further transformation of the 
Society to a sunna-minded movement.   
Furthermore, I suggested in this chapter that the promotion of MSSN’s objectives in Yoruba 
society showed many continuities with the colonial practices and discourse of Islam of the 
Yoruba Muslim elite up to the 1980s. The continuity happened because the MSSN pioneer 
members as well as Muslims who schooled in the colonial period and about the second decade 
of decolonization maintained their relationship with the Society of which the story of Adegbite 
is an example. Also, the established authorities in such organizations as the Ansar-Ud-Deen 
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continued to be associated with the activities of the Society as teachers. Consequently, how the 
MSSN promoted its objectives in Yoruba society up to the 1980s appeared to be a little 
departure from the notions of Islam of the Muslim elite in the region. The emphasis on Western 
education, rejection of the Ahmadis and the introduction of music as a form of da’wa are 
examples that point to the nexus. However, the epistemological link on Islam between them is 
not given. As it happened by the late 1980s, the MSSN began to question and rethink certain 
notions of Islam in Yoruba society with a significant effect on the history of the Society from 
the late 1980s which is not only on how it promoted its objectives afterwards but also on the 
religious life of members. What aspects of these notions were contested? Why were they 
contested? And, what was the effect of the contestation on the MSSN as a movement and its 
members? These are part of the questions I try to answer in my discussion of MSSN’s reform 
and organizational crisis in the following chapter.     
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Chapter Five 
Between New Epistemological Perspectives and Competing Reform Orientations: 
MSSN’s Reform, Organizational Crisis and Division, 1980 – 2005 
Before our own generation, the MSSN was known for 'sing-song', 
merrymaking, birthday parties and so on, but today everybody knows that 
when you are looking for Islamic thoughts from the original source (the 
Qurʾan and the Sunna), you'll get it from the MSSN. Even when you have 
springs of it in other organizations, it is the product of MSSN doing those 
bits. So MSSN led battle for Islamic re-awakening in Nigeria and 
invariably in Africa too (Mas’ud Bello, National Secretary of MSSN, 
2004).783 
5.1 Introduction  
From about the mid-1980s, there was a ‘gradual but radical’ attempt to reform the MSSN 
practices and encourage all members to imbibe what is considered the sunna. This involved 
critical debates on ‘correct’ practices in Islam and da’wa methods. Closely connected to this 
reform was a marked division in the Society on questions that relate to its identity as a 
youth/student movement, organisational control and its transformation beyond a ‘school’ 
movement. This led to fragmentation and schism as several groups left the Society from the 
mid-1990s and contested the idea of Islam and practices on which the Society was established 
as well as its power structure. I argue in this chapter that the reform in the 1980s was inspired 
by historical factors and epistemological change that were connected to the MSSN in Nigeria 
and the Yoruba Muslim communities and that these developments contributed to the 
transformation of the MSSN to a reform movement and its fragmentation in the mid-1990s. As 
I will demonstrate in this chapter, the reform did not happen at once and it was not imposed on 
the members of the Society. On the contrary, it took shape gradually through discourses on the 
traditions of Islam and non-Muslims. It also involved a conscious effort to promote religious 
change and define what is a good Muslim in modern times.  
In the first section of this chapter, I analyse the various aspects of this process of reform, 
particularly the main actors and their da’wa activities. I also draw attention to the role of 
transnational Islamic movements mentioned in Chapter Four and the impact of the Iranian 
revolution in 1979. An aspect of my argument in this section is that the reform in the MSSN 
was the outcome of debates among various actors which included students who studied abroad 
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and in Nigeria. To illustrate this further, I will draw attention to these debates in relation to the 
concepts of knowledge referred to as àgbọ́yé (Yoruba, understanding) and ḥujja (Arabic, 
‘proof/evidence’) that developed from the interaction of these actors. Furthermore, I will 
explain why the emphasis on these concepts motivated members of MSSN to follow the sunna. 
Also, I will highlight what members of the Society referred to as sunna in relation to the 
contemporary social changes regarded as modernity.  
In the second section, I employ Asad’s conceptualisation of Islam as a discursive tradition to 
illustrate the process and key elements in the discourses that shaped reform in the MSSN. This 
section also analyses the two main factions that emerged in the MSSN on these discourses, 
“The Jama’at” and “The Mainstream.” I will also shed light on the practices and beliefs that 
were contested and defined as correct in Islam and how the two factions in the Society shaped 
the discourse. This analysis will be continued in the third section by showing that while the 
discourse in the MSSN focused on the traditions of Islam, it also included basic issues that 
relate to the transition of members from educational institutions to public life. In addition, it 
includes debate on the identity of MSSN as a youth/student movement. I analyse this debate 
on youth/student by drawing upon and contributing to the literature on the concept of ‘youth.’  
In the fourth section, I argue that the discourse that enabled reform in the MSSN does not only 
centre on asserting authoritative viewpoints about the traditions of Islam as Asad points out. A 
look beyond the discourse also reveals an actual contest for power and control of the MSSN as 
an organisation, and I draw attention to this in the section on ‘tension and division.’ On this 
point about power, I draw attention to the key actors in the contest such as Abdul-Fatai Thanni 
and Taofeek Abdul-Azeez and the plot to take control of the Society in the mid-1990s which 
involved “The Jama’at” and “The Mainstream” factions. In this section, I also note that by 
1995, the tension created by the plot led to the breaking away of The Jama’at (which became 
the TMC) and other factions from the MSSN. By 2005, two other factions also left the Society 
due to the contest for power and differences in the interpretation of Islam. To understand these 
break-away factions, I give an overview of their interpretations of Islam and their activities (i.e. 
TMC, Dawah Front, Lagos Brothers, Laa Jama’ah, TIMSAN). Beyond an overview of these 
new movements and the crisis that led to their formation, I intend to give an empirical evidence 
to my argument in Chapter Two about “reintepretation” and “schism” as forms of religious 
change. 
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In the concluding section, I reflect on the reform and crisis in the MSSN and how my argument 
departs from Peel’s notion of religious change among Yoruba Muslims. Also, I wish to note 
that the history of the MSSN in this chapter is a continuation of how post-colonial Nigeria 
shaped religious change and encounters which I discussed in Chapter Four. Various examples 
such as Nigeria’s educational policy that give rise to graduates of madrasas in the MSSN and 
what is defined as the sunna concerning modernity are given to illustrate this point.  
5.1 Aspects of Islamic reform in the MSSN 
The radical reform in the MSSN from the 1980s was a process that began before this period. 
Loimeier’s study has drawn attention to the fact that historical conditions in a particular context 
are central to the emergence of an Islamic reform movement.784 I found this to be true in the 
case of the MSSN as focusing on the Yoruba Muslim society and specific actors demonstrate 
that there were historical factors and epistemological change that shaped the reform in the 
MSSN. The historical factors include the emergence and influence of Muslim graduates (who 
studied both abroad and in the local madrasas) and their da’wa activities, while 
epistemological change focuses on the theory of reform which is framed around two key 
concepts of knowledge: ḥujja, and agboye. I refer to these historical factors and epistemological 
shift as the ‘aspects’ of reform in the MSSN to show that the reform was neither shaped by one 
single process nor fixed to a point in time. With respect to my argument in Chapter Two on 
religious change, the reform involved many factors which are entangled into one another such 
as the actors that facilitated the it and their activities as well as the historical conditions that 
aided the the process. The reform also showed different forms such as the reinterpretation of 
existing practice (e.g. sunna). Both the process and forms are, indeed, crucial to understanding 
the Islamic reform in the MSSN and how it was achieved from the 1980s. I begin by showing 
the process and forms with the case of returnee graduates and their propagation of Islam 
through study groups among Muslim students.  
5.1.1 Returnee graduates, study groups and da’wa 
Before the British colonial administrators conceded, after several agitations, to establish a 
tertiary institution in Nigeria in 1948,785 many young Nigerians had been attending universities 
in the UK or the US. In contrast to the colleges such as Yaba Higher College founded in 1932 
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in which they presumed to train Africans for mid-level administrative positions,786 the 
scholarship abroad was regarded as the ‘golden fleece,’ a symbol of authority and honour that 
guaranteed them a higher status in professional life.787 From the late 1950s, several Muslim 
students who had been associated with the MSSN joined those who sought their scholarship in 
the UK and the US as well as Egypt, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In addition to their studies, they 
were exposed to various Islamic teachings and movements. On their return, they established 
study groups and organisations which they employed for da’wa activities that were often 
connected to those abroad. These study groups attracted the participation of Muslims in many 
communities, including members of MSSN, in the learning of Islamic texts. Over time, through 
the members of MSSN in these study groups, new interpretations of Islam found their way into 
the MSSN. In many communities, the returnees were well respected not only because of their 
knowledge of Islam but also due to their exposure outside the country. Thus, I refer to them as 
the men of Ọlaju in the Yoruba Muslim communities. These returnee graduates are many, but 
I will focus on four who were frequently mentioned by my respondents and who had a 
significant impact on the history of the Society.  
Jibril Oyekan was a leading example among these returnees. He completed his bachelor’s and 
graduate degrees at the Imperial College London in the 1960s with a doctorate in Chemical 
Engineering. As I noted in Chapter Four, he considered London to be the place where he “fully 
discovered Islam.”788 This is because of the cosmopolitan nature of the university which 
allowed him to meet Muslim students from different parts of the world including Arabs, 
Indians, Pakistanis and Turks. The university had a mosque and an association for Muslims, 
the Imperial College Islamic Society (ISOC), which he later headed. The ISOC had a study 
group where members memorised the Qur’an and engaged Islamic texts in seminars. In 
addition to these texts, Oyekan also attended lectures organised by the London Islamic Circle 
outside the university. The information about those who formed this circle is scant, but 
according to Oyekan, the circle had Muslims of many nationalities who met every Saturday at 
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the Islamic Cultural Centre. The Centre, which was granted to migrant Muslims in 1944, also 
had a mosque before the building of the London Central Mosque, at Regent's Park by 1976.789 
As a representative of ISOC, Oyekan contributed to the formation of the Federation of Students 
Islamic Societies in the UK and Ireland (FOSIS) in 1963. Like the vision set for the MSSN, 
the FOSIS was aimed at uniting all Muslim students’ organisations in the UK and Ireland. 
Oyekan first served as Secretary of FOSIS and later as President. He was also the chairman of 
FOSIS’ monthly journal, The Muslim, for some years. The platform provided by FOSIS further 
allowed Oyekan to interact with prominent Islamist thinkers in the Muslim world such as 
Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi (1903-1979), a Pakistani and author of several Islamic texts.790 He 
also had exchanges with Muhammad Asad (1900-1992) who gave lectures at programmes 
organised by the FOSIS. Muhammad Asad was born Leopold Weiss but adopted the Muslim 
name after converting to Islam. He authored the English translated Qur’anic text, The Message 
of the Qur’an.791 By 1970, on his return to Nigeria, Oyekan introduced a weekly study circle, 
Qur’anic Study Group, at the University of Lagos (UNILAG). According to him, the group 
focused on intensive study of the fundamentals of Islam in the Qur’an and the sunna of the 
Prophet Muhammad. A number of students in the MSSN participated in this circle, and he 
considered them to have “transmitted the spirit” of what they had learnt to the Society when 
they became leaders.792 As I noted in the previous chapter, Oyekan also played a role in the 
establishment of WAMY as a regional representative in Lagos. In his professional life, he 
served in many ministries of the government in Nigeria as a director such as the Ministry of 
Industries and the Department of Petroleum Resources and was later appointed a member of 
the Board of Trustees of the MSSN.  
There was also the Islamic Study Group of Nigeria (ISGON) used by many Muslim elites to 
study the Qur’an and the Hadith. Up to the early 2000s, the group often addressed the public 
on social issues such as alcoholism. Akande Abdul-Kareem Hussein, a pioneer member of the 
MSSN who studied in the United States, was a major figure in this group between the 1970s 
and 1990s. He became a professor in the field of biochemistry and taught in Nigeria and at a 
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university in Sudan.793 One of the students that participated in this study group was Ibrahim 
Uthman, the B-Zone MSSN President in 1994. He was an active member of ISGON between 
the 1970s and 1980s, although he also identified with other Muslim organisations in this period. 
At ISGON, he was inspired by Hussein’s method of teaching, because according to him, 
Hussein would discuss what he and other colleagues had learnt at the end of each meeting with 
them one after the other. This method of learning as well as his exposure to various Islamic 
texts during the meetings ensured that he was well-informed about Islam and could engage 
many Islamic texts when he eventually became a committed member of the MSSN.794  
Dawud Noibi, mentioned in previous chapters, was another returnee MSSN graduate. From a 
young age, Noibi had a “burning desire” to know about Islam and speak Arabic. Thus, in 1965, 
he enrolled in the Arabic and Islamic Studies programme at Cairo University, Egypt and 
declined an offer to study English. By 1972, he completed his graduate studies in the same field 
at the American University in Cairo. While at Cairo, he facilitated the formation of an MSSN 
branch in the university together with other Nigerian students. His knowledge of Arabic was 
enhanced when he had a temporary appointment as a broadcaster and translator of Yoruba-
Arabic-English language on the Egyptian Radio (also known as Radio Cairo) for the Nigerian 
community in Cairo between 1966-1972. Before this time, he had worked with Imam Ekemode 
of Ansar-Ud-Deen at the Nigeria Broadcasting Corporation as a discussant. As I noted in 
Chapter Four, he lectured at the Department of Arabic and Islamic Studies of the University of 
Ibadan (UI) where he was appointed a professor. He also served as Imam of the UI Muslim 
community up to 1990.795 Through his weekly Friday sermons and Ramadan lectures, he 
engaged the Muslim community, including students on issues such as the Sharia and the 
importance of unity among Muslims in Nigeria. He was also invited to MSSN programmes for 
lectures, and Uthman considered him to have inspired many students, especially those who 
thought it was impossible to do a proper exegesis of Islamic texts in English.796  
The other major figure was Abdul-Fatah Thanni (b. 1939). In 1969, after completing his 
elementary education at Ansar-Ud-Deen Primary School and Qur’anic studies at a madrasa in 
Lagos, he travelled to Kuwait to further his education. He studied at a teacher training institute 
in Kuwait and received a bachelor’s degree in Accounting and Economics at the University of 
Kuwait. Within this period, he had a special coaching on Islamic education and was exposed 
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to several texts of Islamic scholars. After his education, he worked for almost a decade in 
Kuwait. He was first employed by the Kuwait Finance House, a bank established in 1977 to 
operate according to Islamic law. He also worked at an American school called Al-Bayan as a 
business manager before his return to Nigeria in 1982. In 1984, he was appointed a 
representative of the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs of Kuwait for Nigeria and West 
Africa, a position he held until 1990. The ministry supervises charitable institutions which 
assist Muslims in many parts of the world in such areas as education, Qur’anic study centres, 
and refugee crises.797 By 1990, Thanni decided to dedicate himself fully to da’wa.798 For most 
of my respondents, Thanni is assumed to be the most influential figure in the radical reform 
and crisis in MSSN from the mid-1980s, which sets him apart from other returnees. Unlike 
others, he broke the barriers of societal approval against the expression of what is referred to 
as “pristine Islam” in the Society.799 His project of reform was promoted in many ways which 
included establishing a da’wa group called the Islamic Centre of Nigeria (ICN) in the 1980s. 
The Centre produced sermons on audio cassettes and engaged many young Muslims in weekly 
study circles in places such as Lagos and Ibadan.800 Later, I will discuss how he contributed to 
the reforms and the crisis in the MSSN.  
There were other returnees from countries such as Sudan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia in the 1980s 
who taught Islam based on those considered al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ (or Salafis). One could argue that 
the Salafi orientation might not be new to the MSSN in this period. Lauzière has argued that 
even though it was restricted in meaning, the Salafi orientation in Islam had existed prior to the 
twentieth century. While it only reflected a theological position in the past, today it has been 
expanded to represent the broader examples of some predecessors as well as theology, laws, 
and etiquette.801 With the assumption that the Salafi interpretation of Islam had gained currency 
from the twentieth century, it is possible to argue that some Yoruba Muslims were already 
familiar with it by the time the MSSN was established in 1954. Thurston’s study on Salafism 
in Northern Nigeria has drawn attention to another root of this interpretation of Islam in 
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Yorubaland. His study refers to two Yoruba Muslims who studied in Saudi Arabia’s Islamic 
University of Medina which introduced the Salafi canon to Muslim students in different parts 
of the world.802 There was Iysa Ade Bello (b. 1949) who obtained an LL.B. in Islamic Law in 
1976 at the Islamic University of Medina and later a PhD at the University of Toronto in 1986. 
He was WAMY’s African representative between 1986 and 1993, but Thurston doubted his 
Salafi credentials based on what he regarded as the Salafi canons. There was also Abdurrasheed 
Hadiyyatullah, who attended the university in the 1960s. Unlike Bello, Hadiyyatullah 
continued to be linked to Saudi Arabia. He established the Sharia College of Nigeria in Iwo, 
Osun State in 1988. In 1999, the college was renamed Sheikh Abdul-Azeez bin Abdullahi bin 
Baaz Sharia College, a renowned Salafi scholar, to commemorate his death.803 Thurston further 
showed that while the Islamic University’s attempt to recruit students began in the 1960s, it 
was not until the 1980s that their recruiting became successful in Northern Nigeria through its 
global outreach tours (dawr¯at). Nigerians ranked as the highest number of students who 
attended the university between 1982 and 1997, having 245 teachers and 8,146 students of all 
nationalities which ranged from Senegal to Great Britain to Sri Lanka.804  
My Salafi respondents also told me that many of their teachers studied in Saudi Arabia and 
countries such as Yemen and Sudan. On their return, they established madrasas and mosques 
where they introduced Salafism to many students. 805 Among these learning centres are the 
Madrasa at-Tawheed As-Salafiyyah, Ede; Centre for Ahlus-Sunnah Wal-Jamaa'ah, Osogbo; 
Mahdul Umar bn Khattab, Orile-Iganmu Lagos; and Daarus-Salafiyyah, Ibadan.806 But some 
students were introduced to Salafism in Northern Nigeria. Among them was Abubakar Afis, 
who told me he embraced the sunna at a mosque in Kaduna in 1995.807 He later studied Mass 
Communication at Ahmadu Bello University (ABU), Zaria, Kaduna and Law at OAU in Osun. 
He began to teach at one of the Salafi madrasas in Osun after his law programme. The history 
of Afis illustrates that Salafism was introduced to the MSSN by many students who attended 
Salafi learning centres outside school. Moreover, the MSSN also facilitated its introduction by 
inviting many returnee Salafis to its programmes. But in addition to these returnees, as noted 
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below, the MSSN also had graduates from local madrasas who contributed to the reform in the 
Society. 
5.1.2 Graduates from local madrasas 
When it was founded in 1954, the MSSN was made up of students attending Christian 
missions’ schools and public schools. Generally, many of these students were considered to 
know less about their religion than the madrasa graduates.808 Through the years, the Society 
gradually witnessed a rise in the number of students that were knowledgeable in Qur’anic 
education. The arrival of these students, which brought a new pattern to the membership of the 
Society, was facilitated by two related factors. The first was due to parents who insisted that 
their children must have Qur’anic education at least up to 'idadiyyah809 level while they were 
enrolled in Western schools.810 In this category of students, there were those who completed 
the 'idadiyyah level before enrolling in Western schools, those who attended the Western and 
Qur’anic schools at the same time, and those who attended the madrasa after completing 
secondary schools before proceeding to tertiary institutions. The second factor is connected to 
the reform of many madrasas which integrated Western school pedagogy into their mode of 
learning. This began with the madrasa of Shaykh Kamalud-deen Al-Adaby (1905–2005) in the 
early 1940s.811 The reforms of these madrasas were further enhanced by a change in Nigeria’s 
education system which allowed their graduates to obtain a certificate and diploma, and later 
degrees, in tertiary institutions. This began with the provision of Arabic and Islamic Studies in 
the West African School Certificate (WASC) examinations from the late 1950s812 and the 
establishment of the Department of Arabic and Islamic Studies at UI which started a certificate 
programme in 1963/1964.813 The educational experience of many of my respondents fit into 
either of these two contexts, among whom were Afis Oladosu, Abideen Olaiya, M. O. Abdul-
Rahman, Ibrahim Uthman and Taofeeq Yekini.  
 
808 MSSN UNILAG, “Embryonic Stage of Muslim Students' Society of Nigeria”. 
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Because of the emphasis on non-discrimination and brotherhood in the Society, the MSSN 
accommodated these students with positions of authority once they showed their interest and 
commitment. They were appointed to leadership positions such as Imam and Amir (known as 
President in the MSSN). They were also tasked with teaching Qur’an memorization, doing 
tafsīr or leading ad̲h̲kār (‘remembering’ God). The ad̲h̲kār includes the recitation of the names 
of God or texts from the Qur’an which are understood as an invocation and a form of worship. 
Through the Qur’an memorization, tafsīr and ad̲h̲kār, these graduate students helped to shape 
the practices and opinions of members regarding Islam. They engaged in discourses, which 
many of my respondents told me were mostly in line with the goals and objectives of the 
Society. For this reason, I am of the view that their participation also contributed to knowledge 
production in the MSSN. As one of my respondents narrated to me, they were involved in 
discourses on Islam that were introduced to the Society by the returnees.814 This suggests that 
the reform in the MSSN was not an imposed project from foreign graduates but a product of 
discourses between them and the graduates from local madrasas.  
I wish to point out that the emergence of both returnees and graduates from local madrasas 
created some mentor-student groupings in which members were attached to different mentors 
like Noibi, Hussein, Oyekan and Thanni. The executives of MSSN all-over Yorubaland and 
other parts of the country also identify with different mentors in their respective communities. 
Owing to their relationship, these executives helped to invite their mentors to give lectures at 
MSSN programmes. The influence of such figures as Noibi and Thanni grew in the Society as 
a result of this. Gradually, their influence also began to compete with the clerics of the existing 
Muslim organisations in Yorubaland such as the Ansar-Ud-Deen and Ahmadiyya who had 
been invited to the MSSN from inception. However, until much later, this openness to a variety 
of scholars was not a major problem because the Society enjoined different opinions about 
Islam. In addition to the contributions made by these new Muslim figures, the contributions of 
many transnational Islamist movements were also key to the reform process.  
5.1.3 Transnational Islamic movements 
As I noted in Chapter Four, members of MSSN participated in international conferences 
organised by IIFSO and WAMY in the 1960s and 1970s in many parts of the world. Nigeria 
also hosted four international conferences in the same period at Ibadan (1966), Kaduna (1968), 
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Ibadan (1975) and Lagos (1979).815 Up to 2000, these conferences continued to be organised 
every two or three years depending on resources.816 The example of Solaja, discussed in 
Chapter Four, who found out about the claim of prophethood of the Ahmadiyya Movement’s 
founder in one of these conferences showed that they exposed participants to new information 
and knowledge which made an impact on religious reform. 
Providing access to Islamic literature was another major contribution of these movements to 
the reform in MSSN. Through these movements, many Muslim students were exposed to texts 
referred to as the “IIFSO series”817 produced by many Islamist thinkers. These include 
Hammudah Abdal-Ati’s Islam in Focus,818 Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi’s Let us be Muslims,819 
Sayyid Qutb’s Milestones,820 and WAMY’s Islam in Concept.821 The students also had access 
to texts of early theologians and books of Hadith such as Fiqh Us-sunnah,822 Sahih Al-
Bukhari,823 Sahih Muslim824 and Ihya' 'Ulum Al-Deen.825 The access to these texts and other 
MSSN programmes contributed to the development of Islamic knowledge of many students. 
As narrated to me by Zafaran Adeniyi, a leader in MSSN in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the 
lessons from the texts also facilitated strong commitments of students towards Islam and the 
development of “better Muslim” in the Society.826 
The effect of the 1979 Iranian revolution was also relevant in this change. In many parts of the 
world, the revolution contributed to the rise of ‘political Islam’827 and the instability in Middle-
East/global politics.828 The revolution was followed by a strategic attempt to seek international 
support for the new state in many African countries such as Nigeria, and students belonged to 
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some of the target groups for this international support.829 Indeed, the success of the revolution 
was not lost on many Muslim students who wished for an Islamic state in Nigeria. Some 
officers of the Society who were inspired by the revolution actually contacted the Iranian 
government in this period through its Cultural Attaché at the Iranian embassy in Lagos.830 They 
collected texts, magazines and journals from the embassy in which the ideals of the new Islamic 
state and other Muslims’ concerns were discussed. A major example was the monthly 
periodical Mahjuba (The Covered woman) which discussed the model character of Muslim 
women, the family, and the Islamic legal positions on women’s rights and duties within the 
community. The magazine was said to have introduced some members of the Society to 
pictures of women in ḥijāb and niqāb,831 even though the wives of the alfas belonging to the 
Bamidele movement had been using a similar veil called ‘purdah’ by many Yoruba Muslims 
before then.   
But, in spite of being inspired by the revolution, the relationship between Iran and the MSSN 
was short-lived. This was because the Society was cautioned by some enlightened returnees 
and local scholars on the difference between the Iranian Shi’i Islam and the Saudi Arabian 
Sunni orientation which the majority of Muslims in Nigeria identified with.832 With this 
knowledge, Dhikirullah O. Hassan, a member of the Society narrated that “We severed our 
relationship with the Iranian embassy when we started realising that what we were being called 
towards was the Shia ideology as opposed to the Ahlu-Sunna which is the background of our 
Islamic practice.”833 It is also possible that the MSSN’s decision to cut ties with Iran was 
influenced by Saudi Arabia’s inspired international youth movement, WAMY, of which the 
MSSN was a member. As a major promoter of the Sunni creed, Saudi Arabia used such 
organizations as WAMY to compete for influence against Shiism in many Muslim societies. It 
is also worth noting that while most members of the MSSN considered the success of the 
Iranian revolution as an inspiration, which convinced them that Islam was also practicable as a 
political system, they objected to the strategy of the revolutionists. According to Hassan, we 
realised “the fact that the way of revolution could not be fitting in into (sic) Nigerian political 
reality in establishing our goal.”834 I understand the use of “Nigerian political reality” to mean 
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its diversity especially in terms of ethnicity and religious groups. Almost a decade before the 
Iranian revolution, Nigeria’s civil war, as I noted in Chapter Four, had demonstrated how deep 
the problems of ethno-religious identities were for the country. Given these various concerns, 
the MSSN began to discourage members from reading literature from Iran. During my 
fieldwork, one of my respondents showed me samples of this literature but cautioned me 
against reading them.  
The National Vice-President of the MSSN (International Affairs), Ibrahim El-Zakzaky and 
other students in Northern Nigeria, however, gave support to the Shi’a Muslim government in 
Iran. Some Iranian diplomats and clerics were reported to have introduced Khomeini’s teaching 
to members of the MSSN in the region. In line with the teaching, El-Zakzaky also supported a 
Muslim state ideology against the western-inspired nation-state and led a protest against 
Nigeria’s constitution in Zaria in 1980. He later established a Shi’a Muslim movement in 
Northern Nigeria called the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) in 1980 to demonstrate his 
support for the Iranian-style state system.835 Over the years, the Nigerian government has been 
concerned about the security threat posed by this movement. El-Zakzaky has thus been arrested 
and detained by security operatives because of his activities which are considered to violate 
state laws. Apart from the North, some Yoruba Muslims have also identified as Shi’ites, among 
who is Mr. Muftau Zakariya. Between 2018 and July 2019, Zakariya led the protest in Abuja 
and Lagos to call for the release El-Zakzaky who was detained by the government in 2015 after 
members of his movement clashed with security forces in Kaduna.836 Even though there are no 
reliable figures on the Shi’ites in Nigeria, these members have increased in population since 
1980.837  
Rather than the Iranian model, the MSSN embraced the ideals of the Muslim Brotherhood in 
the writings of Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb and Abul A’la Mawdudi’s Jamaat-i-Islami 
(Islamic Society).838 While these three figures had their point of divergence, they share similar 
worldviews on the comprehensiveness of Islam as a way of life for state and society. They also 
held the Qur’an, sunna and Sharia as foundations of pious Muslim life and considered being 
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faithful to the establishment of God’s sovereignty would bring success, power and eternal 
reward to Muslims.839  These thoughts inspired many members of the MSSN who began to 
mould their lives according to them. The training and range of activities for developing a pious 
life espoused by Al-Bana and Mawdudi also made an impact on the reforms of the MSSN 
activities.840 A major aspect of this was Mawdudi’s focus on ‘knowledge’ of Islam which he 
considered the first step in building Iman (faith) and being Muslim.841 As I will demonstrate in 
Chapter Seven, acquiring Islamic knowledge became one of the key aspects of the MSSN 
reform. 
The Muslim Brotherhood, as I noted in Chapter Two, is considered to have a political agenda 
to establish an Islamic state, but its members are divided on either taking a revolutionary 
approach or a progressive one.842 Qutb’s radical thought favours the former and it has been 
understood by many, especially the media, to be the starting point for many radical groups.843 
The MSSN follows the second approach, which involves a gradualist moral reform with no 
plan to take power by violence. Oladosu, who had a view of ‘religious movement’ in terms of 
power, was thus quick to point out to me that the MSSN had no vision of establishing a state 
because it was not the vision of the Society: 
The root is the Muslim students in the schools; from primary to secondary to 
tertiary institutions. That was the vision that led to the founding of the Society. 
But once it becomes a movement, it would be for those who want to establish 
a state. Those who want to move Islam – in theory – to the practice in all its 
ramification. Essentially, the establishment of an Islamic state like you have 
in the Arab world. But we know that once that is done, the foundation would 
be lost.844 
The major factors that made the MSSN adopt evolutionary reforms are not very clear. But one 
way of looking at this is to consider Oladosu’s position in this period that the MSSN was not 
given to foreign da’wa and opinions that were not suitable for the local context845 or the 
‘Nigerian political reality.’ I also look at the MSSN decision as a product of self-reflection and 
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negotiation on Islamic practices in which many Muslims are engaged. Within the Islamic 
tradition, as noted by Asad, many Muslims do not act upon what they read in Islamic texts 
without reinterpreting them in relation to their social context.846 As the MSSN example 
suggests, their actions are often determined by the experience and context they find themselves 
in. The ideals of Al-Banna and Mawdudi on education, science and technology among others, 
which are produced in the West, may also have appealed to many students in Yorubaland. 
Although they both advocated for the Islamization of Western values and technology,847 I 
understand their emphasis on this form of Islamization as resonating with Yoruba Muslims' 
interest in education, ọlaju and the ability to compete with Christians. It was, therefore, these 
ideals that further shaped their understanding of Islam on how to negotiate and live as better 
Muslims in the post-colonial context. As Otayek and Soares have suggested in the notion of 
islam mondain, this form of negotiation is common among many Muslims in the modern world 
that is largely influenced by neoliberal policies.848  
In sum, I argue that these three developments in the MSSN: the arrival of Muslim graduates 
from abroad, graduates from local madrasas and the MSSN link to transnational Islamic 
movements, all contributed to the reform and crisis in the Society. However, they do not 
adequately explain all the factors that shaped members' attitudes towards the idea of reform 
and being better Muslims. As I will discuss below, the request for ḥujja849 (proof) was also 
crucial in this reform.  
5.1.4 ‘Factically Ḥujja’ 
I wish to note that only one of my respondents used the expression, “factically ḥujja.”850 But I 
assumed it was a popular expression in the past because I interacted with many others who 
used similar anglicized expressions such as “sunnatic,” “unsunnatic,” “ḥijābites,” “niqābites” 
and “mechanical ad̲h̲kār.” These concepts may be understood on the one hand as part of 
‘Muslim popular culture,’ involving the blending of Arabic or Islamic ideas with other 
elements of popular cultures. On the other hand, I consider them to be products of the learning 
experience of Muslims who engaged in Western thought in the ‘secular’ school system. Owing 
to this engagement, members of the MSSN often discussed Islamic issues from that perspective 
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by referring to Western scholars who confirmed their discourse. The use of these expressions 
is related to what Peel referred to in the case of the NASFAT’s jargon such as, “marketing our 
product” and “showcasing itself” to describe its activities. But Peel could not tell where these 
expressions had been borrowed, from the world of business, media or through Pentecostal born-
again Christianity.851 Although I do not argue that borrowings did not happen, I wish to suggest 
that Peel’s inability to explain this is due to the failure to recognise the key influence of Western 
education in shaping their thoughts and expressions. There are many Yoruba Muslims who 
read novels and motivational books and those who attend leadership and entrepreneurship 
courses often organised by the MSSN, and it is inconceivable to assume that the knowledge 
gained from them would not impact on their thoughts. Moreover, their Western educational 
engagements are not the only influence that shaped their thoughts, they also employed the 
broader Yoruba culture, especially by using proverbs and ewi (poems) to explain Islamic issues. 
Sara Katz's recent article draws attention to the fact that by the 1920s, Yoruba Muslim 
journalists had been using this technique to translate Qur’anic verses and concepts for a broader 
audience who read their newspapers.852 While this technique continued to be noticed in the 
sermons of Yoruba Muslim clerics, discussing Islam based on either the Western thoughts or 
the Yoruba worldview is actually part of the key issues which the concept of ḥujja sought to 
address in the MSSN by the early 1980s.  
On ḥujja, I build on the definition of Gardet and Hodgson853 who suggest that ḥujja means both 
proof and presentation of proof. It is a Qur’anic term that is applied to an argument that is false 
and an argument that is true. It is close to the word dalīl in the sense of “proof,” as well as 
“burhān” in the sense of “argument.” However, dalīl suggests “indication” or “guide” that 
leads to certainty while ḥujja suggests a final argument that beckons no reply. Also, while 
burhān suggests clear evidence of an incontestable proof and the correct reasoning that 
produced it, the meaning of ḥujja as a contrary argument remained unchanged. The notion of 
“dialectical proof” is thus suggested by Gardet and Hodgson as the translation of the primary 
meaning of ḥujja.  
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Studies by Noah Salomon and Seesemann suggest that the emphasis on proof is at the core of 
the discourses of reformist thinkers and their projects in Muslim Africa.854 For these reformers, 
any practice and belief in Islam that has no evidence in the Qur’an and Hadith is an unlawful 
innovation. Noah Salomon’s study of post-independence Sudan shows that dalīl is used by a 
Salafi inspired group known as Ansar al-Sunna to contest the practices of Sufi brothers. 
However, while it is usually assumed that only the Islamic reform movements participated in 
the episteme of evidence, Salomon insists that the Sufis also make requests for it, even though 
they also consider the establishment of truth to be in the domain of secrecy (sirr) or what is 
elusive.855  
Little is known about how the idea of ḥujja developed in the MSSN. A magazine of the MSSN 
UNILAG branch suggests that it was in the era of reform in the Society which began in 1979856 
and coincided with Iran’s revolution year. One of my respondents also suggests that it was 
probably through the returnee graduates who participated in the MSSN programmes.857 What 
is important to note is that the request for ḥujja marked the beginning of an era in the MSSN 
in which members questioned almost everything they were told on Islam, from the ‘most 
established’ to those that were ‘taken for granted’ in everyday religious life. As Taofeeq Yekin 
described it:  
There was an era in MSSN, whatever you say, they would say ‘your ḥujja 
please’ – that is, what’s your evidence. Even if it’s a normal thing. If you say 
… let’s go and pray. It’s time for ṣalāt. And they would say, ‘your evidence 
please?’ Then you would say that Allah says that He has commanded that 
prayers should be offered and at its appropriate time. Then they would say 
evidence accepted, let’s go… Things like that… even established things, they 
would ask you, where is your proof?858 
The establishment of proof of any position from the 1980s was through argument, questioning 
and citation of authoritative texts that supported the position or invalidated it. According to 
Luqman Abdur-Raheem,859 a former member of the MSSN at Obafemi Awolowo University 
(OAU) Ife, the argumentations were also less conflictual. Furthermore, students were not 
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obliged to accept another person’s opinion in line with the openness of the Society to diversity. 
But as I will discuss later, this was not always the case as Abdur-Raheem suggested here: 
…that was the era of factically ḥujja. Do you have ḥujja for what you are 
saying. The prophet did this, what is your evidence? And those who are used 
to evidence, they will quote Muslim, quote Bukhari [i.e. books of Hadith cited 
above] and so on and so forth… When somebody gives a lecture, some people 
would challenge him or her…But it was a healthy rivalry then. So nobody 
would force anybody. But those of us who are onlookers, we would see facts 
and figures and you would be able to decide which side of the fence you want 
to be. So that was the era.860 
The concept of ḥujja challenged the practices of many students that were considered to rely on 
the heritage of parents and the position of the established alfas and Imams in Yorubaland. 
Mahfuz Alabidun, an MSSN Amir at Lagos State University (LASU), drew my attention to 
this phenomenon using his own experience. He told me that before he could challenge it, he 
engaged in Sufism because that was what he had learnt from his father who is an alfa who, in 
turn, had learnt it from his parents.861 The concept of ḥujja also challenged the practice of many 
students who discussed Islam without any authorised Islamic text. This concerned those who 
referred to Western philosophical texts. Abdul-Fattah Abdul-Majeed who was a former 
national leader of the MSSN was quoted as saying this phenomenon was a major problem in 
the Society up to the early 1980s.  
…..I remember even in the early ‘80s at the University of Lagos, people 
would come to deliver lectures/sermon and they will be quoting from 
Williams Shakespeare, it was as bad as that.862 
By questioning their inherited practices and ‘un-authorised’ arguments, the idea of ḥujja thus 
encouraged many members to develop their knowledge of Islam in Islamic texts. Because the 
idea saddled them with the burden of proof of their own practices and sayings, it allowed them 
to become more conscious of what they would say, and they were prepared to be challenged if 
they must say it. As Yekin explained to me, the era “really got people informed. Because you 
would not say anything until you are really sure of your footing. So, because you would expect 
it, you would be prepared.”863 Yekin further suggested that people may learn about the proof 
of an Islamic point sub-consciously through regular study of the Qur’an and other Islamic texts, 
rather than actual preparation or research when they want to discuss it. The consciousness for 
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proof thus encouraged many students to be attentive to various points in the texts which they 
employed in different arguments and occasions as Yekin narrated here:  
So the ḥujja era was a fantastic one…in fact by the time that you are even 
listening to the Qur’an, you won’t even know that you are even noting certain 
things. Somebody will just say something and then you would say, Yes, it’s 
in the Qur’an. In chapter so so, I can’t remember what verse it is. It’s so so 
chapter...because the ḥujja thing has gone into your sub-conscious. You don’t 
even know when you are even holding on to certain points, probably for use 
of reference in the future.864 
The concept of ḥujja is also linked to how good or bad a practice or belief is evaluated. Abd' 
Razaq Abdus Salaam, a former leader of MSSN in Lagos pointed out that this was done by 
explaining the importance of ḥujja and other authoritative Islamic texts to members which 
allowed them to question what is correct and incorrect in their own practices. He explained that 
“we guide them to question what is sinful. By the time we introduced people to the concept of 
the Qur’an and Sunnah, and also to the concept of Ujja, then they begin to ask questions ‘Are 
these things I indulge in right?'”865 
Given their consciousness to the concept, I consider ḥujja as a key element in the idea of a 
good Muslim that was developing at the time because it attempts to separate what is the ‘truth’ 
or ‘correct’ from what is not in Islam. However, ḥujja was not enough to bring about reform in 
the practices of many students. From the testimonies of many respondents, this also depends 
on the àgbọ́yé of prophetic sunna.  
5.1.5 Àgbọ́yé, Sunna and Islamic reform 
Àgbọ́yé is a Yoruba term which means “understanding.” It could also mean “sufficient 
knowledge.” This term derives from two words: àgbọ́ (to hear/listen/know) and (o)yé 
(well/enough/adequately). The word oyé could also stand on its own to mean “understanding.” 
With regards to religion, àgbọ́yé could be used with another word rendered as àgbọ́yé ẹsin, 
“understanding of religion” the same way we can talk of àgbọ́yé ọrọ “understanding of words.” 
The meaning of àgbọ́yé and how it is used in the Yoruba language is not different from English 
usage. The argument of Gbajabiamila in 1923 on the importance of Western education for 
Muslims (in Chapter Three) suggests that having an ‘understanding’ of Islam has been linked 
with what it means to be a good Muslim among Yoruba Muslims before the establishment of 
MSSN. Today, it is still common to find many alfas in Yorubaland who argue that 
understanding of Islam is crucial to be a ‘proper’ Muslim.  
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Given the number of students who studied under the alfas and those who attended Western-
oriented schools where Islamic knowledge is taught, this argument also feeds back into the 
construction of àgbọ́yé and its linkage to what being a good Muslim suggest in the MSSN. On 
the other hand, the idea of àgbọ́yé in MSSN reform also appears to draw insights from 
Mawdudi’s thesis in which he argues that “knowledge” plays a key role in becoming “true 
Muslims in the true sense of the word.”866 In his 1938 Punjab (Pakistan) addresses to some 
villagers, Mawdudi argued that a person cannot become a Muslim because he is born into Islam 
especially through family, which for him is the assumption of many Muslims. Also, a person 
cannot become a Muslim by name and through verbal testimony (which is the shahāda, 
considered by many Muslims to signify conversion into Islam) without deliberately accepting 
what is taught by the Prophet Muhammad. Thus, to be a Muslim is based on that prophetic 
knowledge as he explains here: 
Islam, therefore, consists, firstly, of knowledge and, secondly, of putting that 
knowledge into practice. A man can be white and have no knowledge; 
because he is born white, he will remain so…But no man becomes truly a 
Muslim without knowing the meaning of Islam, because he becomes a 
Muslim not through birth but through knowledge. Unless you come to know 
the basic and necessary teachings of the Prophet Muhammad, blessings and 
peace be on him, how can you believe in him, have faith in him, and how can 
you act according to what he taught? And if you do not have faith in him, 
knowingly and consciously, as fully as you can, how can you become true 
Muslims?867  
Mawdudi further argues that knowing the prophetic teachings is a guide for Muslims in their 
relationship with God. He cautioned against ignorance which is capable of leading Muslims 
astray and emphasises the importance of knowledge as the “absolute necessity” that determines 
whether Muslims “are true Muslims and remain true Muslims.”868 However, he did not expect 
every Muslim to become a scholar, but he encouraged them to devote an hour a day to acquire 
the knowledge of Islam.  
Mawdudi’s thought resonates in the testimony of Oladosu. He pointed out that “the whole idea 
about Islam is predicated upon knowledge, not on ignorance,” and that “to be Muslim is to live 
a practical life of the Qur’an which under normal circumstances should be predicated on 
knowledge.”869 But unlike Mawdudi, Oladosu did not consider a Muslim without “knowledge” 
as a “bad Muslim” or “less-Muslim” because the definition of who is a “good Muslim” is 
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subjective. For him, it is also not possible to assume that a Muslim is a ‘bad Muslim’ if s/he is 
alive because such a person can still repent in future before his or her death. In the same vein, 
Oladosu argued that a Muslim that is assumed to be a ‘good Muslim’ may also do something 
that negates Islam in the future which will make him/her a ‘bad Muslim.’ This argument, which 
is common in the sermons of many alfas in Yorubaland that I know, is one of the ways a 
Muslim is constructed among Yoruba Muslims. Furthermore, Oladosu is of the view that there 
are Muslims who have “knowledge” of Islam but whose practices are not consistent with the 
foundational texts of Islam, and for him, such Muslims are those labelled by the media as 
‘terrorists.’  With this position, he categorised the idea of a Muslim into three:  
The first groups are those who are practising Islam just because others are 
doing it. The second are those that are practising Islam based on their 
intellectual knowledge. They know that for them to practise Islam completely, 
they have to situate and establish it on a certain intellectual foundation. The 
third groups are those whose actions negate what you presume to be the 
textual foundation of the religion. And you find these [groups] in the current 
crises in the world: ISIS, AL-SHABAB in the eastern part of Africa and then 
since 2009, the Boko Haram in Nigeria.870 
This categorisation may be understood in relation to the different ways in which Islamic texts 
are interpreted by many Muslims, which I will discuss later. Having said that, despite the 
different conceptualisations between Mawdudi and Oladosu, what I consider to be useful is 
their emphasis on “knowledge” of Islam as a crucial factor in being a good Muslim. This 
emphasis on “knowledge” is conspicuous in a magazine produced by the UNILAG branch of 
the MSSN to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Society. The magazine refers to a period, the 
“Era of Intellectual Development (1979-90s),” to analyse and describe the reform in the 
Society, rather than tajdid (renewal) or islah (purification) mentioned in Chapter Two. I am 
not suggesting that the idea of tajdid or islah is not implied in this period, but the word 
“intellectual” which includes the idea of “knowledge” and “understanding” was used to signify 
this process. The era is seen to be marked by the establishment of the theory of evidence based 
only on the Qurʾan and the sunna of the Prophet Muhammad.871 Also, the magazine notes that, 
The period is marked by the knowledge and intellectualism, which later 
brought about the strict adherence to the Qurʾan and Sunnah. Brothers, 
especially those in Universities, became enthusiastic to search for knowledge 
" ... they profusely read Islamic literatures especially those authored by Imam 
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Abul A’la Maududi, Sayd Qutb and Hassan Al-Bana". Since then, intellectual 
prowess has become the lots of the members of the society(sic).872 
This search for knowledge was considered to have taken place in order “to cope with the 
prevailing trend within the Society, as the religion of Al-Islam itself is based on knowledge 
and comprehension of the Deen.”873 It is further assumed that as a result of acquiring 
knowledge, “the consciousness of Islam, as the only legacy was awakened in people; thus they 
became more sincere and ready to practice the religion to the letter.”874 Some of the terms used 
in these quotes show clearly that the notion of reform in the MSSN is framed in relation to their 
Arabic concepts. For instance, in the indented quote above, the use of “strict adherence to the 
Qur’an and sunna” suggests an effort to reform Islam (in line with prophetic traditions) referred 
to as tajdid. The other quote in this paragraph refers to “awakened” which implies revitalisation 
regarded as sahwa.875 In all, these various terms imply that the MSSN reform was understood 
in different ways. And, in these multiple notions of the term, the roles of ḥujja based on the 
Qur’an and Hadith and the “understanding” of these texts were salient, as noted here:  
Before this period, people's orientation to Islam was based on heritage from 
parents, though some basic tenets of the Islamic faith like Ṣalāt, Ṣawm 
(fasting) and few others were adhered to. Majority of the members could not 
understand and have not handled on the sayings of the Prophet (SAW) called 
Hadith, it was a dry desert where almost everybody dreaded going… The 
situation at the period was very unimaginable. Rather suddenly, the lost 
property of the' Muslim Students' Society of Nigeria was found. Though, it 
didn't matter where it came from, as long as it was useful. But unlike ever 
before, it was found through better understanding of the Qurʾan and the 
Sunnah876 of the holy prophet.877 
A pertinent question here is how does “knowledge” or “understanding” relates to Islamic 
orthodoxy in the MSSN’s sense and how do this relationship shapes reform? My assumption 
is that understanding is not only about knowing something, it also includes knowing it 
differently or having a different interpretation of that knowledge. As many academics in the 
social sciences and humanities are aware, there could be different interpretations of the same 
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phenomena such as ‘identity’ and ‘religion.’ This assumption allows me to argue that the 
knowledge of Islam in the teachings of the Prophet was already in the MSSN but was 
understood differently. It is possible that some issues in Islam might not have been known, but 
it is a mistaken notion to think that the thoughts of Mawdudi and other Islamists introduced 
members of the MSSN to the knowledge of Islam or the teachings of the Prophet. Thus, when 
members of the MSSN say they had a “better understanding of Qur’an and Sunna,” I take this 
to mean that they had a different interpretation of these texts which inspired the desire to live 
according to their new interpretations. This ‘reinterpretation’ as well as ‘elaboration’ of 
existing tradition are forms of religious change according to Eller.878 As a factor of religious 
change, they can lead to the introduction of novel ideas in lived practices and the discontinuities 
of others as I will show in the next section. We can understand the impact of reinterpretation 
by looking at how prophetic sunna was understood as a way of life among many Yoruba 
Muslims before and during the MSSN reform, which I noted in Chapter Four. While in the 
past, the majority of the MSSN members also considered adhering strictly to prophetic sunna 
as less mandatory or some aspects of it as not suitable in their social context, a different 
understanding of Islam thus encouraged a relentless desire to follow the new notion of sunna 
from the 1980s.  
Of course, the development of a different understanding of Islam is not peculiar to the social 
experience of Yoruba Muslim students because it is one of the core factors responsible for 
change and diversity of Islam and how it is lived in many Muslim societies. Soares’ study of 
Muslims in a West African town of Mali has clearly highlighted this, referring to how Muslims 
changed from one Sufi affiliation to another. He showed that the French colonial policy, in a 
bid to maintain order and prevent a pan-Islamic movement, shaped new ways of being Muslim 
for many Sufi orders from their past. However, they became affiliated with another Sufi 
tradition following the emergence of the charismatic Tijaniyya Sufi Shaykh Ahmad Hamallah 
who challenged the Sufi establishment favoured by the colonialist.879 Janson’s study of the 
Tabligh Jama’at in Gambia also illustrated that while there were Muslims who identify as Sufi, 
seen as less orthodox, and those who identify as reformist, considered as radicals, the Tabligh 
Jama’at do not identify with either of them, even though the Tabligh Jama’at is also regarded 
as a reformist movement.880 In addition, Uthman in his study of the crisis caused by Muslims 
in Northern Nigeria, contends that differences in understanding Islamic texts between Muslims 
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in Yorubaland and Muslims in Northern Nigeria is why some Islamic reform movements have 
taken a violent turn in the latter and not because of cultural differences, geographical factors or 
socio-economic strain as many studies881 suggest.882 This argument is part of the thinking of 
many Yoruba Muslim elite that they are more engaged in “intellectual jihad” to promote 
Islamic reforms than taking a violent approach.  
With the insistence on ḥujja and the impact of àgbọ́yé, the MSSN gradually adopted what is 
regarded as the prophetic sunna to be the basis of its practices and the way of life of members. 
Because of this, embodying the sunna became another major experience in which many 
members of the Society situated the idea of reform and good Muslim practice. Although he 
was criticising the MSSN in his blog, the role of sunna and ‘understanding’ in this reform and 
the Islamist thought that contributed to shaping it was noted by Aboo Aamir Al-Atharee, (a 
former leader in the MSSN who later identified with Salafism) in his short history of the MSSN.  
The Muslim Students’ Society [of Nigeria], MSS[N], was founded in 1954 
basically to cater for the religious needs of the young Muslim boys and girls 
in some Lagos grammar schools and colleges. When it started it was all 
singing and dancing. The beginning of the group was therefore upon a shoddy 
foundation, perhaps a foundation informed by the level of the Islamic 
understanding of the time. Calling people to the Kitaab [Qurʾan] and Sunnah 
at the time was no doubt a mirage. The way the fathers were so were the 
children… 
Thus, there came a phase when some breeze of the Sunnah came upon the 
MSSN, that was in the 90’s. Books such as ‘The Milestones’, ‘Let us Be 
Muslims,’ ‘Return of the Pharaohs’, ‘What Does My Being A Muslim 
Mean?,’ etc., were those works that served as the intellectual cum Sunnah 
foundations of the group. Thus, it would not be farfetched what sort of Sunnah 
was in vogue then. To those who do not know, those books were written by 
the arrowheads of the Ikhwaanee [The Muslim Brotherhood] Thought 
Founders, Sayyid Qutb, et al (sic).883 
Until much later when the Society introduced an Islamic Affairs Board which moderates 
different Islamic opinions, embodying the sunna was ‘not necessarily compelled’ on members 
(but it was understood by some members to be compelled). Rather, it evolved from that 
consciousness to ḥujja. This consciousness is important to understanding the transformation of 
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MSSN into a reform movement by the late 1980s. As Yekin pointed out, the consciousness 
reveals that while the Society was requesting evidence on every aspect of Muslim practices 
and beliefs, it was also emphasising the need to reform or revive these practices and beliefs.  
…when you are asking for ḥujja, you are saying you are going back to the 
sunna, you are going back to the basis. And so, it was actually that attitude 
that led MSSN wholesomely…to the sunna. When you have to ask for 
evidence for everything, you are definitely going back to the fundamental. To 
the very basis and there is no basis in Islam other than the Qur’an and the 
sunna because everything would lead us to what the Prophet did or did not 
do.884  
But I do not consider the consciousness for ḥujja and the idea of sunna as a simple blueprint 
for reform or action in the MSSN reform. Rather the reform was also produced by discourses 
and contests regarding what is correct and incorrect in prophetic traditions and local Yoruba 
Muslim practices. The major topics in these debates and how the debates played out are 
discussed in the next section.  
Though the wide-scale adoption of prophetic sunna by many Muslims is considered in many 
studies to reflect what is considered the ‘modernisation of Islam’ or ‘modern Islam,’ I wish to 
point out that most of my respondents did not use the word “modern Islam” to describe this 
social experience. Rather, they discussed this change using at least these three expressions: 
ḥujja, àgbọ́yé ẹsin and going back to the sunna. Although little is known about the discourses 
and major actors in the period of reform, I did not find any document where the idea of the 
‘modernisation of Islam’ was used to describe the reform. And, where the word ‘modern’ is 
used, it is considered a construction by other people including Western scholars. While 
discussing the crisis in the MSSN in this period, for instance, Zafaran Adeniyi referred to it as 
what “is liberally tagged in the word of Western writers of Islam as the struggle between the 
‘modernist’ and the ‘traditionalist’ among the Muslims.” 885 One can take another example 
from the broader Yoruba society. Largely, it is common among non-Muslims to refer to 
Muslim women who dressed modestly without the veil as sọji alhaja (lit. wake-up Alhaja, 
referring to an enlightened female Muslim). Men who do not identify with sunna practices such 
as having a beard are also called sọji alfa (lit. wake-up cleric, referring to an enlightened male 
Muslim). These discriminatory expressions usually put off the sunna-minded students from 
identifying with the term ‘modernity.’ 
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Not using ‘modern Islam’ may also be connected to their thinking that ‘modernity’ describes 
the culture of the West, the ‘secular’ and industrial world which they understood to be different 
from the Islamic world. As an illustration, Habibah Oladosu pointed out to me that ‘modernity’ 
may be regarded as a major factor that determines how a good Muslim is recognised from a 
bad one. Because, according to her, “if you don’t align with modernity, with what is going on 
then you are a bad Muslim. Then, at times, if you want to sell out your Islam, you want to 
compromise your Islam for modernity then you become a good Muslim.”886 Given this 
understanding in the MSSN, I consider the notion of modernisation of/modern Islam is 
inadequate to describe the reform in the Society.  
5.2 Debating Sunna   
I employ Asad’s concept of Islam as a discursive tradition to understand and analyse the 
discourse and contest which led the MSSN to adopt sunna as a way of life. Concerning his 
argument noted in Chapter Two, Asad contends that discourse involves arguments which seek 
to establish orthodoxy and orthopraxy, and it is possible to understand it by focusing on the 
discursive process which includes the definition of orthodoxy, the style of reasoning, and the 
historical and material contexts.887 Due to the paucity of data, little is known about the 
discursive process in the MSSN in this period. However, the aspects of Islamic reform, 
discussed above, provide useful information on how this process was shaped. I wish to point 
out that the “notion of Islam” which I discussed in the next chapter is also part of this discursive 
process. A look at the process revealed that there were many actors involved in the discourse, 
especially those mentioned above. The discursive process also involved an attempt to define 
orthodoxy which focused on what is ‘fundamental’ and ‘non-fundamental’ aspects of Islam. 
While for many years, there was little or no sharp division in the MSSN, the arguments on the 
‘fundamental’ and ‘non-fundamental’ aspects of the religion however suggest that there was a 
divergence of opinions in the Society.  
My use of ‘fundamental’ builds on the definition of my respondents. According to Noibi, what 
is ‘fundamental’ in Islam is “all the originals and all the authentic teachings.” 888 He also 
explained that being a fundamentalist is not the same as “fanaticism” but going back to the 
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foundational principles and practices of Islam.889 For example, many Muslims considered acts 
like the ṣalāt (prayer) and fasting in Ramadan to be fundamental in Islam.890 But there are 
several aspects of these acts that are considered less fundamental but rewardable. For instance, 
while performing the daily ṣalāt is regarded as a fundamental act, not performing tarāwīḥ 
(supplicatory prayer in Ramadan) is not.891 Many Yoruba Muslim clerics have debated the 
sunna along this line of reasoning. Abdul-Ganiy Raji, a leader and member of the MSSN since 
1979, gave an example of standing during urination which was criticised by some members of 
the Society who considered squatting as the correct position in sunna. Raji considered this as 
an aspect of Islam that is not fundamental and worthy of disagreement compared to ṣalāt.892 
In the early 1980s, the MSSN was largely polarised on the definition of what is fundamental in 
the prophetic sunna. Like Raji pointed out, there were arguments over whether practices like 
veiling, having a beard and wearing trousers that are above the ankle, should be regarded as 
fundamental aspects of sunna or not.893 The Society resolved these contending issues through 
public debates in many of its programmes such as the IVC and the National Higher Institution 
Convention of Muslim Students (NHICOMS). In 1999, the Society organised one of such 
debates at the IVC held at Sango-Ota between those who considered that the use of face cover 
(niqāb) for women was compulsory and those who argued otherwise. As narrated by Asimiyu 
Rasheed in his study, “Proofs and arguments on the issue were produced by both parties. At 
the end of the dialogue, certain resolutions were reached and both parties involved honoured 
the view of each other.”894 The proofs of each party were accepted by the Society,895 and it 
resolved not to deny whoever wanted to wear the face cover, but it was not compulsory for 
anyone to wear it.896 The dialogue and resolution of the MSSN on the niqāb illustrate how the 
discursive tradition was connected to the formation of moral self and knowledge production.  
Besides public debates, many in the Society also produced texts which they used to articulate 
their points. A major example was Uthman’s The Ḥijāb of the Muslim Woman and a Call to 
Every Reformer which posited that the type of veil worn by the wives of the Prophet was not 
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compulsory for other women.897 Some students expressed their views on other issues in the 
magazines of the Society such as Al-Ilm (knowledge). But unlike Uthman’s text which focused 
on debates about the veil, the discourse of these students sought to promote the Islamic 
traditions in various institutions of Nigeria. In 1985, for instance, an editorial opinion of Al-Ilm 
contested what it regarded as the “Euro-Christian” tradition of Nigeria’s constitution and its 
failure to deal with the problems of corruption and poverty in the country. It, therefore, called 
for the implementation of Sharia as a system of law that would ensure that social justice is 
embedded in Nigeria’s constitution.898 Another student, Kunle Sanni (a leader in the MSSN at 
Ilorin who later became the national coordinator of NACOMYO), used the magazine to 
denounce public schools in Yorubaland for failing to promote the teaching of Islamic 
education. He also gave a damning remark about Muslim teachers who, as he claimed, were 
attracted to western lifestyles and failed to encourage their students to dress modestly and live 
a moral life.899  
The discourse of reform in the MSSN also involved arguments on two styles of interpretation 
of the Qur’an and Hadith. These styles may be linked to two approaches towards the 
interpretation of the Qur’an by many Muslims, although this dichotomous view is problematic 
because there is no strict boundary between them.900 The first, associated with exotericism, is 
a voluntarist approach which, as pointed out by Salomon, suggests that the knowledge of 
Qur’anic texts can be attained individually based on the assumption that “God and the Prophet 
have already acted in spreading knowledge and thus agency in attaining this knowledge is 
placed primarily in the hands of the Muslim individual.”901 This way of knowing, also referred 
to as scriptural tradition, is common among reform movements, as noted in Chapter Two. In 
contrast, the second approach, regarded as esoterism and linked to the Sufi tradition, assumes 
that religious knowledge is available to only a few specialists (often called shaykhs) who could 
transmit it to others in an “initiatic” manner as Louis Brenner suggests.902 Brenner argues that 
this way of knowing involves a progressive transmission of knowledge (through different 
stages of madrasa) which in turn is expected to transform an individual gradually.903 But 
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beyond this, as Salomon argues, there are a significant number of Sufi followers who contend 
that though an individual is expected to enter into a relationship of strict discipline with a 
learned shaykh to acquire knowledge, attaining the knowledge is nevertheless elusive because 
it is a “secret (sirr) that remains eternally secret to the common adept.”904  
In the MSSN of the 1980s, some young scholars argued that the Qur’an and Hadith have 
apparent meanings (exoteric) and that Muslim practices must purely reflect these meanings. 
Many insisted in contrast that the meanings of these texts were hidden and sacred (esoteric). 
On several occasions, those who considered this esoteric pattern of reasoning to be correct were 
baffled by their opponents for not being able to think deep about what they read and requested 
to know if certain practices could be subjected to exoteric interpretation. One of the questions 
in this regard, as Oladosu noted below, was whether using three fingers to eat, regarded as the 
practice of the Prophet, could apply to all kinds of food:  
Have you forgotten that sometimes in the past, we debated whether we must 
eat with three fingers or not? Whatever we read we were ready to follow. 
While some of us called for caution and introspection, while some of us 
wanted to know whether the Prophet could have drunk pap with three fingers, 
others were saying we must keep with the esoteric meanings of the text, not 
its exoteric imports.905 
Despite the distinction usually made between the two styles of reasoning, it is doubtful whether 
every member of the MSSN adopted one over the other. Although the Society is assumed to 
favour the exoteric style today, there is usually a negotiation of which style to follow, 
depending on the Islamic practice and what is permitted in different circumstances for many 
members. This is part of my discussion in Chapter Six in which I show the extent to which the 
reform in the MSSN made an impact on actual practice. 
When the debates on sunna started in the early 1980s, the emphasis on respecting the diversity 
of opinions and practices in the MSSN was sustained. However, by the late 1980s, this style of 
reasoning had been challenged by the emergence of two main factions. The first faction called 
The Jama’at (by the second faction) comprised of students who were inspired by the teachings 
of Thanni, while the second, referred to (itself) as The Mainstream, was made up of students 
with no identifiable teacher or leader.906 Yet, from its name, this second faction appeared to 
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identify with the babas in the Society such as Adegbite and Oyekan, even though these babas 
might not demonstrate their biases for a faction in public.  
Asad’s argument on the context in which orthodoxy is established is important to understanding 
how these factions attempted to institutionalise correct practice. He posited that the context 
where “Muslims have the power to regulate, uphold, require, or adjust correct practices, and to 
condemn, exclude, undermine, or replace incorrect ones,”907 is the place to find orthodoxy and 
not only in some doctrines in Islam. This attempt to establish orthodoxy was shown in the 
attitude of the two factions regarding the methodology of adopting the prophetic sunna. Unlike 
the Mainstream, The Jama’at was willing to see every member adopt prophetic sunna 
immediately and went on criticising those who failed to do so.908 This found expression in one 
of the IVCs organised by the Society in which The Jama’at attempted to enforce the sunna with 
the campaign titled “no socks no paradise” for the female members.909 The Mainstream was 
opposed to this approach and considered it to be less mindful of Muslims diversity and social 
experiences of students from home. It insisted that members should be allowed to adopt the 
sunna gradually through incremental socialisation and knowledge rather than compelling them 
to comply. A member of this faction drew my attention to the difference between them and 
The Jama’at this way: 
…one of those (sic) indicators of their…point of divergence…is modus 
operandi. MSS believes in people understanding things and willingly taking 
it up as Islamic principles. But they felt ‘no, it is too slow.’ It should just be, 
you know, wholesome change at once. And MSS says ‘no.’ Somebody who 
has been used to tight jeans from home. Who doesn’t know about Islam, you 
just pick the person one day and say, start using ḥijāb. No, MSS would not 
do that. MSS would start enlightening the person, ‘these are the ways of 
dressing of the Muslims, these are the implications of dressing…otherwise 
and things like that.’…[but] somebody who has been dressing in a particular 
way, to just switch to another mode of dressing, as human beings, it’s not that 
easy. It takes a process of socialisation for you to make the person to adjust. 
But they want people to adjust as if abracadabra.910  
The disagreement on methods between the two factions also draws attention to Asad’s notion 
of ‘power’ and ‘resistance.’ As he argues, “the process of arguing, of using the force of reason, 
at once presupposes and responds to the fact of resistance. Power, and resistance, are thus 
intrinsic to the development and exercise of any traditional practice.”911 In this regard, the two 
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factions both animated power and resistance in their discourse and method of reform. And, 
none of them should be regarded as promoting the correct method. In contrast, their differing 
methods should be understood as representing the different ways in which they seek to regulate 
what they regarded as the correct belief and practice. Besides, as Asad argues, “Any 
representation of tradition is contestable. What shape that contestation takes, if it occurs, will 
be determined not only by the powers and knowledges each side deploys, but by the collective 
life they aspire to.”912 I take this “collective life they aspire to” to mean the subjects of debate. 
In the next section, I will draw attention to the practices that were contested in the Society by 
the two factions and the prophetic sunna they encouraged members to inculcate.  
5.2.1 Contested practices  
Several issues in the debate focused on the activities of MSSN, everyday practices of members 
and those of different Muslim organisations which they belonged to outside the schools. One 
major aspect of these debates centred on ritual practices such as the tradition of congregational 
ad̲h̲kār, the use of tasbīḥ (rosary), and touching the face with hands after prayer. They also 
argued that Sufi practices like the wird (a litany of prayer) and pious motivated visits to holy 
places and saints called ziyāra were not correct practice in Islam. To confirm their acceptance 
of this argument, many of my respondents told me that they had changed from Sufism to ahl 
al-sunna (people of the examples of Prophet Muhammad) when they were shown the proof 
that Sufism was not part of Islam.913 In place of these Sufi acts, the MSSN encouraged the 
regular reading of the Qur’an and Al-Ma'thurat, a collection of important Qur’anic verses and 
Hadiths in the form of a litany compiled by Hassan Al-Banna.914 However, encouraging the 
use of Al-Ma'thurat contradicts what the Society promotes, because, given the Sufi background 
of Al-Banna (discussed in Chapter Two), the text only replaces the elements and not the whole 
form of what the Society regarded as Sufi tradition.  
Apart from singing and dancing competitions, discussed in Chapter Four, the Society also 
discouraged the celebration of festivals like mawlid al-nabī and Kayo-Kayo. The former is used 
to mark the birthday of Prophet Muhammad. Although it is popular among the Sufi brothers, 
other Muslim groups in Yorubaland usually organised or participated in this festival. Before it 
was contested, the MSSN organised public lectures in different communities to mark this 
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occasion often with the attendance of the media who later broadcast the event.915 Kayo-Kayo, 
on the other hand, is marked annually by Muslims in towns like Epe during the first month of 
the Islamic calendar known as Yawm-al- āshurā, the tenth day of Muḥarram. Muhsin Balogun 
points out in his study that Muslims in Epe used the event to commemorate their arrival in the 
town and the important role of a ‘boat’ as a means of transportation.916 Apart from this festival, 
the MSSN also discouraged members from attending or organising elaborate funeral 
ceremonies which are still common among the Yoruba. The other contested practice was the 
style of dressing of the members. A typical example was the popular long, wide-sleeved 
flowing gown for men called agbada. Female members were also encouraged to embrace a 
variety of veils such as the ḥijāb, niqāb and jilbāb (outer garment) and abandon the use of 
scarves and dresses which were considered immodest. As part of this notion of modesty, the 
painting of nails, use of synthetic wigs and lipsticks were also discouraged among the female 
members.917 
Local socio-cultural practices also came under criticism. Among these was the use of charms 
which many students were said to have collected from either their parents, alfa or babalawo. 
In this category, one could find those who graduated from local madrasa who used tira or 
hantu before joining the MSSN.918 Many Yorubas refer to tira as a kind of amulet (Qur’anic 
verses which may be written on paper and tied with thread or wrapped in leather and carried 
on the body) while hantu is the water from Qur’anic verses written on slate and drunk for 
various therapeutical purposes which include blessing and protection from misfortune. In 
addition, the Society discouraged the use of certain Yoruba expressions which were regarded 
as shirk. One of these is ori, which means “head.” The ori is believed by many Yorubas to be 
the bearer of a man’s destiny and the essence of his personality which rules and guides him. It 
is thus considered as an òrìṣà (a personal god) in its own right.919 Among many Yoruba, it is 
still common to say ori lo yọ mi ni nu ewu (my head saves me from calamity) and ori lo ba mi 
ṣe (my head assists me) when they talk about their social encounters in life. Rather than 
referring to the ori, the MSSN encouraged such expressions as al-ḥamdu li-llāh (praise belongs 
to God). Other socio-cultural practices like prostration (for males) and kneeling (for females) 
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to greet people were also criticised. While they are regarded as signs of respect and honour by 
many Yorubas, they are considered a form of shirk in the MSSN because, according to Yekin, 
the practice involved using parts of the human body which should be for the worship of God.920 
Rather than greeting in this manner, saying As-Salaam-Alaikum, (Peace be unto you), often 
with a handshake, is considered a better Muslim practice. Despite promoting these practices, 
there was no uniformity in the understanding of Islam and how it is lived in the Society. 
However, the issues involved in the discourse of Islam in the MSSN in this period are only one 
aspect of what polarised the Society. Other major issues that are connected to this division are 
the question of transition and control of the Society which pitted The Jama’at against The 
Mainstream. In the two next sections, I will discuss how these issues connected to the discourse 
on Islam of the two factions and why they contributed to the crisis and breakaway of many 
groups from the Society. 
5.3 “No graduation from MSS” 
The phrase, “no graduation from MSSN,”921 developed in the 1980s as a campaign which 
appeared to be primarily related to the crisis of transition on the future of the MSSN and its 
members, as well as the identity of the Society as a student/youth movement. However, these 
subjects of transition and identity were also largely connected to many practices that were 
debated in the Society and the reasoning behind the debates of many actors. An aspect of the 
reasoning behind the debates of these actors involves taking over the organisational control of 
the Society to implement what they defined as good Muslim practices in the wider Yoruba 
society. 
What gave rise to the campaign and debates that enabled it? It happened that after embracing 
the sunna, some students became concerned about how to sustain their new identities when 
they left school to pursue other life courses such as marriage and employment. Among them 
was Abideen Olaiya, mentioned in Chapter Five, who told me that he was particularly worried 
about the kind of job he would do without engaging in corruption because he had learnt about 
the exemplary leadership styles of the Prophet and his companions. This concern was important 
for him because of the problem of corruption in Nigeria’s public establihsments, which had 
become prevalent under the Ibrahim Babangida (1985-1993) administration.922 He later 
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decided to become an academic when he learnt that members of ASU (Academic Staff Union) 
of universities and the NBA (Nigerian Bar Association) were the major groups that could 
protest government policies on national issues without fear, unlike others who were said to 
have been bought by the government.923 Many of his contemporaries in the leadership of MSSN 
also became academics, and many got employed in other industries or became entrepreneurs. 
But such employment did not guarantee that their sunna would be preserved in other aspects 
of life as the experiences of other members of the Society indicate. Samsideen Ayinla, who 
converted to Islam as a student and became an officer in MSSN in the early 2000s, narrated to 
me that most students were unable to sustain their sunna when they faced the “reality of life” 
beyond school as he illustrates here: 
When you are on campus now, you are told, your trousers should not go below 
your ankle, you must keep your beard. And you now get to the street to seek 
for a job. Reality has set in. He attends the first the interview, he was the only 
one looking odd. She goes to an interview and she sees she is the only one 
that her ḥijāb drags on the floor. Can you see that reality has set in?  
And those that go for interviews that are alfas, they would go and clean-shave. 
He would remove everything. His trousers, he would make it exceed his 
ankle. He would look smart. Reality has sets in. It was before reality set in 
that all those fatwas [opinions of expert Muslim jurists] that he has read in 
Sohih Bukhari that would be boiling in his head. …he would sha [still] be 
arguing. But… when he gets to the outside world, he would feel like, so this 
is how reality feels like, he would pity those that are still in the system that 
they know nothing yet (sic).924 
In addition, Ayinla mentioned how one of his friends who had worked in an industry before he 
enrolled as graduate student would explain to members of the MSSN at UI that “The Prophet 
says, the prophet says, does not extend beyond the wall [of the school],” 925 and that they should 
rather focus on improving their academic skills in order to compete in the outside world. He 
gave the example of another friend who told him he had found it difficult to complete his daily 
ṣalāt after school. The friend in question thus imagined that “those hardline stances that we 
used to take, it’s all because we had all the time in the world until reality sets in.”926  
To an extent, the inability of many students to remain dedicated to their sunna is understood to 
be caused by the lack of an effective platform like the MSSN for interaction after school. 
Although a platform was created for this purpose called the Central Branch, it was not 
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functional in many communities. Because of this, many students often went back to their 
parents’ Muslim groups (such as Ansar-Ud-Deen) and those who found it difficult to fit into 
such settings would remain on their own. But wherever they found themselves, Ayinla opined 
that they found it difficult to sustain their sunna.927  
The members of The Jama’at appeared to identify this as a major limitation of the Society in 
the late 1980s and began to consider establishing other organisation(s) that would fill the gap. 
Beyond filling this gap, this transitional plan was considered because  they also discovered that 
it was difficult for them to come back to the MSSN after school and claim membership, and 
for them, the MSSN was established for “students” needs and not for life after school.928 The 
break-away of many groups in the MSSN suggests that there were many of such transition 
plans. Soares’ study on NASFAT refers to this in the testimony of Akinbode who noted that 
the organisation was founded in 1995 to meet “their own needs after leaving university.”929 
Because the exit of groups like NASFAT caused less tension in the MSSN, little or no 
information is given on them by my respondents or in any documents. In contrast, the one that 
is mostly discussed, and which resulted in a deep organisational crisis appears to be the 
proposition by The Jama’at that the MSSN transition into a “movement.”930  
What is known about the main actors and their conceptualisation of this “movement” is 
sketchy. But the establishment of The Muslim Congress (TMC), to be discussed later, is 
considered by many to be the outcome of this proposal. The expected movement is seen in the 
mould of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), which has a structured system that incorporates 
families, students, the middle-class, professionals, and clerics with different departments and 
networks in many countries around the world.931 Some students actually believed it would be 
an extention of the MB in Nigeria. Besides, it is understood to aim at helping Muslims to 
address their socio-economic needs and negotiate for power and resources in Nigeria.932 
Although there were members of the Society who opined that this kind of movement had some 
advantages, but they also had their objections to it. Largely because of the promoters’ link with 
international Islamic movements, these members doubted the motives of the intended 
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Movers and Shakers: Social Movements in Africa, ed. Stephen Ellis and Ineke van Kessel, 178–96, (Leiden, 
Boston: Brill, 2009), 185. 
930 Taofiq Abdul-Azeez, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
931 See Mitchell, The Society for the Muslim Brothers, 163–84. 
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movement. They also expressed concern that such a movement might not fit into the local 
socio-political context because its goal was to establish an Islamic state without considering 
local diversity. Besides, they considered the goal of the movement as a violation of the 
objectives of the MSSN tailored towards students’ needs and that these students might be cut 
off once leaders of the movement achieved their own interest.933 It was this transitional plan, 
among others, that further shaped the discourse on Islamic tradition between The Jama’at and 
The Mainstream. While the Jama’at wanted the MSSN to become a ‘movement,’ The 
Mainstream was opposed to it. The opposition to this plan found expression in the campaign, 
‘no graduation from MSSN,’ and it was connected to the debate on Islam about the concept of 
a ‘learner/student.’ The debate on this concept questions the notion of the MSSN as an 
association for ‘students’ understood as ‘youths’ based on age category and it is important to 
understanding one of the definitions of a good Muslim in the MSSN from the 1980s. I analyse 
this debate below to contribute to the literature on the fluidity of the concept of youth.  
5.3.1 Between a student and a youth 
There are many studies which suggest that the concept of ‘youth’ is fluid and difficult to reduce 
to age category. Such framings as ‘waithood’ and ‘youths in motion’ have been employed in 
the discussion of this fluidity. “Waithood,” according to Diane Singerman, “places young 
people in an adolescent, liminal world where they are neither children nor adults.”934 
Singerman conceptualised this term to explore the economic challenges of young people who 
had to wait for many years to enter marital relations in the Middle East. Alcinda Honwana also 
employed this concept to demonstrate the similar challenges of young people in Africa waiting 
to make transition to major life courses such as jobs and marriage. For her, this waiting does 
not only imply an “involuntary delay in reaching adulthood”935 but also compounding the 
meaning of youth. Also, seeking for a more nuanced way of conceptualising ‘youth’, Rebecca 
Colling et al focused on “youth in motion” which takes the notion of ‘mobility,’ referred to as 
movement between and within spaces936 as default.937 Mobility, according to Tim Creswell, is 
socially produced in three relational moments which include human movement from one place 
 
933 Afis Oladosu, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
934 Diane Singerman, “The Economic Imperatives of Marriage: Emerging Practices and Identities Among 
Youth in the Middle East,” Middle East Youth Initiative Working Paper, no. 6 (2007): 6. 
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Va.: Kumarian Press, 2012), 4. 
936 Claus J. Tully, “Youth in Motion: Communicative and Mobile. A commentary from the perspective of 
youth sociology,” YOUNG 10, no. 1 (2002): 19. 
937 Rebecca Collins et al., “Youth in Motion: Spatialising Youth Movement(s) in the Social Sciences,” 
Children's Geographies 11, no. 3 (2013): 370. 
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to another and how the human condition or feelings changes.938 Given this fluidity, the concept 
of “Youth in motion” encourages us to move away from a static definition to a dynamic 
conception that illustrates how people occupy and move between different interlocking spaces. 
Based on these definitions, one may argue that the construction of ‘youth’ would become even 
more problematic if the concept of a ‘student’ which is often commonly used interchangeably 
with it is also taken into consideration. As I understand in the MSSN debates, both concepts 
are not the same, and at the same time, taxing to construct.  
The MSSN debate on this concept is built on the theory of ‘student’ and the acquisition of 
knowledge in Islamic discourse. As many of my respondents told me, Islam enjoins all 
Muslims to acquire knowledge (both religious and non-religious) and they must seek this 
knowledge from childhood until the time of death. Based on this understanding of Islam, they 
argue that all Muslims are “learners or students for life.”939 This definition of a Muslim is 
regarded as the working definition of the MSSN as a ‘student’ Society, even so it contradicts 
the widespread assumption in Nigeria that the MSSN is a “youth” organisation. But, to 
illustrate that its identity as a ‘student’ group is not peculiar to the MSSN, Abdul-Ganiy Raji 
explained to me that the word ‘student’ which means ṭālib in Arabic is the same as the name 
of the Islamic movement in Afghanistan called Taliban (Ṭālibān, plural in Arabic).940 It is 
worth noting that the Taliban was in government from the mid-1990s until 2001 when the US-
led military coalition invaded Afghanistan.941 At his opening address of the MSSN IVC in 
2016, Abdul-Ganiy also referred to the MSSN as a “primary school” for those who considered 
themselves to be at that stage of learning about Islam. He explained that they could move on 
to a “secondary” Muslim organisation if they considered themselves to have more knowledge 
and to be above this stage of learning.942 This argument, which was made in reference to other 
Muslim groups (which he did not mention), implies that the MSSN is a ‘school’ where 
‘students’ are not only expected to acquire knowledge but to remain as learners throughout 
their lives.  
 
938 Tim Cresswell, On the Move: Mobility in the Modern Western World (New York: Routledge, 2006), 4–5. 
939 Ayinla Samsideen (Pseudonym), interview by Adeyemi Balogun; Afis Oladosu, interview by Adeyemi 
Balogun; Hakeem Adisa (pseudonym), interview by Adeyemi Balogun, November 16, 2016, Oja-Oba, 
Ibadan. 
940 Abgul-Ganiy Raji, interview by Adeyemi Balogun; Afis Oladosu, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
941 See Juan Cole, “Pakistan and Afghanistan: Beyond the Taliban,” Political Science Quarterly 124, no. 2 
(2009): 233–44. 
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Furthermore, being a student for life is assumed to be a social reality by many members of the 
MSSN. According to Ayinla943 and Oladosu944 it is an existential reality because it assumes 
that people do not know everything, and if they assume that they know everything and stop 
learning then they will start retrogressing and become irrelevant in a world that is constantly 
changing. Moreover, they argue, some things learnt in the past are often forgotten and could 
be relearnt later in life. Oyekan also insisted that the concept of a ‘student’ can neither be 
reduced to an age category nor equated as ‘youth,’ because those in educational institutions are 
generally referred to as students and they are not defined by age at undergraduate or graduate 
levels since it is possible that a person could be in school at age forty, 945 defined as adults in 
Nigeria.946 Thus, members of the MSSN are also defined by association with their place of 
study rather than their age. Although Oladosu considers the notion of ‘student’ to be 
problematic due to such social realities as age, he opines that being a student in the Islamic 
sense is useful to be a better Muslim. He illustrates this with the attitude of Iblīs (satan) in the 
Qur’an towards knowledge, suggesting that Muslims should not see themselves as such even 
if they are senior academics. 
That you would be a professor and you would still be a student of Islam, and 
for me, I see it positively because it prevents a Muslim from constructing 
himself the way Satan construct itself, that he knew everything. Once you say 
you have reached the shore of knowledge then be sure you have reached the 
abyss of ignorance. So, our inability to construct who the Muslim [student] 
is, is actually an opportunity.947  
The campaign, ‘no graduation from MSS’ developed from this perspective of ‘student’ in the 
1980s to promote a transition plan in the MSSN. The campaign was used to encourage 
members of the Society to join the MSSN Central Branch after university and it was built on 
the reconstruction of who is a ‘student.’ However, as Adeniyi narrated below, the definition 
challenged the initial image of a ‘student’ (understood as a youth based on age category) on 
which the Society was established.  
…around ’80 – ’88, because those who founded MSSN really, it was basically 
for students. Lateef Adegbite and some other people like that. So, they were 
secondary schools’ students when they began it.  But now, people now try to 
look at it beyond…they first change the meaning of students, they first change 
the concept of students that you are a student throughout your life, to make 
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us relevant in MSS. So, having change that one, the second thing was that, if 
you now leave university, where will you go? That now gave birth to Central 
Branch. That “no graduation from the MSSN”. Even if you are the president, 
if you are the governor, you are still in MSSN.948 
The specific date in which this Central Branch was established cannot be ascertained. But it 
was mentioned in a 1984 document of the Society as a platform for “working-class Muslims 
or Muslim students in their transitional period from one educational level to another.”949 The 
working class is not defined either as graduates or non-graduates, but members of this branch 
at the time of my fieldwork included both. The Central Branches are in local government areas 
where members meet weekly to memorise and study the Qur’an, discuss MSSN affairs, and 
attend to each other’s socio-economic needs. But some of them do not function effectively due 
to low attendance and the different social realities of members which include their work 
schedule.950 Based on this existing structure, those who criticised the transition into a 
‘movement’ do not see the need for it.  
Interestingly, those who identified with The Jama’at did not dismiss the definition of Muslims 
as students for life, but they considered it only as a theoretical concept rather than being 
practical because it ignored the realities of the contemporary world. They based their argument 
on the thinking that people over fifty years old cannot acknowledge publicly that they are 
‘students’ nor claim to be representatives of the MSSN without feeling embarrassed. Based on 
the primary objectives of the MSSN, they assumed that being a ‘student’ also to put limitations 
on what they could do in addressing the contemporary socio-economic challenges of Muslims. 
Therefore, they opined that many members do not associate with the MSSN after leaving the 
university because they do not regard themselves as ‘students’ in the sense of being a ‘youth’ 
or associated with a school.951 Certainly, this argument is not limited to the Jama’at faction. 
Many students who identify with the Mainstream also shared this view, leading to a suspicion 
among them that the babas claiming to be members of the MSSN might be using the Society 
for personal gains and hegemonic control.   
Rather than insisting on ‘students for life,’ The Jama’at appeared to support the transformation 
of the MSSN into a “movement” which would incorporate “non-students” as members. It also 
proposed a change to the constitution of the MSSN that allowed membership to extend to ‘non-
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students’ in the school system. This amendment, which was supported by both factions, 
provided for the appointments of these students into zonal and national administrative positions 
unlike in the past. More importantly, it strengthened the Central Branches as part of the 
structure of the Society and it encouraged greater involvement of graduate students and 
professionals in the affairs of the Society.952 However, this constitutional review did not stop 
the disagreement between the two factions as each of them tried to ensure that the 
administrative officers of the Society were those who identified with their visions for the 
Society and interpretation of Islam. The contest over the leadership of the Society from the 
mid-1980s therefore ensued because of this. As will be demonstrated below, this contest was 
connected to the debate on Islam in the Society and it contributed to some altercations and 
fragmentation of the Society from the mid-1990s. 
5.4 Tension and division, 1994 – 2005  
From the two sections above, I have shown that reform and discourse are central to the 
transformation of MSSN to a reform movement. This transformation is an example of religious 
change. As pointed out in Chapter Two, religious change can also take the form of “schism” 
resulting from crisis in a religious organization. With such division, the breakaway groups may 
establish their own organizations often with little doctrinal differences from the main 
organization. In this section, I will show this process of schism in the MSSN by drawing 
attention to the cases of division, the major issues involved in the division, the main actors, the 
breakaway organisations and their main arguments on Islam. The rise of The Jama’at and its 
battle for the control of B-Zone MSSN was one of such cases of division. The battle, which 
almost led to a violence between the late 1980s and 2005, could be traced to the debates on 
sunna in the Society. Though there were many figures in the debates, the da’wa activities of 
Thanni were central to why the debates led to the organisational crisis of MSSN. As noted 
earlier, the notion that Thanni played a vital role in the debate calls attention to the differences 
in his activities in relation to other figures before him. Let us look at the role he played in the 
MSSN reform and schism.  
5.4.1 The factor of Abdul-Fatah Thanni  
Thanni’s activities in the MSSN began in Lagos and his influence grew because of the 
contributions he made on several reforms in the Society. This started at the MSSN event 
organised at Baptist Academy school where he was invited to give a lecture in 1983. After the 
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lecture, he was requested to give an appraisal of the performance of a “sing-song” competition 
at the event. According to him, he knew that music was not a correct practice in Islam, but he 
reluctantly accepted the request in order not to embarrass the students. After the event, he 
convinced some students about the position of Islam on music, arguing that it was not a correct 
tradition in Islam.953 As I discussed in Chapter Four, this argument was contested in the Society 
until the late 1980s when the “sing-song” was finally ruled out. Gradually, Thanni attracted 
many students whom he taught the sunna of the Prophet, and he was invited to many 
programmes in the MSSN where he gave sermons on how to achieve ‘Islamic’ discipline in 
everyday life.954 Another major contribution he made was the introduction of Arabic learning 
to challenge the practice of religious education through Islamic texts in English (including the 
textbooks produced for schools) which he believed to be a weak point in the MSSN. For him, 
these texts were not enough for Muslims to understand the fundamental teachings of Islam 
because they promoted an Orientalist perception of Islam.955 Thus, he offered to teach those 
who wanted to learn Arabic in order to have a better understanding of the religion. 
For many of his teachings, Thanni invited students to study circles which many returnees 
organised outside the schools. The invitation to these circles was facilitated by students who 
were his mentees in the MSSN. However, unlike other returnees, Thanni’s lectures became a 
concern due to the method of invitation and what was taught in those lectures. Many students 
were invited in the name of the MSSN, thereby thinking they were MSSN programmes. There 
was also an allegation of covert and selective invitations in which friends, often in the same 
room at halls of residence, may not have been aware that they were invited to the same lecture 
until they met at the venue. Adigun Saliu, who was among the invited students from UI between 
the late 1980s and 1990s, noted that he attended these lectures to learn about Islam, but he was 
not aware of any motive behind them. 
My experience… I think I was in 200level, we had some of our brothers, we 
were all together at the MSSN, but they were in the executives, we were not 
in the executive…it was in my 100level then…they would organize 
programmes outside of the campus, invite us, take us there. Sometimes some 
of these programmes were held covertly. They didn’t do anything either than 
to learn Islam…that was all, nothing extremist to most students at first. So, 
we saw it more as spiritual development exercises for us, being novices in the 
scene… some others were viewing us with suspicion, we didn’t know because 
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we were a novice and following these brothers to these programmes. We 
never knew what was going on.956 
As Saliu suggested, some “extreme” religious lessons were taught in these lectures. These 
lessons, according to him, were against the objectives and positions of MSSN on Islam. 
However, Thanni did not see anything “extreme” in what he taught the students except the 
basic teachings of the Prophet Muhammad and how these teachings could be relevant in their 
lives. He contended that he introduced the students to the “comprehensiveness” of Islam which 
achieved a success as he noted here: 
all the teachings of Prophet Muhammad (SAW), the comprehensiveness of 
the dīn [religion] is what I have introduced to them. So that every part of the 
personality of a Muslim is realized; and when you realize it, it would make 
you become unique. And that is what we got at the end of the day.957 
Many students were attracted to Thanni and his lectures because of his erudition in speaking 
Arabic which he combines with English and Western scholarship.958 Using his own experience, 
Abdur-Rahman Taiwo who is an executive in the MSSN, draws attention to how such people 
could influence students’ consciousness for Islam and their quest for knowledge.959 He narrated 
that what attracted him to the MSSN when he enrolled at the Polytechnic Ibadan were the 
academics he saw wearing suits and ties who came to the mosque to pray and read the Qur’anic 
text. Before then, his impression was that Western educated Muslims were not very serious 
about religion and would not mix with non-literates. 
Perhaps, what also attracted many students to Thanni was the support they got from him. He 
was a philanthropist who supported the education of many students,960 which could have been 
part of his responsibilities as a representative of the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs of 
Kuwait. This assistance would be significant for many students in the context of the chronic 
economic crisis in Nigeria between the 1980s and 1990s that was symbolised by huge job 
losses, the closing of industries and an increase in poverty. This was also the period when 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) were introduced in developing countries, like 
Nigeria, with failures, a phenomenon that was later referred to as ‘the lost decades’ of economic 
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development.961  In addition to his philanthropy, the thirst for knowledge and new experience 
as well as a zeal for the da’wa also caused many students to gravitate towards Thanni. Abiodun 
Raheem, who was an executive in the MSSN in this period, pointed out that “the brothers did 
not identify with him because of the money alone but also due to their zeal to proselytize the 
da’wa that they were used to. They were so eager to learn.”962 The students who identified with 
his teachings later pushed for reforms within the MSSN. Through their views on Islam and 
other activities, The Mainstream began to call these students The Jama’at to show that they had 
a different orientation towards Islam from their own. 
From the late 1980s, The Jama’at began a struggle to take control of the MSSN B-Zone and 
Thanni was understood to support its bid either as part of an extension of the Muslim 
Brotherhood to Nigeria or a new movement in which he would be appointed as the murs̲h̲id 
(one who gives right guidance).963 Because of the conflicts that resulted from this power tussle, 
his activities became a concern for many pioneer members and patrons of the MSSN, such as 
Oyekan and Lateefat Okunnu,964 who called for his ban in the Society by 1990.965 While they 
wanted to help the Society sustained its identity and objectives, the reaction of these patrons 
was often looked upon by The Jama’at as an opposition to their new understanding of Islam. 
Thus, The Jama’at also painted their bid for power as an effort to assert their independence 
from the control of these patrons. In the ensuing power struggle, The Jama’at lost to The 
Mainstream and left the MSSN to form The Muslim Congress (TMC). Below, I give an 
overview of the power struggle and the formation of TMC. 
5.4.2 Struggle for power  
The Jama’at had a stronghold in Lagos where Thanni resided. Owing to this, the contest was 
framed as a battle between the MSSN Lagos Area Unit and other states in MSSN B-Zone. The 
contest started with the impeachment of Abdul-Akeem Abiola, the amir of the MSSN Lagos 
State Area Unit in the mid-1980s, although the main issue responsible for his impeachment 
remains unclear. In 1990, a major contest for the leadership of the MSSN B-Zone also occurred 
at the zonal conference held at Government College Ibadan to elect new executives. One of the 
main issues in this contest was surrounded by the appointment of a shūrā (consultative) 
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committee charged with the responsibility to elect new officers. The method of appointment 
provided for one representative from each state in the zone to be part of the committee, in 
addition to some former executives of the Society. However, there were concerns that this 
method did not take into consideration the disparity in the population of member states. These 
concerns were expressed by the MSSN Lagos Area Unit which had the largest number of 
members in the MSSN, a manifestation of the higher number of Muslims in Lagos compared 
to other parts of Yorubaland. Connected to this population disparity was that the state with the 
largest number of Muslim students contributed more funds (in terms of dues collected from 
members) to the Society, which again put Lagos at the forefront of other states. Consequently, 
the contest for the head of zonal officers was understood by some members of the Society to 
challenge the politics that favours one vote for each state without respecting the size and 
contributions of member states.966 Nevertheless, this argument appears to be weak since there 
is no evidence that the appointment of these officers constituted a major problem before the 
1980s. The struggle for power must, therefore, be situated within the debate on whether the 
Society should go beyond its orientation of a ‘student’-centred movement. 
More importantly, there is a need to understand the motives of the main actors in the contest 
for power. The contest for power at the 1990 conference was understood by many students to 
be part of this motive. At the conference, a series of meetings were held by the leaders of The 
Jama’at in a strong bid to ensure that their representative emerged as the Zonal President. The 
politicking between the two factions became raucous to the extent that the babas of the Society 
had to intervene, and it turned out that they were blackmailed for doing so, as their own interest 
and partisanship were questioned. The stormy conference eventually produced Taofiq Abdul-
Azeez from Ogun State as the zonal amir, Basheer Agboola as IVC Organiser and Basheer 
Olanrewaju as Secretary.967  
As the amir, Abdul-Azeez was one of the main figures at the centre of the struggle to take 
control of the MSSN B-zonal office. Today, a professor of English at the University of Abuja, 
Abdul-Azeez joined the MSSN at Anwarul-Islam High School in Iseyin in 1978. He had a few 
years of Islamic education at a madrasa in Kano where he grew up and studied under his uncle, 
Shaykh Abdul-Qadri, and a private teacher, Shaykh Moshood Akajewole (who became the 
Chief Imam of Ede). Abdul-Azeez mentors were Sufi brothers and he identified with their 
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practices and those of the Tabligh Jama’at for a long time before he abandoned them in line 
with the new understanding of the prophetic sunna in the MSSN. He was also a student activist 
at UI. Before the 1990 conference, he had been friends with some members of The Jama’at, 
but he was also sympathetic to the cause of The Mainstream. This is why his election was 
accepted by both factions because he was understood to be a bridge between them.968  
However, because Abdul-Azeez’s loyalty remained in doubt, several attempts were understood 
to be made by The Jama’at to discredit him and call for his removal. Among these was the 
allegation against him during the IVC held at Ayetoro in 1990 that he failed (as the imam) to 
lead the ṣalāt ẓuhr (prayer at noon) at the right time in which he was charged to the Sharia 
court. Though the jurisdiction of this court is limited to the IVC, its judgement is nonetheless 
binding. When the plot to discredit him failed, a bold attempt was made to adopt him into The 
Jama’at with a bid to convincing him to hand over his position to them. For this, he was invited 
by the representatives of The Jama’at to different meetings, one of which was held at Eruwa 
(Oyo State), to negotiate the terms of vacating his position and taking over the MSSN B-Zone. 
The identity of those he met at these meetings is less known, but Abdul-Azeez refused the 
many offers made to him by them. Rather than taking his position, he advised them to leave 
the MSSN and form another organisation in which they could implement the objectives they 
wanted to promote in the MSSN. To demonstrate his sympathy for The Jama’at’s cause, he 
also vowed to leave the MSSN if they were willing to accept his proposal. This proposal, for 
him, was the only reason that would make him vacate his position as the amir. As this proposal 
was not immediately acceded to, he established his own authority in the Society and helped to 
ensure that the amirs who succeeded him did not identify with The Jama’at.969 
But, Abdul-Azeez’s support for The Mainstream was not without chaos over the control of the 
Society. By 1992 when his tenure was due, The Jama’at had extended its control from Lagos 
to Oyo and Ogun states to enhance its representation in the shūrā. But it suffered a setback 
when Oyo was lost again a few months before the zonal election, thus causing another round 
of intrigues and face-off between the two factions.970 There was also a plan to disrupt the 
organisation of the annual IVC held at Abeokuta Grammar School in 1992 which was salvaged 
by one of the patrons of the Society, Chief M.K.O. Abiola. In 1993, there was also a move to 
take control of the MSSN UI Branch in which the imams in the halls of residence were forced 
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to step down. The move, which resulted in a physical fight, was stopped by the officers of the 
Society at its secretariat located at the central mosque. Efforts were also made to take control 
of the Osun Area Unit at OAU and the Edo Area Unit at the University of Benin (UNIBEN), 
while the Ondo Area Unit was held firm by those who identified with The Mainstream.971  
The 1994 zonal conference held at the Iman Centre in Ibadan to elect new officers was probably 
the last intriguing encounter that ended the relationship of The Jama’at with The Mainstream. 
The shūrā at this conference announced Afis Oladosu as zonal amir, Abideen Olaiya as IVC 
Organiser, Abdul-Wahid Bamigbade as Secretary and Abdur-Rahman Balogun as Public 
Relations Officer (PRO) who were all rejected by The Jama’at. A representative of The Jama’at 
named Abdul-Jelil Raji opposed the appointment of these officers and contested Oladosu’s 
embodiment of the sunna which was symbolised by his slouched cap. He insisted that the 
candidate of his faction, Kamil Zakariyah, must be appointed as the amir.972 Two months after 
The Mainstream rejected this plea, The Jama’at announced the establishment of the TMC in 
Lagos with Abdul-Razaq Abdus-Salam as amir.973  
Throughout this struggle, Thanni was sympathetic to the cause of The Jama’at because, for 
him, his mentees had a genuine interest to run the Society better. But he was disappointed that 
their objectives were misunderstood.974 Following the inauguration of the TMC in 1994, these 
mentees made him their Grand Patron. In 2016, he was turbaned as one of the Imams of 
TMC.975 Another patron of TMC was Alhaji Lanrewaju Moshood Adepoju, a popular Yoruba 
poet, broadcaster, social critic and president of a sunna group, Universal Muslim Brotherhood 
in Ibadan.976 While the other key issues in the MSSN crises in the 1990s remain scanty, the 
objectives of the TMC and its activities seem to give insights into what The Jama’at wanted to 
achieve by taking the MSSN beyond a student-centred movement.  
5.4.3 The Muslim Congress and other break-away groups  
Apart from TMC, several Muslim organisations emerged in the 1990s that were directly or 
indirectly linked to the MSSN crisis. This includes NASFAT, Al-Mu’minaat, the Al Fatih-ul-
 
971 MSSN Lagos Area Unit, WhatsApp communication to Adeyemi Balogun, February 27, 2017. 
972 Ibid. 
973 Ibid. 
974 Shaykh Abdul-Fatah Muhammad Thanni, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
975 The Muslim Congress, “The Imams of the Muslim Congress (TMC): 3 of 3,”, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i616uAmrr_s (accessed February 24, 2018). 
976 See Oyeniyi Okunoye, “Lanrewaju Adepoju and the Making of Modern Yoruba Poetry,” Africa 81, no. 2 
(2011). 
 
218 
 
Qareeb Islamic Society of Nigeria, the Movement for Islamic Culture and Awareness (MICA), 
the Companion, Dawah Front of Nigeria, and Al-Usrah. NASFAT has become one of the 
largest Muslim organisations in Nigeria, but its emergence in 1995 is rarely discussed in the 
MSSN crisis as noted earlier. Some notable studies have been done on NASFAT including 
those of Soares,977 Obadare,978 Peel,979 Ibrahim980 and Adetona.981 Soares contextualises the 
emergence, socio-economic and religious activities of NASFAT from the perspective of social 
movement theory, Adetona focuses on its contribution to da’wa in Lagos, while Peel, Obadare 
and Ibrahim compare NASFAT practices with Pentecostal Christianity. The founders of 
NASFAT, like Akinbode, are considered by many in the MSSN as those who had contrary 
views to the radical reforms in the Society. Practices like singing, dancing, and weekly group 
prayers which became widely used in NASFAT are regarded as points of disagreement between 
them and the MSSN. Like other groups who left the MSSN, this disagreement did not cause 
rancour because Akinbode and others were understood to have left on their own. This is unlike 
the TMC, a less-known but controversial movement among the supporters of MSSN. 
On the reasons for establishing TMC in 1994, its website notes that Muslims in Nigeria “ravage 
the land empty of heart, forlorn of hope” because they do not have Islamic spirit “that gives 
life to dead faith.” They were deprived “of security, land, personality, food and shelter, life and 
other things guaranteed them by Allah to lead an exemplary life of leaders and best of 
mankind.” The TMC is thus seen as a response to give assistance to Muslims and help them 
“return to the position of honour and leadership.”982 This is quite similar to the narratives of 
many Islamic reform movements. The reform project of the Congress is also well articulated 
in its vision of playing a leading role to “guiding, influencing and setting agenda for societal 
reformation in line with Qur’an and Sunnah.”983 But, many aspects of its vision and objectives 
are quite similar to the MSSN such as the “restoration of Arabic as the language of Muslims.” 
What appears to set the Congress apart from the MSSN is its focus on socio-economic needs 
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of members which include providing social services and the establishment of economic 
frameworks in the larger society.984 
Since 1994, TMC has received the support of prominent Muslims in Yorubaland including 
Adegbite and Aromashodu who commissioned some of its projects.985 Its members include not 
only artisans and businessmen, but also academics, such as Abdur-Raheem and political 
administrators, such as Abdul-Hakeem Abdul-Lateef, the Lagos State Commissioner for Home 
Affairs (2015-2019). The majority of the members are men, and according to Abdur-Raheem, 
the decision to make it a male organisation was to avoid a situation in which members clashed 
among themselves over women, as witnessed in the MSSN before its founders left.986 However, 
wives and daughters of Congress members belong to another organisation called Al-Mu’minaat 
(The Believing Women) Organisation formed in 1995. Al-Mu’minaat aims to propagate what 
it regarded as “pristine Islam,” assist women through empowerment, health and education 
programmes, fight for the rights of Muslim women and support women in building an “Islamic 
family” life.987 While TMC is understood by many students as operating like the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood,988 some aspects of its organisational structure does not differ from 
previous Muslims organisations in Yorubaland such as the Ansar-Ud-Deen. For instance, like 
these other organisations, the Congress has an amir, executive officers, a chief missioner and 
clerics. Apart from this, members of the Congress are also encouraged to marry among 
themselves as in the MSSN, and this is often done through a form of matchmaking. 
The Congress’ programmes include monthly supplicatory ad̲h̲kār sessions, weekly Tazkiyyah 
(purification) lectures, an annual Islamic Training Programme (ITP) which is a practice carried 
over from the MSSN IVC, and Muharram Get-Together to mark the start of the Muslim 
calendar. Like many reformers, the Congress issues fatāwā (rulings) on several topics in Islam 
to guide members. To ensure that they consume Sharia-compliant products, the Congress also 
established a Halal Certification Authority to examine the process of production and 
ingredients of articles in the market. The Congress also encourages Islamic charitable pious 
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duty through its Zakat and Sadaqat Foundation, and it supports entrepreneurial development 
for low-income Muslims through its Al-Barakah Microfinance Bank. The Congress also has a 
disaster humanitarian programme for victims of accidents, fires, explosions and floods through 
its Human Concern Foundation International (HCFI). In relation to the Nigerian state, the 
Congress addresses socio-economic and political issues such as corruption, fuel subsidies, and 
insecurity through press releases and conferences. Some members of TMC also established a 
Muslim school (which offers primary and secondary education) called Vanguards Academy at 
Ijebu-Ode, Ogun state. In future, the Congress plans to have a university. While little is known 
about the population of Congress members, it is estimated to have about three hundred centres 
in Nigeria spread across Lagos, Ogun, Oyo, Osun, Kwara, Niger, Edo and Abuja, as well as 
the Republic of Benin.989 Over the years, as it expands, TMC became the subject of criticism 
of many Muslim groups which include the Salafis and the MSSN. The Salafis are of the view 
that members of TMC have derailed from the path of the sunna because they have become 
lenient in many practices such as not emphasising the use of face veil.990 But for members of 
the MSSN, TMC has not departed from the sunna but has merely discovered why it is difficult 
to train Muslims and adopt the sunna in this complex world.991 
The Dawah Front of Nigeria is another major organisation that broke away from the MSSN. It 
was established by former MSSN members who upon its formation appointed Abdul-Azeez as 
its national missioner (or spiritual head). The establishment of Dawah Front shows that Abdul-
Azeez and its facilitators also shared the idea of another Muslim organisation which is not for 
students. A pointer to this is the argument by the Dawah Front on why it was formed in 1996, 
as noted on its website: “The existing fora and media of interactions were considered 
inadequate to meet the dynamic but sophisticated needs of a certain category of Muslims.”992 
For Abdul-Azeez, the establishment of the Dawah Front (and the TMC) also aimed at putting 
an end to the contest between The Jama’at and The Mainstream in 1994.993 In contrast to the 
MSSN, the Dawah Front adopts the motto “Islam is Simple” as part of its vision to propagate 
“Islam as a simple, attractive and accessible way of life; and a mission to promote Islamic 
brotherhood.”994 Its activities include annual vacation camps called Daura, family seminars, 
 
989 The Muslim Congress, “About The Muslim Congress”. 
990 Al-Atharee, Aboo Aamir (Ishaaq AbdirRaheem), “What is Haunting The Muslim Congress?”. 
991 Adeniran Q. (pseudonym), interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
992 Dawah Front of Nigeria, “About Us,”, http://dawahfrontnigeria.com/welcome/about_us (accessed 
February 25, 2018). 
993 Taofiq Abdul-Azeez, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
994 Dawah Front of Nigeria, “About Us”. 
221 
 
weekly ad̲h̲kār and a monthly tahajjud (mid-night prayer) like the NASFAT. It has some 
medium scale enterprises like schools, and it supports members through facilities like a Health 
Savings Scheme, an Investment Window, and a Thrift and Loan scheme. The national 
secretariat of the Dawah Front is in Abeokuta, with branches in Lagos, Oyo, Osun, Ondo, Ekiti, 
Port Harcourt and Abuja. 
While the establishment of these organisations has added to the diversity of Islam in 
Yorubaland, their break-away from the MSSN on account of needing a transitional group 
dedicated to ‘non-youth’ often did not support this argument because they all have structures 
for young people. The only exception seems to be TMC, although its youth group is understood 
to be a faction in the MSSN. Also, many members of the break-away group have mended their 
relationship with those in the MSSN whom they clashed with in the 1990s, and they participate 
in each other’s programmes. There is also no major difference in their practices with those in 
the MSSN such as dressing, except in colour. Thus, while I consider that the break-away of 
these organisations is related to the contests for power and the different understandings of 
Islam, their programmes and facilities for members suggest that the break-away is also 
influenced by the happenings in the global world of Islamic revival movements and local socio-
economic strains which they wanted to address due to the failure of the state.  
5.4.4 Factions in the MSSN: the ‘Lagos Brothers’ 
The crisis that led to the formation of TMC also produced the faction called the “Lagos 
Brothers.” The name of this faction refers to members of the MSSN representing Lagos State 
Area Unit. Though the group emerged amid the MSSN crisis, referring to them as ‘Lagos 
brothers’ could be linked to the stereotype of many Yorubas, and many groups in Nigeria, about 
those who live in Lagos. Lagosians, araa Eko (colleagues from Lagos), are considered 
‘modern’ and less- ‘traditional’ in habits and taste. This seems like a positive description to 
outsiders, but it is also used derisively to suggest that they are ‘un-African.’ This notion has its 
root in the nineteenth century Victorian lifestyles of the western educated elite of Saro and 
Aguda origin, many of which were later adopted by other migrants to the city. The lifestyle of 
these elite found expression in their Christian values of marriage and the organisation of social 
activities like naming ceremonies and funerals.995 Mann's study has illustrated that such 
marriage values as one man to one woman were contested by many Yoruba from the mid-
nineteenth century colonial Lagos,996 while those who promoted the Christian values see their 
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critics as backward in their ways of life. Through the years, many Lagosians have helped to 
sustain their perception about not being ‘African’ by referring to non-Lagosians as araa oke 
(colleagues from up-country) and araa oko (colleagues from the village/bush) suggesting that 
they are not people of Ọlaju. Lagosians also considered themselves to be ‘unique’ and 
‘progressive’ compared to non-Lagosians. It is interesting that this perception of the other 
partly came up in the debates on Muslim practices and the factionalisation of the MSSN.  
The Lagos Brothers are regarded as the mentees of Thanni (and sympathisers of TMC) by The 
Mainstream. This theory has been sustained since the MSSN Lagos Area Unit exited the MSSN 
B-Zone, firstly in 1999 and secondly in 2005. Despite exiting the MSSN B-Zone, the MSSN 
Lagos Area Unit remained within the national body of the Society. But there is a minority 
faction within the MSSN Lagos Area Unit that is unsympathetic to the vision of the state’s 
leadership. This minority faction, therefore, returned to the MSSN B-Zone in 2006. 997 At 
present, the leader of the break-away faction is Saheed Ashafa, while Mas’ud Kolawole 
(referred to as Asqolani) heads the minority faction who remains in the B-Zone. In Lagos, 
Ashafa’s faction heads sixteen local governments out of twenty while Kolawole controls the 
remaining four.998 In the Mainstream MSSN, TMC is largely understood to be “controlling” 
and “sponsoring” Ashafa’s faction. Furthermore, the reason for the exit of Ashafa’s faction 
from the B-Zone is also regarded as part of TMC’s aim to create a ‘movement’ that has a 
student body, a class of professionals, and clerics. These assumptions have fed on programmes 
organised by Ashafa’s faction which were always attended by clerics from TMC including 
Thanni, the same way in which the MSSN members in Ashafa’s faction attended the 
programmes organised by TMC.  
However, the relationship between TMC and the Ashafa faction is more complex than what 
these assumptions reveal. Indeed, nearly all my respondents in Ashafa’s faction did not deny 
their relationship with TMC, but they did not see the reason why they should not be linked to 
TMC because they recognised it as a sunna organisation which is related to the MSSN in 
orientation.999 Importantly, they contend that those in TMC are their brothers in Islam, many 
of whom are actually family members. Thus, they argued, it is difficult to dissociate themselves 
from TMC.1000 But what this relationship also suggests is that they have some problems with 
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The Mainstream, which interestingly enough are what they regarded as the reasons for their 
exit from the MSSN B-Zone in 2005.     
One of them, Razak Adebisi, narrated that they broke away because they disagreed on the 
methodology of da’wa, referring to how they wanted to apply some practices.1001 An example 
of such practices was demonstrated by Abdul-Hakeem Opadijo (a former leader, singer, school 
teacher and poet in the MSSN) when I performed ṣalāt ẓuhr (prayer at noon) with him and his 
pupils at Ransome Kuti Memorial Grammar School, Yaba Lagos. After the prayer, Opadijo 
said some ad̲h̲kār which we all recited aloud after him. When we finished, he told me that was 
the kind of practice which had divided them from those in the B-Zone. Those in the B-Zone, 
according to him, were opposed to saying the ad̲h̲kār in congregation.1002 Adebisi narrated to 
me that this was a problem because it opposed the ḥujja they had, which made them 
uncomfortable regardless of being the same Muslims.  
…I believe in my evidence. And we now come together in a circle and we are 
now reciting it. You know, you will not feel comfortable that you are doing 
some things that I don’t support, and we call ourselves the same thing (sic).1003  
The other practice he mentioned was the performance of tahajjud (midnight prayer) in 
congregation which he said those in The Mainstream opposed. Adebisi told me that the 
difference in their opinions generated several arguments that led to tagging them as ‘Lagos 
Brothers.’ Like himself, other members of his faction found this term very disturbing because 
it undermined their association with the Society and, at the same time, it gave them the 
justification for pulling out from the B-Zone.  
So instead of us focusing on Islam, it’s always these arguments, bringing out 
arguments. The arguments now reach a particular level that I am now seeing 
it as banal. Accusations now coming out that these are the Lagos Brothers. 
When they see you, they call you the Lagos Brothers. That bond of actually 
seeing my Muslim brothers and sisters together, you know, that created a lot 
of issues which, to me, this development shows that things are coming in line 
together.1004 
From the late 1990s, the ‘Lagos Brothers’ became a category that was used to represent many 
things such as ‘rebellion’ and ‘incorrect practice’ in the MSSN. The reference to the ‘Lagos 
Brothers’ on their attitudes to early marriage and the use of phones in various debates were 
examples of this. By way of illustration, the Society generally considered early marriage as an 
 
1001 Adebisi Razak (Pseudonym), interview by Adeyemi Balogun, February 9, 2017, Ifako Lagos. 
1002 Abdul-Hakeem Opadijo, interview by Adeyemi Balogun, January 31, 2017, Yaba Lagos. 
1003 Adebisi Razak (Pseudonym), interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
1004 Ibid. 
224 
 
aspect of what it means to be a good Muslim in order to avoid zina (adultery). For the most 
part, the Lagos members did not disprove of early marriage, yet they were opposed to it for 
many reasons. This includes the high cost of living in Lagos, the need to graduate from school 
and have a job, and the concern that their parents would not approve of the marriage if they 
had no job. Unlike them, they considered early marriage would be easy for non-Lagos residents 
who lived in states where the cost of living was lower. Rather than considering their 
differences, Adebisi said that those in the B-Zone started taking ‘Lagos Brothers’ as examples 
in their lectures to describe Muslims who could buy expensive phones but could not afford to 
get married.1005 Beyond the dispute that provoked the stereotype ‘Lagos Brothers,’ this kind of 
argumentation points attention to the current emphasis in the MSSN to guide members about 
modern lifestyles. However, even if the aim was to inspire change to a modest lifestyle, using 
such stereotypes inadvertently affected their in-group relationship. In general, beyond their 
different da’wa methods, there are no major differences in the programmes of Ashafa’s faction 
and the B-Zone except in terms of organisation and conception of that programme.1006 This 
suggest to me that their schism did not produce a radically different orientation to Islam and 
mode of sociality between the two factions.  
5.4.5 Laa Jama’ah: the Salafi challenge 
A Salafi-minded group, though diverse in membership, also emerged amid the MSSN crisis in 
the early 2000s. The faction is generally referred to as the ‘Laa Jama’ah’ (no 
congregations/groups) in the MSSN. This term describes one of its major critiques against the 
MSSN as well as other Muslim organisations in Yorubaland. Members of this faction are of 
the view that all Muslims are one community or group and that the idea of “communities,” 
“organizations” or “groups” within the Muslim community such as the MSSN, Ansar-Ud-
Deen, NASFAT, and TMC do not have evidence in Islam.1007 A leader of the Salafi group in 
Ile-Ife, Kabir Ajadi, noted that many Muslims often misunderstood this argument when they 
criticised them. According to him, 
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The word Laa Jama’ah is used to describe those people that castigate MSSN. 
Because what we usually say is that La Jamaa’at, which means that there is 
no forming of groups in Islam. But there should be a group and not groups. 
And that is what the Prophet told us. It is Laa Jama’at not Laa Jamaa’at [in 
plural]. So, at times, when people say it, you see that they are suffering from 
lack of Arabic knowledge. We described them as people without in-depth 
Arabic knowledge. So, they would now be telling people that we are saying 
there is no group, that when we want to observe ṣalāt we observe it 
individually.1008 
Another major argument of the Salafis centred on Muslim participation in Western democratic 
politics and use of a constitution rather than the Qur’an and the Hadith. Ishaq AbdirRaheem, 
one of these Salafis, considered the MSSN involvement in politics as one of the practices that 
made it stray away from the sunna.1009 Because the arguments of these Salafs were opposed to 
what the MSSN was promoting, the Society began to prevent clerics who identified with 
Salafism from attending its programmes.1010 However, the ban was not enough to stop the 
number of students who identified as Salafis from the late 1990s. 
Apart from the MSSN, the other Muslim organisations in Yorubaland, such as Ansar-Ud-Deen 
and TMC have been concerned about the Salafi claims. There have been lively debates between 
the clerics of these Muslim organisations and the Salafis on many of these claims during public 
lectures and on social media. The most widely circulated debates on social media in recent 
times have been between the Salafis and the TMC,1011 on the one hand, and the Salafis and 
Shaykh Habeeb Al-Ilory,1012 on the other hand. In one of the debates between Habeeb and the 
Salafis, Habeeb challenged the use of “Salaf” as an identity of Muslims and contested the 
emphasis on the face veil for women by the Salafis.1013 The highly charged tones of these 
debates often stir security concerns in the society. In 2016, for instance, a renowned Iwo cleric, 
Shaykh Bilal Al-Asrau called for the prosecution of two Salafis named Rasheed Mustapha 
(a.k.a. Abu Ibeji) and Ustadh Yusuf (a.k.a. Abu Abdillah) on allegations of libel and threat to 
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his life over the comments he made supporting democratic governance in Nigeria. The two 
Salafis were arrested and detained by the police afterwards.1014 
Despite their widespread presence in the MSSN B-Zone, the Salafis only had a very stronghold 
in the MSSN Osun State Area Unit between the early 2000s and 2017.1015 They took control 
of MSSN OAU Ife where many students were introduced to Salafi practices, many of which 
were not supported by the management of the university especially the use of niqāb. The Salafis 
in this university also abandoned the MSSN constitution and introduced Islamic Awareness 
Programmes (IAP) in place of Jihad Week which is common in other MSSN branches.1016 Over 
time, these Salafi teachings became a concern at the university when some parents began to 
lodge complaints with the school authority about their daughters. This included students who 
abandoned their studies in Law (due to its focus on non-Muslim constitutions) for History and 
those who got married and impregnated without their parents’ knowledge. One of these 
students abandoned her study in Medicine and migrated to Sudan together with a Salafi male 
friend.1017 The complaints about these students fed into a widespread ‘theory’ in the university 
that the MSSN ‘brothers’ had “hypnotised” and “brainwashed” these sisters.1018 Consequently, 
many parents began to caution their wards not to join the MSSN at OAU. Ajadi, a leader of the 
Salafis at the university when I visited in 2016, did not deny knowledge of such cases, but he 
contended that the ‘brothers’ involved were naïve and ignorant of their actions on the traditions 
of Islam.1019 
The activities of the Salafis later led to a face-off between them and the Imam of the OAU-Ife 
central mosque, Abubakr Sanusi, a professor and consultant nephrologist, who dissociated 
himself from MSSN in the university.1020 The face-off was followed by the decision of the 
school authority not to register the MSSN as an association in 2005, and afterwards, there were 
many attempts by the school authority to forcefully eject the executives from their secretariats 
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1019 Kabir Ajadi (Pseudonym), interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
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at Obafemi Awolowo Hall (a.k.a Awo) mosque.1021 In 2006, the MSSN B-Zone also issued a 
letter dissociating itself from the MSSN OAU-Ife.1022 This continued until 2015 when some 
students, including Abideen Okunade and Akeem Idowu, challenged the Salafis by forming 
another MSSN branch that sought to reposition itself in line with the objectives of the MSSN. 
The new body which was headed by Idowu was constituted in 2016 and registered by the 
university management with the support of Imam Sanusi and the MSSN B-Zone. It operated 
from the university’s central mosque while the Salafis held on to the halls of residence 
mosques. In 2016, the two factions clashed in the attempt to claim legitimacy in the university. 
The clash was later resolved in 2017 following the intervention of the Sultan of Sokoto, Alhaji 
Sa’ad Abubakar and the secretary of the Muslim Ummah of South-West Nigeria (MUSWEN), 
Prof. Dawud Noibi.1023  
This Salafi trend, which the MSSN presently considers as its biggest challenge to date, draws 
attention to the inconsistency found in the representation of Salafism on Islam, similar to what 
Thurston referred to in the case of Shaykh Gumi.1024 Although the Salafis criticized the idea of 
groups which include the MSSN, they are, however, unwilling to dissociate themselves from 
the Society or its name, the MSSN. To illustrate this, Ajadi insisted that they are using this 
name because they are also ‘Muslim students’ which is implied in the name, ‘MSSN.’ He also 
noted that the name of the Society is needed for the annual renewal of their registration with 
the school authority.1025 This inconsistency is part of the main critiques of the MSSN leaders 
such as Oladosu against the Salafi’s claim that formation of groups among Muslims is an 
unlawful innovation. To be sure, Oladosu did not oppose this claim, but he contended that not 
forming it was at variance with modern reality especially in a colonial system whose 
government was concerned about the activities of religious movements. For him, the 
establishment of the MSSN was in line with that social reality.   
…the argument of La Jama’ah is that...there was nothing like an officially 
given name. Whereas there was no necessity for it. The society today is a 
modern one. Everything you have to do now, you have to be named for 
recognition, for many reasons. You can’t just operate anonymously. You 
would need something from the government. Government would need to 
know what group it is dealing with. If you say you are doing certain thing, 
you are not going to name yourself, then you won’t even achieve anything. 
 
1021 Kabir Ajadi (Pseudonym), interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
1022 Abideen Okunade, interview by Adeyemi Balogun, February 27, 2017, OAU Mosque, Osun. 
1023 Favour Igbafen, “Sultan Mediates in OAU MSSN Crisis,” New Telegraph, April 8, 2017, 
https://newtelegraphonline.com/2017/04/sultan-mediates-oau-mssn-crisis/ (accessed March 7, 2018). 
1024 Thurston, Salafism in Nigeria, 72–89. 
1025 Kabir Ajadi (Pseudonym), interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
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You understand? So, imagine in 1954, at the time, if Dr. Adegbite and others 
didn’t give it Muslim Students’ Society of Nigeria, how would they have 
demanded what they want. You would say you are a group of people, they 
would say who are you? It’s a logical thing.1026 
The Salafis critique of Muslims’ participation in democratic politics also appears at odds with 
their practice. For instance, I learned from Ajadi that they have mostly sought the intervention 
of Adebayo Shittu (referred to in Chapter Five), a politician and Nigeria’s Minister of 
Communication (2015-2019) in their clash with the OAU Muslim community. But before then, 
they were reported to have criticised the OAU Muslim community for honouring Shittu on his 
appointment in 2015 and allowing him to campaign for his governorship ambition.1027 These 
inconsistencies appear as a form of survival strategy, yet I also consider it as part of the 
ambivalences in what it means to be a Muslim which Samuli Schielke talked about.1028 In the 
next section, I will discuss the experience of Tijaniyya members of the MSSN who were also 
at the centre of the MSSN reforms and the Salafis debates. 
5.4.6 TIMSAN: the Tijaniyya encounter 
Sufi orders, especially the Tijaniyya, appear to have started in Yorubaland in the nineteenth 
century.1029 As I noted in Chapter Two, Peel referred to some Tijaniyya alfas in Yorubaland 
who promoted the reformed sufism, but I wish to point out that their histories still need to be 
reconstructed. Among them was Shehu Usman1030 Lanase (d. 1954) of Aremo quarter in 
Ibadan. He was understood to be a reformist and one of the clerics who clashed with the Òrìṣà 
devotees.1031 Over time, he was criticised by many alfas for promoting practices such as the 
use of purdah for women. Another figure was Alhaji Shehu Ahmed of Bere quarter also in 
Ibadan who, for many years, was said to live at Kaolack and married to Niasse’s daughter. He 
attracted many Muslims in the 1960s, but he was said to lose his credit among other alfas. One 
of the main factors responsible for this was his claim to be the aṣẹda (creator/one who can do 
and undo) which other alfas considered repulsive.1032 
 
1026 Afis Oladosu, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
1027 Jamiu Rabiu, “'Cold War' Between Buhari's Minister, OAU Muslim Community,” iWitness, September 27, 
2017, https://www.iwitness.com.ng/cold-war-between-buharis-minister-oau-muslim-community/. 
1028 Schielke, “Second Thoughts about the Anthropology of Islam, or How to make Sense of Grand Schemes in 
Everyday Life”: 1–2. 
1029 Peel, Christianity, Islam and Oriṣa-religion, 178. 
1030 Written locally as Sunmonu 
1031 Emmanuel O. Oyelade, “The Lanase Movement of Nigeria,” (MA Thesis, Institute of Islamic Studies, 
McGill University, 1970), 35–47. 
1032 Peel, Christianity, Islam and Oriṣa-religion, 179. 
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The turn towards the sunna by many students in the MSSN opened several debates and 
criticisms of Sufi practices such as the waẓīfa (daily group recitation) and recitation of the 
litany called ṣalāt al-fatih. As I mentioned earlier, many of my respondents confirmed that they 
were members of the Tijaniyya brotherhood before they were introduced to Islamic texts and 
debates that invalidated Sufism. Abdur-Raheem who was one of these students narrated that 
the lectures delivered by many brothers at the OAU Ife during the era of ḥujja made him realise 
that sufism was an imported practice to the ‘real Islam’, and this encouraged him to abandon it 
for the sunna based on Qur’an and Hadith.1033 On the other hand, many Tijaniyya students 
considered such lectures as a confrontation to their practices. They also believed that their 
critics were the ones who caused disunity in MSSN and a threat to their sense of belonging. 
Thus, they decided to create their own identity by establishing the Tijaniyya Muslim Students’ 
Association of Nigeria (TIMSAN) by the late 1980s (the exact year remains unknown, but one 
of my respondents told me they had the first Tijaniyya leader named Giwa Adebayo in 1987 at 
UI).1034 One of the leaders of TIMSAN, Sulaimon Odetayo, drew attention to this encounter 
during a leadership training seminar in 2013.  
We are here because of the necessity to have an identity which will bring us 
together. However, the MUSLIM STUDENTS SOCIETY OF NIGERIA 
(MSSN) has been initially created for the purpose of safeguarding the interest 
of every Muslim in the campus, and promoting peace unity and harmony, but 
fortunately and unfortunately, it was hijacked by some cabals with the 
intention of destructing Islam; These so called cabals introduced some 
provocative doctrines and ideology into the system of the MSSN to attain 
their own selfish interest and desire. The Muslim Students Tijanis were 
thereafter humiliated, segmented and basterdized (sic).1035 
Despite establishing TIMSAN, many Tijaniyya students often participate in the MSSN 
programmes because they consider the Society is “for all Muslim students.”1036 However, both 
the continued criticism of their practices as well as the discouragement by Sufi clerics have 
kept many of them from participating. Aminat Ajibola, a member of TIMSAN who studied 
Psychology at UI, narrated to me that she boycotted MSSN because her Sufi shaykhs were 
subject to criticism in many of the lectures which she found difficult to tolerate.1037 Misbaudeen 
 
1033 Abdur-Raheem Luqman, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
1034 Misbaudeen Babarinde, interview by Adeyemi Balogun, December 13, 2016, UI, Ibadan. 
1035 Muqoddam Odetayo Sulaiman, “The TIMSAN Message,”, http://timsannational.blogspot.de/2014/10/the-
timsan-message.html (accessed March 8, 2018). 
1036 Ajibola Aminat, interview by Adeyemi Balogun, December 13, 2016, UI, Ibadan. 
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Babarinde, another Tijaniyya student who studies Political Science at UI and who has also 
boycotted the MSSN, explained that Tijaniyya students were not welcomed in the MSSN.  
Like the MSSN, Tijaniyya students’ activities are allowed in many schools, and they have often 
had the support of many of the academic staff members. A notable example was Dawood 
Adekilekun Tijani (1942-2006), a Tijaniyya and Imam of the UI central mosque, who taught 
at the Department of Arabic and Islamic Studies at the university. He supported the Tijaniyya 
students with accommodations outside the university. This might be due to the limited space 
in the halls of residence. At the same time, it was also meant to support their Sufi practices by 
ensuring that they move away from their critics who were mostly the Imams in the halls of 
residence mosques. Adekilekun also supported the use of the UI central mosque for their 
weekly waẓīfa.1038 His demise in 2006 however led to a change in how the Tijaniyya students 
were treated afterwards. From this period, they began to clash with some members of MSSN 
who contested their practices in this mosque. Aminat narrated one such disturbing encounters 
for her in 2008 when their waẓīfa was disrupted and some of their members were beaten.  
In the mosque. I remember that day we were in the mosque and they said... 
‘Don’t come to do waẓīfa again? Don’t come to do this… What is this? What 
is happening? And they said that if we come, we are going to be beaten. That 
day, everybody come (sic) and they started their problems, they started 
beating some brothers.1039 
She referred to another incidence in 2010 when their celebration of the Mawlid al-nabī was 
disrupted and the guests were embarassed. The event was suspended as a result of this incident. 
Oladosu1040 and Uthman1041 who teach at the university confirmed that the Muslim community 
of the university intervened in many of such cases. Apart from the UI, cases of such encounters 
ensued in other MSSN branches such as the University of Ilorin in Kwara where the Tijaniyya 
students were attacked by some members of the MSSN in 2015.1042 Also, at the OAU Ife,  
TIMSAN has been the subject of criticism by some members of MSSN.1043 But as Aminat and 
Babarinde told me, they remained less perturbed by the various attacks on them because they 
were taught to be patient as Sufis. On the whole, the contests and clashes in the MSSN from 
the late 1980s show that schism in a religious organisation do not only produce contradictory 
orientations but also conflict among the actors involved in the organisation. As a form of 
 
1038 Misbaudeen Babarinde, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
1039 Ajibola Aminat, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
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religious change, the example of MSSN and its splinter groups show that it can inspire and 
shape new forms of religiosity.  
5.5 Conclusion  
This chapter draws attention to the historical and epistemological developments that shaped 
Islamic reform and the organisational crises in the MSSN. The major historical factors include 
the return of foreign graduates, the emergence of graduates of the local madrasas, the link to 
transnational Islamic movements and greater access to Islamic texts. The epistemological 
development focuses on the emphasis on the concept of ḥujja and how Islam was understood 
differently from the past. The consciousness for ḥujja encouraged the MSSN to be concerned 
about reforming and reviving the past traditions of Islam and this consciousness played an 
extensive role in the transformation of the Society into a reform movement. This transformation 
led to the contestation of many ideals of Islam on which the MSSN was established. Broadly 
speaking, the concern for the sunna appear to be the major factor in this contest, however, the 
contest was also linked to the struggle for power and how to cope with life transition changes 
of Muslim students. One of the MSSN ideals that was challenged by this contestation was 
brother/sisterhood which was employed to promote equality and respect among members 
irrespective of their creeds outside the school. Before the 1980s, this was sustained because the 
Society did not oppose the practices of different Muslim groups to which its members belong. 
However, practising the sunna or identification with a creed became the yardstick for many 
members to measure who belonged to their ideal of brother/sisterhood. In the same vein, the 
idea of diversity within Islam was challenged as practices not based on what the Society 
considered the sunna began to be contested. Thus, the concept of one Muslim community on 
which the Society was built was also affected.  
The historical and epistemological developments which I refer to in this chapter help us to 
understand the trajectory of Islamic reform in MSSN better than what Peel discussed in his 
study on religious change among Yoruba Muslims.1044 Although Peel indicated that the reform 
was linked to the “contemporary currents in the wider world of Islam,”1045 little insight was 
given on how this link took shape. Rather, he suggested that the takfīr against the Ahmadiyya 
movement gave way to a “more militant and assertive”1046 conception of Muslim modernity 
which the MSSN represented. This study, however, moves beyond this narrow understanding 
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of Islamic reform and shows that multiple factors shaped the MSSN emphasis on the prophetic 
sunna. 
Also, a close reading of Peel’s discourse suggests that the adoption of orthodox Muslim identity 
in MSSN is representative of all Yoruba Muslims,1047 although I am aware that he only used 
the MSSN as an example. His analysis appears to build on the evidence that many members 
and graduates of MSSN have been influential in shaping Islamic discourse in Yorubaland. But 
there is a danger in accepting this narrative of religious change because it does not show the 
diversity of Islam as a lived religion, not only among Yoruba Muslims, but also in the MSSN. 
As I showed in this chapter, there are various Muslim groups in Yorubaland (and in the MSSN) 
who debated as well as opposed many aspects of the sunna which defined Islamic reforms in 
the MSSN. Thus, while the history of MSSN (and other reformist movements that emerged 
from it such as TMC and Dawah Front) may not be enough to tell the whole story of religious 
change among Yoruba Muslims, it is sufficient to see it as one of the fundamental processes 
involved in this change. Indeed, the history of MSSN should also be understood within the 
context of the diversity of Islamic practices which continued to develop among them since the 
pre/colonial period. 
The history of MSSN discussed in this chapter further shows that many Yoruba Muslim 
students are linked to the Islamic revival and reform movements that emerged in post-colonial 
Muslim societies in many parts of the world. The students were connected to these movements 
through different transnational organisations, literature and reformist thinkers. But they were 
neither passive followers of Islamic reform nor unreflective about the knowledge produced and 
circulated by these movements. They debated on what Islam is by reflecting on their own 
knowledge of the religion in relation to what they learnt from the transnational Islamic thinkers 
and movements. At the same time, they were mindful of their social context in this discourse. 
Their turn towards the sunna was thus a product of discourse and negotiation rather than blind 
imitation of practices that do not fit into their own social experience. 
I also show in this chapter that the reform in MSSN led to a significant shift in the way the 
Society promoted its objectives from the 1950s. The new interpretation of sunna played a key 
role in this shift. Although many aspects of the Society’s initial objectives have been sustained 
to date, the different interpretation of sunna has impacted on their reviews and how they are 
put into practise. Several debates shaping the extent to which the MSSN’s reform is embodied 
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have been put forward by many members concerning the new notion of sunna. As I will 
illustrate in the next chapter, while the promotion of the objectives of the Society is anchored 
on the sunna, the debates ensured that the impact of the reform on practise is not uniform. 
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Chapter Six 
Diversity in Reform: Islam, MSSN and the Challenges of Ethical Practice, 1980-2014  
6.1 Introduction 
The reform that swept through the MSSN from the 1980s led to a change in the way Islam was 
understood and practised among Muslim students. Despite being ostensibly anchored on the 
prophetic sunna, this chapter argues that the reform neither produced a monolithic 
interpretation of Islam nor a uniform practice. To the contrary, it resulted in multiple and 
sometimes conflicting interpretations of the sunna as well as diversity in practice. On the one 
hand, certain interpretations of Islam within the MSSN, which included the notion that Muslims 
should maintain a “balanced position” on matters of religion and social life, the embodiment 
of Islamic knowledge in a “gradual” manner, the “flexibility of Islam” and “Islam’s tolerance 
to cultural diversities,” helped to shape this outcome. On the other hand, the multiple authorities 
which the students followed and the uncertain social realities that confronted them in 
Yorubaland, and Nigeria, such as Islamophobia and opposition to practices such as veiling, 
were also factors in the outcome. The first aim of this chapter is to discuss how those 
interpretations of Islam, multiple authorities and social realities shaped the processes of Islamic 
reform in the MSSN, and secondly, to show the diversity in the practices of the MSSN and its 
members. This is in response to the research question: what is the impact of Islamic reform on 
the understanding and practice of Islam in the MSSN? The argument of this chapter, which is 
situated in the literature on the multiplicity of Islam in Africa and religious diversity as a whole, 
is the focus of the next two sections. This includes a discussion of the notions of Islam in MSSN 
and the different realities that enabled them. The last three sections of the chapter look at the 
diversity of practices among Muslim students and within the MSSN. I wish to note that this 
chapter is meant to end in 2014, in line with the title of the thesis. However, because the impact 
of MSSN reform goes beyond this period, my empirical analyses have substantially centred on 
what continued to happen up to the time I conducted fieldwork and wrote this thesis. 
In discussing diversity in MSSN, little attention is paid to the major factions within the Society, 
that is, the MSSN B-Zone, the Ashafa-led MSSN Lagos Area Unit and the Salafi-minded 
MSSN OAU Ife Branch. This is because, despite their differences, they all identify with the 
national body (MSSN) often through various networks of individuals who are either patrons or 
former members. As a matter of fact, some members of MSSN in Lagos and the OAU Ife (as 
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well as those who belong to the Sufi group, TIMSAN) are of the view that, despite the 
differences among them, their membership in the MSSN is automatic anywhere in Nigeria 
insofar as they are “Muslim students, and the Society is not owned by any individual or a 
particular group.1048 Also, it is useful to note that while the practices of these factions are useful 
in showing us the diversity in the MSSN, it is also misleading to think that practices in each 
faction are uniform. Thus, this chapter does not explore the diversity in MSSN from the 
perspective of one faction but the Society as a whole. 
6.2 Diversity in Islam 
Muslims in the world are highly diverse in population, language, geographical location, social 
organisation, culture and economies.1049 The diversity among them goes beyond simple 
dichotomies such as Shi’i/Sunni Muslims, folk/popular Islam, heterodox/orthodox and 
tolerant/intolerant Muslims.1050 Although Muslims frequently refer to the common 
foundational texts, Qur’an and Hadith, and agree on many aspects of their creed, they also 
engage in debates and give multiple and conflicting positions on a wide range of social, 
religious, economic and political issues.1051 They have different practices which might include 
those adopted or adapted from non-Muslims. In the 1980s, the controversies and diversity 
among Muslims were the thrust of anthropological studies, which I showed in Chapter Two, 
seeking to make sense of the variant forms of Islam and how it should be studied. The debates 
in these studies show that Muslims diversity can be understood through analytical frameworks 
that not only takes Islam as a discursive tradition but also recognise the ambivalences and 
inconsistencies in their practices.   
Diversity among Muslims can take the form of the contentious ‘syncretism,’ which in many 
studies has been narrowly employed to describe the practices that are presumed to be a 
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deviation from the ‘authentic’ religious practice.1052 For instance, the idea of syncretism as a 
deviation from the “real Islam” is the main argument of Muhsin Balogun’s thesis on the beliefs 
and practices of Muslims in Epe, a coastal Yoruba city in Lagos.1053 However, as posited in 
Chapter Two, this notion of syncretism is problematic because it seeks to justify the ‘purity’ 
and ‘rigidity’ of every religion which is inconsistent with reality.1054  
Muslims diversity also connects with the process of “religious assemblage.” Janson refers to 
this process as the result of the mixture of two or more religious elements which remain open-
ended.1055 Closely related to this is the practise of “religious pluralism,” which according to 
Soares is the existence of multiple religious traditions in one space or how an individual or 
group is involved in different religious practices.1056 It is revealing that Janson and Soares’ 
studies, which analysed the history and encounters between Christians, Muslims and 
Traditional religion devotees within the same framework, found various forms of hybridity and 
syncretism among practitioners of each religious group. Janson’s study shows that a religious 
movement in Nigeria called CHRISLAM ‘assembled’ the practices of Christianity and 
Islam,1057 while Soares’ study illustrates that a controversial religious figure in Mali called 
Adama Yalcouyé engaged in the synthesis of the Christian, Islamic and Traditional Religions 
practices.1058 Many Muslims in Yorubaland would contest that people who assembled different 
religious traditions or engaged in religious pluralism are not Muslims, yet this cannot be 
dismissed as the social reality of many of them. This has been revealed in a recent KEO1059 
quantitative survey by Insa Nolte, Clyde Ancarno and Rebecca Jones on Muslim-Christian 
relations in many Yoruba communities. Their findings show that even though a clear majority 
of Yoruba are Muslims and Christians, “56.1 percent of KEO survey respondents said that they 
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had a family tradition or custom (even if it was not one they practised themselves), while 19.3 
per cent contribute money to family deities and 48.2 per cent use traditional medicine.”1060  
The processes of syncretisation, religious pluralism and assemblage can occur in different 
religious groups or individuals. This is true in the Yoruba religious field. Peel’s study has 
shown in this field that many Christian groups have appropriated practices such as vigils from 
Muslims while some Muslim groups, particularly the popular NASFAT, have equally 
borrowed Pentecostal forms of prayer and organisation.1061 Loimeier’s study of Muslim 
societies in Africa demonstrates that diversity can also occur due to the need for people to 
position themselves differently in a changing world.1062 His argument on this process is focused 
on the idea of “hybridity.” However, I wish to depart from this conceptualisation because it 
suggests that one religious practice or entity is pure before it mixes to become a hybrid. 
Nonetheless, his argument on the diversity of Muslims in Africa deserves closer attention. He 
posits that diversity in Muslim societies is influenced by differences in the interpretation of 
Islamic texts and the impact of social change and globalisation which facilitated the spread of 
new knowledge, cultural ideas, fashion, and technology from the Western world. The diversity, 
therefore, developed through the translation of the Western mode of cultures into the Muslim 
context to make them digestible. Interestingly, as the actors involved in these translations are 
engaging modern cultures, they are also having dialogues with the traditions of Muslims in the 
past. In this way, their efforts involved embracing modernity while maintaining a distinctive 
Muslim identity. This mode of expression occurs at many levels: it could be in a given religious 
tradition like a Sufi order, between two or more Sufi groups, between Sufi groups and reformist 
movements or between different religions.1063  
If the processes of syncretisation, religious pluralism and assemblage actually reveal a lot about 
the meaning of religious diversity among Muslims, Eva Spies has nevertheless encouraged us 
to take a step further and look at it from the perspective of “incommensurability” which 
acknowledges differences in religious forms and practices as well as questions the universal 
category regarded as “religion.”1064 This perspective is underscored by the fact that while the 
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notions of syncretisation, pluralism and assemblage assume that “religion” or religious 
groupings like Christianity and Islam are static entities that may be compared or in conflict 
with other traditions, incommensurability stresses that even though this comparison may occur, 
the “different traditions may not refer to the same frame of reference and are not, therefore, 
always comparable on the basis of a single standard.”1065 What this suggest, as Spies’ fieldwork 
in Madagascar illustrates, is that one can engage in a “religious” tradition (e.g. Christianity) 
side by side with another “religious” tradition (e.g. traditional rites during burial) because the 
latter is not taken to be religious even though many Christians understood it as such. In Chapter 
Three, I gave a similar example of Yoruba Muslims who participated in festivals which they 
understood to be part of their cultural life. And, as will be shown later, the MSSN also promoted 
some aspects of indigenous culture, that are related to followers of Traditional Religion, but 
understood to be “non-religious.”  
Besides these existing frameworks, recent studies have been looking at how religious diversity 
is produced in Africa through a “relational” process.1066 Spies and Seesemann argued in some 
of these studies that we should not limit our understanding of African religious diversity to the 
so-called “religion”; it is also useful “to study specific themes, social formations, practices, 
texts, or objects connected to a religious tradition and analyzing their relations to other 
activities, texts, objects, (religious) traditions, and so forth.”1067 As Spies contends, this 
perspective moves beyond the conception of religious diversity in terms of a difference with 
no standard way of measurement and the static conception of a religious tradition, object or 
practice. On the contrary, it encourages us to see diversity “as emerging and changing in and 
through continuous multiple processes of relating, and thus as being always multiple.”1068 A 
good example that reveal this diversity is the field of Islamic education in which, according to 
Spies and Seesemann, we encounter an interface of pedagogies, concepts and praxis that are 
based on various epistemologies and styles of learning, which are difficult to categorized as 
either Arab or African, traditional or reformist, local or global.1069  
These various perspectives suggest that the diversity among Muslims is complex and multi-
layered. They also indicate that Muslims’ diversity is shaped by a range of factors in different 
 
1065 Ibid.,119. 
1066 Eva Spies, “Being in Relation: A Critical Appraisal of Religious Diversity and Mission Encounter in 
Madagascar,” Journal of Africana Religions, 7, no. 1 (2019): 62-83; Eva Spies and Rüdiger Seesemann, 
“Pluralicity and Relationality: New Directions in African Studies,” Africa Today, 63, no. 2 (2016):132-139. 
1067 Spies and Seesemann, “Pluralicity and Relationality”: 136. 
1068 Spies, “Being in Relation”: 65-6 
1069 Spies and Seesemann, “Pluralicity and Relationality”: 137. 
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settings. Of major interest is their varying historical conditions which include cultures, political 
systems, social experiences and geographical settings. These historical conditions are not static 
in any given context as they continue to relate with other changing temporal phenomena 
beyond such context in a way that leads to multiple religious productions at different points in 
time. Another major factor is the varying translations of the foundational texts of Islam which 
are due to different social contexts. Combining two or more religious traditions or with non-
religious traditions is also an aspect of their diversity. In addition, their diversity also results 
from the attempts by religious groups and individuals to reposition themselves from others. 
These various factors are noticed in what shapes the MSSN reforms in the way they were 
understood and promoted. To illustrate, since the 1980s, some ‘ideals’ which can also be called 
‘arguments’ or ‘interpretations’ of Islam emerged in the debates that determine the process of 
reform in the Society. I refer to these ‘ideals,’ which I found in the testimonies of my 
respondents and records of the Society, as the ‘notions of Islam’ that reflect the MSSN 
interpretation of the sunna and reform. These notions of Islam were used to position the MSSN 
differently from its rivals and other Muslim groups, although these notions were also closely 
connected to the orientations of the rivals in question. Certainly, the debates around these 
notions of Islam suggest that they were not new to members of MSSN before the period of 
reform. If anything, the debates in this period confirmed the consciousness of the students about 
these notions and their style of reasoning. As will be discussed below, these notions of Islam 
were constructed and sustained based on different historical and social conditions in Yoruba 
society and the global world of Islam, and they confirm the argument that the diversity among 
Muslims is not only constituted by the processes of syncretism or assemblage but also due to 
the relationality of Islamic epistemologies as well as Islam’s relation with other wider social 
phenomena.1070 
6.3 Notions of Islam in the MSSN reform  
The four notions of Islam in the MSSN reform include the argument that Muslims should 
maintain a “balanced position” on matters of religion and social life, the embodiment of Islamic 
knowledge in a “gradual” manner, the “flexibility of Islam” and Islam’s tolerance to diversity 
and local cultural practices. These notions of Islam were mentioned by my respondents with 
reference to various Islamic texts. At the same time, they refer to a number of social realities 
in their discourses which draw attention to why they maintain these notions. Their discourses 
 
1070 Spies and Seesemann, “Pluralicity and Relationality”: 136-7; Seesemann, “Epistemology or Ideology?”: 
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in this regard thus illustrate how they translate and interpret the texts in relation to the local 
context.   
6.3.1 “Be balanced in everything”  
The quote in the title of this section was used by a respondent to describe the notion of a 
“balanced position” as an ideal that is strongly emphasised by the MSSN.1071 A former 
governor of Kano, Mallam Ibrahim Shekarau, who has identified with the MSSN since 1974 
also referred to this in his 2014 address to mark the sixtieth anniversary of the Society organised 
by its national headquarters in Abuja. He argued that the Society had kept the tradition of the 
“middle-ground” throughout its long history to avoid identifying with any sect. Even though 
he was talking from a different geographical context, Shekarau’s reference to it demonstrates 
that the balanced position is an interpretation of Islam promoted by the MSSN in both Northern 
and Southern Nigeria.1072  
According to Habibah Oladosu,1073 the balanced position is based on the concept of wasaṭiyya 
in the Qurʾanic verse “Thus, have We made of you an umma [community] justly balanced that 
ye might be witnesses over the nations and the Apostle a witness over yourselves” (Q. 
2:143).1074 She is of the view that this verse enjoins Muslims to take a middle position so that 
“you are not too much of the extreme of the right and you are not too much of the extreme of 
the left.”1075 However, despite her reference to this text, the concept of wasaṭiyya is ambiguous 
both in theory and practice. We can look at this ambiguity from the meaning of the concept 
which is from the Arabic word wasaṭ, usually referred to as ‘moderation.’1076 It is often 
compared with the Aristotelian “golden mean,” referring to “the intermediary point between 
two extremes of excess and lack.”1077 Based on his study of this concept, Kamali explains that 
wasaṭiyya can also be used interchangeably with the notions of “average,” “core,” “standard,” 
“heart,” and “non-aligned.”1078 His study further suggests that the concept goes beyond its 
religious referent to other aspects such as economics and politics. Also, wasaṭiyya is associated 
 
1071 Adesola Sodiq (pseudonym), interview by Adeyemi Balogun 
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1074 The Holy Qurʾān: English Translation by 'Abdullah Yusuf 'Ali, 3rd ed. (Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad 
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with the concept of the umma (community) used in the Qurʾanic text above. But the concept of 
umma is also open to question, even though it is commonly considered to refer to Muslims 
alone. Fredrick Denny argues that the word umma has been applied to many people, including 
non-Arabs, many years before the Prophet Muhammad and that it has developed from this 
general usage “toward a more exclusive one which is limited to the Muslim community”1079 
who lived in his time in Medina. Limiting the notion of umma to this Muslim community 
implies that wasaṭiyya only applies to Muslims as mentioned in the notion of a ‘balanced 
community’ above. Contrary to this view, Muhammad Arkoun argues that the concept also 
applies to non-Muslims.1080  
Also, wasaṭiyya is seen as a “moral virtue” of an individual and a community. In this sense, 
Kamali argues that it is a “virtue that helps to develop social harmony and equilibrium in 
personal affairs, within the family and society and the much wider spectrum of human 
relations.”1081Kamali points out that the concept does not convey a definite meaning on its own 
because it is transitive and can only be applied as a qualifier to another subject. Owing to this, 
there is usually an attempt “to ascertain what wasaṭiyya means in a relationship, for example, 
to the enforcement of penalties and in connection with religiosity, consumerism and finance, 
speech, lifestyle and so forth.”1082 The various ways in which the concept is interpreted is also 
revealed in the testimony of Afis Oladosu. He first explained it within the context of àgbọ́yé - 
understanding (discussed in Chapter Five) - and how Islam is practised. He gave the same 
analogy of three groups of Muslims, cited in Chapter Five, to explain this concept of 
moderation:  
we could have a Muslim by name; a Muslim who join others in practising 
Islam without necessarily knowing why they are practising Islam and without 
necessarily knowing why such is considered a fundamental in the 
religion…The second are those that are practising Islam based on their 
intellectual knowledge. They know that for them to practise Islam completely, 
they must situate and establish it on certain intellectual foundations. The third 
groups are those whose actions negate what you presume to be the textual 
foundations of the religion. And you find these groups in the current crises in 
the world: ISIS, AL-SHABAB in the eastern part of Africa and then since 
2009, the Boko Haram in Nigeria.1083  
 
1079 Frederick M. Denny, “The Meaning of "Ummah" In the Qurʾān,” History of Religions 15, no. 1 (1975): 36. 
1080 Mohammed Arkoun, Rethinking Islam: Common Questions, Uncommon Answers, Translated by R. D. Lee 
(San Francisco, CA: Westview Press, 1994), 53. 
1081 Kamali, The Middle Path of Moderation in Islam, 1. 
1082 Ibid., 11. 
1083 Afis Oladosu, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
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From this analogy, he positioned the MSSN in the second group which portrays the Society as 
a group of Muslims who not only based their practices on Islamic texts but also as Muslims 
who reflect on these texts. His analogy also suggests that this second group comprises of 
Muslims whose interpretation of Islamic texts do not support anarchy and violence in the 
society.  Also, Afis Oladosu used other contexts to interpret the concept of moderation and to 
draw attention to where the MSSN stands. 
The spectrum MSS occupies is that which seeks to evolve the balance 
between the worldly and the other-worldly…between the terrestrial and the 
celestial. While there is a stream to the extreme right and a stream to the 
extreme left, MSS sought to be at the middle. The necessity to evolve a 
balance is in line with the Qurʾanic text which…informed the emergence of 
the MSS or the constitution of the Society.1084 
From his argument, taking a balanced position between the “worldly” and “other-worldly” 
suggests that while the MSSN is inclined to some form of mundane or secular affairs, it is also 
disposed to religious matters. Also, taking a middle position between the “extreme right” and 
the “extreme left,” as he noted, implies the need to avoid two ends of a pole. Despite the many 
contexts used to explain this concept, it is interesting to note that the way and manner it is 
implemented by the members of MSSN is understood differently by many Yoruba. For 
instance, Shakirulah Adedoja, President MSSN Oyo Area Unit in 2016, illustrates what 
moderation means in the MSSN by pointing to the leg opening of his own trouser which was 
slightly raised above his ankle.1085 He referred to the leg opening of a trouser that is raised far 
above this level, common among those who identified as Salafis and Tabligh Jama’at, as an 
indication of extremism. On the contrary, many people in Yorubaland, including Muslims, 
consider the MSSN as well as Salafis and Tabligh Jama’at as groups that exhibit extreme 
religious positions. One of them is Khabirat Balogun, a graduate student at UI, who narrated 
to me that she could not identify with the MSSN in school because everything the Society 
taught and encouraged such as the use of a veil was “too difficult” for her.1086  
These different understandings illustrate another major controversy that is embedded in the 
concept of wasaṭiyya. Most importantly, it draws attention to the problematic distinction that 
is often made in the political and media discourses between Muslims who are ‘moderates’ (seen 
as non-extremists) and those who are ‘radicals’ (seen as the extremists).1087 In differentiating 
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1086 Adeyemi Balogun, Field Notes (2016). 
1087 Davids, “Islam, Moderation, Radicalism, and Justly Balanced Communities”: 5–7. 
243 
 
between the two, Kamali argues that ‘extremism’ is always self-evident and easily identifiable 
because it tends to push away from the centre toward the outer edges. Yet, he pointed out that 
this needs to be properly understood in different contexts because one person’s notion of 
moderation may be another person’s idea of radicalism. Like moderation, “extremism also 
applies to the entire spectrum of values, good and bad, positive and negative.”1088 To this 
extent, referring to the MSSN as a ‘radical’ movement, as is understood by many in Yoruba 
society, may not necessarily be misplaced. It needs to be emphasised, nonetheless, that the 
ambiguity of the concept of wasaṭiyya is useful to the understanding of Muslims’ diversities. 
Insofar as it is interpreted and applied differently by Muslims, it allows for the emanation of 
multiple expressions of what the concept means.  
But why has the MSSN emphasised the balanced position in its ideal of reform? To understand 
this, I focus on the historical context of discourse in which my respondents explain the notion 
of wasaṭiyya. Building on Asad’s argument, the historical conditions of Muslims’ discourse is 
important because they “enable the production and maintenance of specific discursive 
traditions, or their transformation—and the efforts of practitioners to achieve coherence”1089 
with past traditions. In this sense, when Habiba Oladosu mentioned the concept of wasaṭiyya, 
she used it to demarcate the training she had received in the MSSN and what the MSSN 
promoted in the past from its ‘new radical’ tendencies. She explained that in the past, the MSSN 
accommodated every Muslim group, including the Sufi and Ahmadiyya, without condemning 
their different practices. She considers this accommodation to be based on the principle of 
wasaṭiyya. However, according to her, this form of accommodation has changed as many 
members of the Society have become intolerant of other Muslim groups. Still, she insists that 
she has not followed this ‘radical’ tendency because of her training, based on wasaṭiyya. From 
her testimony, it is possible to argue that one of the historical conditions that enabled the 
production and maintenance of her view on moderation is the emergence of the ‘radical’ 
elements in MSSN. Differentiating herself from these elements illustrate her ideal of reform, 
which is one that accommodates other Muslim groups who share different interpretations of 
Islam from her own.  
Outside the MSSN, two major challenges many Yoruba Muslims faced in the past, helped to 
foster a balanced position in MSSN: how to be Muslim without rejecting the new ọlaju which 
their rival Yoruba Christians have accommodated; and how to be better Muslims without being 
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criticised in the broader modern society. The first challenge relates to the negative attitudes 
which many Muslims have towards Christian missionaries, the post/colonial state system, 
Western education and the participation in politics. As discussed in Chapter Three, enrolling 
Muslims into Western schools was considered by many of them as a form of apostasy. Even 
though this has diminished significantly, such fear was expressed for many years by the Muslim 
group called Zumratul-Mu’meena. From 2004, opposition to Western education has also been 
strongly propagated by an offshoot of the Tabligh Jama’at movement in Ibadan known as 
“Karikasa” – a name referring to a locality in Lagos where it originated.1090 Taking a balanced 
position thus appears as a critique of this opposition because it suggests that the concern for 
religion can be moderated with the concern for the non-religious aspect of life. The MSSN has 
therefore been using this argument to encourage Muslim students to be skilled in different areas 
of life, as one of its members reveals below.  
…what MSSN Lagos Area Unit has taught, which is what Islam has taught, 
is to be balanced in everything you do as a Muslim. That is what Allah told 
us, not to be extremist about everything. And, that is what Prophet 
Mohammad taught us, that you have to balance everything… Allah says, ‘use 
what Allah has endowed you with in this world to get pleasure in the hereafter 
and despite that… don’t forget your portion on this earth.’ So, Allah is telling 
us ‘you have to balance the two… as you are striving to get the hereafter, 
don’t forget you are expected to be successful on this earth.’ …as a Muslim, 
everywhere you find yourself there is an impact, and there is a role they expect 
you to play there. Even in politics, because Islam has left nothing untouched. 
Every aspect of human life except if the person has not discovered or does 
not know that aspect…that is why you see average member of the MSSN, 
they will always be an all-rounder. They can’t say because I am studying 
medicine, I don’t know what is going on in MSSN. You can be called at any 
time that you should come and discuss politics. And, you have to discuss 
politics as if you are a politician.1091 
Apart from Muslim students, the MSSN is also encouraging this notion of balanced education 
to be integrated into Nigeria’s educational policy. In 2012, its UNILAG Branch in Lagos 
invited the federal and state ministries of education to a seminar used to promote this form of 
education as shown in figure 2 below.  
The second challenge is closer to the concern raised above by Habibah Oladosu. It is on the 
reactions of different segments of the Yoruba society towards Muslim practices that are deemed 
to be radical. There are Muslim parents who many university teachers such as Dawud Noibi 
and Taofeek Yekin confirmed to me had approached them to complain about the ‘extreme’ 
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  Fig. 2. A poster showing MSSN notion of Islam on education. Source: MSSN Lagos Area Unit, 2018. 
 
religiosity of their daughters and sons.1092 The teachers referred to those who used the veil as 
well as male students who questioned their parents’ ritual practices such as the use of the prayer 
beads, which is discussed later.1093 Some female students also confirmed to me that they did 
not use the veil because their parents disapprove of it.1094 The criticism of these parents is also 
shared by many alfas. One of them, Alhaji Sheriffdeen Adenuga who teaches at a local 
madrasa, noted that many alfas today are worried that Islamic movements like the MSSN are 
placing more emphasis on what is less fundamental in Islam, such as veiling, while they neglect 
the more important aspects of the religion. He suggests that what is important for Muslims is 
to purify their souls and be clear about the “intentions” of their actions because God is more 
interested in this form of piety than outward appearances.1095 There is also Muhib Opeloye, an 
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academic and a prominent member of the Muslim community in Osun state, who criticised the 
adoption of veiling in place of the popular local dress. He maintains that “since the underlying 
principle for the concept of ḥijāb is the need to cover essential parts of the body, the traditional 
Yoruba dress (consisting of bùbá, ìró, gèlè, and ìbòrí)1096 satisfies the requirement.”1097  
For many Christians whom I have interacted with, the image of the Muslim women’s veil and 
male Muslims (whether of the MSSN, the Tabligh Jama’at or the Salafi) whose trousers’ leg 
openings were far above their ankles, evoked religious extremism. Moreover, since the 1990s, 
there has also been a rise in Islamophobic attitudes against veiled Muslim women in work 
establishments and schools. Many of them have been terminated or refused employment by 
banks and advertising media because they insist on using their veils.1098 Between 2010 and 
2017, the number of young women who used the veil, as a disguise, that carried out suicide 
bombings through the Boko Haram in Northeast Nigeria also aggravated this Islamophobia.1099 
It was not surprising that by 2014, many women in the region abandoned their veils owing to 
the fear which the veiled bombers created in the public. The government also attempted to ban 
the veil in the region in 2015, though it was resisted by some Muslims including the leadership 
of the Federation of Muslim Women in Nigeria (FOMWAN).1100 Some of the bombings by 
Boko Haram were made on educational institutions in the North, and there were threats to 
attack many schools in Southwest Nigeria.1101 A number of tertiary institutions including IU 
and OAU therefore responded to this threat with additional security measures on their 
campuses. In addition, they placed more emphasis on female Muslim students’ dress codes. 
While in most cases, the dress code only ruled out the face veil, there are departments such as 
Nursing and Tourism where no form of veiling is allowed.1102 Given these attitudes and 
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reactions, taking a moderate religious position is used by the MSSN to encourage social 
acceptance and lessen the fear of insecurity, even if it is understood differently. 
6.3.2 Being a Muslim is a gradual process 
To an extent, the need to ensure moderation can be linked to another major notion of Islam 
which is emphasised in the MSSN: the learning and embodiment of Islamic knowledge as a 
“gradual” process. This argument on gradualism is akin to a school system where students start 
their education with knowledge of simple things and continuing to the more complex ones, 
moving from the elementary school to the tertiary institution. As pointed out in Chapter Five, 
this argument is used to oppose the Jama’at faction of the MSSN, who insisted on the instant 
embodiment of practices such as veiling among female students, irrespective of their level of 
knowledge of the religion. Rather than demanding that Muslim students embody the knowledge 
at once, the gradual approach supports a process where they are given time to do so. This 
approach is considered to have a precedent in how Allah changed the pattern of life of Muslims 
in the past.1103 Referring to the Qurʾan texts on alcohol, Adeniran, a member of the Society, 
explains that, 
 When Allah was going to condemn alcohol, He did not say in one day, ‘leave 
alcohol.’ In that generation, people were already steeped in alcohol. And for 
Him to stop them from alcohol, the first thing He said was that, ‘in alcohol, 
you have more evils than benefits.’ Obviously, they would start thinking of it 
that if I am taking something and it would cause me more harm than good... 
A matured person who still has something upstairs [i.e. who can think] would 
be thinking, ‘is it now good for me?’ Then the verse of ‘if you are drunk, 
don’t come to mosque’ came. [By] then, they had gotten used to going to the 
mosque, and now [with the new verse] if they had alcohol, then they wouldn’t 
have their ṣalāt …at the end of the day, gradually, they started dropping it 
until the final verse that now says, ‘no to alcohol.’ And it was so easy for them 
to abandon it at that point, because they had been taken gradually, they had 
been given information … So, Islam is a gradual change.1104  
Habibah Oladosu is of the view that this steady embodiment of knowledge and practices must 
start with teaching Muslims to develop an inner faith in Allah (iman) because it is the 
fundamental basis for being a Muslim.1105 She notes that this notion of Islam underscored the 
Kalima of the MSSN, its new motto mentioned in Chapter Four. Furthermore, she contends 
that as soon as faith is instilled in the hearts of Muslims, they can be taught the other 
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fundamentals of the faith such as prayer, belief in the Qurʾan and the prophets, fasting during 
Ramadan, almsgiving, as well as practices like veiling. She emphasises that when Muslims 
“understand” these beliefs and practices, they will adopt them on their own steadily. To 
emphasize the importance of this process, she critiques the Jama’at who insisted on 
embodiment of practices like veiling without knowledge, 
What matters most is the knowledge. When a sister understands what ḥijāb 
means she uses it. …when knowledge is there, other things follow. People 
will be saying that, ‘that brother that does not keep beard’ or ‘that sister that 
does not wear ḥijāb.’ And [yet], ḥijāb is not a license to paradise!... What 
matters most is Islam with knowledge. By the time knowledge comes, other 
things will follow.1106  
Habibah’s argument can be linked to the modernist discourses on Islam that are articulated in 
the writings of Mawdudi, embraced by many members of the Society. As discussed in Chapter 
Five, Mawdudi identifies the knowledge of Islam as the key factor that distinguishes who is a 
Muslim from who is not. Mawdudi further contends that knowledge can help to acquire “faith” 
which is the foundation of being a “true Muslim.” 
Faith, thus, is firm belief arising out of knowledge and conviction. And the 
man who knows and reposes unshakable belief in the Unity of God, in His 
Attributes, in His Law and the Revealed Guidance, and in the Divine Code of 
Reward and Punishment is called Mo'min (faithful). This faith invariably 
leads man to a life of obedience and submission to the Will of God. And one 
who lives this life of submission is known as Muslim. This should clearly 
bring home the fact that without faith (lman) no man can be a true Muslim. It 
is the indispensable essential; rather, the very starting point, without which 
no beginning can be made.1107 
Despite the link between them, Habibah’s argument on the role of the Kalima contrasts with 
Mawdudi in one respect. Mawdudi maintains that “After affirming this Kalima you are not at 
liberty, as are the unbelievers, to do as you like. You have to follow what it prescribes and 
renounce what it forbids.”1108 Meanwhile, Habibah is of the view that less emphasis should be 
placed on strict adherence to rules for Muslims who are still learning, and that they must not 
be rebuked for not observing the rules at once. Hence, she claims that the MSSN is a movement 
that accommodates all manner of “nonsenses” from young Muslims, and she thinks that these 
young ones will eventually abandon their “nonsenses” when they finally understand what Islam 
requires from them. She illustrated her position with the example of some ladies she knew in 
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the past who used to wear miniskirts when they prayed in the mosque. Despite their mode of 
dressing, she stated that the MSSN allowed them to lead their peers in prayers and that in the 
long run, many of them abandoned their miniskirts for long ones and began to use the ḥijāb.1109 
Many of my respondents, such as Adeniran and Yekin, also mentioned similar cases of Muslim 
students who went through this kind of change in the MSSN.1110 These examples illustrate that 
the MSSN does not always follow the ideals of Islamic modernists despite their linkage. 
The social reality that enabled the emphasis on this idea of gradualism in the MSSN has a close 
link with the one on moderation. According to Yekin, who is quoted below, the emphasis on 
this notion of Islam is partly caused by the complaints of parents over Muslim students’ 
radicalism. It is also influenced by the fact that the MSSN has many ‘young people’ as members 
who are from diverse religious backgrounds, often with ‘little’ understanding of the religion. It 
is therefore important to promote this notion of Islam in order to keep such members as Yekin 
points out here:  
We are not far from the reality of our situation. You know, the reality is that, 
the students who are our primary, our automatic members would be coming 
from different backgrounds. We are not expecting every Muslim parent to be 
very religious. In fact, at times, some of the students, by the time they grow 
quite religious, when they go back home, they would have problems. Their 
parents would say, ‘No! your own is becoming too much. No, you have to 
scale down.’! And of course, a lot of cases like that on our hands that we have 
had to deal with. So… it is only natural that that is the methodology that MSS 
would adopt. Because if you say it is strict Islam or it is either you are in Islam 
or nothing…  now, if you do that, of course you cannot have members. That 
means who do not want… will just withdraw their children.1111 
The process in which Islamic knowledge and practices can be progressively learned and 
embodied is assumed to be embedded in the educational platforms of MSSN. These educational 
platforms are structured to teach different aspects of Islamic knowledge tailored along what is 
required for each member category from primary school to tertiary institution.1112 A major 
example is the IVC, which is structured based on age group, students’ levels in the academia, 
and marital status of members (discussed in Chapter Seven). The different structures of the 
MSSN, such as the Branches which only have students in tertiary institutions as members, are 
also considered as a means used to achieve this systematic learning.1113 However, this gradual 
 
1109 Habibah Oladosu, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
1110 Adeniran Q. (pseudonym), interview by Adeyemi Balogun; Shakirulah Adedoja, interview by Adeyemi 
Balogun; Taofeeq Yekin, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
1111 Taofeeq Yekin, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. Emphasis in italics mine. 
1112 Shakirulah Adedoja, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
1113 Ibid. 
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approach is not without its problems. This is because the process of gradual learning or 
embodying knowledge may not define all that could be learned or embodied and at what point 
it should cease. Hence, the process can stand in conflict with the idea of moderation. 
6.3.3 “All Muslims cannot be put into a straightjacket”: the flexibility of Islam 
The quote used as the title of this section is one of the points made by Oyekan to describe the 
notion of the “flexibility of Islam” employed by the MSSN to promote its ideal of reform. To 
an extent, the notion appears as part of the MSSN attempt to find a way around the problem of 
locating the ideal of moderation. As Oyekan explained to me, Islam allows “flexibility” and 
freedom to make choices from practices that are within the bounds of rules provided by the 
religion. Even though this suggests that people can learn and embody knowledge that is within 
two ends of a pole, it does not take away the problem of determining where the middle position 
lies. It is interesting that Oyekan also alluded to this problem in his example of the speed limit 
on the road and its link to flexibility in Islam.  
The religion of Islam sets out various guidelines and principles. Now, within 
these guidelines and principles, you are given freedom to operate as you 
like… ‘varieties’ they say ‘is the spice of life.’ So, all Muslims cannot be put 
into a straightjacket when there is flexibility in Islam. The French might say 
the maximum limit that you must drive is 60km per hour, if it suits you, you 
can go 5km per hour. If it suits you, you might go 59.9km per hour. You are 
still operating within the law. So, it is not like we all have to practice exactly 
the same way. There is flexibility, but what is our common denominator is 
conformity with the content of the Sharia.1114    
From this idea of flexibility, the MSSN, therefore, suggests many ‘options’ on what it 
considered proper in Islam on different aspects of life. None of these ‘options’ is made 
compulsory over the other, and members are free to choose from any one of them. Afis Oladosu 
illustrates this ideal of flexibility with the example of two forms of veiling, niqāb (a veil with 
face cover that leaves the eye region open) and ḥijāb (a veil without face cover). 
 …what the MSSN believe is the middle position that Islam emphasizes. For 
example, the niqāb, a woman’s face cover and the ḥijāb. MSSN position is 
that niqāb is part of Islam, but it is not made compulsory. We cannot say that 
until a woman covers her face, her ḥijāb is not valid. MSSN would say no to 
this. The MSSN says, if you use niqāb to cover your face, you are okay. If 
you don’t cover your face, you are okay. Ensure you cover what is necessary. 
Don’t show your figure. Let your ḥijāb be big enough, then don’t let it go 
beyond your buttocks. So that is what Islam demands. And don’t let it be so 
attractive that it would be creating distractions.1115 
 
1114 Jibril Oyekan, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. Emphasis mine 
1115 Afis Oladosu, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
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Coming up with these options is not necessarily informed by an abstract ideal of Islam. It is 
shaped by the realisation, as Gudrun Krämer and Sabine Schmidtke suggest, that there are 
multiple authorities in Islam who seek to explore the meaning(s) of Islamic texts and implement 
their injunctions in different contexts.1116 For example, apart from the major scholars among 
Sunni Muslims, referred to as the four madhabs (Abu Hanifa, Malik, al-Shafi and Hanbal), 
there is also a wide range of scholars in many Muslim societies who have followers practising 
the religion based on the interpretation of Islamic texts by these scholars. These followers 
include reform movements who, though emphasised the supremacy of the Qurʾan and Hadith 
as the basis of their practices, uphold the interpretation given on these texts by scholars such 
as Mawdudi. One major effect of this multiplicity of authorities is the production of various, 
often contradictory, opinions on many issues in the religion. These opinions, in turn, have 
produced what Ebrahim Moosa referred to as “multiple representations of being Muslim, 
embodied by concrete individuals and communities.”1117  
Apart from taking these multiple authorities into account, the notion of the flexibility of Islam 
in the MSSN is also shaped by the realisation that Muslim students belong to different Islamic 
groups whose leaders are either regarded as authorities on their own or followers of other 
authorities. Before the mid-1980s, this reality ensured that the MSSN was a movement that 
encouraged the diversity of opinions and practices, allowing the Society to sustain one of its 
main objectives: to unite Muslim students irrespective of the groups they belonged to.  
Although the reform in the MSSN has challenged this objective, it did not put an end to the 
recognition of multiple authorities. On the contrary, it streamlined the number of authorities to 
those who promote the Society’s understanding of the sunna. 
6.3.4 Islam and local cultural practices  
Connected to the notion of flexibility is another argument in the MSSN that Islam is a religion 
that tolerates diversity and accommodates local cultural practices which do not contradict its 
fundamental tenets. This support the debate that Islam is not a ‘purist’ or ‘rigid’ religion that is 
unable to cope with other cultures.1118 The theory of a purist Islam becomes weak in the face 
of evidence on the Islamization processes in many Muslim societies. As Geertz contends in his 
 
1116 Krämer, Gudrun and Schmidtke, Sabine, “Introduction: Religious Authority and Religious Authorities in 
Muslim Societies. A Critical Overview,” in Speaking for Islam: Religious Authorities in Muslim societies, 
eds. Gudrun Krämer and Sabine Schmidtke, 1–14 100 (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 3–4. 
1117 Ebrahim Moosa, “The Debts and Burden of Critical Islam” in Progressive Muslims, 114. 
1118 Zulfikar A. Hirji, “Debating Islam from within” in Diversity and Pluralism in Islam, 1–30; Opeloye, “The 
Yoruba Muslims’ Cultural Identity Question”: 2. 
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study of Morocco and Indonesia, Islam is able to cope with other cultures because Islamization 
consists of double efforts: to translate a ‘theoretically’ well-integrated system of beliefs and 
rituals into different local realities; and to maintain its identity, despite its adaptive flexibility, 
as a religion and directives transmitted by God through the Prophet Muhammad.1119 By coping 
with other cultures, one finds diverse Muslim practices across the world that reflect different 
indigenous cultural practices while sharing a uniform tradition.  
As discussed in Chapter Three, the process of Islamization in Yoruba society also showed that 
several local practices and institutions were adapted into Islam, just as the religion equally 
adapted to them. That MSSN has promoted the idea of Islam’s tolerance to diversity and local 
cultural practices reflect its continuity with this expression of Islam in Yorubaland. Most 
importantly, it is a telling example that its understanding of the sunna does not translate to 
abandoning all the local cultural practices. Despite this, however, the MSSN makes a 
distinction between local practices that it considered ‘permissible’ and the ones that are not 
permissible in Islam. One example is the opposition to prostration by men and kneeling by 
women when greeting an elderly person. While the MSSN opposition is seen as an affront to 
the values of respect and the structure of hierarchy by many Yoruba, members of the MSSN 
consider it as a rejection of shirk (association of partners with God). This is because the practice 
is seen to involve the position of worship during ṣalāt.1120 But in some cases, the MSSN 
accommodates aspects of the so-called impermissible practices and modify their contents to 
conform to what is considered to be permissible in Islam. In this manner, the Society tries to 
reduce the supposed friction between Islam and other cultural traditions, thereby encouraging 
students to engage in both side by side. Recalling the example of Spies’ study,1121 this suggests 
that while Islam is seen as a ‘religion,’ the other tradition is not. Aisha Muritala, a female vice-
president of the MSSN at UI, described how this was done for a genre of traditional oral poetry 
called ìjálá (chant) which was recited in one of the MSSN events she participated in.  
We sang one song like that. We now chanted in the middle of the song…iba 
atelese ti ko wu irun. That iba actually means you are praising, like you are 
saying Allāh ʾakbar. The chant is like this: iba akoda iba aseda, iba atelese ti 
ko wu irun. So akoda is Allah, He is the first and the last. Aseda is the person 
that created everything… but we cannot take that attribute, and we were asked 
to change it to iba Olodumare to da atelese lai wu irun.1122  
 
1119 Clifford Geertz, “Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia,” in The 
Anthropology of Islam Reader, ed. Jens Kreinath, 65–74 (London: Routledge, 2012), 68. 
1120 Taofeeq Yekin, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
1121 Spies, “Coping with Religious Diversity”: In A Companion to the Anthropology of Religion, 127-8 
1122 Aisha Muritala, interview by Adeyemi Balogun, January 18, 2017, UI, Ibadan. 
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Quotes with translation:  
We sang one song, and we chanted in the middle of the song ‘reverence to the 
foot that doesn’t grow hair.’ That ‘reverence’ actually means praise, like you 
are saying Allāh ʾakbar. The chant is like this: ‘reverence to the first created, 
reverence to the One who creates, reverence to the foot that doesn’t grow 
hair.’ So, akoda is Allah, He is the first and the last. Aseda is the person that 
created everything… but we [humans] cannot take that attribute. [Thus]1123 
we were asked to change it to ‘reverence to God who created the foot without 
hair.’ 
In whatever way the MSSN has promoted the ideal of Islam’s tolerance to local cultural 
practices, the students who are opposed to its interpretation of the sunna do not think that the 
Society has lived by this ideal. The major voices in this regard are members of the Sufi group, 
the TIMSAN. One of the members of this group, Misbaudeen Babarinde, does not think that 
the MSSN has promoted this tolerance because its members have adopted ‘Arabian’ dress, 
especially the veil, as a symbol of ‘authentic Islam’ while they neglect the local ones which 
meet the criteria of modesty.1124 But beyond this critique, MSSN support and accommodation 
of these practices show how varying aspects of Yoruba identities are preserved in the 
expression of Islam among students.  
The foregoing discussion illustrates that these notions of Islam in the MSSN reform overlap 
and relate to one another. The idea of “moderation” is related to those of “gradual embodiment 
of learning,” “flexibility of Islam” and “Islam’s tolerance to other cultures” because they all 
support a particular disposition about the expression of Islam. However, each of these notions 
also embeds different and contested ideals on what such expression should be. Thus, while the 
relationality of these notions of Islam gives an impression of uniformity in the ideals of MSSN 
reform, it also reveals the various points of divergence in the reform, and this is line with the 
argument by Spies that relationality in the context of religious diversity is not only about 
connections, dependence or cooperation and but also about disconnections, rejections or 
conflicts.1125 As will be shown below, the notions of Islam discussed above shaped the diverse 
practices and interpretations of Islam that became noticeable in the MSSN from the 1980s. The 
diversity, on the one hand, shows differences and disagreements on practices that are 
considered ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect,’ as well as practices that are regarded as ‘fundamental’ and 
‘less fundamental’ in Islam. On the other hand, the diversity demonstrates fluidity in many 
 
1123 Emphasis mine 
1124 Misbaudeen Babarinde, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
1125 Spies, “Being in Relation”: 68-9. 
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practices. This diversity is reflected in everyday rituals, style of dress, and socio-cultural 
activities which are discussed with relevant examples in the following sections.  
6.4 Ritual practices 
In the daily religious acts of Muslims, the MSSN reform has focused on promoting the ‘correct’ 
practices and their ‘correct’ performance. My evidence based on participant observation in the 
MSSN on what the correct practices are and how they should be performed reveals several 
varieties and controversies. The tahajjud is an example of ritual practices that show this trend. 
Regarded as a rewardable non-obligatory prayer performed at night/before dawn, many 
members of the MSSN consider it as one of the sunna of Prophet Muhammad. They are also 
of the view that during his lifetime the Prophet performed the prayer alone, rather than in 
congregation. This argument has been used by many of them to position the MSSN differently 
from movements like the NASFAT who organised regular congregational tahajjud for 
members. As this view seems to be shared generally in the MSSN, I saw many students who 
performed it alone at the UI mosque at midnight. However, this was not the case at the MSSN 
B-Zone IVC in 2016 when the tahajjud was performed in congregation. The Imam who led the 
prayer later claimed that this was necessary because the IVC was a training programme and 
that the prayer was performed in congregation in order to teach the delegates who had not 
inculcated it in their daily rituals. But many students disagreed with this argument and 
performed the prayer alone. I also heard many students, who I shared space with at the IVC, 
complained about being woken early for the tahajjud for what they thought was an “obligatory” 
prayer.1126 Thus, while the performance of the tahajjud reflects the diversity in the MSSN, it is 
a practice that is both controversial and open to innovation.  
The ad̲h̲kār (remembrance; invocation) is another ritual that shows diversity in the MSSN. 
From the perspective of many members of the Society, the ad̲h̲kār must be done regularly. But 
they disagreed with the ad̲h̲kār done in congregation at the end of each ṣalāt,1127 which is not 
only the norm in several mosques outside the schools but also among MSSN members in Lagos 
which I referred to in Chapter Five. Also, they opined that Muslims should not gather at a place 
to do the ad̲h̲kār. This argument is used to criticise the collective Sufi ritual called waẓīfa and 
the weekly prayer meetings called asalatu (Arabic ṣalāt) which is common among Muslim 
movements such as Ansar-Ud-Deen, Nawair-Ud-Deen and NASFAT (some gather for this 
asalatu on Friday while others meet on Sunday as in the case of NASFAT). However, these 
 
1126 Balogun, Field Notes. 
1127 Taofeeq Yekin, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
255 
 
arguments are not applied in every MSSN activity. In the MSSN B-Zone IVC, for example, 
the ad̲h̲kār was performed in congregation at the end of each ṣalāt. As in the case of tahajjud, 
the Imam explained that this was done because the IVC was a training programme meant to 
teach delegates about the correct prayers enjoined by the Prophet. He also expressed concerns 
that many Muslims do not usually perform the ad̲h̲kār after their ṣalāt. He therefore urged them 
to see the congregational ad̲h̲kār as an opportunity to inculcate it into their daily rituals.1128 
What is interesting is that this argument is also made by many Imams I know outside the 
schools, who ironically have been criticised by the MSSN for doing what it claimed is not 
correct. Besides the objective of training, which is noticed at the IVC, the ad̲h̲kār is also 
performed in congregation in other MSSN programmes. These include the Brothers Forum and 
the Sisters’ Circle organised at the Federal College of Education, Akoka Lagos. As a 
participant-observer in the two programmes in 2017, I witnessed the recitation of the ad̲h̲kār 
compiled by Al-Banna, Al-Ma'thurat, in congregation by both brothers and sisters in their 
separate sections of the mosque.1129  
In addition, many MSSN branches hold congregational prayer sessions for their pressing needs 
in school. The group prayer is similar to those of the asalatu groups that assemble Muslims to 
supplicate for their everyday concerns such as employment opportunities, success in business 
and protection against enemies, whether real or perceived. Unlike their parents, one of the most 
important concerns of many students is to pass their exams. For this purpose, the MSSN in 
branches like the Yaba College of Technology (YABATECH), Lagos organised the Success 
Dua (supplication) for members. For many years, this was held at the college mosque, two days 
before the commencement of exams in each semester. However, in 2016, the Success Dua was 
contested by an executive member of the MSSN in the College who identified with the ahl al-
sunna wa῾l-jamā῾a (people of the tradition [of Muhammad] and the community [of believers]). 
According to the President of the College’s MSSN branch, he argued that the Success Dua was 
not “sunnatic,” and therefore, not a correct practice. He also provided evidence in Islamic texts 
that allegedly supported his argument. However, despite accepting the validity of his evidence, 
other members of the executive thought that it would be difficult to stop it because of its 
usefulness to many members of the Society. Instead of cancelling it, they adjusted the practice 
by ceasing the congregational session and inserted some ad̲h̲kār in what is called the 
 
1128 Balogun, Field Notes. 
1129 Ibid. 
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“Examination Dos and Don’ts,”1130 pasted on notice boards, which members can recite 
individually prior to writing their exams.1131 This innovative blending of ad̲h̲kār with an 
examination instructions, as noted in Loimeier argument above, shows how a new practice is 
produced and promoted as part of being Muslim. 
The use of prayer beads for ad̲h̲kār is also contested in the MSSN. The prayer beads called 
tẹsuba (tasbīḥ in Persian and Muslim Indian usage) by Yoruba Muslims, is considered as an 
aid to counting in place of the fingers or finger lines. Members of several Muslim groups such 
as the Ansar-Ud-Deen, Jama’atul Islamiyyah, the NASFAT and the Tijaniyya regularly make 
use of such beads. But there are MSSN’s members like Yekin who are of the view that there is 
no proof that the tẹsuba was used by the Prophet.1132 Therefore, they consider its use as a form 
of bid’a (unlawful innovation) which should not be allowed in Islam. This argument 
encouraged them to abandon the tẹsuba for their fingers during ad̲h̲kār. On the contrary, there 
are those who consider its use as a less fundamental issue in Islam because it is only an aid to 
counting. I saw many of these students who used the tẹsuba and one of them confirmed to me 
that she only used it occasionally.1133 The contest over the beads shows why multiple 
authorities and interpretions of Islam account for different practices of the religion. This 
multiplicity is also found in the type of dress worn by many students. 
6.5 Dress 
To a large extent, the change in dress of MSSN members has been the most visible expression 
of their new ways of being Muslim in public since the 1980s. The styles of dress that represent 
this change are the men’s kaftan and the women’s veil as shown in figure 3 below. But there 
are variations in this mode of dressing. Among the male students, there are those who regularly 
wear the kaftan with an embroidered cap from Northern Nigeria. Some students wear clothes 
such as t-shirts with trousers. Many students also wear the ‘traditional’ bùbá (blouse) with the 
slouched caps made from the hand-woven fabric referred to as aṣọ oke (lit. a cloth from 
upcountry). While many Yoruba consider this men’s blouse to represent the ‘authentic’ Yoruba 
identity, its origin tells a different story. This cloth, as suggested by Peel, is of Northern 
Nigerian Muslim origin.1134 Like their clothes, the size of the trousers of members of MSSN 
also varied. Their trousers include those whose leg openings are below the ankle, those that are 
 
1130 This is an instruction manual designed to guide students during preparation for exams.  
1131 Ibrahim Umar, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
1132 Taofeeq Yekin, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
1133 Adesina Kafayat (pseudonym), interview by Adeyemi Balogun, October 27, 2016, UI, Ibadan. 
1134 Peel, Christianity, Islam and Oriṣa-religion, 161–62. 
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slightly above the ankle and those that are raised far above the ankle. However, sometimes the 
length of the trousers does not correspond with what a student wears every day. A student may 
have trousers that are of these three lengths worn on different days. According to some 
members of the Society, a student can choose any of these lengths because there is evidence 
for all of them in Islamic texts.1135 However, this argument is inconsistent with the Salafis and 
Tablighis who frequently wear trousers that are far above their ankles. 
There are also a wide variety of styles in the dress of female students. Some of them wear 
trousers/skirts and shirts with turban hats/ḥijāb1136 and keep scarves in their bags which they 
use when they pray in the mosque or attend MSSN events. These students are categorised by 
some members of the MSSN as “scarfites,” often as a criticism that they are less “suunatic,” to 
differentiate them from those who used the veil. Outside the MSSN, however, they are 
identified with terms such as sọji Alhaja (enlightened/civilised Muslim woman), especially 
among non-Muslims. The two categories are a telling example of the varying social acceptance 
of the veil between the MSSN and the larger society. But those who use the veil, similarly 
categorised based on the type they used, do not regularly wear them. Their veils are in different 
sizes, colours and styles such as the niqāb (a face veil that leaves the area around the eyes 
open), the jilbāb (a veil that covers the body from head to toe leaving the hands and face open), 
the khimār (a long, cape-like veil which may hang down to the waist or knee), the burqaʻ (a 
veil that covers the body and face with a mesh for the eyes) and the al-amira (a two-piece veil 
which include a close-fitting cap). Many of those who use these veils also wear either socks or 
gloves or both.  
 
Fig. 3a: The diverse style of Muslim students’ dress. Picture by Yemi Balogun, 2017 
 
1135 Balogun, Field Notes. 
1136 The turban hat, a cap that is worn to cover the head, performs a similar function to the turban ḥijāb. But 
unlike the hat, turban ḥijāb is wrapped on the head.  
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Fig. 3b. The diverse style of Muslim students’ dress. Picture by Yemi Balogun, 2017 
It is also important to point out that the categorisation of these female students into the type of 
veil they used is not fixed because many of them often switched from one type of head-
covering/veil to another. There are “scarfites” who also use the jilbāb and the khimār only 
when they pray, either at home or in public. Many of them do this due to concerns that those 
wearing veils in public are looked upon as “religious extremists.”1137 Anifa Oyekola, a student 
of Osun State University, Osogbo who is of the view that veiling is not easy to adopt, explained 
that many female Muslims do this because they have to “please Allah” when they pray and 
“please themselves” when they are not praying.1138 In this regard, the veil is only seen as an 
object meant for religious spaces rather than the public sphere. 
Besides, many female students switch their style of veiling due to peer pressure and what is 
socially acceptable. The contrasting dressing of two friends I interacted with named Rashida 
Hammed and Jelila Hassan, both students of the University of Lagos, illustrates this point. 
Rashida wore the jilbāb, while her friend Jelila wore the turban hat and kept a scarf in her bag. 
But before then, Jelila used to wear the khimār while Rashida had changed from a turban ḥijāb 
to the jilbāb before dropping it for some time and taking it up again. They both explained that 
their use of the veil was consistent when they were in the circle of veiling Muslims, while they 
had been discouraged from using it in the circle of non-veiling Muslims, as well as Christians 
who often contest the use of the veil.1139 
 
1137 Shukuroh Jimoh, interview by Adeyemi Balogun, January 14, 2017, Akoka, Lagos. 
1138 Anifat Oyekola, WhatsApp to Adeyemi Balogun, November 2, 2018. 
1139 Hassan Jelila (Pseudonym), interview by Adeyemi Balogun; Hammed Rashida (Pseudonym), interview by 
Adeyemi Balogun, January 14, 2017, Akoka, Lagos. 
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The rules on dressing in many schools and work establishments are also responsible for why 
many females switch veils. This is the case with students in the departments of Nursing of 
many tertiary institutions where the use of the veil is restricted. Female students in this 
department use the turban hat when they attend classes but change to their veils when they are 
not in class. For some female students, the shift is caused by what is approved of by parents 
and guardians. A case in point is that of Anifa Oyekola, mentioned above, who for many years 
was required to use the ḥijāb when she was living with her uncle whose wife uses the khimār. 
Following her admission into the university, she changed to a turban ḥijāb, although not 
completely. She pointed out that she was concerned about her modesty and that she often used 
the ḥijāb depending on the occasion she attended or what matched her style of dress.1140 The 
veil is therefore not only a symbol of an assumed understanding of Islam for her but also what 
is necessary for different occasions. 
The different experiences of these female Muslims support the argument of scholars such as 
Soares and Osella1141 and Schielke1142 regarding the significance of taking the range of 
struggles, ambivalences and failures of Muslims seriously in the understanding of their 
religiosity. Their argument is part of the discourse that challenges the anthropological studies 
which, according to Schielke,1143 largely focused on how morality and piety are created and 
practised in Muslim societies. Mostly relevant in this regard is Mahmood’s study of the 
women’s piety mosque movement in Egypt which demonstrates the role of the veil in the 
practice of modesty.1144 Taking a contrary view to feminists who refer to the veil as a symbol 
of Muslim women’s subjugation and docility, Mahmood contends that veiling should be 
understood as a key symbol of piety and one of the ways in which the veiled women’s agency 
is realised. Furthermore, she argues that veiling plays an instrumental role in practising the 
ethic of modesty. The veil, according to her, often serves at first as a measure to train oneself 
on the attribute of modesty, and that it cannot be separated from this ethic because it is integral 
to practising it.1145 However, by focusing on the achievement of piety, Mahmood gives little 
attention to the ambivalences, failures and struggles that are imbricated in the practice of 
 
1140 Anifat Oyekola, WhatsApp to Adeyemi Balogun. 
1141 Soares and Osella, “Islam, Politics, Anthropology”: 10-11. 
1142 Schielke, “Being Good in Ramadan”: 25. 
1143 Ibid. 
1144 Mahmood, Politics of Piety; Mahmood, “Feminist Theory, Embodiment, and the Docile Agent”. 
1145 Mahmood, Politics of Piety, 158. 
 
260 
 
veiling. Meanwhile, these challenges usually impose different negotiations on many Muslim 
women and determine how they truly live. 
A related point to consider is that the colour and size/type of veil that is used by female students 
is shaped by different interpretations of the concept of veiling. The idea of veiling, as Mahmood 
illustrates in her study, is considered to help Muslim women achieve modesty.1146 In the MSSN, 
there are debates on what colour is suitable for achieving this goal. Many female students who 
used the black coloured veil consider it as the most appropriate. They are of the view that this 
colour is less attractive and that it meets the condition of modesty which veiling is expected to 
produce.1147 However, this is contested by Uthman Ibrahim who argues that the evidence cited 
by many scholars in Islamic texts that support the black colour is untenable because the Prophet 
did not give clear instruction regarding it. He thus contends that women can choose the colour 
of their choice.1148 Based on this kind of argument, many female students used a variety of 
colours such as pink, brown and blue, thereby showing the impact of the multiplicity of 
authorities on lived Islam. 
Also, with regards to the size/type of veil, some students consider the jilbāb to meet the criteria 
of modesty while others think it is the khimār.1149 An example is Rashida Hammed, mentioned 
above, who is of the view that she prefers the jilbāb, which she uses because it does not reveal 
her body shape that the rules of modesty demand. Some students also consider the use of both 
the niqāb and the burqaʻ as the “peak” of veiling, suggesting that these two types of the veil 
are the best among the rest. Interestingly, this view is also shared by Rashida Hammed while 
comparing her own jilbāb with the niqāb of her friend, Shukuro Jimoh, during a group 
discussion. Although Shukuro (who considers herself to have reached the “peak” in terms of 
veiling)1150 left midway during the discussion, Rashida was full of admiration and respect for 
her for defying all sorts of oppositions and discriminations against it in the Yoruba society. 
Anytime I see someone in niqāb; like that sister, I am seeing her for the first 
time. If I see you in niqāb, I just have to know who you are and your story. It 
is just like an attraction once you are wearing niqāb. I’m just like, wow! 
Because you’ve gone against all the society. It is really not easy, even wearing 
normal ḥijāb. It is not easy especially in the southwest [Nigeria].1151   
 
1146 Mahmood, “Feminist Theory, Embodiment, and the Docile Agent”: 213–6. 
1147 Anifat Oyekola, Field Report on Women and Veiling, 2017. 
1148 Ibrahim Uthman, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
1149 Hammed Rashida (Pseudonym), interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
1150 Shukuroh Jimoh, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
1151 Hammed Rashida (Pseudonym), interview by Adeyemi Balogun. Emphasis mine 
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While the MSSN leaves the option open for female Muslims to choose the type/size of veil 
they want, the choice also depends on what is recommended by the Muslim organisations 
which they belong outside the school. The khimār, for instance, is mostly used by female 
students who are linked to the TMC and Al-Mu’minaat (The Believing Women’s) 
Organisation. Students who identify with different Salafi movements also tend to use niqāb 
and burqaʻ. But the recommendation of the type of veil to adopt has stimulated the reactions 
of many students, including those who are in the MSSN, who contend that the decision to veil 
must be preceded by a deep knowledge of the concept of veiling and why Muslim women are 
required to do so. These students are of the view that the knowledge of veiling will not only 
help women to make informed decisions on the type of veil they want to use but also prevent 
switching from one type of veil to another.1152 This argument buttresses the emphasis in the 
MSSN on the gradual embodiment of knowledge rather than being required to do so at once. 
6.6 Socio-cultural practices 
In the 1950s when its link was established with the students in Lagos, the Burmese Muslim 
students group had annual events that were used to engage members in cultural and educational 
activities such as picnics, lectures, quiz and debates. These activities were often organised 
within the framework of the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday called mawlid al-nabī.1153 Indeed, 
some of these activities, especially the quiz and debates were not new to the Muslim students 
in Lagos in the 1950s. Lateef Adegbite and Saidat Mabadeje actively participated in them, as 
mentioned in Chapter Four. But the extent to which these two activities were used to engage 
issues, if any, relating to Islam and Muslim culture is not known. Despite their experience in 
the activities organised by Lagos schools, however, the ones put together by the Burmese 
students may have shaped the development of their own since the content relate to Islam. Yet, 
this is not to suggest that the MSSN did not borrow from their Christian students’ groups, as 
will be shown later. Since 1954, these social activities have continued to be organised in the 
MSSN, except for a few of them, like the celebration of the Prophet’s birthday which had been 
stopped. Besides, the MSSN also introduced new activities such as the singing and dancing 
competitions (before they were stopped in the late 1980s), entrepreneurship training, and prison 
and hospital visitation. Generally, the participation of Muslim students in these activities 
 
1152 Aminah Olabisi Adisa, interview by Anifat Oyekola, February 17, 2017, Ile-Ife, Osun; Hassan Jelila 
(Pseudonym), interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
1153 Yegar, The Muslims of Burma, 54. 
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showed that they have been able to incorporate the practices of the colonial schools into their 
way of life. 
The social activities of the MSSN are incorporated into several platforms of the Society. A 
major example is the Orientation Programme which is usually organised for first-year students 
at tertiary institutions. Although it is designed to introduce these students to university life, it 
is also put together to give them various kinds of assistance needed to get settled in their new 
environments. This is sometimes expected to prevent them from seeking the assistance of the 
Christian students’ groups who offer the same programme. The orientation is also anticipated 
to prevent them from joining some clubs and associations which are assumed to place less 
emphasis on the worship of God.1154  
At the orientation organised in UI in 2017, the MSSN engaged first-year students in an 
excursion to historical sites around the city of Ibadan such as Mapo Hall. The hall is a colonial 
architectural legacy, commissioned in 1929, used for historical political gatherings in 
Southwest Nigeria. As part of the orientation, the students also had a higly stimulating event 
called Variety Night. The event began with a Qurʾan memorisation competition among students 
who represented each hall of residence in the university. This was followed by a quiz 
competition in which questions were based on Islam. There was also Pick and Talk, an 
intellectual game that has been in practice since the first decade of the history of the Society. 
Contestants in the game, who represented different faculties, discussed the topic they had 
selected from a variety of questions in crumpled papers. Unlike the quiz, these questions were 
not limited to Islam but included questions about science, literature and politics.  
The last major event of the night was the Qurʾan Galore, which was more of an entertainment 
than competition. It involves the recitation of Qurʾanic texts with melodious voices and styles 
of recitation from different Islamic education schools and clerics in Yorubaland. Among these 
were the Adabiyya (of Al-Adabiy’s madrasa) and the Markaziyya (of Al-Ilory’s madrasa) 
styles of recitation. The recitation also included those of popular scholars in the Muslim world 
such as the Imam of the Grand Mosque of Mecca, Abdul-Rahman Ibn Abdul Aziz as-Sudais 
(b. 1960). As-Sudais’ style of recitation has become popular in Nigeria due to the CD and 
cassette technologies which made it possible to record his recitation of the Qurʾan and the 
circulation of this recording among a larger audience. Up to fifteen students participated in the 
galore which incidentally included a member of the Ahmadiyya who recited the Qurʾan with a 
 
1154 Balogun, Field Notes. This include cult groups and palm wine drinkers club referred to as Kegite. 
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technique common to many Ahmadis. Like other events of the night, the galore elicited 
appreciations from many students who were thrilled by the various style of recitations.1155 But 
beyond entertaining the students, the galore illustrates one of the ways in which the MSSN 
accommodates other Muslims despite their different orientations. 
The MSSN has other forms of activities which are common to other Muslims and non-Muslims 
in another event called Jihad Week (also called MSS Week [MSS Day in secondary schools] 
or Islamic Propagation Week in some Lagos branches). The Jihad Week is an annual week-
long event in many tertiary institutions (or day event in secondary schools). To kick-start the 
event, members of the MSSN usually had a procession with students holding posters, handbills 
and banners which displayed the theme of the event around the campus and sometimes outside 
the school. The parade is also used to announce MSSN activities (such as madrasa and weekly 
meetings of members) in the school and to encourage non-Muslims to embrace Islam. In 2016, 
I saw secondary school pupils with MSSN officials who embarked on this parade at Ojuelegba 
Lagos with the theme “Great Procession” (see fig. 5 below). Like in other parades, a public-
address system was also used to create awareness about the week-long programme.  
In 2016, the YABATECH branch of the MSSN embarked on this procession with a horse on 
which its president addressed the student community (shown in fig. 4). The image of a 
horseman in a procession has been a recurring practice during special occasions in many parts 
of Yorubaland. By the 1850s in cities like Osiele and Abeokuta, the leading alfas rode on horses 
in a grand procession to the location where the communal prayer that marked the end of 
Ramadan was performed.1156 Also, in the 1950s colonial Lagos, several grand processions were 
usually organised from the ọba’s (king’s) palace for this festival. The processions, watched by 
the governors of Lagos, had many Muslim associations (ẹgbẹ), social groups, as well as cyclists 
and Muslim chiefs on horses who accompanied the ọba and the chief Imam.1157 While 
processions in the MSSN show continuity with this age-long practice in the Yoruba Muslim 
society, it does not always agree with the interpretation of Islam of many students. An example 
is the student who identified with the ahl al-sunna wa῾l-jamā῾a, mentioned above, who 
contested the whole idea of a procession. But unlike the Success Dua, his arguments were not 
enough to stop the procession. He therefore excused himself from the procession.1158 
 
1155 Balogun, Field Notes. 
1156 Peel, Religious Encounter and the Making of the Yoruba, 203. 
1157 COMCOL, Muhammedan Festivals, 758, NAI. 
1158 Ibrahim Umar, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
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Figure 4. Islamic Propagation Week (IPW) procession of YABATECH, Lagos, 2016. Picture from Ibrahim Umar. 
 
Figure 5. The procession to kickstart MSSN Week of Surulere Area Council, Lagos. Picture by Yemi Balogun, 2016. 
Apart from demonstrating the MSSN continuity with Yoruba Muslim practices in the past, and 
despite the MSSN link to the Burmese group, the organisation of this procession within the 
Western school system may have been appropriated from the practices of many Christian 
missions’ schools and colonial institutions in the early decades of the twentieth century. The 
parade, for instance, attracted children to the mission schools and the Church in Lagos. The 
parade organised by these missionaries included members of the scouting movement, Boy 
Scouts, which was founded in England in 1907 by Robert Baden-Powell and introduced to 
Nigeria by Lord Frederick Lugard in 1915, initially for dependents of British citizens.1159 There 
 
1159 The Scout Association of Nigeria, “The Nigerian Scouter,” (2016). 
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was also the Christian interdenominational youth association, Boys Brigade, established in 
Glasgow in 1883 by William Alexander Smith and introduced to Nigeria in 1908 by Mr. A.W 
Wakeman (Revd. Canon) of the Holy Trinity Anglican Church.1160 There is no doubt that many 
Muslim educational institutions may have appropriated the same practice. From 1938, in the 
process of modernising his own madrasa, Al-Adaby who saw the effect of the parade in Lagos 
organised the same for his students, dressed in similar clothes, in which they marched from 
Ojo Giwa to Onala, via Idumagbo and Jankara. This parade, according to Aliyu, contributed to 
an increase in his student population, from twenty to fifty in one month.1161 Today, in many 
tertiary institutions in Yorubaland, processions and rallies are still organised by Christian 
student groups, as part of their annual socio-religious programmes to create awareness and 
invite students into their folds. Its appropriation by the MSSN may, therefore, be considered as 
a way to promote similar objectives in order to preserve the identity of Muslim students.    
The procession is not the only example of appropriation in the MSSN. In recent times, it has 
included different aspects of urban and youth cultures which are seen during the Jihad Week. 
The most conspicuous is the customising of shirts to bear the logo of the MSSN, the theme of 
the Jihad Week, and the names of each student, as shown in the picture above. In the past, the 
male Muslim students wore traditional attire, which included the agbada (garment), while the 
females wore the blouse, wrapper, head tie, and scarf for the event. Over time, the agbada gave 
way to the kaftan among many male students while the veil replaced the traditional attire of the 
female students. The customised shirts have become the newest addition to these attires. 
The culture of customised shirts seemed to have become prominent in Lagos in the mid-1990s 
among university students to create their own identity and to celebrate life achievements such 
as graduation from a university.1162 What is unique about the shirts is that it allows the students 
to create a personalised variation of their names, or nicknames, in forms that are not necessarily 
intelligible. Examples of such names are “Gbàgbé” (Forget) derived in contrast to the Yoruba 
name “Rántí” (Remember), and “Doohroduller” from the Yoruba name “Dúródọlá” (wait for 
wealth).1163 Muslim names such as “Ibrahim” may also be personalised as “Ibro” and “Abdul-
Akeem” rendered as “Akoko Akumari.” Certainly, the personalisation of Muslim names in this 
way has not escaped the condemnation of many clerics which I am familiar with in Yorubaland. 
 
1160 E. A. Birch, Story of the Boys' Brigade (London: Frederick Muller, 1959), 5. 
1161 Aliyu, Transmission of learning in modern Ilorin, 119. 
1162 Techgeniusworld, “The History of Customised Fashion,” Nairaland, 
https://www.nairaland.com/4161150/history-customising-lagos-nigeria (accessed December 1, 2018). 
1163 Olúsànyà E. Kọ̣́mọláfẹ̣́, “Name ‘Customizing’ Among Nigerian Youth and Its Implications on Literacy and 
Culture,” International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention 3, no. 6 (2014): 48. 
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Incidentally, this topic was part of the discourse in one of the MSSN lectures at the UI mosque 
which I attended in 2017. Like other Muslim clerics, the discussant considered the distortion 
of Muslim names to fall short of a good Muslim identity because most of them are attributes 
of God or names of His prophets, in which a change in letter would render them meaningless 
or turn them to “curses” for those who bear them.1164 To avoid this, most of the customised 
shirts in the MSSN are not usually printed with the names of students. In cases where there are 
names on the shirts, the correct spellings, which are often in Arabic, are used. Yet, this is not 
to suggest that all Muslim students have corrected this practice, as shown in figure 5 below. 
Nonetheless, the use of the customised shirts can be regarded as an aspect of modernity which 
the MSSN translated and made digestible for many Muslim students. 
 
Figure 6. Picture showing a customised name “Harnisheet,” probably from the Muslim name “Hanifa.” Picture by Yemi 
Balogun at UI campus, 2017. 
Apart from this modern youth culture, a handful of local popular cultures are also embedded 
in many MSSN events. A major example is the recitation of a genre of modern poetry called 
ewì in Yorubaland which replaced singing and dancing competitions during MSSN events. 
Given the historical context in which it developed and its features, the ewì may be considered 
as a popular culture that reveals the unbounded nature of the diversity of students’ practices in 
MSSN. Historically, as Oyeniyi Okunoye1165 narrates, the ewì emerged in the nineteenth 
 
1164 Balogun, Field Notes. 
1165 Oyèníyì Okùnoyè, “Ewì, Yorùbá Modernity, and the Public Space,” Research in African Literatures 41, 
no. 4 (2010): 50–1. 
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century among the early educated Christian Egba (at Abeokuta) elite who demonstrated their 
literacy with poems modelled on indigenous poetic forms. The forms include proverbs and 
chants used by hunters and devotees of deities such as the Egúngún (masquerade). The ewì was 
formally established as a genre in the twentieth century as part of the cultural nationalism 
promoted by the Western educated group, Ẹgbẹ Ijinle Yoruba.1166 In this sense, it can be 
regarded as a popular culture with mixes of indigenous and borrowed values that emerged at 
the dawn of Christianization and Western education.1167 An example is the popular Iṣẹ́ ni òògùn 
ìṣẹ́1168 (Work is the antidote for poverty) ewì recited by a female student at the Convention of 
Secondary School Muslim Students (COSSMUS), a holiday course organised by the MSSN in 
2016.1169 This particular ewì is one of the collections of J.F. Odunjo (1904–1980), a teacher 
and politician who published poems, folktales and proverbs in Yoruba for school children. By 
encouraging the ewì, many students in the MSSN usually go beyond the collections of people 
like Odunjo to compose their own. Some of the ewìs composed by these students are quite 
fascinating, as revealed in the case of a young female student who composed her own ewi on 
the topic “hard work” at the COSSMUS event. She began the recitation of this poem with a 
prologue, which contained some chants that are widely used by people of different religious 
groups including the Traditionalists in Yorubaland. 
Mo de ki oloko mo le roko  
Mo de k’olona mo le r’ona mo  
Mo de papapa bi eji ale  
Mo de wara wara bi eji owuro  
Mo de papapa bi eji iyaleta  
Mo ni ki olorire o wa nkan fidi le  
Ki oloriburuku o gbona oko lo ko lo ra agbado  
Mo ti je orogbo ki ohun mi legbo  
Mo ti je ogede ki ohun mi lede  
Mo de werewere ki n le gbo ni o  
Translation1170 
I come to let the farmer stay at home  
I come to let the person on the road stop  
I come like a downpour at night  
I come like an early morning downpour  
I come like a downpour at sunrise  
I beseech the successful One to take a seat 
Let the One with bad luck go and buy maize at the farm  
I have eaten bitter-cola to strengthen my voice 
 
1166Formerly known as the Yoruba Poetry Group  
1167 Ibid. 
1168 See appendix.  
1169 Balogun, Field Notes. 
1170 Translation mine. 
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I have eaten a banana to ease my voice 
I come swiftly for you to hear me.1171 
 
It is also revealing that many members of the MSSN who used to be part of its singing groups 
in the past have changed to writing ewì. Notable among them is Abdul-Hakeem Opadijo, a 
former naibul-amir (vice-president) of the MSSN Oshodi-Isolo Area Council. He is a 
schoolteacher of Yoruba language and culture, and a coordinator of a community-based 
organisation (CBO), called Oshodi Local Heritage. His CBO provides support for the less-
privileged in Lagos. Following the arguments against singing in the MSSN in the 1980s and 
the new kind of knowledge (àgbọ́yé) they had, according to him, he shifted his interest from 
music to ewì.  
I was trained by MSS. Starting from secondary school, during the time of 
singing. I love singing. I started as a fuji [a genre of music among the Yoruba] 
musician and I later joined Islamic singing. But when understanding came to 
MSS that singing is not part of it, so I changed it to poem.1172 
Up to 2005 when the Ashafa faction of MSSN left the B-Zone, Opadijo usually composed ewìs 
that reflected on different themes of the annual MSSN IVC. The poems may include chants, 
supplication and injunctions from Islamic texts. According to him, he has been able to create 
these mixes because of his deep understanding of Yoruba culture and his knowledge of 
Islam.1173 
Apart from the ewì, Opadijo like some other members of the Society, also performs a musical 
genre of poetry that is popular among Muslim clerics in Yorubaland called wákà. This genre 
is often traced to Badamaṣi Musa Agbaji, mentioned in Chapter Three,1174 who composed many 
of these poems in the nineteenth century. The poem is mostly rendered with a musical tone 
with verses that could be a supplication or sermon called waasi (Arabic wa'z). It is also 
performed with Qur’anic verses used to celebrate returning pilgrims, the birth of a child and 
new couples. Over the years, it moved beyond these modes of expression. From the 1950s, it 
developed into a form of ‘Islamic song’ exclusively performed by Muslim women during 
ceremonies. The 1980s saw the genre popularised beyond its confines of ‘Islamic song’ by 
Batili Alake (d. 2013) and Salawa Abeni (b. 1961), the two female Muslims who incorporated 
 
1171 Balogun, Field Notes. 
1172 Abdul-Hakeem Opadijo, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. Emphasis in italics mine. 
1173 Ibid.  
1174 “Badamasi B. Musa Agbaji,” in Arabic Literature of Africa Online, ed. John O. Hunwick and R. S. 
O’Fahey (Leiden: Brill, 2016). 
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traditional musical instruments into it and commercialised it.1175 Despite this development, 
wákà has continued to be rendered with no musical instrument by most Muslim clerics. Given 
that a number of Muslim students studied under these clerics, they also rendered the wákà 
during their lectures at MSSN events. In one of his lectures, for instance, Opadijo performed 
the wákà below as a criticism of both the Christians and Traditionalists in Yoruba society. 
Mimo ni f’Olorun mi, mimo ni fun Oba ogo  
Allahu ko pe meji, laye ati l’Orun 
E so fun baba Sango ko ni k’irin wo pa ohun 
E so fun eni t’on bo Oya k’oni k’odo gbe ohun lo  
E so fun awon t’on sin Jesu k’oni ki won kan won pa  
E mi lo sowipe iku Allah ni ma ku (Opadijo 2017)  
Translation1176  
Glory be to Allah, glory be to Allah 
Allah is One, on earth and in heaven  
Tell the Sango [god of iron] priest to prevail on iron to crush him to death  
Tell the one who worships Oya [river goddess] to prevail on the river to be 
drawn by it  
Tell those who worship Jesus to call for their own crucifixion  
But I can say that Allah will be responsible for my own death.  
The content of Opadijo’s wákà reflects the kind of discourse that is employed by many Yoruba 
Muslims to oppose the practices of non-Muslims in their lectures. Thus, it is a genre that is also 
instrumentalised in interreligious encounters. Importantly too, it shows the MSSN continuity 
with the practices of other Yoruba Muslims in their encounters with non-Muslims. Besides, the 
various aspects of popular culture such as the ewì and wákà tend to reveal the innovative 
blending of different traditions that shape the diversity in the practice of sunna in MSSN. 
6.7 Conclusion 
In sum, the everyday rituals, ways of dressing and socio-cultural practices among Muslim 
students in the period after the MSSN reform are varied and inconsistent as this chapter 
demonstrates. This support the argument that the Society’s reform neither leads to a fixed 
understanding of Islam nor unchanging practices. To this extent, these findings call attention 
to the risk of understanding Islamic reform and the ideals it seeks to promote in a narrow sense. 
The case of MSSN shows that Islamic reform is shaped by certain notions of Islam which are 
highly debated among Muslims. It is therefore important to take cognizance of the debates on 
these notions in the understanding of Islamic reform in the MSSN, and in other similar social 
 
1175 Bode Omojola, Yorùbá Music in the Twentieth Century: Identity, Agency, and Performance Practice, 
(Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2012), 211. 
1176 Translation mine. 
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contexts. In the same vein, it is also important to be aware of the role of socio-historical realities 
of the setting in which the ideals of Islamic reform are debated and set into operation. The 
realities in the case of the MSSN suggest that the efforts aimed at producing good Muslims 
have not only been informed by the foundational texts of Islam; the efforts also involved paying 
attention to the societal norms, challenges and concerns which include those of non-Muslims. 
To be a good Muslim in this sense is not just about cultivating oneself based on certain ideals 
in Islamic texts, the cultivation also entails reflecting and negotiating between what those texts 
say and what is possible in a given setting. 
In support of Loimeier,1177 it is worth noting that while the MSSN effort on Islamic reform 
emphasises the promotion of the traditions of Muslims in the past, this effort is also open to the 
ideals of modern society and local cultural practices. This underscores the MSSN promotion 
of a “balanced position” in Islam and the “tolerance of Islam to other cultures” which enabled 
the Society to embrace the cultures of the modern world and those of Yoruba society. As a 
result, the new ways of being a Muslim in the MSSN has developed through a series of 
negotiations between the traditions of the past and those of the changing modern society, which 
ensures that many Muslim students inhabit multiple identities rather than one. 
Along the same line, the continuities in the practices of MSSN and those of other Muslims, 
which include the Sufi and asalatu groups in Yorubaland also suggest that MSSN does not 
promote ideas that are unique and clear-cut from them. In this regard, this chapter supports the 
argument in many studies which emphasised the overlapping doctrinal traditions and 
continuities between reformist and Sufi Muslims.1178 More importantly, it underscores the 
notion that, despite the effort of reformers to position themselves differently from the Sufis, 
there is one Islam which is nevertheless understood and lived differently in various social 
contexts. In all, this chapter show that the diversity in MSSN reform is produced by a wide 
range of processes which can be understood from such perspectives as syncretisation, 
assemblage, pluralism, incommensurability and relationality. These various perspectives 
suggest that religious diversity is a multidimensional and interlinked process and it manifest in 
differences in practice, symbols and beliefs. 
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Chapter Seven 
Afiwekewu/Akewukewe: MSSN and New Forms of Islamic Education 
7.1 Introduction 
The two Yoruba words used as topics of this chapter, afiwekewu and akewukewe (mentioned 
in Chapter Four), are employed to describe the way Yoruba Muslims, and the MSSN, make 
sense of the educational experiences of Muslims in the Islamic and Western school systems. 
The former illustrates a method of learning with the aid of the Western school episteme and 
pedagogy, often with less competence or knowledge on the different aspects of Arabic 
language and the ethics of Islamic education, while the latter suggests having such competence 
and ethics in addition to being educated in the Western school. The two concepts are used in 
this chapter not only to demonstrate the link between Western education and Islamic education 
in the MSSN but also why members of the Society, as well as Yoruba Muslims, framed the 
link in these terms. Looking beyond the nexus between Islamic and Western schooling, these 
terms also help to shed light on the change in Islamic knowledge production among Muslims 
in Yorubaland since the colonial period.  
As discussed in Chapter Four, two of the objectives of MSSN are to encourage the study of the 
Qurʾan and Hadith and to provide guidance on how to live as a Muslim in Nigeria. From 1954, 
these objectives have been carried out in ways that incorporate the pedagogy and epistemology 
of the three forms of Islamic education that came into being in Yoruba society by 1960 and 
beyond this period: the classical madrasa (Qur’anic school which has incorporated little or no 
aspects of Western school pedagogy), the reformed madrasa (Qur’anic school which has 
incorporated many aspects of the Western school system), and Muslim schools (which are 
established along the Western school system). In addition to these three, the MSSN also 
instituted new methods of learning from transnational Islamic movements from the 1960s. This 
form of religious change, which Eller refers to as “addition,”1179 is the basis of my argument in 
this chapter that the MSSN has contributed to the development of Islamic education in post 
independence Yorubaland (and Nigeria) and that its contribution is part of the mode in which 
the ‘classical’ Islamic education has been transformed following the impact of modern 
education and colonization. The MSSN’s contribution is not only about instituting another 
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religious education but also promoting the old and contemporary methods and epistemes of 
this learning. The Society has demonstrated this by introducing the madrasa system into public 
and private schools and promoting varying forms of knowledge transmission which include the 
Islamic Vacation Course (IVC), usrah (lit. family, referred to as study circle), leadership 
training and the gendered Brothers’ Forum and Sisters’ Circle. Though they are all connected 
to one another in some way, each form of education embodies specific contents or subjects that 
are used to shape the MSSN notion of a Muslim in a modern society and a multireligious 
setting. The subjects of this educational programme range from Arabic language to Qur’an 
memorisation, devotional practices, religious comparison, moral conduct, leadership skills, 
politics and marital affairs. These various subjects and the platforms employed to transmit them 
will be a major part of the discussion in this chapter. This is aimed at answering the following 
research question: what are the forms of education in MSSN and aspects of knowledge taught 
in the Society? 
To understand the forms of knowledge transmission in the MSSN and how the MSSN 
contributed to Islamic education, this chapter is situated within the wider context of change of 
the Islamic education following the impact of colonial policies on Muslim education, the 
introduction of Western education, new communication technologies and eventually the 
Internet. One of the major outcomes of this change in Yorubaland is the transmission of Islamic 
knowledge in a Western school system (and particularly in Christian schools) with its own 
distinctive pedagogy and epistemology which is different from the classical madrasa rooted in 
many Islamic debates and traditions.1180 The other results of this change include the 
establishment of Muslim schools that integrate Western and Islamic education, and the 
adoption of Western school pedagogy by many madrasas. This change not only happened in 
Yorubaland but also in many Muslim societies in Africa. Some of the studies that focused on 
this change include Louis Brenner’s Controlling knowledge1181 in Mali which showed that a 
network of modern médersas (madrasas), that combined secular subjects and Western 
education pedagogy with those of Islamic education, emerged in opposition to the state schools 
that were favoured by the French colonial government. The edited volume by Robert Launay, 
Islamic Education in Africa,1182 further demonstrates that the change caused by the adoption 
of Western school pedagogy by Islamic educational institutions in many parts of Africa led to 
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the use of blackboards which symbolised different methods and epistemes from the classical 
madrasa and led to the emergence of Muslims with a distinctive educational experience from 
the past. While one of the major aims of this chapter is to highlight the contribution of the 
MSSN to the transmission of Islamic knowledge in Yoruba society, it also argues that the 
MSSN contribution is only part of these wide-ranging changes. 
The broader transformation of Islamic education in Africa has led to a significant adjustment 
in the process of the transmission of Islamic knowledge. An important aspect of this change 
that is crucial to the case of the MSSN is what Dale Eickelman refers to as the 
“objectification”1183 of religion in many Muslim societies. One of the main features of this 
objectification is when ‘Islam’ is made an object of study in relation to the other subjects in 
schools. Another aspect of the change that is close to the example of the MSSN is what Gregory 
Starrett called “functionalisation” of religion, referring to how Islamic knowledge is put to 
work for socio-economic and political ends of the colonial government.1184 My respondents in 
the MSSN used certain terms like “practicals” and “student language” that are related to these 
concepts of objectification and functionalisation. Thus, I draw on Eickelman and Starrett 
studies to analyse what they meant by these terms in order to demonstrate the kind of 
knowledge that is taught to Muslim students.  
In addition to the new process of transmission, there has also been an epistemological shift, but 
not in practice, in Islamic knowledge production particularly from the esoteric to the exoteric 
(including Brenner’s notion of ‘rational’) paradigm. The promotion of what Seesemann refers 
to as the maqāṣid (purposes, objectives) by postcolonial Muslim professionals is also part of 
this shift. Theoretically, many studies suggest that the two well-known paradigms, esoteric and 
exoteric, are interwoven in Islamic knowledge production, yet there have been debates between 
Muslims of Sufi and reformist traditions that one is more correct than the other. Among Yoruba 
Muslims, this debate is directly related to the concepts of afiwekewu and akewukewe. This 
chapter therefore draws on the literature on these various paradigms to analyse the 
epistemological variation in Islamic education in Yorubaland and in the transmission of 
knowledge in the MSSN. And, as I will argue, even though the MSSN deemphasises the 
esoteric paradigm in its approach to reform, the transmission of knowledge in the Society does 
not support its move away from this episteme.  
 
1183 Eickelman, “Mass Higher Education and the Religious Imagination in Contemporary Arab Societies”: 646-
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In the next section, this chapter will focus on the history and change in Islamic education in 
Yorubaland in order to situate how the MSSN contributed to the development of Islamic 
education. This section also analyses the MSSN link to the objectification and functionalisation 
of Islam, epistemological variation in Islamic education, and the concepts of afiwekewu and 
akewukewe. The second section will analyse the contributions of MSSN to Islamic education 
through different forms of the transmission of knowledge, the type of subjects and morals that 
are taught to students, and the epistemes that shape them. My analyses will draw on literature 
that are connected to the new forms of education in the MSSN. For instance, the discussion on 
the IVC and the madrasa draw from studies on Islamic education in Africa including Brenner 
and Launay’s works. As part of the IVC, I also refer to studies on the activities of Islamic 
reform movements and comparative religious discourse in Muslim societies of Africa. On the 
leadership training, an insight, with a critique, is taken from Peel’s argument on the “double 
sense of inferiority” of Yoruba Muslims. Also, an insight from Mahmood’s study of the da’wa 
activities of Muslim women in Egypt is employed to reflect on the Sister’s Circle, while the 
discussion on usrah draws from the literature on the role of the mosque as a centre of Islamic 
education. I wish to note that the presentation of some aspects of these forms of education is 
descriptive, but in line with the studies on change in Islamic education which I refer to in the 
first section. In the concluding section, I reflect on the MSSN contribution to Islamic education 
and its impact on Yoruba Muslim society. 
7.2 Change in Islamic education in Yorubaland 
Until the beginning of the twentieth century, the classical madrasas in Yorubaland provided 
Islamic education for the majority of Muslims.1185 These madrasas operated informally often 
with no specified structure. They were held in places such as the homes of the teacher and 
mosques in the morning, late noon and at night after the last obligatory prayer. Little is known 
about the method of learning in these madrasas and how they were organised. But from the 
praxis of those that survived well into the twentieth century, this appears to be done in three 
stages. The first was the elementary school called ile kewu wala (slate school). The name of 
this school is indicative of the main materials used for learning and developing Arabic writing 
which are the ‘wooden slate’ (Yoruba, wala) and ‘ink’ (Yoruba, tadaa). Learning in these 
 
1185 See Aliyu, Transmission of learning in modern Ilorin; Stefan Reichmuth, Islamische Bildung Und Soziale 
Intergration in Ilorin (Nigeria) Seit Ca. 1800, (Münster: Lit Verlag, 1998); Reichmuth, “Education and the 
Growth of Religious Associations among Yoruba Muslims”; Olurode, Glimpses of Madrasa from Africa; 
Sakariyau A. Aliyu, “The Modernisation of Islamic Education in Ilorin: A Study of the Adabiyya and 
Markaziyya Educational Systems,” Islamic Africa 10 (2019); and Oladiti, “The Growth and Development of 
Modern Arabic schools in Ibadan, 1945-2000”. 
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schools began with the Arabic alphabet inscribed by the teacher or older students and 
progressed to the memorisation of short texts and verses of the Qur’an. The process was 
through constant repetition and incremental learning. Most pupils enrolled in these madrasas 
before the age of seven, and they were not allowed to ‘carry’ (Yoruba, gbe) the Qur’an because 
it was assumed to be sacred for them at this level. While learning, they sat on a mat with their 
slates around a teacher who often held a cane or whip to inculcate discipline and ensure correct 
pronunciation of the texts.1186 This kind of physical discipline is one of the ways in which the 
body is disciplined to embody the sacred text, even though its importance should not be 
exaggerated. The practice supports Rudolph Ware’s argument that Islamic knowledge is 
embodied and it “is brought into the world through concrete practices of corporal 
discipline.”1187 
Most students stopped at this first stage, having memorised the text they needed to perform 
daily rituals, and began to learn a trade. Generally, few students proceeded to the second stage 
called ile kewu ilimi1188 (lit. knowledge school) referred to as the Advanced level in many 
studies.1189 This stage primarily involved the translation of the Qur’an and the Hadith, but 
students were able to learn a few other related topics to this translation such as nahw (grammar), 
fiqh (jurisprudence), and adab (ethics). Thereafter, they proceeded to the third stage considered 
the area of specialisation. Subjects taught at this stage include nahw, adab, fiqh, ṣarf 
(morphology), iman (faith), tajwīd (elocution), and tafsīr (exegesis). Unlike the first and 
second, there were multiple teachers who specialised in different texts at this stage. This often 
meant that students travelled from one town to another studying a text or part of it under a 
learned scholar. Upon completion, a student obtained an ijaza (authorisation) which certified 
that he had mastered the text. Notable towns with such scholars include Ilorin, Epe, Iwo and 
Iseyin.1190 
The language of communication between the teacher and students was a barrier in the early 
classical madrasas because the teachers were mostly Hausa, Fulani and Tapa speaking people. 
As a result, the students had to learn the language of their teachers first (or the teachers learned 
Yoruba). This resulted in the appropriation of many Arabic and Hausa words into Yoruba as 
 
1186 Aliyu, Transmission of learning in modern Ilorin, 59–68; Olurode, Glimpses of Madrasa from Africa, 49–
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well as the writing of Yoruba in Arabic. The Ajami script, mentioned in Chapter Three, is one 
of the products of this appropriation. Such texts continued to be used until the second half of 
the twentieth century when the Arabic primer, Qaidat Baghdadi, was introduced to teach the 
standardised Arabic phonetics.1191 The primer also led to the decline of the use of slate. 
Organising wolimọ (from the Arabic word walīmah, referring to banquet) following the 
memorisation of certain verses of the Qur’an were marked in these madrasas. The feast was 
frequently marked with chicken or a ram, and it was understood to encourage the enrolment of 
many children into the madrasas.1192 However, the huge expenses involved in the feast also 
contributed to the dropping out of many students from the madrasas. This was the experience 
of Alhaji Ladejo, a member of Ansar-Ud-Deen Society (AUD), who was forced to drop out 
from his madrasa in the colonial period because of the huge cost of the wolimọ.1193 
From the second half of the nineteenth century, the introduction of Western schools by 
Christian missionaries began to pose a challenge to this madrasa system. With many students 
enrolling in Western schools, attendance at the madrasas gradually began to decline. Some 
madrasas adjusted to this change by teaching students in the afternoon and at night after the 
students had attended the Western schools in the morning. On the other hand, some madrasas 
borrowed from the practices and teaching methods of Western schools while they continued to 
operate in the morning. This innovation began in the madrasa established in Lagos by Shaykh 
Al-Adaby in 1938. His innovations included the adoption of a curriculum for teaching, the use 
of benches and tables which signalled a departure from sitting on the mat, and the use of a 
blackboard that represents a break from the slate. Other Muslim scholars who borrowed from 
the Western school system, though in varying degrees, were Shaykh Al-Ilory, founder of 
Markaz in Lagos,1194 and Shaykh Kharashi Muhammad Thanni (d. 1965) the proprietor of 
Kharashi Memorial Arabic Secondary School, Ibadan (est. 1945).1195 However, the reforms of 
these madrasas did not lead to the collapse of the classical madrasa system; the two of them 
continued to co-exist in Yorubaland. Generally speaking, these reformed madrasas impacted 
on the development of MSSN Islamic education in one major respect. As discussed in Chapter 
Five, these madrasas produced students who got admitted into tertiary institutions and became 
 
1191 Aliyu, Transmission of learning in modern Ilorin, 62. 
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133–37. 
1195 Oladiti, “The Growth and Development of Modern Arabic schools in Ibadan, 1945-2000”: 26–30. 
277 
 
teachers, Imams and leaders in the MSSN. Many of these students later introduced different 
methods and epistemes of the reformed madrasas into the MSSN. 
Apart from the madrasas, the transformation that led to the establishment of Muslim schools 
further impacted Islamic education in the MSSN. It should be noted that many of these Muslim 
schools, as discussed in Chapter Three, had been established through communal and 
associational efforts before Al-Adaby’s innovation. Thus, the establishment of these schools 
formally introduced new pedagogies to Islamic education which included the use of 
chalkboards, a curriculum for religious instruction and a shift from learning under a learned 
scholar to a more direct, albeit selective, access to Islamic texts. They also ensured that the 
space for transmitting Islamic education was expanded beyond the madrasa. Reichmuth’s 
study illustrates how one of the Muslim associations, the Ansar-Ud-Deen (AUD), promoted 
this new method.1196 In 1931, the AUD established its first school in Lagos and by the late 
1960s, it increased to over two hundred in various parts of Nigeria.1197 The schools largely 
operated along the Western model with a curriculum that laid strong emphasis on ‘secular’ 
subjects such as English and Arithmetic. At inception, the curriculum included Islamic 
instruction taught in the English language with no Arabic content. But by the 1970s, which 
coincided with the 1976 UPE (discussed in Chapter Four) policy that made provisions for 
Arabic language in the school curriculum, the AUD began to emphasise the importance of 
Arabic language as an important aspect of Muslim identity. It established Arabic classes in 
many of these schools which were attended by both children and older people such as market 
women and professionals.1198  
The involvement of women in the transmission of religious knowledge from the colonial period 
is another major feature of the changing Islamic education among Yoruba Muslims. The AUD, 
which emphasised the participation of Muslim women in public life, provided the platform for 
many women as part of this transformation. Among the women were Imam Ekemode's wife, 
Hulaymat M. Ekemode (later Mrs. Shodeinde, d. 1971). She taught at the first AUD school at 
Alakoro in Lagos (1932-1969) and organised Adult Education lessons for women in both 
English and Yoruba. There was also Aminat O. Gbajabiamila (1908-83) referred to as Onikewu 
Adini (teacher of the religion). A wife of a member of AUD’s Mission Board, she organised 
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tafsīr and Arabic classes for women in the society.1199 Over the years, other Muslim 
organisations including the MSSN have encouraged this AUD model among women. 
The organisation of study circles also came into being as part of this changing Islamic 
education. An early form of these circles was the Augusto led Muslim Literary Society 
(mentioned in Chapter Three) in the 1910s. As discussed in Chapter Five, more of these circles 
were organised by the Muslim elite who studied away from Nigeria which they used to engage 
some members of the MSSN. Aside from these circles, one can add that the expansion of radio 
and television broadcast services from 19351200 also impacted on new forms of transmission of 
Islamic knowledge. As I mentioned in Chapter Three, Imam Ekemode of the AUD and Dawud 
Noibi promoted this form of education with the discourse of Islam on the radio from 1955.1201 
There were also clerics such as Imam Shodeinde of the Ahmadiyya who stimulated the 
discourse of Islam through newspapers.1202 From 1954, the MSSN adopted many aspects of 
these forms of education, albeit with some modifications. The Society also facilitated the 
emergence of new ones among which is the IVC. 
As seen in many Muslim societies in Africa, the transformation of Islamic education in 
Yorubaland since the colonial period led to a significant adjustment to the epistemology and 
process of transmission of Islamic knowledge. Some key aspects of this transformation are the 
processes in which Islam has been ‘objectified’ and ‘functionalised.’ Added to these is the shift 
in modes of knowledge transmission and authentication, particularly the esoteric and exoteric 
paradigms.  
7.2.1 ‘Objectification’ and ‘functionalisation’ of Islam  
As Eickelman points out, the objectification of Islam refers to the process in which three kinds 
of questions became prominent in the consciousness of many believers in the modern era. 
These are: “What is my religion? Why is it important to my life? and, How do my beliefs guide 
my conduct?”1203 These objective questions involved discourse about Islam that is shaped by a 
large number of people and the practice of all Muslims. Often, the discourse may be led by 
people considered to be experts, even though many Muslims may disagree with these experts. 
The discourse also acknowledges the traditions of both Muslims and non-Muslims. The major 
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factors responsible for this objectification, as Eickelman argues, are the increase in access to 
mass (including higher) education and mass communication.1204  
One of the measures of this objectification is how, for many Muslims, Islam has become a 
coherent system and a subject to be “explained” and “understood” in relation to other 
disciplines or systems. This found expression in school textbooks, newspapers and cassette-
sermons in which Islam is presented as a set of beliefs and practices. Presentation of this kind 
of knowledge is common in the writings of reformist thinkers such as Sayyid Qutb who 
considers religious beliefs as “systems” that could be differentiated from one another.1205 By 
presenting Islam this way, the mediation of a learned scholar in the transmission of knowledge 
is removed. The discussion of Islam in this way may also be considered a radical departure 
from the medieval tradition in which matters of the religion were debated based on different 
social conditions. Based on the medieval tradition, Islamic knowledge accommodates change 
because it is constantly being reinterpreted according to varying historical conditions. 
However, while this tradition has not been displaced among many Muslims, objectification 
seeks to promote Islamic knowledge as something that is fixed and unchanging.1206 
By the end of the twentieth century in Yoruba Muslim society, objectification of Islam was 
apparent in the way Islamic knowledge was transmitted in Muslim schools such as those of the 
AUD and the government schools. These schools facilitated the teaching of ‘Islam’ in the 
discipline referred to as Islamic Religious Studies/Knowledge (IRS or IRK) as a subject to be 
studied in relation to others such as Biology and Mathematics. They promoted mass 
transmission of Islamic knowledge through a teacher who taught many subjects of the religion, 
rather than a specialist in one subject. The subjects taught by the teacher were spelt out in a 
newly designed curriculum. Another major development in these schools was the production 
of textbooks for the curriculum. Many of these textbooks were authored by western educated 
Arabic and Islamic scholars such as the University of London-trained Ismail Balogun who 
authored Islamic Religious Studies for Schools and Colleges,1207 the British-born Aisha Lemu 
who produced Islamic Knowledge for Senior Secondary Schools,1208 and Musa Abdul, a 
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graduate of  McGill University in Canada, who wrote on The prophet of Islam.1209 These books 
formed the basis of Islamic knowledge for many Muslim students who did not attend the 
madrasa. It must be pointed out that cases of objectification were not only observed in the 
schools, they also found expression in the emergence of media-based sermons through the 
radio, television and audiocassettes generally in Nigeria. As mentioned in Chapter Four, the 
MSSN also made use of radio and television to broadcast its sermons. These various aspects 
of objectification are also closely related to the process of functionalisation in the transmission 
of Islamic education. 
Starrett argues that functionalisation of religion is a “process of translation in which intellectual 
objects from one discourse come to serve the strategic or utilitarian ends of another 
discourse.”1210 This usually shifts the meaning of the context of the object of discourse and 
ensures that religious discourses become reified to fulfil a purpose. Starrett emphasises this 
point by using the policy of the British colonial government in Egypt which encouraged 
Muslim teachers to place “spiritual education and moral uplift” in the same context “as the 
habit of cleanliness and cooperation-enhancing village games”1211 for students in elementary 
schools. Under this policy, Muslim scholars and study circles were also placed under 
government bureaucracies as part of the broader colonial policy to use religion to promote 
social planning rather than the embodiment of the Qur’an. Consequently, the policy ensured 
that the values, beliefs and institutions of Islam that have their own evaluative criteria were 
subsumed to the evaluative criteria of social and political ends.1212 
There are many examples in the textbooks produced for Muslim students (generally in Nigeria) 
that show how Islam is functionalised. For instance, in Lemu’s pedagogical text for primary 
schools, Methodology of Primary Islamic Studies,1213 she encouraged teachers to teach the 
morals of Islam so that children can become “good Muslims” and “good citizens” in the society.  
The teacher should relate worship and the moral and social teachings of Islam 
to the pupils’ daily lives, at home, at school, and as members of the 
community. The good Muslim is automatically a good citizen, and the 
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teacher’s emphasis on Islamic moral conduct in everyday life can do much to 
set the younger generation on the road to a better society.1214 
Furthermore, Lemu encouraged the teachers to teach Islamic Studies by relating it to other 
subjects such as Health Education, Mathematics and Agricultural Science so that students can 
see Islam in every aspect of the knowledge of the world. This method was also expected to 
help children affirm their faith in Islam as she pointed out below. 
Islamic Studies should not be taught as something unrelated to other 
knowledge. Seeing other subjects from the Islamic viewpoint helps the 
children to know their value and to integrate them into their overall 
understanding of the world. Also, in teaching Islamic Studies, references to 
things the children have learned in other subjects often act as excellent 
illustrations of the teachings of Islam, which helps to confirm the child’s 
faith.1215 
Bringing Islam into other contexts in the manner recommended by Lemu for children is also 
common in the writings of many Western educated Yoruba Muslims. A major example is 
Abdul’s contribution to the journal of the MSSN, “The Role of Islam in the Development Plan 
of Nigeria”1216 which stated why Islam can be used for social and political ends. 
Islam does not make a difference between the religious and secular life of the 
individuals. One is to supplement the other, that is, the religious teachings and 
practices are purposely directed towards making every citizen a useful 
member of the community. In this wise, the behaviour of Musa, for example, 
in the mosque or at any religious gathering should not be different from his 
behaviour - thinking, dealings - at a marketplace or at a political gathering.1217   
Given that members of MSSN usually go through the school system in which IRS/IRK is 
taught, the process of objectification and functionalisation of Islam also impacted on the type 
of Islamic education in the MSSN. In addition to the schools, the impact of this process also 
comes from senior members of the MSSN who became academics, such as Abdul and Balogun, 
and continued to be involved in the Society’s programmes as guest lecturers or Imams. This 
impact is found in the testimonies of some of my respondents who argue that while the MSSN 
produces the same Islamic knowledge as in the madrasa, the MSSN is only different from the 
madrasa because the knowledge produced in the MSSN is in “student language.” The “student 
language,” used by them, is one of the ways in which I think they make sense of the notion of 
objectification and functionalisation of Islam. Adebisi Razak, who is one of the MSSN leaders 
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in Lagos, considered “student language” to mean the use of expressions that students can 
comprehend as well as the discourse of issues that is closer to what a student can relate with, 
as he explains here;  
And, when I say ‘student language’, you will see that… your colleagues are 
the one delivering the lecture. You will appreciate it…because they 
understand what you are facing as a Muslim and, also as a student. They speak 
your language and use the explanation that you can comprehend.1218  
Closely related to this “student language” is the assumption by Razak that people’s 
“environment” also has an impact on how they comprehend and engage different issues. This 
notion of environment, which Razak assumes to be another key factor that differentiates the 
transmission of knowledge in the MSSN from the madrasa, reflects Lemu’s advice for teachers 
to relate Islam with what a student can identify with.  
Your environment goes a long way in appreciating what you are doing. What 
I mean in that respect is that, for example, there are tenets of Islam that, as a 
student or let me say as a worker, there are different ways you view some 
issues. Or let me say, if you are a family man and you have someone that is 
not married, when there are issues, there are different ways they would view 
it because the environment a married man is operating is different from the 
environment a single person is operating… that’s why I said the methodology 
used by the madrasa in teaching Islam is not the same methodology MSS use. 
Because the environment differs.1219  
The method of transmission of knowledge in the MSSN also illustrates how functionalisation 
of Islam may be understood. Unlike the classical madrasa, transmission of knowledge usually 
begins with the memorisation of the Arabic alphabet and the Qur’an which often take many 
years for some students to complete before they are taught the meaning of the memorised texts. 
Meanwhile, even though memorisation of the Qur’an is also emphasised in the MSSN, the 
Society mostly facilitates learning through discourse, the use of English-Arabic transliterated 
texts and literature that discusses Islam in English. This method helped the students to move 
beyond the process of memorisation of the whole Qur’an for many years before the reform, 
although the method did not cease after the reform. As this method of transmission also 
facilitates the practical demonstration of lessons in Islamic texts, it allowed many of my 
respondents to contend that the MSSN teaches the “practicals” of Islam. They mostly used 
“practical” to mean that the MSSN guides students to live according to what the Qur’an and 
Hadith say while they assume the tuition in the madrasa to fall short of this. Yekin narrated his 
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own experience suggesting that while he studied at a madrasa for some years, he could not 
practice what he had learnt properly before his association with the MSSN.  
After my secondary education, I also had the opportunity to learn at an Arabic 
institution for three years at Iwo before I had opportunity of pursuing higher 
degrees. So, you know, from my experience, I am able to know that learning 
Arabic is a way and then practicalizing it and imbibing it is yet another tuition 
that one learns through interaction with like minds – people of like 
orientations. So, not until one has the opportunity of such association, one 
may not really appreciate what we are talking about.1220 
For many students, access to literature from organisations such as the WAMY played an 
important role in teaching what they regarded as the “practicals” of Islam. As narrated by one 
of my respondents, this literature helped them to differentiate the “real Islam” from their former 
religious experiences because they spelt out what Islam was all about and how they could 
imbibe every aspect of the religion.  
When we were at the madrasa, we were taught how to read the Qur’an by our 
alfa. So, there is no practical experience as par how the religion is supposed 
to be practised. What we all know was that Islam is based on knowing the 
Qur’an and how to do small things like burning things [charms] 
The real Islam that I’m talking about is, we never learn it in the madrasa that 
this is practical salat. All we knew was how to read Arabic, how to make 
intentions, what can nullify a salat. But the rudiment aspect of how to offer 
the salat itself, this is how Islam explains it, this is the right intention. As at 
then, we were all the same whether you are a Christian or either you are a 
Muslim, or you are something else. We don’t see anything different in it. 
Later on, we realized that the Islam we learnt in Arabic is different from what 
we are now seeing. This is the practical Islam. We were now being introduced 
to new books. That was when WAMY came to Nigeria and brought some 
literature.1221 
However, this position on “practicals” should not be taken at face value because it is part of 
the narratives used to claim the idea that the practice of one Muslim group is better than others. 
Rather, the idea that the MSSN teaches the “practicals” of Islam should be understood as the 
outcome of objectification and functionalisation, which Razak suggested in an interview, has 
helped the MSSN to fill an important void in Islamic education for many Muslim students who 
did not attend the madrasa. As he narrated, 
Most of the instruction of our madrasa alfas are actually tailored to learn 
Arabic, maybe learn how to read Qur’an. But, the etiquette value of it, 
appreciating the reason why you do those things, they don’t fill those gaps. 
And, that is why some coordinators of those madrasas don’t live what they 
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preach. MSS now came in, to encourage you to live according to what is 
preached. So, people see it in their character… that is the gap we fill.1222  
On the other hand, teaching the “practicals” of Islam and encouraging students to live according 
to them may also be understood within the context of an embodiment of Islamic knowledge 
which is a key attribute of the epistemology of Islamic education in the madrasa. This is noted 
in the point made by Yekin above that his training in MSSN taught him how to practicalise and 
imbibe Islamic knowledge. As Ware rightly points out, “to embody Islamic knowledge is to 
actualize it, to make it concrete through deeds.”1223 Based on this, even if they are new 
methodological developments, objectification and functionalisation of Islam also foster the 
embodiment of Islamic knowledge for students in the MSSN like those trained in the madrasas. 
7.2.2 Epistemological variation in Islamic education  
The change in Islamic education in Yorubaland has also impacted on its epistemological 
character. Many studies of Muslims in Africa show that two main epistemes are connected to 
this change referred to as the esoteric and exoteric/rationalistic forms of knowledge.1224 These 
epistemes are closely linked to the style of debates in the MSSN reforms noted in Chapter Five. 
For the purpose of this chapter, I wish to restate and widen the main arguments of these 
epistemes in studies of Islamic education. The esoteric paradigm assumes that the highest form 
of knowledge (religious) is known to a few specialists and that a student must learn from these 
specialists through an initiatic form. This personalised form of learning, according to Loimeier, 
is based on the theory that knowledge is neither gained in the text nor imparted by an institution 
nor through individual learning, because these forms of learning may cause misunderstandings 
due to interpretation.1225 On the contrary, knowledge is considered to reside in a learned 
teacher, considered to have the spiritual blessing (baraka), and can only be transmitted through 
personal teaching together with the baraka. Therefore, only a learned person can provide 
explanations in cases of the misunderstanding of the texts. One of the methods of realising this 
knowledge is embedded in the structures of the madrasas and majlis (personalised tuition) 
schools where students first learn the Qur’an by rote before proceeding to the stage where 
meaning is taught (as described in the Yoruba madrasas above). This process, linked to Sufism, 
 
1222 Adebisi Razak (Pseudonym), interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
1223 Ware, The walking Qur'an, 8. 
1224 Brenner, Controlling Knowledge, 7–8; Ware, The walking Qur'an, 203–27. 
1225 Loimeier, Between Social Skills and Marketable Skills, 151. 
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ensures that knowledge is acquired through successive stages of learning which goes side by 
side with devotional practices.1226  
Exotericism, associated with the Salafis and other scripturalists, presupposes that knowledge 
is available to everyone without the mediation of a specialist. In Brenner’s word, it is a 
“rationalist” conception of knowledge which presumes that one can acquire religious 
knowledge through intellectual reflection and explanations of Islamic texts through principles 
that follow divine revelation. While esoterism assumes that the process of learning is linked to 
devotional practices, exoterism, in theory, seeks to separate the two processes.1227 Although 
Brenner gives an impression that there has been a shift from the esoteric episteme to the rational 
form from the colonial period,1228 he recognises that there is no clear-cut boundary between 
the esoteric and exoteric paradigms in practice as other scholars like Seesemann have 
argued.1229 In many cases, the Sufis and Salafis draw on any of the paradigms depending on 
what is practicable in any social context. 
Seesemann has drawn attention to other paradigms that are related to both epistemes namely, 
the sanad (chain of transmission), the maqāṣid (purposes, objectives) and the dalīl (evidence) 
paradigms.1230 The first two are relevant here because the third is the same as the exoteric 
episteme. The sanad paradigm assumes that Islamic knowledge resides in a chain of recognised 
authorities that reached back to the Prophet Muhammad. It assumes that a student can acquire 
the knowledge through a personal relationship with a renowned authority who is connected to 
this chain. 1231 Loimeier argues that this recognition of a chain of authorities is peculiar to both 
the Sufis and Salafis even though they lay claim to different teachers with links to the 
Prophet.1232 Thus, unlike the binary seen between esoteric and exoteric paradigms, the sanad 
integrates the two because it focuses on the modes of authenticating and transmitting 
knowledge which are required in both cases.1233 The maqāṣid, as Seesemann contends, remains 
difficult to describe because it draws on a wide range of thoughts from Muslims of different 
western educational backgrounds. However, this paradigm tends to promote rationality with 
less emphasis on injunctions in Islamic texts in the determination of what is correct or good. It 
 
1226 Brenner, Controlling Knowledge, 18–19. 
1227 Ibid., 7–8. 
1228 Ibid., 8. 
1229 Seesemann, “Epistemology or Ideology?”: 257. 
1230 Ibid., 232. 
1231 Ibid., 236–38. 
1232 Loimeier, Islamic Reform in Twentieth Century Africa, 53. 
1233 Seesemann, “Epistemology or Ideology?”: 236–8. 
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assumes that what is good should be determined by the purpose or benefit it serves, instead of 
what the Qur’an or the Hadith may say about it. This way of thinking informs the “Islamization 
of knowledge” project of many reformist movements which suggests that all knowledge (both 
religious and scientific) which serve the common good are ‘Islamic’ from the root, therefore 
they can be learned. Rather than entering a personal relationship with a chain of transmitters to 
learn, it assumes that knowledge (which has been ‘Islamised’) is accessible to everyone 
because it is not handed down through the transmitters.1234 
In a general sense, all the epistemes mentioned above have characterised the educational terrain 
of Yoruba Muslims since the colonial period. There are the madrasas which promote the 
esoteric episteme while the Muslim schools (and reform movements such as the Salafis and 
TMC) advocate the rational episteme. There is also the “Islamization of knowledge” project of 
the Islamic Education Trust in Niger State of which Oyekan is a representative in Lagos. Also, 
some tertiary institutions, such as Crescent University in Abeokuta (est. 2005), offer courses 
that are tailored toward this goal.1235 But compared to the esoteric and rational epistemes, the 
promotion of the ‘Islamised knowledge’ has yielded little success in Nigeria.1236 The effort to 
promote it has been hampered by many problems which include the lack of a model curriculum 
and expertise to teach this form of knowledge.1237 Nonetheless, these epistemes have, in 
varying degrees, shaped the religious education of many Muslim students in Yorubaland.  As 
I noted above, many students who became teachers in the MSSN also underwent the esoteric 
training as well as the rational one. Today, while the Society emphasises the latter, it has 
nevertheless continued to foster the esoteric paradigm in its educational activities. 
There are still debates among many Muslims in Africa on which of these epistemes is correct 
regardless of their interconnections.1238 Among the Yoruba Muslim scholars, the debate is 
connected to what is conceived as afiwekewu and akewukewe. As will be analysed below, these 
concepts are helpful in grasping the epistemological transformation of Islamic education in 
Yorubaland and the impact of this transformation on the epistemes that are embedded in the 
transmission of religious knowledge in the MSSN.  
 
1234 Ibid., 249–53. 
1235 Rafiu I. Adebayo, “The Challenges of Islamization of Knowledge in Nigerian Islamic Universities,” IIUM 
Journal of Educational Studies 4, no. 1 (2016): 86–7. 
1236 AbdulGafar O. Fahm, “An Assessment of the Islamization of Knowledge Process in Nigeria,” World 
Journal of Islamic History and Civilization 4, no. 4 (2014): 121–3. 
1237 Adebayo, “The Challenges of Islamization of Knowledge in Nigerian Islamic Universities”: 87–9. 
1238 Seesemann, “Epistemology or Ideology?”: 253–8; Salomon, “Evidence, Secrets, Truth”: 826–35. 
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7.2.3 Afiwekewu and akewukewe 
The origin of afiwekewu and akewukewe among the Yoruba remains sketchy. But they appear 
to have been in use by the early twentieth century to describe the education of Muslims (and 
their identities) who either studied in Western schools and madrasas or both. Some Muslims 
who were trained in both Western and Islamic schools adopted one of these terms as their name. 
One of them is my respondent (and his father), Alhaji Bolaji Akewukewe.1239 The two of them 
are notable ‘religious comparatists’ (who compare the doctrines and practices of Islam with 
other religions) in Lagos. I pointed out in Chapter Four that the first concept, afiwekewu, was 
derisively used by the alfsa who studied in madrasas to contest the knowledge and authority 
of MSSN members to speak about Islam. But beyond the challenge of the alfas, the concept 
describes the episteme and pedagogy of Islamic education given the impact of Western 
education. 
Afiwekewu largely goes beyond its literal meaning: using books to study Arabic texts. It also 
includes learning about the Qur’an and other Islamic texts in a Western school, which comes 
with the pedagogy of this type of school. To put it clearly, among many Yoruba Muslims, the 
object called iwe (book), despite being made of the same material (paper) on which Arabic 
texts are written today is ‘not always’ used in the same sense as Islamic texts. Rather, it is 
called a tira when Arabic script is written on it, although it is also noteworthy that the word 
tira is used stereotypically by many Yoruba to mean an ‘amulet.’1240 Yet, there is one exception 
to this, which is that many clerics refer to the word ‘book’ (iwe) as the translation of the word 
kitāb which they consider the Qur’an to be. Beyond this exemption, most Yoruba Muslims do 
not refer to Islamic texts which have been translated into English or Yoruba, as well as Islamic 
literature written in English, as tira but as iwe. Importantly, there is the need to emphasise that 
not referring to Arabic texts written on paper as iwe by many Yoruba Muslims does not 
necessarily mean they are unaware of its paper material. Instead, they seek to make a distinction 
between the words iwe and kewu (Arabic), and by extension between Western education and 
Islam because they consider Arabic as both the symbol and language of Islam. This could 
further be linked to how most Yoruba, Muslims and non-Muslims, make sense of the word iwe 
and the concept of education. It is common among many of them to refer to iwe as ‘book.’ 
They also used iwe in the sense of ‘education’ in a Western school. For example, it may be said 
that mo kawe or mo ka iwe (I am educated). They also make a distinction between a Western 
 
1239 Bolaji Akewukewe, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
1240 Oladimeji A.-G. Oloruntele, “Evil Forces and Shirk Among the Yoruba Muslims in Nigeria with Special 
Reference to Ilorin City,” (MA Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2009), 54. 
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school and a madrasa when they refer to the former as ile-iwe (lit. ‘book study house/centre’), 
while the latter is called ile-kewu (lit. ‘Arabic study house/centre’). For the most part, the two 
are not used interchangeably. 
To this extent, the criticism of the afiwekewu by the alfas is one of the ways of contesting the 
episteme and pedagogy of Islamic education in Western schools. The Western school, 
according to Launay, embodies a different epistemology and pedagogy that characterises the 
transmission of knowledge in the madrasa.1241 For instance, while the madrasa facilitates a 
personalised form of learning, the Western school encourages mass education with certification 
based on exams. Oral testimonies are also accepted as valid in the madrasa while the Western 
schools consider written texts as authentic. As demonstrated above, Western schools also 
promote the rational episteme as well as the objectification and functionalisation of Islam. The 
concept of afiwekewu, therefore, did not only seek to challenge the Islamic education 
transmitted in Western schools but also the episteme and method of education. The idea of 
akewukewe, on the other hand, is considered to be better because it describes a dual educational 
experience, one in a Western school and the other in a madrasa.  
Akewukewe represents the current emphasis on Islamic education in the MSSN. Apart from the 
criticism of the alfas which led to this dual education, it is also connected to the crisis in the 
Society. According to Yusuf Olayinka, the Chief Security Officer (CSO) at the MSSN IVC in 
2016, the MSSN realised that its internal crisis in the 1990s was created by those who 
interpreted the Qur’an “wrongly” to suit their own purposes. This encouraged the Society to 
support the establishment of madrasas in many tertiary institutions to teach Arabic so that 
members could interpret the texts themselves.1242 Also, they were established to challenge the 
madrasas outside the schools (the Sufi and the Salafi-minded ones in particular) where 
members learnt what was regarded as the opposite of the objectives of the Society. Thus, 
besides the promotion of Islamic education, these madrasas are aimed at promoting Islamic 
knowledge based on the understanding of Islam in the MSSN. However, despite the shift 
toward akewukewe, many members of the Society continued to rely on Islamic texts published 
in English for their knowledge. The Society also encouraged the use of these texts in many of 
its programmes. In recent time, this has been aided by access to the internet, cassette- and 
 
1241 Launay, Islamic Education in Africa, 1–26. 
1242 Yusuf Olayinka, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
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YouTube-based sermons. Therefore, the two concepts are still relevant in understanding the 
range of Islamic educational experiences in the Society. 
Because it gives additional knowledge, the emphasis on akewukewe is understood in the MSSN 
as a form of power which MSSN members have over the alfas, since most of the alfas only 
received education in a madrasa.1243 This thinking appears to have created tension between the 
Muslim elite and these established scholars in the larger Yoruba Muslim society. The tension 
has mostly played out between the body representing the alfas called the League of Imams and 
Alfas (LIA) (see Chapter Three and Four) and the Muslim Ummah of South-West Nigeria 
(MUSWEN), founded in 2008 by Muslim professionals (lawyers, academics, doctors, etc.) 
most of who had been members of the MSSN.1244 The LIA, which seldomly speak for Yoruba 
Muslims in Nigeria often opposed many practices of the Yoruba Muslim elite. In 1985, the 
League under the leadership of Shaykh al-Ilory resisted the appointment of a wealthy 
businessman, Chief Abdul-Wahab Iyanda Folawiyo (1928-2008), as the first Baba Adinni of 
Nigeria arguing that the position had been politicised rather than being based on merit.1245 
Although some members of LIA have been educated in western schools today, the founders of 
MUSWEN appear to see them as not having the modern education and competence to express 
the common interests of Yoruba Muslims based on new developments (such as the rise of 
Pentecostal churches headed by Western educated men, democratic governance since 1999 and 
globalization) some of which characterised their encounter with Christians.1246 In the remaining 
sections, I will show how the broader change in Islamic education among Yoruba Muslims has 
shaped the MSSN educational activities. I will also highlight the new forms of education 
(including subjects) in the MSSN which I take to be part of this broader change. 
7.3 Transmission of Knowledge  
Since 1954, Islamic knowledge has been transmitted in the MSSN through a range of platforms. 
Based on the examples I will give in this section, I consider these platforms and the style of 
learning embedded in them as aspect of “addition” which Eller refers to as a form of religious 
change.1247 The development of these platforms appear to be shaped by two key processes: the 
revival of Islamic education in the past and borrowing from the contemporary schooling 
 
1243 Ibid. 
1244 The establishment of MUSWEN, headed by Dawud Noibi, was facilitated by some ex-MSS members who 
formed The Companion in 1984 in Lagos as an umbrella body for Muslim businessmen and professionals.  
1245 “Rebuff for Baba Adinni of Nigeria: Imam League Takes Stand,” National Concord, June 19, 1985, 1 & 3. 
1246 Peel, Christianity, Islam and Oriṣa-religion, 142. 
1247 Eller, Introducing Anthropology of Religion, 151. 
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system. In addition, some aspects of these platforms also show the impact of the encounter 
between Christians and Muslims. These platforms do not only shed light on the contribution of 
MSSN to Islamic education, they are also crucial to understanding the process in which the 
reform in the Society was inspired and promoted. They showed the styles and techniques 
employed by the MSSN to discuss Islam in relation to the contemporary world as well as how 
the Society teach students and fashioned religious piety among them. This is why I take them 
to be part of my understanding of religious change among Yoruba Muslims and the 
contribution of MSSN to this change.  
Some of these platforms have been mentioned in previous chapters, which include the IVC, 
seminars, picnics, public lectures and conferences. Though some of them have been sustained, 
and little is known about how they were organised and what has changed, the Society engaged 
in a few educational activities up to the 1970s.1248 Many educational programmes were 
introduced during the era of reforms in order to replace activities such as singing,1249 and some 
of them have been replicated in many platforms. For instance, the IVC features Qur’an 
memorisation, public lectures and seminars which are also included in other programmes such 
as the Rural Dawah and Jihad Week. Therefore, the educational programmes discussed below 
are based on the availability of data and on the need to avoid repetition while showing their 
diversity. In addition, because it is difficult to describe how they were organised in the past, 
the focus is mostly on how they have been organised in contemporary times since participant-
observation allowed me to describe them better. However, I draw attention to the historical 
development of some of them up to the period under study. 
7.3.1 Islamic Vacation Course (IVC): a camping educational programme 
The IVC is the most elaborate educational programme of the MSSN. In contrast to the madrasa 
discussed later, the IVC is a combination of ‘Islamic’ and ‘less-Islamic’ educational activities 
organised at a camp, all of which are employed to provide guidance on what it means to be a 
Muslim in Nigeria. The content of the camping programme, on the one hand, emphasises the 
transmission of Islamic knowledge, and on the other hand, it aims to facilitate an understanding 
of Islam that takes other modern realities in Nigeria and the world into consideration such as 
Muslim-Christian encounters, political instability, economic crises, science and information 
technology and the way to deal with these realities as Muslims. This is illustrated by the variety 
of activities in the camp which include sermons, studies of Islamic texts, Qur’an memorisation, 
 
1248 Jibril Oyekan, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
1249 MSSN UNILAG, “Embryonic Stage of Muslim Students' Society of Nigeria”. 
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devotional practices, comparative religious discourse, marriage counselling/match-making, 
vocational training, politics and economic matters. 
As noted in Chapter Four, the IVC was first organised by the MSSN in 1965. It may have been 
borrowed from the SCM and the SU who used it to engage Christian students. It is also possible 
that the idea came from the transnational Islamic movements such as the IIFSO,1250 in which 
the MSSN was associated by 1966. The IVC is held twice a year during school breaks which 
coincide with two Christian festivals, the first in April during Easter and the second in 
December during Christmas. Using these festive periods is not mere coincidence, part of the 
reasons for organising the IVC in these periods is to ensure that Muslim students do not 
participate in them.1251 Up to the 1980s, the IVC in December was organised for five days, but 
it is now organised for ten days while the one of April last four days. From 1965, the IVC was 
held at various locations, especially in schools across the Southwest and Middle-belt regions. 
But since 2003, it has been held at Imolisa village, Ogunmakin Ogun State, along the Lagos-
Ibadan Expressway. From the late 1980s, this Expressway regarded as “spiritual highway” by 
Janson and Akinyele, has become the location of a growing number of big Pentecostal churches 
and other religious organisations in Nigeria such as The Redeemed Christian Church of God 
(RCCG), the Mountain of Fire and Miracles, Deeper Life and NASFAT.1252 The MSSN camp 
on this road is about 35 acres of land and it is owned by the MSSN B-Zone. Located beside the 
camp is one of the many schools owned by WAMY in Nigeria, the WAMY International 
Secondary School. The camp, which is still under construction, has a mosque, an event hall, 
hostels, a clinic, a kitchen and markets. It is useful to note that in 2016, apart from the camp in 
Ogunmakin, the B-Zone also organised the IVC in Auchi Polytechnic, Edo State and in Al-
Usrah Complex located at Rumuekpirikom, Port Harcourt for the South-South and South-
Eastern states. The organization of IVC at these different locations was probably due to the 
long distance between members within the two regions.1253 The MSSN Lagos State Area Unit 
led by Ashafa also has a 10 acres of land located at Epe, Lagos where its IVC was held.1254 But 
the focus of this chapter is on the B-Zone IVC at Ogunmakin. This IVC was chosen not only 
 
1250 The camping programme is one of the ways in which IIFSO promote Islamic education and other forms of 
Muslims sociality. See Altalib, Training Guide for Islamic Workers, 279–319. 
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by virtue of being the oldest but because it also has members from all Southwestern states, 
including a faction of the MSSN Lagos Area Unit. 
Generally, apart from discouraging Muslims from participating in the Christian festivals, the 
IVC is considered a “training” in spirituality for the participants who are called “delegates.” 
Idris Awal, the MSSN leader at the Federal College of Education, Akoka Lagos, explained to 
me that spirituality means having Allah at the centre of every human activity. He contends that 
“anything that we are going to be doing at all, be it mundane activity, personal activity, it must 
not go outside the realm of the main purpose for which we are created on earth which is for us 
to come and worship Allah.”1255 Islam, according to him, touches on every aspect of life and 
there are things expected of a spiritual person which the MSSN enjoins such as the regular 
recitation of the Qur’an, fasting during Ramadan, performing the ṣalāt, attending gatherings of 
“righteous people,” listening to the exegesis of the Qur’an and doing things that have proofs in 
the Qur’an. He considers the IVC as one of the platforms in the MSSN used to achieve this 
spirituality.1256 This notion of spirituality and the practices that are expected of students to 
achieve it call attention to the esoteric paradigm which shows that the acquisition of Islamic 
knowledge is supposed to go side-by-side with devotional practices. 
The organisation of this camp and the identities of the delegates that participated in it draws 
attention to the extent of the impact of modern social changes on MSSN educational activity. 
This was apparent in the registration of the delegates on the internet and at the campsite. Among 
these delegates were students, artisans, traders, academics and professionals. Upon registration, 
they were issued name tags with lanyards which they wore throughout the programme. At the 
back of the tag was a meal table that was presented for attestation before meals were served. 
Overall, more than 6,500 delegates attended the camp (compared to more than three thousand 
recorded in the Ashafa led MSSN Lagos camp). This number only represents the delegates in 
Southwest Nigeria.1257 The number was said to be the highest in 1994 (before The Jama’at and 
other groups left) at the IVC held at the Federal Government Girl’s College, Oyo with a figure 
of more than ten thousand delegates.1258 Another major aspect of the camp’s organisation was 
the departments and officers charged with different responsibilities. They included the Imam 
(who is the amir of the MSSN B-Zone) who led the daily prayers, the Directorate of 
 
1255 Idris Awal, interview by Adeyemi Balogun, March 7, 2017, Fed. College of Education (FCE), Akoka 
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1257 Balogun, Field Notes. 
1258 Abiodun Raheem (pseudonym), interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
293 
 
Programmes (DOP) in charge of camp activities, the Muslim Students’ Security Organisation 
(MSSO) responsible for security and mobilization of delegates for camp activities, the 
Directorate of Studies (DOS) in charge of educational programmes, the Director of Press and 
ICT who oversees information and communication, and the Clinic which handles cases of ill-
health. There was also a Sharia Court which adjudicated on misconducts in the camp, even 
though its jurisdiction was limited to the camp. There was also an advisory body called the 
Think Tank largely made up of elderly members, most of who are academics and professionals. 
Part of the training at the camp which reveals the way Islamic knowledge is embodied is the 
one that focused on the daily rituals of many Muslims. An example is the tahjjud, the prayer at 
midnight. For the ten days, delegates were woken up at 4:00 am to perform this prayer in 
congregation. This was on the open ground used for the mosque, with planks and bamboo 
separating the male from the female section. The student Imams from tertiary institutions led 
this prayer, but there were at least two instances in which pupils from secondary schools were 
called upon to lead the prayer. The Imams later announced that the pupils were selected because 
they had memorised a large part of the Qur’an and that there was a need to develop their ability 
to lead the prayer. He therefore encouraged other pupils to emulate their example. Giving 
students this kind of responsibility is one of the methods of teaching in the MSSN. Ware refers 
to this kind of practical training as a process in which Islamic knowledge becomes an embodied 
knowledge. This is based on the theory that Islamic knowledge is transmitted through bodily 
practices the same way as through mere words.1259 
The tahjjud was followed by the memorisation of some verses of the Qur’an, referred to as the 
‘Memory Verse’ which is also used in many Christian students’ programmes. At least three 
memory verses are chosen each year that reflect the theme of the IVC for that year. The Imam 
led the recitation of these verses while delegates repeated them after him. In the end, a few 
delegates were called on to recite the verses to examine how well they had memorised them. 
This session continued in the evening before ṣalāt mag̲h̲rib (prayer after sunset), although 
many delegates extended their memorisation beyond these three verses in private. However 
short the verses are, this emphasis on Qur’an memorisation shows one of the ways in which 
the MSSN has continued with the esoteric episteme of the madrasa which stresses the 
embodiment of the Qur’an.  
 
1259 Ware, The walking Qur'an, 49–50. 
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The Memory Verse session was followed with the division of delegates into different classes 
by the DOP. Until 1985, according to a study by Salami, there were four classes for the IVC.1260 
The organisation of these classes reflected the pedagogy of modern schooling and the concern 
for the systematic transmission of knowledge in the esoteric paradigm referred to by 
Brenner.1261 All the lessons taught in these classes, put together in a curriculum,1262 also showed 
the example of the objectification of Islam. For instance, there was a Class One recommended 
for new delegates or those who were presumed “knew next to nothing about Islam.”1263 Topics 
for this class were on the “meaning of Islam, pillars of Islam, importance of prayers, life of the 
prophet and revelation of al-Qur’an.”1264 There was a Class Two for those who were assumed 
to have little knowledge of Islam. They were taken through such topics as ablution and engaged 
in the memorisation of short Qur’anic verses. Class Three was considered more advanced. 
Delegates in this class were taken through topics on the “comparison between Islam and other 
religions, importance of Islam as a social order, detailed study of the pillars of Islam, the four-
orthodox caliph-life and practices.”1265 The fourth class, which was said to be made up of 
students in tertiary institutions was meant for discussion on various topics. However, Salami 
gave no information on these topics.1266 
The 2016 IVC which I attended shows that while some changes have been made to the 
curriculum, the gradual embodiment of knowledge through the division of delegates into 
classes was sustained and widened to reflect changes in the Society from the late 1980s. Thus, 
rather than classes one to four, there was a Lower Class (for delegates between Pry. 6 and JSS 
1), a Middle Class (for JSS 2 - SSS1), an Upper Class (for SSS2 – SSS3)1267 for secondary 
school pupils, and Advance One (for first time delegates), Advance Two (frequent delegates) 
and Advance Three classes (regular delegates) mostly for students in tertiary institutions and 
professionals. The curriculum also included new platforms specifically tailored to meet the 
concerns of married men and women called Abau (Arabic ab, referring to father) and Ummahat 
(Arabic ummahāt, referring to mother) Forum, and another one for singles called Marital 
Counselling for Singles (MCS). In addition to the curriculum of these delegates, children below 
 
1260 Salami, Modes of Da'wah in some Selected Towns in Yorubaland, 76. 
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1267 The abbreviations in full are Pry (Primary school, btw age 11-12), JSS (Junior Secondary School, age 12-
15), SSS (Senior Secondary School, age 15-18). 
295 
 
age ten also had a separate programme in another location called Kiddies Camp (at the WAMY 
school). 
As in the former classes, new delegates were requested to join the Lower Class, but the subjects 
taught in this class and the other two for secondary school pupils were on the same issues, 
albeit at varying levels. The subjects include the Qur’an, the Hadith, Arabic language, adab, 
fiqh, tajwīd, sīra (biography/history), tawḥīd (oneness of God), current affairs, English 
language, Mathematics and ICT.1268 What the pupils are expected to know on these subjects is 
in the MSSN curriculum included in the appendix of this thesis. For instance, their lesson on 
adab includes proper bodily disposition and prayers to be said before undertaking different acts 
such as waking up, eating, using the restroom, and going out of the house. Lessons on sīra 
focus on the biography of many prophets including Prophet Muhammad and his caliphs. Pupils 
preparing for terminal exams in their schools also received some coaching in Mathematics and 
English grammar. 
Like in others, the pedagogy of modern schooling is largely embedded in the transmission of 
knowledge in the classes for secondary school pupils. This found expression in the arrangement 
of the class, the mode of knowledge transmission between the teachers and pupils, and their 
behaviours as Launay suggests.1269 The teachers for these pupils were male students in tertiary 
institutions. Nearly all the teachers in the female classes were also males. During the classes, 
the teachers wrote on blackboards as well as whiteboards while pupils copied the lessons in 
exercise books (see figure 7 below). Many of the teachers held canes which they used to 
discipline the pupils only on a few occasions. This was despite the level of noise through 
conversations and whispers from many pupils who were often not concentrating. This shows 
that the use of the cane to discipline the body to embody Islamic knowledge is less important 
in comparison to the classical madrasas which Ware talked about.1270 
Besides, many of the pupils in this class sat on plastic chairs and benches while they placed 
their exercise books on their laps to copy the notes. Those who could not find chairs sat on 
mats. The flexibility in the sitting position of the pupils is common in other MSSN educational 
platforms, to be discussed below. It should be noted that this flexibility goes against the ethical 
views of some medieval scholars who considered a particular sitting position as proper conduct 
 
1268 Directorate of Studies, “Syllabus for Islamic Vacation Course for Upper, Middle and Lower Categories,” 
(MSSN B-Zone, 2015). 
1269 Launay, Islamic Education in Africa, 1–26. 
1270 Ware, The walking Qur'an, 8. 
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for the transmission of knowledge. Seesemann refers to one of these scholars, a Shafi jurist Ibn 
Jamāʿa (d. 733/1333), who instructed students of Islamic sciences to sit as children would do 
before their Qur’anic teacher.1271 Like the mode of transmission, the process of certifying the 
pupils’ knowledge also followed the modern school pedagogy. This was done on the seventh 
day of the IVC where the pupils had exams under strict supervision. The exam was based on 
multiple-choice questions on all the subjects they learnt in their classes. 
 
Fig. 7. MSSN IVC for Lower, Middle and Upper Classes, picture by Yemi Balogun. 2016. 
Even though I could not attend all the three Advance classes because they were held 
simultaneously, their curriculum reflects the MSSN engagement with everyday religious and 
non-religious issues in Yoruba society and among Muslims in the world. The religious aspect 
of this curriculum treated topics that emphasised the Society’s focus on the sunna such as the 
“Hadith 19 of An-Nawawi” and “Ahlus-Sunnah: Are we?” A part of the syllabus is devoted to 
addressing Muslims religious life in relation to contemporary issues in politics, economy, 
security and education in Nigeria. Topics which focused on these include “Insurgency, 
Recession and Corruption in Nigeria: A Challenge on our Faith,” and “My Academics, My 
Faith.” The MSSN’s identification with the challenges of Muslims in other parts of the world 
is also emphasised in a topic, “Global Ostracizing and Enmity against Islam: the case of Yemen 
and Syria.” In addition, the Society’s aim to help Muslim students develop their intellectual 
abilities is reflected in the topic, “Life Skill: Critical Thinking and Decision Making; Reading 
and Writing Skill; Negotiation/Refusal Skill.” Furthermore, an aspect of the curriculum 
 
1271  Rüdiger Seesemann, “'Ilm and Adab Revisited: Knowledge Transmission and Character Formation in 
Islamic Africa,” in The Piety of Learning: Islamic Studies in Honor of Stefan Reichmuth, eds. Michael 
Kemper and Ralf Elger, 15–37 (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2017), 24–25. 
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indicates the MSSN attempt to support members to deal with various socio-economic 
challenges in Nigeria such as unemployment and poverty. This is similar to the concerns of the 
new Muslim organisations referred to in Chapter Five: NASFAT, TMC and Dawah Front. For 
this socio-economic support, the IVC had a seminar on “Nigerian Economy and the Fate of 
Average Income Earners.” In practical terms, vocational training in trades such as eCommerce, 
shoemaking, bag making, soap making, and mentholated spirit production were also organised 
at the camp.1272 
 
Fig. 8. MSSN IVC Advance 2 Class, picture by Yemi Balogun. 2016. 
 
I attended Advance Three class where the topic, “the Conditions of lā ʾilāha ʾillā llāh” (there is 
no god but God), was discussed. The organisation of this class, which is similar to figure 8 
above, is like those of the secondary school pupils. But, unlike the pupils, the transmission of 
knowledge in this class reflected the discursive peer learning method in the contemporary post-
secondary school system. The MSSN adopted this method because it assumes that the delegates 
in this class, numbering more than forty, had the basic knowledge about Islam, even though 
they were also considered as first-time delegates. The discussion in this class was led by a 
brother, who I will refer to as Idris.1273 Brother Idris became a member of the MSSN in 
secondary school and later the amir of the MSSN Ogun State Area Unit. He studied at a local 
madrasa for six years and he is a member of a study circle called Qur’anic Study Group in 
Ogun state. Before going into the topic, he said he was aware that we were “practising” 
 
1272 Directorate of Studies, “MSSN B-Zone 102 Islamic Vacation Course,” (MSSN B-Zone, 2016-2017). 
1273 Balogun, Field Notes (This respondent wished to remain anonymous).  
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Muslims with knowledge of Islam. As a result, he noted that he was not in the class to “teach” 
but to exchange with us what we already knew. Although he still gave the major points on this 
topic, he allowed delegates to give input through different questions.1274 
Apart from this discursive method, the way objectification and functionalisation of Islam are 
achieved is also demonstrated in this class. For instance, while Brother Idris discussed the topic 
by quoting verses of the Qur’an and the Hadith to support his points, he went beyond the 
reference to these texts by using concepts in the technological world to frame his points. 
“Submission to Allah” was one of the conditions he mentioned on this topic. But he also framed 
this by saying “submission means using Allah’s telescope to view things.” He further explained 
that this means subjecting any undertaking to Islamic perspective. He mentioned another 
condition which was “love for Allah and the Prophet.” One of the framings he used for this 
was the allusion to a “software” (by which he meant people’s brain and mind) which he argued 
had been “infected” by a “virus” (bad things). He therefore said that love for Allah and the 
Prophet was necessary to help in “formatting the brain and mind” from this “virus” that infects 
them.1275 
The importance of the concept of tawḥīd in Advance One class was another fascinating topic I 
followed in the camp. The discussion, led by a leader in the Society called Yunus Anola, was 
used to explore the importance of the belief in the oneness of Allah and why Muslims must 
rely on Him alone in everyday life. Situating it within the Yoruba society, he explained that the 
Yoruba had cultural practices and beliefs before they accepted Islam and that many alfas had 
integrated a handful of these practices and beliefs into Islam. Therefore, he encouraged 
delegates to be wary of these practices. Among them is the Òrìṣà called ori, which is discussed 
in Chapter Five. He also mentioned the practice of tira ọdun or gbigbọhun tira, mentioned in 
Chapter Three. Another example he gave was the practice of making akara oku (bean cake 
used to commemorate the dead) and the prayer which is made to the dead translated as; “do not 
sleep in heaven, please look back to your children.” These practices are used to seek for 
protection, blessing and well-being by many Yoruba. But, according to Anola, they invalidate 
the concept of tawḥīd which he believed to be the basis of being a good Muslim. Rather than 
engaging in them, he argued that Muslims must always look for Allah’s protection alone.1276 
This concept of tawḥīd, which aims to discourage Muslims from association with local cultural 
 
1274 Ibid..  
1275 Ibid. 
1276 Ibid. 
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practices, is common in the debates of Salafis and other reform movements in Africa.1277 The 
importance of tawḥīd in their debates, as Abdoulaye Sounaye contends, is to promote exclusive 
reliance on the Qur’an and the Hadith.1278  
After the morning classes, there was a break at 10:30 to allow delegates to take their breakfast. 
Afterwards, another round of classes was held between 11:30 am and 1:30 pm. There was a 
long break afterwards, for at least three hours. The break was a period of rest, but it was also 
full of different social activities which were used to promote interaction among the delegates. 
Some of the lessons which the MSSN seeks to inculcate in the delegates are also embedded in 
these activities. Within this period, for instance, after performing the two afternoon prayers, 
many delegates took a nap while others used the period to play football. In the past, a football 
tournament and other sports such as taekwondo and table tennis were formally organised by 
the MSSN during this period. Loimeier’s study illustrates that such leisure activities are 
peculiar to many reform movements such as the major madrasas in Kenya and the Yan Izala 
in Nigeria. The case of Yan Izala suggests that many young Muslims participated in football 
matches to avoid going for the ḏh̲ikr of the Sufi brotherhoods.1279 However, while these reform 
movements have organised football teams and competitive matches, the MSSN has given less 
attention to this aspect in recent times. In the mid-1990s, the football tournament became a 
concern in the IVC camp following a keenly contested match that failed to produce a winner 
beyond the time due to perform the prayer after sunset. According to Abdul-Ganiy Raji, the 
Society decided to stop organising a football tournament because matches like this could 
happen again and would be a distraction from attaining the objective of spiritual development 
on which the camp was established.1280 Stopping this tournament is one of the ways in which 
the MSSN has reformed its own practices. Besides, stopping it also underscores the strict 
emphasis on religiosity in the Society. 
Apart from the leisure activities, the break also gives an opportunity to see other approaches to 
inculcating discipline in students which are nevertheless like those of the madrasas. These 
approaches, which focused less on intellectual discourse, include the enforcement of varying 
types of behaviours and ethics. And, unlike the classes, those responsible for this enforcement 
might be MSSN officers or even vendors in the camp. One major setting that points attention 
 
1277 Roman Loimeier, “Patterns and Peculiarities of Islamic Reform in Africa,” Journal of Religion in Africa 
33, no. 3 (2003): 254. 
1278 Abdoulaye Sounaye, “Salafi Revolution in West Africa,” ZMO Working Papers 19 (2017): 1–2. 
1279 Loimeier, “Patterns and Peculiarities of Islamic Reform in Africa”: 257–8. 
1280 Abgul-Ganiy Raji, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
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to this kind of discipline is the makeshift boundary that separates the male from the female 
delegates. Typically, both male and female delegates meet over this boundary, including 
parents who meet their sons or daughters. During these meetings, the MSSO, in charge of 
security in the camp, patrolled the boundary to ensure that a minimum of two feet separated 
the male and female on either side. As I learned from the members of the MSSO, this is to 
prevent the intermingling of unmarried males and females.1281 It is worth noting that the 
emphasis on the separation between men and women in the MSSN differs from the objective 
of many reform movements such as Ansar Dine du Nord studied by Dorothea E. Schulz and 
Souleymane Diallo in present-day Mali. This movement, as Schulz and Diallo argue, gives 
support to patriarchal authority by constructing a good Muslim identity of a man that is based 
on regulating women in public and domestic life which includes segregating them from 
unrelated men.1282 To the contrary, the MSSN insistence on separation between men and 
women is based on its ideal of reform which at the same time does not disregard gender equity 
in pulic life. 
Besides segregating men and women at the camp, the MSSO made several other noticeable 
efforts to enforce compliance with camp regulations which included disciplining delegates 
caught gambling, those caught talking to the opposite sex in restricted hours and areas, and 
those who left the camp without permission. Such discplines, which were usually based on the 
verdict of the Sharia court in the camp, may also be likened to the method of the classical 
madrasas where physical punishment is considered a part of training the body to receive the 
words of God. In some cases in the camp, the enforcement of ethics took the form of a polite 
or even a discourteous correction. The encounter I had with a vendor in which I was corrected 
on the ‘proper conduct’ of eating on a plate illustrates this point. This happened at a canteen 
when I was eating pasta from the opposite side of the plate which I held in one hand. Once the 
vendor saw this, he collected the food and turned the side of the plate I was eating to face me. 
When I asked him why he did that, he told me it was sunna to be eating from the side of the 
plate that faces me.1283 
 
1281 Balogun, Field Notes. 
1282 Dorothea E. Schulz and Souleymane Diallo, “Competing Assertions of Muslim Masculinity in 
Contemporary Mali,” Journal of Religion in Africa 46, 2-3 (2016): 234. 
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Another distinguishing aspect of the IVC focused on comparative religious debates.1284 This 
kind of debate has become a feature of Christian-Muslim relations in Africa. David 
Westerlund's study refers to one of the prominent Muslim figures in the 1980s, Ahmed Deedat 
in South Africa, who inspired this form of debates among Muslims who lived with Christians 
in many parts of Africa.1285 Deedat’s interest focused on providing theological tools for 
Muslims to defend their faith against the missionary activities of Christians. His audience was 
the lay Muslims rather than the learned Muslim clerics. As part of his discourse, he employed 
satirical images and remarks in pamphlets which were shared with his audience.1286 
Comparative religious debate, as Jon Abbink points out, expresses contests about religious 
‘truths’ and power claims, and it could result in sharpening boundaries between faith 
communities which in turn affect relations between the citizens and the power of the state.1287 
In his study of this phenomenon in Ethiopia, Abbink shows that the theological arguments of 
figures like Deedat and Zakir Naik, another Indian Muslim preacher, have contributed to the 
growing hegemonic strategies and claims to power by Muslims in their relation with Christians 
in Africa.1288 
A number of Yoruba Muslims have also promoted this comparative discourse since the colonial 
period. Among them is Alhaji Akewukewe, who I mentioned earlier. Akewukewe wrote some 
articles whose titles include “True Light” and “Take a Decision: Christianity or Islam” in 1966 
as part of this discourse. These articles were published in Quarterly, a magazine of the Islamic 
Youth League of Nigeria.1289 Since 1954, the MSSN has also produced many students who 
have taken to this form of polemics, among whom are Dawood Ayodele Amoo and Ishaq Kunle 
Sanni. In 1987, the two of them published a text, Why you Should Never be a Christian,1290 in 
the light of their encounter with Christians in Yorubaland. 
 
1284 The comparative religious lecture is part of the open-air lectures called taʿlīm (education) which usually 
began by 7:00pm after the delegates performed the prayers: ṣalāt mag̲h̲rib (prayer at sunset) and ṣalāt ʿishā 
(night-time prayer). The other topics discussed in this period range from religious to non-religious matters. 
See appendix on this. 
1285 Westerlund, “Ahmed Deedat's Theology of Religion”. 
1286 Ibid., 263–64. 
1287 Abbink, “Religion in Public Spaces”: 253–4. 
1288 Ibid., 264–65. 
1289 The magazine and the organization are mentioned briefly in a study by Mujahid Shitu citing Patrick Ryan 
with little information about the articles by Akewukewe. See Ryan, Imale, 240; Mujahid H. Shitu, “A Review 
of the Activities of Christian Missionary, Clergy ‘Experts’ And Writers on Islam in Nigeria,” Journal of 
Islamic Studies and Culture 2, no. 3 (2014): 45. 
1290 Ishaq K. Sanni and Dawood A. Amoo, Why you Should Never Be a Christian (Ibadan: Iman Publications, 
1987). 
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At the IVC in 2016, the comparative debate was led by another former member of the MSSN, 
Mallam Yusuf Adepoju who has become a well-known figure in Nigeria. In previous IVCs, 
the MSSN had invited other comparatists such as Amoo, who by coincidence inspired Adepoju 
during his lecture at the IVC in 1992. Although Adepoju was first exposed to Deedat’s texts as 
a delegate in the IVC of 1991, his interaction with Amoo further shaped his own career as a 
comparatist which began in 1994.1291 At the IVC, he discussed the topic “Defending our Faith 
Comparatively.” Adepoju began his argumentation with the display of some publications 
authored by Christians, including former Muslims, which they used to contest the beliefs and 
practices of Muslims.1292 He raised a point in one of these publications, How we found Jesus: 
Twenty ex-Muslims Testify,1293 which questioned the verse of the Qur’an: “Guide us to the 
straight path” (Q. 1:6).1294 The author of the text had argued that this verse shows that Muslims 
are “sinners” who follow the wrong faith and had been praying to God to lead them away from 
their wrong faith. In reaction, like Deedat in South Africa,1295 Adepoju encouraged the IVC 
delegates to challenge this position by referring Christians to similar Biblical prayers such as: 
“And forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors. And lead us not into temptation but 
deliver us from evil” (Matthew 6: v. 12-13), and “for all have sinned and fall short of the glory 
of God” (Roman 3: 23).1296 For him, these verses proved that Christians were the ones on the 
wrong path. Apart from drawing a boundary between Islam and Christianity, this debate is also 
employed by the MSSN to encourage Muslim students to cherish their own religion, a point 
which Adepoju also emphasised in his debate. Abbink’s study referred to a similar case in 
Ethiopia in which Muslim polemics initially focused on admonishing Muslims to take care of 
their faith and to participate in da’wa activities rather than contesting the traditions of non-
 
1291 In 1995, Adepoju founded the Academy of Islamic Propagation (ACADIP) for da’wa and engagement 
with Christians. He also established ACADIP Institute of Comparative Religious Studies (AICOS) in 2016 
which run courses such as Science of World Religions, Dawah Methodology, Comparative Religion and 
Information Technology. See ACADIP Online Institute, “Our History,”, http://aicos.com.ng/about-us/our-
history/. 
1292 One of these is Abdiyah A. Abdul-Haqq, Sharing Your Faith with a Muslim (Minneapolis, MN: Bethany 
Fellowship, 1980). He mentioned other texts with no publication details such as Rev. Tunde Olufowobi, The 
Gate of Hell is Close; and Oluwasegunfunmi Onasanya, Jesus Christ through the Qur’an, God, Mankind, 
Disobedience and Spiritual death.  
1293 No information is given about the author of this text. 
1294 The Holy Qurʾān: English Translation by 'Abdullah Yusuf 'Ali, 3rd ed. (Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad 
Ashraf, 1937). 
1295 Westerlund, “Ahmed Deedat's Theology of Religion”: 271. 
1296 The King James Version of the Holy Bible (2004). 
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Muslims.1297 Thus, beyond contesting the Christian faith, the comparative religious discourse 
is also a key aspect of Islamic knowledge in the MSSN. 
Another interesting aspect of the IVC is the Marital Counselling for Singles (MCS).1298 This 
was introduced in 2012 to address the problem of those searching for spouses. As mentioned 
in Chapter Four, the need to ensure that Muslims marry among themselves is one of the goals 
of the MSSN. For some time, however, the MSSN made it difficult for this to happen, at least 
during the IVC, because the male and female delegates were camped in different locations.1299 
Although the use of separate camps was often caused by the lack of space to accommodate all 
the delegates (this was before moving to the present location), it was also done to prevent 
intermingling between them. Thus, there was no point of contact between them. In addition to 
helping members find partners, the MCS was also introduced because of the uncoordinated 
method in which some members courted in schools, where a lady often attracted the interest of 
several men which led to stiff competition between them over her. Because of this, the MSSN 
campaigned against pre-marital relationships among members, especially during the period of 
the reforms. However, discouraging such relationships not only made it difficult for some 
members to find spouses, it also led to a situation in which they married Christians. As Olaiya 
narrated, 
we started campaigning against brothers-sisters relationship. And, we were 
emotional about it. So, when we started campaigning, then it became an 
offence for a brother to even talk to a sister. And those who got to 
marriageable age during that period, they had problems getting suitors, 
especially when they passed out of their various institutions of higher 
learning. In fact, it got to a point that we were hearing that some Muslim 
sisters were marrying Christians and they were complaining that Muslim 
brothers didn’t come. They still have to marry, anyway. We also had some 
Muslim brothers marrying Christians when the Muslim sisters were not 
available. So, it was when this crisis was coming to our hearing, then we now 
decided to always have a singles forum or marriage seminar.1300 
In addition to establishing the MCS to address the crisis, the Society began to have males and 
females in the same camp by 2014. Also, it encouraged some senior members of the Society to 
embark on certified training on marital counselling, among whom is Olaiya. This is necessary 
 
1297 Abbink, “Religion in Public Spaces”: 265–6. 
1298 Apart from this, there is also Abau and Ummahat Forum, mentioned earlier, which focused on marital life. 
It held at another location outside Ogunmakin village, where the camp of married women was located. I 
could not attend this forum because it was organized simultaneously as the MCS in which I participated. But 
the curriculum of this forum included topics on “Risk Management in an Ideal Islamic Home,” “Polygamy: 
Reality of our Time,” and “Managing Career and Home Front.  
1299 Abideen Olaiya, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
1300 Ibid. 
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to ensure that the Society offers a professional based service at no cost. This is unlike career 
counsellors and match-makers who charged for their services.1301  
Three seminars on different dates and topics were organised for those seeking spouses at the 
IVC hall. Attendance at the seminar, which turned out to be more than a hundred, also included 
those who wanted to listen to the lectures or see the singles yearning for marriage. The first 
seminar was led by Isa Adeeyo, an engineer and one of the certified marriage counsellors for 
the Society. He discussed the topic “My Faith, My Status” where he introduced the singles to 
the importance of marriage for Muslims, making references to verses of the Qur’an which he 
considered to authorise it. Olaiya discussed the topic of the second seminar which was on “Take 
a Step beyond your Faith.” He explained how to make a decision on marriage and introduced 
the participants to the conditions that should be met before making that decision. Important 
aspects of these conditions, according to him, include having a means of income to sustain a 
family and following what the Prophet recommended in the choice of a spouse. At the end of 
this second session, he requested those who considered themselves to have met those 
conditions to hand in their profiles, including their choice of partner, which many did.1302 The 
third seminar was, thus, a follow-up to this and it was strictly for those who had submitted their 
profiles. After the IVC, the marriage counsellors usually match the profiles and contact the 
potential spouses. But beyond this match-making, the MCS should also be considered as a 
platform that teaches the MSSN idea of “practical Islam” on how to start a family as Muslims. 
It is organised to ensure that the process that leads to marriage is guided by knowledge on what 
the Society considered to be permitted in Islam. It therefore embodies Islamic education on this 
aspect of Muslim life for the participants. 
Even though the objective is to transmit knowledge and cultivate spirituality and good moral 
character, there was nothing in the camp that suggested that there were no challenges or 
incidents of moral misconduct. For instance, to attend many camp activities, including the 
obligatory prayers, the MSSO had to enforce compliance. Many delegates also refused to attend 
the tahjjud which was considered to train them. Whether in classes or during tafsīr, many 
delegates played games on their phones or chatted on social media or with friends. Some 
 
1301 The counselling profession, which began in Nigeria in 1959, is still a small industry. Today, there are 
many counsellors focusing on different aspects of life such as marriage, childcare and education. See A. J. 
Adugbo, “Counselling Approaches in Nigerian Traditional Communities,” International Journal for the 
Advancement of Counselling 2, no. 3 (1979); Aize I. Obayan, “Client/Family Interface in Counselling: 
Challenges for Counsellor Acceptability and Performance in Nigeria,” Counselling Psychology Quarterly 11, 
no. 1 (1998). 
1302 Balogun, Field Notes. 
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delegates were caught gambling and there were several cases of bullying among secondary 
school pupils which went to the Sharia Court in the IVC. In addition, many delegates also 
contested the practices which the MSSN sought to inculcate in them at the camp. Of major 
interest is the ethic on food preservation which is regarded as an aspect of sunna in the Society. 
The MSSN enjoined delegates not to complain about the camp’s food irrespective of the taste 
and portion they were served. Still, many delegates violated this regulation by expressing their 
displeasure and taking only the beef and abandoning the rest. Eating together on the same plate, 
another behaviour considered to be sunna, was also disregarded by many delegates. However, 
these revelations do not suggest that there is a problem or crisis in the mode of learning in the 
MSSN; rather, as suggested in many studies,1303 it is part of the different challenges which 
many Muslims face in their attempt to cultivate moral character. 
7.3.2 Madrasa: The Circle of Learning (COL) 
The effect of the Western system of education on the organisation of madrasa in Yoruba 
society, and in many parts of Africa,1304 is also true in the case of the MSSN. Like those outside 
the schools, the organisation of the MSSN madrasas is determined by the structure of the 
western schools in Yorubaland. Furthermore, being in the western school setting also imposes 
some conditions that make the operation of the MSSN madrasas different from the ones outside 
the schools. To illustrate, unlike those outside the schools, the MSSN madrasas do not operate 
along the five- or six-days-a-week system. Rather, they are designed to fit into periods 
considered free of academic activities for most students. This also depends on different tertiary 
institutions. In tertiary institutions with student residential halls, the madrasa usually operates 
during the evening and in the morning on weekends. An example is the madrasa at the 
University of Ibadan (UI), called the ‘Circle of Learning’ (COL) which operates on Fridays (7-
9pm) as well as Saturdays and Sundays (7:30-10am) at the central mosque of the university. 
But in institutions without residential halls such as the Ladoke Akintola University of 
Technology (LAUTECH), Oyo, the madrasa operates in the evening and on weekends.1305  
The esoteric model of learning that emphasises the steady incremental acquisition of Islamic 
knowledge is rooted in these madrasas. This is first represented in their division into classes, 
which I will demonstrate with the case of the COL at UI. During my visit, the students in the 
 
1303 Janson, “‘How, for God's sake, can I be a Good Muslim?'”: 33–8; Schielke, “Being Good in Ramadan”: s33-7. 
1304Some of the major studies which have focused on this are Brenner, Controlling Knowledge; Launay, Islamic 
Education in Africa; Zahraa McDonald, Expressing Post-Secular Citizenship: A Madrasa, an Ethic and a 
Comprehensive Doctrine (Oxford, New York: Peter Lang Ltd, 2015). 
1305 Balogun, Field Notes. 
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COL were divided into four classes: Preparatory Class, Class One, Class Two and Class Three. 
The MSSN instructors in this COL are aware that some students had knowledge of the Qur’anic 
texts, yet, before they are admitted into any of these classes, the students take a mandatory 
placement test to determine the level of their knowledge and the class appropriate to that level 
of knowledge to begin with. If the students failed to demonstrate their proficiency in this test, 
they will begin the study at the Preparatory Class. Throughout their period of study at the 
university, they will graduate from each class, from the Preparatory Class to Class Three.1306 
The COL is also linked to the episteme of the reformed madrasas outside the schools through 
its teachers and curriculum. The teachers, who are predominantly males and students of the 
university, are graduates or students in various reformed madrasas outside the schools such as 
Markaz in Lagos. Among them is Brother Mukhtar, a religious comparatist and a student in the 
Faculty of Pharmacy. Together with the Director of Studies (DOS) in the MSSN UI branch, 
these teachers designed the curriculum of the COL mostly in line with those of the reformed 
madrasas.1307 Except for the subjects like Mathematics, English and ICTs which are taught 
under another platform, the curriculum of the COL is nearly the same as the IVC. The subjects 
include tafsīr, fiqh, tawḥīd, adab, sīra, tajwīd, Qur’an memorisation, numbers in Arabic, and 
Arabic language and writing. The curriculum is supplemented with different texts for each 
subject. As is the case in some madrasas outside the schools, in contrast to the fee-paying 
reformed madrasas,1308 the teachers at the COL do not receive any compensation for their 
service. Mukhtar told me that they are not paid by the MSSN or the students because they 
consider their services as a form of ṣadaqa (voluntary charity) which Islam encourages 
Muslims to perform.1309 Although students are required to pay some fees to apply for study at 
the COL, the proceeds from these fees are not given to the teachers but used to procure 
materials like whiteboard markers and chalk used to teach. 
Apart from the teachers and division of the classes, there is also a connection between the 
reformed madrasas and the COL in the Islamic texts used for teaching and the style of 
knowledge transmission. An example of these texts is a primer that is common in many 
madrasas and Muslim schools in Nigeria. One part of the primer has images with their Arabic 
 
1306 The preparatory class had the least students numbering six, while the three other classes had between 
thirteen to thirty students. ibid. 
1307 The DOS of MSS in the university is the coordinator of COL. He is responsible for drawing out the 
timetable for the COL together with these teachers. The timetable made provision for three subjects daily in 
each class, and fifty minutes for each subject. 
1308 Olurode, Glimpses of Madrasa from Africa, 90–91. 
1309 Brother Mukthar, interview by Adeyemi Balogun, March 19, 2017, UI, Ibadan. 
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and English translations which assist students by relating words with pictures. The other part 
of the primer has Arabic letters and exercises that could assist students to develop their writing 
skills in Arabic. Regarding the style of learning, in the Preparatory Class, for instance, the 
teacher began to pronounce the Arabic letters from the primer one after the other while the 
students repeated them after him. Later, he called on each student to pronounce the letters to 
ensure that they grasp the pronunciation correctly. He corrected those who were not able to do 
this by explaining the rules that guide the letters as well as showing them the mouth and nasal 
positions which must be observed when pronouncing them. He explained that proper 
pronunciation of different letters was important in order to avoid using words that sounded 
similar in pronunciation but whose meanings vary. To illustrate this, he gave the example of 
qul which means ‘say’ and kull which means ‘eat.’1310 This process of ensuring correct 
pronunciation of the Qur’anic texts, regarded as the science of tajwīd, is taken seriously in the 
embodiment of Islamic knowledge. Kane argues that the process is based on the thesis that the 
Qur’an is composed of the words of God, and that it is essential to articulate its texts properly 
to avoid distorting the meaning of God’s words which many learned clerics regard as a great 
sin.1311 This thinking, as Kane notes, is why many reciters usually beg God for forgiveness 
after reading the Qur’an in case they have committed an error in their pronunciation of these 
divine words. 
In Class One where the primer was also used, the effort was to teach certain sentences in Arabic 
and their English and Yoruba translations. The teacher in this class taught the students the use 
of simple expressions which related to their daily activities such as how to say, ‘give me your 
book.’ For them to master the Arabic words, he encouraged them to start using the expressions 
gradually even if they must combine it with English expressions such as “give me your kitāb” 
(book).1312 This style of learning is typical of the approach of afiwekewu, and it shows one of 
the processes in which the MSSN is inculcating an Arab identity in Yoruba Muslim students, 
regarded as part of being better Muslims. 
Despite the efforts of the teachers, many students struggled to pronounce the Arabic words, 
which often amused their colleagues. This reaction was noticed in other classes in which 
teachers gave examples on a topic which caused laughter. But the teachers usually remonstrate 
the students over this. The teachers explained to them that this attitude was not a good Islamic 
 
1310 Balogun, Field Notes. 
1311 Ousmane Kane, Beyond Timbuktu: An Intellectual History of Muslim West Africa (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2016), 77–78. 
1312 Balogun, Field Notes. 
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ethic and that what they were teaching should not be taken as a joke. This kind of remonstration 
was also used to disapprove of other attitudes of many students, such as their inability to revise 
what they had learnt in previous meetings and their irregular attendance in class. This is 
different from the classical madrasas where the alfa usually uses the cane to discipline the 
students on such attitudes. The non-use of the cane in COL does not suggest that the students 
were not disciplined in class because nearly all of them were attentive despite the moments of 
amusement. In as much as this confirms the argument that the role of physical discipline in the 
transmission of knowledge in the classical madrasa cannot be exaggerated, not resorting to it 
in this context shows the impact of the tertiary education system in which the COL is located, 
where any form of physical discipline to students is discouraged. 
What is also significant to note in the COL is that many practices that are common in classical 
madrasas in Yorubaland are not encouraged. For example, students are not allowed to venerate 
or seek the baraka of their teachers.1313 Instead, they are encouraged to consider their teachers 
as brothers to whom they could turn to for help irrespective of gender and age. To be sure, 
many students usually continue their lesson with these teachers outside the class, a practice 
which nevertheless evinces the person-to-person form of learning of the classical madrasas. 
As many studies illustrate, the MSSN criticism against seeking the teachers blessing, a practice 
identified with many Sufi brothers, is common to many reform movements in Africa.1314 
Drawing insight from Georg Stauth and Samuli Schielke,1315 this veneration is apposite to the 
rational thought of many reformists because, for them, it ascribes an aura of sacredness to the 
teachers which is a form of shirk, or associating partners with God, understood by many 
Muslims as a sin. 
Another critique of the MSSN is the banquet referred to as wolimọ usually organised in the 
classical madrasas. The wolimọ is considered in the MSSN as an innovation that has no basis 
in the sunna of the Prophet. From the 1920s, reformers like the Ahmadiyya have also opposed 
the wolimọ for promoting ostentatious consumption among the Yoruba Muslims.1316 In one of 
the newspaper articles in 1920, a member of the movement further contested the kind of Islamic 
scholarship on which the wolimọ was celebrated. For him, the young Muslims who were being 
celebrated have merely “gone through the Holy Book of God the contents of which they are 
 
1313 Ware, The walking Qur'an, 53–54. 
1314 Loimeier, Islamic Reform in Twentieth Century Africa, 3. 
1315 Georg Stauth and Joska S. Schielke, Dimensions of Locality: Muslim Saints, Their Place and Space 
(Bielefeld, Piscataway, N.J.: Transcript Verlag, 2008), 18–20. 
1316 Katz, “Islamic Prestige, Piety and Debate in Early Lagosian Newspapers, 1920s–40s”: 65–7. 
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neither able to pronounce correctly nor give their real meanings in their own language.”1317 
Today, despite the debate around it, the wolimọ continues to be organised by many madrasas 
in Yorubaland. But it has been modified in the reformed madrasas along the method of 
graduation in Western schools. These madrasas issue certificates1318 (a kind of ijaza) to 
students upon completion of study like their western model. The MSSN COL also follows this 
practice. Rather than the wolimọ, it awards “certificates of participation” after students 
complete Class Three.1319 Many students continued their education after the award of this 
certification either in such madrasas as Markaz in Lagos or by learning from a learned person, 
a practice that allowed them to remain connected to the classical method of Islamic knowledge 
transmission. 
Like the new Muslim schools in Yorubaland, the COL also departs from the old madrasas in 
the aspect of instructional materials. In writing, lessons were taught with the use of blackboards 
with chalk and whiteboards with markers, while students copied their notes on exercise books 
with a ballpoint pen. However, as is the case in the old madrasas, the teachers wrote the lessons 
in Arabic. Likewise, the students copied their notes in Arabic. A number of teachers and 
students also read the electronic copies of the texts being used for the class from their 
smartphones and tablet PCs, even though printed texts were also available.1320 Largely, the 
electronic copies of these texts are not limited to students in the MSSN; they are also found 
among those who attend the madrasas outside the secular schools. In Nigeria, availability of 
these electronic copies has been made possible by access to the internet which began from 
1996.1321 This has allowed Muslims in Yorubaland to download and share religious educational 
contents among themselves.  
It is also noticed in the COL that the use of notebooks allowed students to take the exercise 
books home in order to review their lessons. This contrasts with the classical madrasas where 
what is learnt is washed off from writing boards and drunk by the students. Drinking the water 
from the writing boards indicates imbibing the ink used to write the Qur’anic texts. As Ware 
contends, this is part of the ways in which the Qur’an is embodied for many years by West 
 
1317 Abdu Rahim Alabi Smith, “Wolimo: An Unfounded Islamic Practice Among the Nigerian 
Muslims,” The Times of Nigeria, October 18, 1920, Cited in ibid., 67. 
1318 In tertiary institutions where the certificates are recognized in Nigeria, graduates of these madrasas could 
be admitted for a study in Arabic and Islamic Studies. 
1319 Brother Mukthar, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
1320 Balogun, Field Notes. 
1321 Esharenana E. Adomi, “Internet Development and Connectivity in Nigeria,” Program 39, no. 3 (2005): 
259. 
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African Muslim students in addition to other methods such as memorisation and mimesis of 
learned persons.1322 The water is understood to have spiritual power which helps to develop 
the intellectual ability of the student. Apart from the students, imbibing the Qur’anic texts is 
also conceived by many Muslims to have therapeutic purposes for human conditions like ill-
health and success in any undertaking. Among the Yoruba Muslims, many alfas wrote Qur’anic 
texts on slates for such purposes. The water from the washing of these texts, called hantu 
(Arabic, khaṭṭ referring to Arabic script), is used in different ways such as drinking and 
bathing.1323 However, the MSSN notion of sunna is opposed to this hantu. 
There is no doubt that the example of the COL shows the different ways in which colonial and 
modern school systems have shaped Islamic education. The modern school system has 
introduced the blackboards different from the writing boards of the classical madrasa which 
Launay considers to be symbols of “different postures, different attitude, and different 
behaviours, which served to inscribe different disciplinary projects on the bodies of pupils.”1324 
However, the use of electronic devices shows that Islamic education has gone beyond these 
blackboards and writing boards and this has made the different attitudes and disciplines that 
are inscribed in Muslims more problematic. In the MSSN, for instance, ICTs have also allowed 
the provision of another learning experience on social media. This includes Facebook and 
WhatsApp groups where explanations of the texts of the Qur’an and the Hadith are shared. 
They are also used by students to raise questions about their faith and practices. Several texts 
meant to ridicule and educate members at the same time are also expressed in ‘memes’ posted 
on this media. 
Many branches of the MSSN also have texts of lectures that could be retrieved by members on 
their websites. A member could also contact the amir on religious issues on this website. 
However, many students have bypassed this website to learn about their religion. Among them 
is Rashida Hammed, a member of the MSSN in Lagos who referred to a website, IslamQA.info, 
as her reference point if she needs an explanation or opinion on any topic.1325 The website was 
set up in 1996 and supervised by the Salafi scholar, Shaykh Muhammad Saalih al-Munajjid in 
 
1322 Ware, The walking Qur'an, 57. 
1323 Oloruntele, Evil Forces and Shirk among the Yoruba Muslims in Nigeria with special reference to Ilorin 
City, 54. 
1324 Launay, Islamic Education in Africa, 1–2. 
1325 Hammed Rashida (Pseudonym), interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
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Saudi Arabia.1326 Born in 1960, al-Munajjid is a student of Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Azeez ibn 
‘Abdillah ibn Baaz and other scholars associated with the Salafi notion of Islam such as Shaykh 
Muhammad ibn Saalih al-‘Uthaymeen.1327 He gives sermons on different media which include 
radio and television, many of which have been published in books.1328 His website also allows 
Muslims in several parts of the world to receive answers and fatwa (a ruling by a recognized 
authority) from him on several topics such as the permissibility of marriage between a Muslim 
and a non-Muslim.1329 By requesting the opinion of this Salafi scholar on the internet, 
Hammed’s case illustrates the need to move beyond the interpretation of Islam in the Yoruba 
Muslim social context. Otayek and Soares have noted that access to the liberalised media has 
motivated many Africans to question and adjust their own practices.1330 The example of Yoruba 
Muslim students is not different from this as Hammed’s case shows that the impact of 
information technology can encourage the consumption of varying interpretations of Islam in 
any social context. 
7.3.3 Leadership Training: self-confidence, organisational skill and speaking about 
Islam  
The leadership training in the MSSN is used to help Muslim students develop their intellectual 
skills, self-confidence and organisational competence in any social context. The need for this 
training is largely connected to the sense of ‘inferiority’ of some Yoruba Muslims to articulate 
themselves in public. Peel’s study draws attention to this, although his argument in this regard 
appears narrow. He argues in the study that from about the early twentieth century, Yoruba 
Muslims have been confronted with a dilemma in the areas of culture, religion and politics in 
Nigeria regarding how to “orient themselves toward their Christian fellow Yoruba or their non-
Yoruba fellow Muslims?”1331 For him, this dilemma ensues from a “double sense of inferiority” 
that confronted them: “the sense of being regarded as less enlightened than their Christian 
compatriots, and as less complete Muslims than their coreligionists in Northern Nigeria.”1332 
Even though this argument refers to a phenomenon among many Yoruba Muslims, I contend 
 
1326 Uriya Shavit, “Can Muslims Befriend Non-Muslims? Debating Al-Walāʾ Wa-Al-Barāʾ (Loyalty and 
Disavowal) in Theory and Practice,” Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 25, no. 1 (2014): 73. 
1327 For reference to these scholars who are also listed on the profile of Al-Munajjid on IslamQA.info, see 
Thurston, Salafism in Nigeria, 60–61; Muhammad Saalih al-Munajjid, “Biography of the Site’s General 
Supervisor: Islam Question & Answer,”, https://islamqa.info/en/about-director (accessed June 25, 2019). 
1328 One of the books is Muhammad S. al-Munajjid, Interactions of the Greatest Leader: The Prophet´s 
Dealings with Different People (Riyadh: Zad Publishing, 2014). 
1329 Shavit, “Can Muslims Befriend Non-Muslims?”: 73. 
1330 Otayek and Soares, Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa, 12–13. 
1331 Peel, Christianity, Islam and Oriṣa-religion, 141. 
1332 Ibid. 
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that Peel actually overgeneralises it. In fact, his argument primarily fails to recognise that 
Yoruba Muslims are of varying social statuses in the society, many of who neither consider 
themselves inferior to the Christians among them nor the Muslims in the North. Looking at the 
Yoruba society in general, one discovers that there are wealthy (ọlọla) and poor (mẹkunnu) 
people who are neither defined by religious identities nor places of origin. This varying social 
status has impacted on the way they relate and think about one another. To be sure, the poor 
generally command the respect of the rich in Yoruba society irrespective of their religious 
faiths. Since the 1850s, education and employment in economic and political institutions have 
also conferred a high status on many Yoruba of different religions who might not necessarily 
be wealthy.1333 In both cases, social status is a marker of superiority in the society rather than 
religion. In the same way, it is erroneous to suggest that Yoruba Muslims regard those in 
Northern Nigeria as “more complete” or better Muslims than them because this suggestion 
overlooks other important factors that shape what they think about their religious orientation, 
and, in this regard, I refer to their different interpretation of Islam and political encounter 
(discussed in Chapters Three and Four). By focusing on the varying notions of Islam in their 
different social contexts and their political relation since the fall of the old Oyo empire through 
the politics of post/colonization, it will be discovered that what the Yoruba Muslims think about 
the Muslims in the North is more complicated than the assumption that some groups feel they 
are better Muslims than others.1334 
This notwithstanding, many Yoruba Muslim students from the early twentieth century are 
understood to think that they are lower in status in relation to their fellow Christians. One of 
the ways in which this attitude was sustained was to identify with their Yoruba names rather 
than their Muslim names in schools where they were outnumbered by Christians. Christian 
teachers in such schools also promoted this tendency by calling them their Yoruba names 
 
1333 For a general discussion on Yoruba social stratification and how the modern social changes have impacted 
on it, see Eades, The Yoruba today, 144–64. 
1334 There are many Yorubas (both Muslims and Christians) who think that Muslims in Northern Nigeria are 
‘backward’ in many ways and because of this they doubt their credentials in the governance of Nigeria. To the 
contrary, the political history of Nigeria shows that many Yoruba have supported Muslim politicians from the 
north. An interesting case is the 1979 general elections in which Christian leaders of the Northern People’s Party 
(NPN) in Oyo campaigned with a song that supported Islam which is noted by Oloyede: “Cast the vote into the box 
of the Prophet (Muhammad, S.A.W.])-shun that of Jahannum (hell-fire), drop your vote into the ballot box of the 
Prophet (Muhammad) [S.A.W.).” Oloyede, “The Council of Muslim Youth Organisations (COMYO) in Oyo 
State”: 83–4. In addition, many Yoruba Muslims also believed that Muslims in the north practiced a ‘radical’ form 
of Islam which does not recognise the character of their own relation with non-Muslims. Yet, despite these views, 
many Yoruba Muslims also consider that they are historically linked with Muslims in Northern Nigeria, while their 
Christian fellows think they are not. For these contrasting views, see Aderemi S. Ajala, “Yoruba Nationalism: 
Culture, Politics and Violence in South-Western Nigeria (1900-2009),”, Arbeitspapiere/Working Papers 107 
(Institut für Ethnologie und Afrikastudien, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität, 2009), 9.  
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instead of their Muslim names.1335 The Yoruba Muslim students’ sense of being lower in status 
is also based on the assumption that many of them do not not feel confident to talk in public, 
especially on occasions where they had encounters with Christians.1336 While some of my 
respondents linked this attitude to the ethic of modesty in the wider Yoruba tradition,1337 many 
Yoruba Muslims think that the ethic is counter-productive in the context of their encounter 
with Christians in modern times.1338 
Since 1954, the MSSN has been involved in helping many Muslim students deal with these 
two challenges. Concerning the first challenge, there is a strong emphasis on members to 
identify with their Muslim names in schools and in public. This is often done by insisting on 
calling students their Muslim names even if such students wished to be identified by their 
Yoruba names. In recent times, as part of the changing interpretation of Islam in the Society, 
some members went a step further by signifying their names in Arabic such as Abideen Olaiya 
who identifies as “Abu Abdullah ibn Kharasiy.”1339 It is also common to see a married woman 
who identifies as “Umu Aisha” (Aisha’s mother) instead of the Yoruba, “Iya Aisha” while a 
married man could bear “Abu Aisha” (Aisha’s father) instead of “baba Aisha.” 
To deal with the second challenge, leadership training is organised in the MSSN to encourage 
the development of public speaking among Muslim students. This approach relates to Peel’s 
argument on the role of Western and Islamic education in how Yoruba Muslims deal with the 
sense of inferiority among them.1340 The leadership training appears to be mainly organised 
through the platform of the Leadership Training Course (LTC), but it is also understood in the 
Society to be embedded in other platforms such as the National Higher Institutions Convention 
of Muslim Students (NHICOMS). These two platforms were introduced as part of the reforms 
in the MSSN in the 1980s. The establishment of these platforms was considered necessary to 
encourage members to develop their knowledge of Islam, the art of public speaking and 
academic research.1341 The Society also assumed that these platforms would help students to 
develop their leadership skills and the manpower needed in the Society and in professional life. 
Thus, the training is often structured to facilitate debates on issues that affect the MSSN and 
 
1335 Noibi, Yoruba Muslim Youth and Christian-Sponsored Education, 18–19. 
1336 Sherrifdeen Adegoke, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
1337 Abdul-Hakeem Opadijo, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
1338 Sherrifdeen Adegoke, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
1339 See his text published for the Society, Abu Abdullah ibn Kharasiy (Olaiya, Abideen), The Covenant, 2nd ed. 
(Lagos: Al-Fathi Islamic Publications, 2003).  
1340 Peel, Christianity, Islam and Oriṣa-religion, 141–43. 
1341 Taofeeq Yekin, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
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the larger Muslim community.1342 I wish to point out that training in public speaking is not 
peculiar to the MSSN in Nigeria; it is also common in other religious organisations as well as 
public establishments. This is why it should be understood as part of the growing form of 
education in contemporary Nigeria. 
Even though I consider them as important aspects of MSSN educational project, I could not 
attend any of these training programmes because they were not organised during my fieldwork. 
But, one of my respondents whose case is quite fascinating draws my attention to a training 
course that is used for students in secondary schools and tertiary institutions based on his own 
experience. His name is Mikhail Abdus-Salam and he is one of the MSSN leaders who 
completed their education at a madrasa before enrolling in a Western school (discussed in 
Chapter Five).1343 He is a graduate student at the Department of Arabic and Islamic Studies, 
UI. On joining the MSSN, Mikhail’s knowledge of Islamic texts quickly facilitated his rise as 
a leader after he was identified at one of the MSSN programmes. He was appointed as the 
naibul-amir or Vice-President of his secondary school. With this responsibility, he led 
members in prayers and gave sermons during the MSSN’s weekly meetings. While he thought 
this was going to be an easy task initially, he realised that he could not express himself in the 
English language. He therefore began to adopt some strategies to teach himself and speak to 
members of the Society. This self-training, according to him, was further facilitated by the 
leadership training of the MSSN. 
The training was at the weekly Area Council meeting held at Molete, Oke-Ado in Ibadan. 
During the meeting, while other members of the Society were assembled in a class for lectures, 
members of the executives, which included Mikhail, attended a separate class called Training 
Class. For this training, similar to an academic workshop, the pupils were expected to have 
many texts which included the English texts of the Qur’an and the forty Hadiths of Imam al-
Nawawi. A few publications produced for secondary schools and colleges as well as the IIFSO 
series may also be part of the training materials. Being a training programme, the students did 
not receive any lecture in the class. However, each of them was requested to study a text or 
research on a topic and discuss it. They were also expected to react to various questions on 
what they discussed as Mikhail narrated here: 
In that class, the training they normally give to a student is that they will 
saddle everybody with a responsibility. They may say this: next week, all of 
you, go and read this book. They may say go and read the first and second 
 
1342 “MSS at a Glance”, 13. 
1343 Abdus-Salam Mikhail, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
315 
 
chapter of this book and you come back next week to summarize it. They may 
say, ok, you, you are going to be the one to give us lecture next week. You, 
read so so so Hadith next week; you will discuss it in the class. The class is 
mainly for training, it is not like anybody would come to give you a lecture, 
you would be the one to talk and many other persons in the class. There is no 
way you are going to escape it, every week, you go to the podium, you talk to 
your mates. They will criticize you, they will ask you questions. So, saying 
that you will not get any assignment before next week, it is mandatory that 
you must get it.1344 
Because he could not express himself in English, and knowing that he would not be overlooked, 
Mikhail was very disturbed by the prospect of embarrassing himself in front of his mates. To 
avoid this, he decided to commit the various texts that explained the topic he was given to 
memory, which is “being good, doing good to parents.” And, when he was called on to discuss 
it, he quickly read out what he had memorised, which he described as “downloaded,” and took 
his seat without responding to questions from his colleagues. 
What I did was that...I know some verses of the Qur’an. So, because that 
evidence is there. So, I tried to get English translated Qur’an. I memorized all 
the quotations in English. I memorize everything, and I got all the Hadiths, I 
memorized all the translated versions of those Hadiths. When I was called to 
come and deliver the lecture, they said they gave me twenty minutes, I only 
spent ten minutes. So, once I downloaded all the verses of the Qur’an and all 
the Hadiths, I left the podium and I went to my seat. They said, ‘Ah! question 
and answer.’ I said I won’t answer. The coordinator said it is compulsory!1345 
Indeed, while he thought he could escape, Mikhail narrated that other members of the class 
protested and criticised his manner of presentation. Of major interest was a lady who was vocal 
in her criticism. She pointed out that Mikhail memorised the texts and “downloaded” them 
rather than engaging and interpreting them in his own words. This suggest to me that she 
actually contested the objectified discourse of Islam by Mikhail. However, despite the protest, 
Mikhail said he did not respond to the criticisms but that the experience challenged him further 
to train himself in the English language,1346 which he succeeded in doing because our 
discussion was in English. 
After his secondary school, his leadership training continued at the tertiary education level 
which was held late in the evening twice in a month. Unlike the secondary school stage, female 
members were only allowed to join the training during the day. The education at this level was 
more like an academic seminar in which senior members of the Society delivered lectures, 
among whom were Afis Oladosu and Ibrahim Uthman. Mikhail narrated that they were taught 
 
1344 Abdus-Salam Mikhail, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
1345 Ibid. emphasis in italics mine 
1346 Abdus-Salam Mikhail, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
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to inculcate several habits in this class. This includes buying one Islamic piece of literature 
every month to improve on their knowledge. They were also taught to strengthen their bond of 
friendship to the extent of knowing each other’s house, a lesson that portrays how the Society 
is strengthening its idea of brotherhood among members.1347  
Mikhail narrated that they were also tasked with different responsibilities on behalf of the 
Society. This includes going to different secondary schools to coordinate MSSN activities such 
as the weekly Friday prayers.1348 In these schools, they lead the weekly Friday prayers. They 
also informed the pupils about the programmes of the Society such as Qur’an memorisation 
and quiz competitions, and they facilitate the participation of these pupils in the programmes. 
Mikhail’s tutelage also includes a workshop at the Islamic Education Trust (IET) in Niger state 
which, as mentioned earlier, is involved in the Islamization of knowledge in Nigeria. According 
to him, the instruction at this workshop also followed the method used to train the MSSN 
leaders in the tertiary institutions. Like others who were appointed to administrative positions, 
Mikhail moved from the position of Vice-President in his secondary school to become Vice-
President of the Molete Oke-Ado Area Council Ibadan, to the President of Akinyele Area 
Council Ibadan, and eventually head of the Directorate of Secondary Schools (DSS) in Oyo 
State.1349 
Beyond this fascinating experience of Mikhail, the leadership training reveals another key 
method of Islamic education in the MSSN. While the training focuses on developing students’ 
administrative skills and leadership responsibilities in religious and professional life, it is also 
used to encourage them to engage in various texts on Islam. This is to facilitate the development 
of their knowledge of the religion and their ability to speak about it. The reaction to Mikhail’s 
presentation also showed that the training is not only about memorising Qur’anic texts and 
knowing their correct pronunciation, it also emphasises the importance of discourse and 
making sense of these texts, which further demonstrates that Islamic education in the MSSN is 
not limited to the embodiment of Arabic texts. 
7.3.4 Brothers' Forum and Sisters' Circles: a gendered approach to learning 
There are two gendered based platforms in the MSSN called Brothers'/Brotherhood Forum and 
Sisters'/Sisterhood Circle. They are organised once every one to two weeks, depending on the 
 
1347 I attended a three-day holiday camp in November 2017, which is regarded as a mini-IVC, for secondary 
school pupils in Akinyele Ibadan where this point was also emphasised. 
1348 Abdus-Salam Mikhail, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
1349 Balogun, Field Notes. 
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school, for students in secondary schools and tertiary institutions, many of whom are not 
married. The Society also has two similar circles called Abau and Ummahāt, mentioned above, 
for members who are married. These circles seemed to have been introduced by the 1980s as 
part of the reforms in the MSSN to provide Islamic knowledge for members on gender roles 
and sex education. Drawing on the study by Mahmood about female Muslims and agency, I 
give more attention to the Sisters' Circle and the Ummahāt in this section to analyse how the 
MSSN promotes this gendered education. This does not imply equating gender with women, 
nor taking out the men from this form of education. Rather, the aim is to illustrate the 
contribution of women to Islamic education in the MSSN and Yoruba society. 
In her critique of feminist ideas about female Muslims and agency, Mahmood shows the 
example of the Muslim women in the mosque movement in Egypt who were concerned about 
achieving piety in their everyday lives.1350 Piety is understood as taqwā in Arabic referring to 
‘virtuous fear’ (or fear of God). As Mahmood argues, this piety is not only realised through 
devotional and non-religious acts, it “also entailed the inculcation of entire dispositions through 
a simultaneous training of the body, emotions, and reason as sites of discipline until the 
religious virtues acquired the status of embodied habits.”1351 The women in Mahmood’s case 
study sought to achieve this piety through da’wa, which requires a Muslim to encourage others 
towards the path of piety. This includes teaching Islamic texts to other Muslim women and 
how to cultivate pious dispositions such as prayers, shyness, fear of God and veiling. Providing 
this kind of da’wa, therefore, allowed the women to enter the male-centred field of Islamic 
education.1352 This women’s movement has some similarities with the ummahāt/Sister’s Circle 
in the MSSN concerning Islamic education. Like the mosque movement, members of the 
ummahāt/Sister’s Circle are also concerned about the achievement of piety through knowledge 
which focuses on different aspects of life such as dressing, prayers, hygiene and social 
interaction. 
The Sister’s Circle of the Federal College of Education (FCE), Akoka Lagos is used as a case 
study in this section. The Circle is coordinated by the amira, who is referred to in the MSSN 
as the female President. The Circle has about twenty-five students in attendance who sat on 
chairs. At the start, the amira introduced a female lecturer,1353 an elderly member of the Society 
who used the ḥijāb but was not a student of the College. The lecturer, standing in front of the 
 
1350 Mahmood, “Feminist Theory, Embodiment, and the Docile Agent”; Mahmood, Politics of Piety. 
1351 Mahmood, “Feminist Theory, Embodiment, and the Docile Agent”: 212. 
1352 Mahmood, Politics of Piety, 57–72. 
1353 I did not mention the name of the Amira and the lecturer because they wanted to remain anonymous.   
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students, discussed the topic, “Muslima and her Soul” to demonstrate the importance of the 
soul in Islam for women and the ways to purify it. As she explained, the soul is important 
because it is the main part of the body that will meet Allah on the day of judgment when a 
person dies. However, she noted that the soul is usually infected by different “diseases” caused 
by insincere intentions through which several activities and practices of a Muslim woman are 
performed. She gave the example of dressing modestly which is not based on sincerity and fear 
of Allah. Another example she gave was what she referred to as “excessive beautification” 
which, according to her, the ḥijāb ought to have discouraged. She also referred to the 
association of partners with Allah called shirk and uncontrolled intermingling with unrelated 
men as other diseases of the soul. To deal with these “diseases”, she urged the female students 
to strive to purify their souls. She also admonished them to be sincere in all they do, move 
closer to Allah, seek Allah’s forgiveness always, attend Islamic lectures regularly and practise 
charity. Furthermore, she encouraged them to develop a “self-reproaching soul,” which might 
sin but is capable of repelling or correcting itself from the sin.1354 From the notes she prepared 
for this discourse, and switching between English and Yoruba languages, she quoted several 
verses of the Qur’an and the Hadith to validate her points. With this explanation, she defined 
what piety means for the female students and the way to cultivate it. 
 
Fig. 9 A typical Sisters’ Circle at Zumratul-Islamiyya mosque, Yaba Lagos. Picture by Yemi Balogun, 2017. 
In addition to their commitment to achieving piety, the women in the MSSN are also concerned 
about socio-economic issues affecting women in the wider Nigerian society. Among these 
 
1354 Balogun, Field Notes. 
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issues is the difficulty in getting employment in public and private establishments. In most 
cases, the veiled Muslim women have been hard hit by this difficulty as many establishments 
are not willing to tolerate the use of the veil, particularly in Southwest Nigeria. But rather than 
abandoning their veils for any professional job, many of these women have decided to set up 
their own businesses which include commodity trade and event decoration after university 
education.1355 Although I could not attend the event, these issues formed the main discussion 
at the annual “Ummahat Day” held at Yaba, Lagos in April 2018 which I followed on 
Facebook. The Ummahat Day focused on the theme, “The Empowered Woman.” The 
discussant at the event was a senior staff member in the service of the Lagos State government 
who adorned the ḥijāb. In her lecture, she emphasised the importance of empowerment for 
Muslim women in the areas of education and entrepreneurship. According to her, Muslim 
women need to work on these areas not only because of their socio-economic challenges but 
also to support themselves and their families. In addition, she encouraged them to be steadfast 
in their ritual prayers and to ensure that their children are guided in the same manner. This 
lecture suggests that the achievement of piety is expected to go hand in hand with Muslim 
women’s empowerment.1356 
Generally, beyond the knowledge they are expected to acquire, both the Brothers’ Forum and 
Sisters’ Circle are also organised to give members the freedom to be open about their private 
concerns.1357 This is expected to encourage those who might be timid to talk about some issues 
or ask certain questions in the presence of opposite gender which a respondent named Kafayat 
Adesina tries to point out here: 
…in the general programme where the brothers and sisters are around… they 
would want to ask some questions but because of the presence of the sisters… 
sisters would be like ‘that brother…you were at the programme and you were 
the one that asked so so questions.’ So, they want to keep quiet that, ‘don’t 
let me ask o.’ Sisters too, sometimes you may want to ask a question. Things 
that are bothering your mind... But because some brothers are there, you 
would say, ‘I don’t want people to be saying I never knew that sister can say 
something like that.’1358 
The freedom and openness which members have in these platforms are also facilitated by the 
choice of teachers. A male usually teaches in the Brothers' Forum while a female (sometimes 
male depending on the topic) teaches in the Sisters’ Circle. As Adesina pointed out, having a 
 
1355 Balogun in Gender and Social Encounters, 108–10. 
1356 Balogun, Field Notes. 
1357 Adesina Kafayat (pseudonym), interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
1358 Ibid. 
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female teacher in their circle usually helped them to feel at ease to share what she considered 
as their “mutual experience.” Beyond having these teachers, the need for separate platforms is 
also because sex education is part of their discourses, which many members might not wish to 
discuss in the presence of the opposite gender. This is revealed in the testimony of a female 
respondent below who confirmed that she learnt about her body system in the Sisters’ Circle 
based on what is enjoined in Islam. She refers to the knowledge of changes in the human body 
such as the woman’s monthly cycle as one of the lessons she learnt in the Circle. This 
knowledge is important because many Muslims consider some rituals such as the daily prayers, 
cannot be undertaken without following the rules on cleanliness after the female monthly cycle. 
I gained a lot from the Sisters’ Circle. There, I learnt about my body system, 
how to calculate my menstrual cycle Islamically and how to know if I am 
clean or not. They tell us that you do not assume that you are clean after three 
days or five days, because there are some things you need to observe to know 
if you are clean or not.1359 
But the gendered education in the MSSN is not limited to issues of sexuality and gender roles, 
both the Brothers' Forum and Sisters’ Circle are also used for entrepreneurship training in 
trades such as bead making, decoration and planning, catering, shoemaking, barbering and 
graphic design.1360 There are several reasons for encouraging the development of these 
entrepreneurship skills among members. The most important of these, as noted earlier, is the 
scarcity of jobs in Nigeria, which has increased exponentially since the economic crisis of the 
1980s. In the same vein, while the entrepreneurship training seeks to address this job crisis, it 
is also aimed at ensuring that young Muslims have jobs that would allow them to start a family 
early in life. As I mentioned in Chapter Five, the MSSN encouraged early marriage to avoid 
courtship and premarital sex which were common among many members before the reform. 
Because the MSSN considered having a job as a prerequisite for raising a family,1361 the 
entrepreneurship training has increasingly become an intervention aimed to assist members to 
perform their gender roles and socio-economic expectations as Muslims. 
7.3.5 Usrah: a mosque-centred education  
The usrah (Arabic, family) is used interchangeably with “study circle”1362 or “learning circle” 
in the MSSN. It is held in different mosques that are in tertiary institutions and secondary 
 
1359 Opeyemi Hadiza (Pseudonym), interview by Uthman Atobatele, January 23, 2017, Apete, Ibadan. 
1360 Balogun, Field Notes. 
1361 Mahfuz Alabidun, interview by Adeyemi Balogun; Abideen Olaiya, interview by Adeyemi Balogun.  
1362 Study circle is associated with another Arabic word known as halaqah which literally means ‘circle’ or 
small group of pupils who sit in a circle with a teacher. Among the Salafis in Yorubaland, the word halaqah 
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schools and, in some cases, in mosques outside these educational institutions. The organisation 
of the usrah in the mosque is one of the symbols of the MSSN emphasis on the revival of 
Muslim traditions from the past. The mosque, which emerged as the classical institution of 
worship by Muslims, doubled from the beginning of Islam in the seventh century as the first 
centre of learning.1363 Wadad Kadi points out that teaching in the mosque started informally by 
learned scholars who shared their knowledge with other Muslims who gathered around 
them.1364 Study circles developed around these scholars who taught a number of subjects such 
as tafsīr and fiqh in separate circles. The structure of these circles is less formal: students 
attended any circle and it was not restricted to any age group. But in contrast to the modern 
Muslim schools, the mosques had no accommodations for students during their studies. Over 
time, many of these mosques became renowned as centres of Islamic education towards the 
end of the tenth century. The first was the Prophet mosque in Medina which attracted a 
significant number of devoted students, many of whom eventually became leading scholars of 
Islam. The other mosques included the Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem and the Umayyad mosque 
in Damascus that were established toward the end of the seventh century.1365 By the end of the 
nineteenth century, the mosque-centred institutions of learning also developed in various parts 
of Yorubaland as illustrated in the first section of this chapter. However, they differ from the 
ones that were organised in the MSSN in terms of the teachers who transmit the knowledge 
and the materials used to study in them. In this regard, the teachers in the MSSN usrah are 
Western educated Muslims who might not have attended a madrasa like the alfas of these 
mosque-centred institutions. 
The introduction of the usrah in the MSSN could be linked to individuals such as Oyekan and 
Hussein who started organising study groups in Lagos from the 1970s as shown in Chapter 
Five. But the term ‘usrah’ did not appear in any major document of the Society until 1984, 
although the Society organised what was called “Sunday lessons” in many branches.1366 Thus, 
this form of education may have started by the 1980s. Today, the usrah is organised weekly at 
different levels for secondary school pupils, students in tertiary institutions and professionals. 
During my fieldwork, one of the sessions held on Sundays for professionals, civil servants, 
 
is used to describe their study programme. This suggests that they have a similar educational platform with 
MSSN despite the debates between them about whose practice is more correct. 
1363 Wadad Kadi, “Education in Islam: Myths and Truths,” Comparative Education Review 50, no. 3 (2006): 
313; Malika Zeghal, “The Multiple Faces of Islamic Education in a Secular Age,” in Islam in the Modern 
World, eds. Jeffrey T. Kenney and Ebrahim Moosa, 125-148 (London: Routledge, 2014), 128. 
1364 Kadi, “Education in Islam”: 313–4. 
1365 Ibid., 314. 
1366 See Tajudeen, MSS at 30.  
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academics, businessmen and artisans between 11 am and 1 pm at one of the local mosques in 
Agbowo, Ibadan. This usrah is under the Central Branch of the MSSN Oyo State Area Unit. 
Participants at this usrah were both men and women who were almost forty in number. 
Although the sitting arrangement of the usrah in many branches of the Society reflects the 
notion of a ‘circle’ (as shown in figure 9), other centres such as the one at Agbowo did not 
necessarily conform to this. The men sat opposite the women, with a space separating them, 
while the lecturer sat in the middle facing the men. Rather than forming a circle, most of the 
participants sat resting against the wall, reflecting the flexibility of posture that is noticed in 
other forms of learning discussed above. 
 
Fig. 10 Usrah in the MSSN. Source: MSSN Lagos 2016 at https://www.mssnlagos.net/ (accessed 17.11.2015) 
The teaching at this usrah, as in other platforms, is based on different topics. For instance, the 
lecturer at this usrah, Dhikrullah Olurode, a senior academic at the Federal University of 
Agriculture Abeokuta (FUNAAB) Ogun State, presented the topic, “Preparing for the 
Inevitable” which addressed the need for Muslims to prepare themselves before death. One of 
the things required for this preparation, according to him, was to keep a diary of the “debts” 
they owed to different people to serve as a reference for their families to repay them after their 
death. The topic of this lecture reflects the emphasis in the MSSN on the importance of a 
‘balanced’ life that is oriented towards the present world and life after death, and, to a large 
extent, an aspect of what the Society regarded as a good Muslim. 
Despite some changes in pedagogy, the study circles in the MSSN have continued with the 
method of learning in the past. For instance, as in other forms of education, the Society put a 
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strong demand on members to take note of the key points which lecturers discussed in these 
circles. Although many participants did not come with exercise books and pen to the usrah I 
attended at Agbowo in Ibadan (unlike the one I attended at Yaba Lagos), they still followed 
the discourse in their copies of the Qur’an. Furthermore, while the lecturers are deemed to be 
learned on the topics they talked about, the usrah nevertheless provokes debates between them 
and the participants on these topics. At the end of Olurode’s talk, for instance, he asked the 
participants some questions in order to generate debates.1367 The disputation between teachers 
and students, as Kadi notes, is one of the modes of instruction in the mosque-centred 
institutions of learning. This method is employed by the teacher to probe a student’s 
comprehension and proficiency to work out difficult questions before he is certified as an 
authority to speak on any discipline.1368 Based on this example, the MSSN usrah shows 
continuity with the past tradition of learning Islam despite the change in the character of 
teachers and instructional materials. 
7.4 Conclusion  
This chapter shows that the MSSN educational objectives and its definition of a Muslim are 
transmitted in a variety of forms which include the IVC, the madrasa, the LTC, the Brothers' 
Forum, the Sisters’ Circle and the usrah. I argue in this chapter that the MSSN has contributed 
to the development of Islamic education among the Yoruba Muslims through these forms of 
learning. The MSSN employed these various modes of learning to teach the knowledge of 
Islam in many subjects such as the Qur’an exegesis, Arabic language, Islamic jurisprudence 
and diverse aspects of life including hygiene, morals, dressing, courtship and marriage. 
Additionally, the Society also focused on developing the skills of Muslim students in the areas 
of academics, administration and entrepreneurship, all of which are considered to be useful for 
being Muslim in modern society. Generally, these educational programmes give an insight into 
the Society’s understanding of Islam in relation to the kind of knowledge which a good Muslim 
should embodied and the method of its transmission. I also consider them to be a crucial aspect 
of the process of religious change among Yoruba Muslims because they integrate new forms 
and epistemes to their religious educational experience which, in turn, shaped new ways of 
being Muslim among them. 
Although these new forms of learning represent some of the ways in which Islamic education 
has changed in many parts of Yorubaland and other Muslim societies in Africa, they do not 
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represent a complete break with the past. On the contrary, they share many attributes with the 
pedagogy and epistemology of the classical Islamic education system which include the 
emphasis on the memorisation of the Qur’an, gradual incremental learning, tutelage under a 
specialist and the actualisation of embodied knowledge through practice. Yet, they differ from 
the classical system through their promotion of objectification and functionalisation of Islam, 
depersonalisation of knowledge transmission, use of English texts and electronic media. The 
change therefore illustrates diversification of Islamic knowledge transmission rather than a 
transition from the past. 
Beyond the contribution to new methods of Islamic education, these modes of education are in 
a broad sense connected to the Muslims response to Christianity in Yorubaland. This point is 
important because the founders of the MSSN could have attended the madrasa if they wanted 
Islamic education, which many of them did in the evening after attending the Western schools 
in the morning (and which many Muslim students continued to do), however, they adopted a 
different model of Islamic education, through an association (the MSSN) inspired by those of 
the Christian students. As the Christian students’ associations were used to promote religious 
education, which attracted many Muslim students to Christianity in the past, the MSSN was 
employed to provide Islamic education for Muslim students and preserve their religious 
identity. As part of this response, the MSSN engages Muslim students in comparative religious 
discourse to position Islam differently from Christianity and encourage Muslim students to 
remain steadfast in their own faith. In this regard, the Islamic education in MSSN can not only 
be understood within the discourse of Islam but also in relation to how Muslims have 
encountered Christianity in Yoruba society. 
Certainly, the significance of the new forms of Islamic education within the MSSN cannot be 
ignored as many of them have been replicated, albeit in different ways, by other Muslim 
organisations including the MSSN rivals in Yorubaland. Of major interest are the vacation 
education course and the female study circles which are also organised by groups such as TMC, 
NASFAT, Dawah Front and the Tijaniyya students’ association. These forms of learning are 
therefore a telling example of the enormity of diversification of Islamic education among 
Yoruba Muslims today. It is also noteworthy that these modes of learning have contributed to 
the rise of another generation of Muslim scholars called afiwekewu and akewukewe that are 
different from the traditional alfas with little or no Western education. These new scholars are 
in various academic and professional fields having sufficient knowledge on various Islamic 
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texts, typical of many Muslim societies with a history of reform.1369 For the most part, they 
often challenge the practices and episteme of knowledge transmission of the traditional alfas, 
the same way the alfas have contested their own knowledge and authority to speak for Islam. 
Their emergence and new identities show the impact of the colonial system of education. It 
also draws attention to the character of those who have joined the production of Islamic 
knowledge in Yoruba society since the colonial period. 
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Chapter Eight 
Summary and Conclusion 
My central argument in this study is that there has been a change in the way Islam is portrayed 
and articulated by a significant number of Yoruba Muslims since the colonial period. I also 
posit that the MSSN played a significant role in mediating this change. In this concluding part 
of the study, I reflect on the role of the MSSN in different aspects of this change and the 
implications of the change in Yoruba society and Nigeria in general. Also, I point out the key 
findings in this study, how this study relates to the existing literature on Islam in Africa and the 
contributions made by this study to such literature.  
Focusing on the MSSN in Southwest Nigeria, this study has demonstrated that what it means 
to be a good Muslim has changed for a significant number of Yoruba Muslim elite from the 
colonial period. Using the concept of Islam as a discursive tradition,1370 the study assumes that 
the definition of a good Muslim in the MSSN is not given, instead, it is constructed and subject 
to fluctuation in different social and historical settings. In reality, for many Muslims, the 
foundational texts of Islam (the Qur’an and the Hadith) serve as the basis for defining who a 
good Muslim is. However, these texts do not speak for themselves, but are mediated by human 
agents who translate them and thereby specify what being Muslim represent within a social 
context. The change in the notion of a proper Muslim for the Western educated Yoruba 
Muslims has therefore been produced by the effort of many actors which include Noibi, 
Adegbite, Oyekan, Thanni, Oladosu and Olaiya in the MSSN to translate these texts at various 
points in time. 
A key point that is emphasised in this study is that the shift in the notion of a good Muslim for 
MSSN members is an aspect of a wider religious change in Yoruba Muslim society, particularly 
from the nineteenth century. This religious change has manifested in new and different types 
of religious organisations, diverse pedagogy of Islamic education and variation in the 
interpretation of Islamic texts and traditions. A rise in multiple forms of ritual practices, 
religious ethics, dress, and sociality are also part of this change. Thus, while the main argument 
of this study is that the MSSN contributed to the religious change of Yoruba Muslims, it also 
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contends that the history of the Society and the experience of its members constitute a major 
aspect of this change.  
The study draws attention to the centrality of various factors that shaped the outcome of this 
religious change such as the cultural practices of the Yoruba, colonization, Christianization, 
transnational Islamic movements, technology, education and the politics of the nation-state. 
More importantly, the study argues that these factors also have an impact on the definition of 
Islam and what a good Muslim represented at different points in time. A major example of this 
is the reinterpretation of ‘knowledge,’ based on Islamic texts, in the light of the introduction of 
‘Western education’ to make the latter acceptable for Muslims. The contrasting characters of 
the colonial and post-colonial governments that determined the shift in the orientation of the 
MSSN is another case study. Also, there are factors like the internet and social media which 
transformed the ways Islamic knowledge is produced and circulated and thereby challenging 
the old pedagogy and epistemology of Islamic education. Based on these various factors, I 
argue in this study that the definition of Islam in any social context and how it is lived are 
products of complex and interwoven processes. This confirms Peel’s argument that religious 
change among the Yoruba is not necessarily a unidirectional development or a phenomenon 
that manifested in a single form but an elaborate one that is noticed in many aspects of social 
life.1371 
The varied local dimensions of transnational Islamic movements that are contributing to 
religious change in Muslim societies of Africa today is another point to consider in this study. 
The examples of these movements among the Muslim students in Nigeria are IIFSO, the 
Muslim Brotherhood, and WAMY. One of the main findings in this study is that these 
transnational organisations are helping to change the orientation of previously localised 
Muslim associational groups which, for instance, the MSSN represent. This study also 
discovered that these transnational movements do not impose their notions of Islam on the 
Western educated Yoruba Muslims. Instead, the new notions of Islam were discursively 
produced between the representatives of these movements and Yoruba Muslim students who 
had graduated from the local madrasas. As part of the interaction between these transnational 
movements and the Yoruba students, this study argues that the MSSN, which was initially 
confined to Yorubaland, metamorphosed to a nationwide movement with a global orientation 
symbolized by its involvement in the formation and membership of IIFSO and WAMY. 
 
1371 Peel, Christianity, Islam and Oriṣa-religion, 5. 
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Taking insight from Otayek and Soares’ argument, this study illustrates how transnational 
Islamic organisations such as IIFSO and WAMY have helped to deepen the interconnection 
among Muslims around the world, leading to the building of a global community of Muslims 
that transcends national states.1372 In many cases, these organisations promote similar 
objectives. The example of Nigeria shows that they often contribute to the educational 
developments of young Muslims through charity. The Muslim World League (MWL) 
declaration of the Ahmadiyya movement as a heretical sect in 1974, leading many Yoruba 
Muslims to dissociate themselves from the movement, also suggests a form of uniformity in 
the discourse of transnational Islamic movements on Islam which includes the definition of a 
‘Muslim’ and a ‘non-Muslim.’ On the contrary, the case of Muslim students in Nigeria also 
indicates that these movements are made up of actors whose visions run at cross-purposes, 
which may be part of their own rivalries for global influence as Peter Mandaville argues.1373 
Of major interest is the competition for international supports between Iran and Saudi Arabia 
from the 1980s.1374 The rivalry between the two countries found expression in Shi’i Islam 
promoted by Iran in Northern Nigeria through a former member of the MSSN on the one hand, 
and the Saudi Arabian sponsored WAMY which helped to strengthen its ties with Muslim 
students of Sunni orientation on the other hand. From the example of these two countries, I 
argue that transnational Islamic movements do not only connect Muslims around the world but 
also contributing to multiple expressions of Islam. 
One of the findings in this study is that while many transnational Islamic movements and their 
local supporters are challenging the legacies of colonization particularly the formation of 
national states, the case of the MSSN reveals that how these movements engaged the nation-
states differ remarkably from one another. Major examples that come to mind in Nigeria are 
the Boko Haram which promotes a violent form of Islam to challenge the government and the 
El-Zakzaky led Shi’i movement that advocates the founding of an Islamic state. However, 
although the MSSN often sympathises with some of the aims of these movements and has a 
goal to build a community of Muslims ruled by Sharia, its own method emphasises 
accommodation of the nation-state and moral change among Muslims. Also, while some 
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aspects of MSSN reform and activities are in opposition to the government, the Society 
nevertheless encouraged Muslim students to be involved in the efforts to build the nation-state 
and their own self-development in life. The example of the MSSN thus supports the argument 
in many studies that the attitude of contemporary transnational Islamic movements toward the 
nation-state is one of ambivalence rather than definitive.1375 
While this study has demonstrated that Muslim students in Nigeria have contributed to the 
development of transnational Islamic movements in contemporary Africa, it also challenged 
how many studies have portrayed the rise of these movements and their interpretation of Islam 
in the country. The existing studies on Islam in Nigeria give the impression that many young 
Muslims and professionals in Northern Nigeria have largely contributed to the formation and 
promotion of reformist traditions of Islam that is emphasised by these movements with little or 
nothing to say about the role of Yoruba Muslims in Southern Nigeria.1376 For instance, studies 
by Kane and Loimeier have looked at the Yan Izala movement and the activities of figures like 
Shaykh Gumi and his relationship with Saudi Arabia.1377 Thurston’s work also focused on the 
contribution of the students who studied in Saudi Arabia to the rise of Salafism in Nigeria.1378 
The implication of focusing exclusively on actors in this region is that contemporary 
expressions of Islam in Nigeria would seem to have only occurred in the North. However, by 
looking at the role of actors like Oyekan, Solaja and Thanni in the MSSN, this present study 
demonstrates that Yoruba Muslims were also actively involved in the rise of these movements 
and that new ways of being Muslims in modern Nigeria have also flourished in the South, some 
of which moved to the North. Thus, for a comprehensive study of contemporary forms of Islam 
in Nigeria, it is important to take the Muslims in Yorubaland into consideration. 
The involvement of these Yoruba Muslim students gives us some key insights into why the 
lives and social experiences of the category of Muslims referred to as ‘youth’ can be understood 
as part of the religious and social changes in post-colonial Muslim societies in Africa. A 
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significant number of Muslim youths in these societies are showing new identities which 
manifest in many aspects of their life such as dress, use of social media, sport, music culture, 
Islamic education and associational activities.1379 In Niger, Masquelier has given an example 
of such Muslim youth who are reconciling hip-hop culture with their faith in Islam.1380 A few 
cases that are similar to this in the MSSN are the use of customised shirt and the reconciliation 
of the traditional oral poetry with Islam. Notwithstanding the fact that they represent new ways 
of being Muslim, the formation of the identities of Muslim youth is also interwoven in different 
layers of politics as Asef Bayat and Linda Herrera suggest. The Muslim youth, according to 
Bayat and Herrera, are salient in the politics and cultures of many societies where Islam is often 
placed in opposition to neoliberal policies, globalisation, imperialism and Western 
civilisation.1381 Furthermore, Soares and Masquelier contend that in the aftermath of the 
September 11 attack on the United States, the character of Muslim youth has also manifested 
in the whole politics of Islam, defined by “the landscape of geopolitical conflicts and loyalties, 
new media, global markets, consumption patterns, and cultural forms.”1382 The major examples 
of such politics as this study demonstrates are the involvement of Muslim students in the 
struggle to encourage the teaching of Islam in Christian and public schools, the MSSN agitation 
for Sharia as well as the support of Muslim political and religious leaders for MSSN activities 
in their encounter with Christians. 
Another dimension of their social experiences in Nigeria today is in the reconstruction of the 
concept of ‘youth.’ One of the main findings of this study is that the MSSN has contested the 
notion of ‘youth’ with the argument that the term is inadequate for conceptualising the 
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“Introduction: Muslim Youth and the 9/11 Generation,” in Muslim Youth and the 9/11 Generation, eds. 
Adeline Masquelier and Benjamin F. Soares, 1–29 (Santa Fe: School for Advanced Research Press; 
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2016), 3. 
1382 Adeline Masquelier and Benjamin F. Soares, “Introduction: Muslim Youth and the 9/11 Generation,” in 
Muslim Youth and the 9/11 Generation, eds. Adeline Masquelier and Benjamin F. Soares, 1–29 (Santa 
Fe: School for Advanced Research Press; Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2016), 3. 
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identities of a good Muslim. In place of this term, it adopts the word ‘student’ based on a 
Qur’anic text that regarded Muslims as learners in life. Even though this new term has remained 
controversial among its members, the dropping of ‘youth’ for ‘student’ is an indication of why 
the notion of a ‘youth’ has remained difficult to frame as many studies illustrate.1383 Beyond 
this, as I showed in Chapter Five, adopting this controversial concept of a ‘student’ has become 
one of the ways in which the MSSN is challenging the definition of youth in terms of age in 
Nigeria. And, as I suggested in Chapter Three, there is still a need to research on the young 
Muslims in Nigeria from the colonial era not only to understand their religious experience but 
also how they define their identities. 
If the social status and educational gap between the Yoruba Muslims and their Christian fellows 
up to the end of colonial rule had been wide, today, these ‘students’ or Muslim elite have 
considerably closed that margin. The new Muslim elite include lawyers, engineers, 
academicians, journalists, bankers, and governors, who not only received training in Western 
schools but also grounded in Islamic education often with methods that differ, but intersect, 
those who studied in the madrasa. Some of them are “public intellectuals,” such as Noibi, 
Oladosu, Opadijo, and Adepoju, with interests in different concerns such as education, ethical 
reform and women’s rights. Soares’ study has shown the rise and significance of these 
intellectuals in the contemporary expressions of Islam in other West African countries like 
Senegal and Mali.1384 In Yoruba society, their rise can be appreciated against the backdrop of 
contemporary social changes that are produced by multiple factors such as the rise of 
Pentecostal Churches, industrialisation, urbanisation, globalisation and increasing access to 
communication technologies. Due to their education and professional experiences, these 
Muslim figures often see themselves as having a better knowledge of these changes and the 
skills to mediate their impacts on many Yoruba Muslims. As I noted in Chapter Seven, they 
have also positioned themselves as the mouthpiece of Yoruba Muslims in religious affairs and 
the articulation of their interest within the larger socio-political sphere of Nigeria. In doing so, 
they challenged the leading alfas that constituted the League of Imams and Alfas (LIA), who 
continued to make their voice heard on such issues. However, these new figures are not united 
in their views because they identify with different orientations including the Salafi and the Sufi. 
 
1383 See Asef Bayat and Linda Herrera, “Introduction” in Being Young and Muslim, 6–8; Collins et al., “Youth 
in Motion”; Honwana, The Time of Youth, 3–7. 
1384 Benjamin F. Soares, “New Muslim Public Figures in West Africa,” in Islamic Education in Africa: Writing 
Boards and Blackboards, ed. Robert Launay, 268–84 (Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 
2016), 268–70. 
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Thus, as the example of contemporary Muslim societies suggests,1385 the rise of these Muslim 
figures is also an illustration of the fragmentation of religious authorities among the Yoruba 
Muslims and how the authority of established scholars among them is being challenged. 
Certainly, there is a need to understand the relationship between the Muslim elite and the 
established scholars beyond what is presented in this study. 
Furthermore, this study demonstrates that the change in the understanding of a good Muslim 
in the MSSN goes closely with a shift in some of its previous objectives and orientations about 
Islam. One major orientation that reveals this shift is the Society’s emphasis on a single Muslim 
community in educational institutions. Between 1954 and the mid-1970s, this orientation had 
allowed open discussion of Islam and accommodation of the students’ religious diversities. 
However, this orientation was first challenged in 1974 after the Ahmadiyya movement was 
declared non-Muslim and in the 1980s following the Society’s insistence on sunna and 
scriptural interpretation of Islamic texts. Even if it has continued to promote the idea of one 
Muslim community, the new orientation has encouraged a form of intolerance of Muslims of 
Sufi and Salafi orientations who do not share the Society’s understanding of sunna and 
interpretation of Islamic texts. Still, rejecting these other Muslims should not be taken to mean 
that there was homogeneity in the MSSN’s interpretation of Islam. Indeed, the interpretation 
of sunna in the Society also varied. Another previous orientation of the MSSN that has 
fluctuated over time is the idea of ‘peace’ in its first motto. To an extent, as I argued in Chapter 
Four, the choice of this word appears to be based on the meaning of Islam, which many Yoruba 
Muslims translate as peace. On the other hand, the use of this word is also closely linked to its 
self-positioning as a non-resistant and accommodating Society. This positioning was with a 
view to cooperate with colonial administrators who were strongly concerned about the 
activities of Islamic movements that were perceived to oppose their rule. The emphasis on 
peace was also aimed at maintaining a neutral stand among Muslims who belonged to different 
political parties in Nigeria’s pre/post-independence era. Even though this notion of peace 
continued to be promoted in the Society, I argued in Chapter Four that the change of its motto 
to the kalima (declaration of faith) was a signal to a different orientation, which confirms 
 
1385 Loimeier, “Boko Haram”: 141–3; Benjamin F. Soares, “New Muslim Public Figures in West Africa” in 
Islamic Education in Africa, 268–70; Francis Robinson, “Crisis of Authority: Crisis of Islam?,” Journal of 
the Royal Asiatic Society 19, no. 3 (2009). 
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Loimeier’s argument on why a change in the terminology used by an Islamic movement is an 
indication of a change in its orientation with regard to Islam.1386  
One of my findings in this study is that the MSSN has many educational platforms that are 
linked to the change in its orientation about Islam. I argue that while these platforms provided 
the settings that facilitated the change to its new understanding of Islam, they also represent 
the outcome of the broader transformation of Islamic education in Yoruba society. Hence, to 
illustrate this point, I describe the many aspects of this transformation which include Islamic 
Religious Knowledge (IRK) textbooks, the Islamic Vacation Course (IVC), Leadership 
Training and the gendered Brothers’ Forum and Sisters’ Circle, among others, that are used to 
transmit Islamic knowledge to students. However, I note that despite the criticism of the 
pedagogy and epistemology of these forms of Islamic education by the established scholars, 
they remained crucial to the process of learning about Islam for many students. In particular, 
many students consider these forms of education to facilitate the embodiment of Islamic 
knowledge in a better way than the madrasas. Also, I argue that while the pedagogy and 
epistemology that underpinned these forms of education are challenging those of the madrasas, 
there is a need to better problematise them beyond the point of view of the classical madrasas 
and the Muslim schools which is popular in existing literature. Be that as it may, it is important 
to note that their pedagogies and epistemologies are still connected to those of the classical 
madrasas in many ways. This is why they may be considered as part of the diverse methods in 
which Islamic education is transmitted today rather than a transition to new forms.  
Apart from the transmission of knowledge, the MSSN educational platforms also facilitated 
open debates about Islam. These open debates were central to how reform was achieved in the 
Society. The reform, as I showed in Chapter Five, was produced by the reinterpretation of 
prophetic sunna and the consciousness for ḥujja (evidence) based on the Qur’an and Hadith. 
From the works of Seesemann and Salomon, I showed that asking for evidence is central to the 
project of many Islamic reform movements in Africa. Added to this, I highlighted the emphasis 
on àgbọ́yé (understanding) in the MSSN reform, which I take to be another major finding in 
this study. The notion of àgbọ́yé describes the importance of sufficient Islamic knowledge on 
any matters of the religion, such as the sunna of the Prophet. It emphasises having a ‘different’ 
or ‘alternative’ concept of this knowledge. Based on this concept, I argue that the MSSN does 
not consider having sufficient Islamic knowledge is what makes a Muslim better. To the 
 
1386 Loimeier, Islamic Reform in Twentieth Century Africa, 19–20; Loimeier, “Boko Haram”: 151–2. 
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contrary, the Society also takes the line of reasoning as a central factor in what makes a Muslim 
better. This study notes that the importance of àgbọ́yé is also upheld by other Muslim groups 
such as NASFAT, the Sufi brothers and the Salafis in Yorubaland regardless of their different 
understanding of Islam. Thus, rather than thinking that àgbọ́yé is only relevant to the MSSN, I 
maintain that it should also be understood as an important factor in the concept of a good 
Muslim in the wider Yoruba Muslim society. 
This study further demonstrates that the MSSN reform had an impact on the religious and social 
lives of many students. However, while the MSSN considers its newly discovered orientation 
as the correct position in Islam, the orientation has affected the way the Society is viewed in 
the broader Yoruba society and in Nigeria. Until the 1990s, many Yoruba Muslims saw the 
MSSN as a platform to give their children an ‘enlightened’ ‘Islamic’ form of social interaction, 
teaching them the basic knowledge of their religion and guiding them on their academic life.1387 
However, the current orientation of the Society is now seen by many of them to be more 
‘radical’ than what they wanted for their children,1388 although there are also parents who 
consider the new orientation as better than what the Muslim youths had in the past.1389 This 
perception has heightened due to the emphasis on the veil for female Muslims and the cases of 
students who have challenged the religious and cultural practices of their parents. This kind of 
reaction to Islamic reforms seems to be widespread in Africa where reformers promote new 
ethics and contest the ‘traditional’ practices of other Muslims. Masquelier’s study has already 
referred to this with the example of women in Niger who opposed the Yan Izala’s emphasis on 
an austere marriage ceremony. While the Yan Izala’s aim is to control extravagant expenses 
on the wedding, and thereby helped the men to meet up their marital obligations, according to 
Masquelier, the women questioned this patriarchal notion of social order by demanding a high 
bridewealth and equipping their daughters with valuable modern household items before they 
join their husbands’ family circle.1390 
Besides the Muslim communities, the current orientation of the MSSN has also produced a 
new kind of interreligious encounters in contemporary Yoruba society. While the past 
encounter was more about the Muslim fear of Christianization through the schools, today it is 
 
1387 Alhaji Sheriffdeen Adenuga, interview by Adeyemi Balogun; Alhaji Muritadha Awal, interview by 
Adeyemi Balogun. 
1388 Alhaji Sheriffdeen Adenuga, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
1389 Alhaji Muritadha Awal, interview by Adeyemi Balogun. 
1390 Masquelier, Women and Islamic Revival in a West African Town, 175–204. 
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more about the Christian fear of Islamization. This fear of Islamization is responsible for the 
increasing number of altercations between Yoruba Muslims and Christians involving veiled 
Muslims in public establishments and schools. Perhaps, what has heightened this fear is also 
the way of thinking of both Muslims and Christians about the issues of “secularity,” “freedom 
of religion” and “multi-religiosity” of Nigeria.1391  The position of many Christians is that using 
the veil in public spaces like school is a violation of the secularity of Nigeria (even though the 
attitude of the Nigerian government to “secularism” remains ambivalent),1392 while the 
Muslims are of the view that the veil is an expression of their religious freedom which the 
Nigerian constitution is understood to recognise.1393 For the most part, these recent encounters 
have not caused any major violence in Yorubaland, but they are challenging the argument 
regarding religious tolerance and coexistence which scholars like Ade Ajayi and Peel refer to 
in Yoruba society.1394 
This study demonstrates that the MSSN is neither oblivious to the counter-reaction of its reform 
from the Yoruba Muslim communities, nor the encounter it inspired within the Christian 
circles. One of the findings in this study is that these reactions are central to the MSSN’ concept 
of Islam that emphasised moderation and flexibility in religious and social life, the gradual 
embodiment of Islamic knowledge and the tolerance of Islam to non-Muslim traditions. As 
shown in Chapter Six, these notions of Islam are contentious and seem difficult to apply in real 
life. Nonetheless, they helped the MSSN to temper the tone of its reform orientation, even 
though the orientation has continued to be understood as “extreme” and “radical” within the 
Christian communities and by many Yoruba Muslims. Moreover, these notions of Islam also 
shaped the diversity of social and religious practices in the MSSN and they allowed multiple 
interpretations and expressions of the sunna to develop rather than one. Furthermore, these 
notions point to the importance of interpreting Islamic texts in relation to historical conditions. 
 
1391 Julius Adekunle, “Religion and Politics in Transition,” in Religion in Politics: Secularism and National 
Integration in Modern Nigeria, ed. Julius Adekunle, 3–18 (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2009); Tunji 
Olaopa, “Of Ḥijāb and Robes: The Challenge of Secularity in Nigeria,” The Guardian, July 24, 2016. 
1392 Osita Ogbu, “Is Nigeria a Secular State? Law, Human Rights and Religion in Context,” The Transnational 
Human Rights Review 1, no. 1 (2014): 135–6; Tunji Olaopa, “Of Ḥijāb and Robes: The Challenge of 
Secularity in Nigeria,” The Guardian, July 24, 2016. 
1393 Fatima Abubakre, “Media Influences on the Perceptions of the Usage of Hijab in Nigeria’S Public 
Institutions and Surrounding Controversy in the Lagos-Ibadan Axis,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 38, 
no. 4 (2018): 6–7. 
1394 J. F. A. Ajayi, “Promoting Religious Tolerance and Cooperation in the West African Region” in 
Proceedings of the International Congress of Dialogue on Civilizations, Religions and Culture in West 
Africa; Peel, Christianity, Islam and Oriṣa-religion, 2. 
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Above all, they shed light on different lines of reasoning in Islam and why they informed the 
heterogeneity of Yoruba Muslims. 
If the MSSN reform aroused opposition from Muslim parents and fear of Islamization among 
Christians, the effect on its own existence as a unit is equally extensive. To an extent, the 
breaking away of groups like the Salafis and TMC from the MSSN is linked to the differences 
in their interpretation of Islam. In this regard, the MSSN took a separate view to the Salafis’ 
argument on the formation of religious groups and participation in politics as well as TMC’s 
emphasis on the embodiment of ethics like veiling and praying regardless of Muslims’ 
knowledge of these ethics. However, besides their different interpretation of Islam, it is also 
important to focus on the struggle for leadership and the question of the transformation of 
MSSN probably to another movement in order to understand why they left. As I demonstrated 
in Chapter Five, these two issues show that the exit in the mid-1990s (especially of TMC, 
Dawah Front and The Companion) is also related to concerns about how to preserve what they 
had learnt about the sunna after school and how to deal with the problems of unemployment, 
poverty and other socio-economic crises which confronted many Nigerians including Muslims 
in the post-independence era. This, therefore, suggests that while religion was an important 
factor in the MSSN crises from the mid-1990s, the strains imposed by the poor socio-economic 
conditions of Nigeria was also salient in the crises. But looking beyond the factors that led to 
its organizational crisis, the fragmentation of the MSSN has added to the diversity of Yoruba 
Muslims today. Even though it challenged the Society’s effort to build an indivisible Muslim 
community, the fragmentation has ensured the widening of new expressions of Islam among 
the Yoruba Muslims. 
In general, while the study argues that the MSSN contribution to religious change involves a 
range of interlinked processes that fluctuated at different points in time, it nevertheless shows 
that what is known about many aspects of these processes remain sketchy especially in the 
period between 1954 and the late 1990s. For instance, little is still known about the other factors 
that led to the constitutional review of the MSSN by the 1980s which culminated in the 
adoption of the kalima as a motto. Also, there is scant information on the activities of the MSSN 
and the everyday life of members of the Society up to the 1990s. Furthermore, this study shows 
that the MSSN encouraged Muslims participation in politics, but what is known about the 
relationship between the Society and the governing elite is insufficient. Also, there is 
inadequate information about the various kinds of relationships between the MSSN and the 
larger Yoruba Muslims and the clerics in particular. The knowledge of these other aspects of 
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the Society’s history will contribute to an understanding of the other dynamics in the religious 
change of many Yoruba Muslim elite. Despite these lacunas, this study has drawn attention to 
some of the key processes involved in this change. 
In all, the study demonstrates that the Yoruba Muslim elite were able to negotiate their religious 
lives in a post-independence Nigeria that has experienced a great deal of socio-economic and 
political changes. It shows that how they negotiate these changes inspired their new ways of 
being Muslim which reflect what Otayek and Soares have identified as Islam mondain (or 
‘Islam in the present world’) in the Muslim societies of Africa today.1395 Their experiences are 
thus an illustration of the way they developed different ways of being Muslim that go together 
with modernity. In another vein, this study broadly suggests that from the colonial era the 
importance of religion in the Nigerian public sphere did not disappear with the onset of 
secular/modern institutions and policies ranging from Western schooling to the introduction of 
nation-state system, neo-liberalism and communication technologies. In fact, the example of 
the school system lagely managed by missionaries gives the impression that religious values 
are integrated into many aspects of these secular institutions, making it a salient factor in the 
private and public life of most Nigerian elite. Little is still known about the religious experience 
of these elite, and it will be interesting in future research to understand why religion has been 
at the centre of their private and public life despite being integrated into secular institutions. 
With the worldwide attention on Nigeria and the often shocking misrepresentation of Islam in 
the country by the media especially following the breakdown of security caused by the violent 
Boko Haram movement in the Northeast region since 2009, this study provides a better and 
thorough insight into the understanding of Islam and Muslims in contemporary Nigeria. Using 
the example of MSSN not only in Yorubaland but also in Northern Nigeria, it shows that 
Muslims relation with Christians in the country is not only about violence. In many 
communities, members of both faiths frequently borrow from each other, marry among 
themselves and convert to each other’s religion. The representation of both faiths is also 
balanced in many public establishments and governance, albeit this is mostly happening where 
the population of Muslims and Christians is almost equal. Furthermore, Islam is widely 
contested among the Muslims in Nigeria, and, often, the contest is linked with intergroup and 
national politics. By implication, it will be erroneous to take the argument of some groups or a 
religious authority as the correct interpretation of the religion in the country. Besides, the 
 
1395 René Otayek and Benjamin F. Soares, “Introduction” in Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa, 17–19. 
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meaning of Islam for many Muslims and their practices are neither static nor closed to 
innovation. The impact of new epistemological perspective, Western schooling and the internet 
are examples of the factors shaping this change today. Another aspect of the contemporary 
expression of Islam in Nigeria is in the activism of Muslim women. In many communities, 
women have established their own religious movements, enrolled in Western schools, acquired 
professional skills, participated in religious knowledge production and remained visible in 
public life. This study illustrates that Muslim movements like the MSSN have generally 
facilitated this public life for many women. There can be no doubt that understanding the 
Muslims in Nigeria from these broad-ranging perspectives is not only fruitful, it is also helpful 
to unravel the extent to which Islam and the different orientations of the religion among them 
have actually influenced interreligious conflicts as well as politics and social encounters in the 
post-independence era. 
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